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The Queen's University Defence Management Studies Program, established with the support of the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND), is intended to engage the interest and support of scholars, members of the Canadian Forces, public servants, and participants in the defence industry in the examination and teaching of the management of national defence policy and the Canadian Forces. The program has been carefully designed to focus on the development of theories, concepts, and skills required to manage and to make decisions within the Canadian defence establishment.

The Chair of the Defence Management Studies Program is located within the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University and is built on the university's strengths in the fields of public policy and administration, strategic studies, management, and law. Among other aspects, the program offers an integrated package of teaching, research, and conferences, all of which are designed to build expertise in the field and to contribute to wider debates within the defence community. An important part of this initiative is to build strong links to DND, the Canadian Forces, industry, other universities, and non-governmental organizations in Canada and in other countries.

This series of studies, reports, and opinions on defence management in Canada is named for Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence from 1946 to 1954. Claxton, the first post-Second World War defence minister, was largely responsible for founding the structure, procedures, and strategies that built Canada's modern armed forces. As defence minister, Claxton unified the separate service ministries into the Department of National Defence; revamped the National Defence Act; established the office of Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee – the first step toward a single chief of the defence staff; established the Defence Research Board; and led defence policy through thom \$ g! e \$ eoch eefuui h ro ah eh tho0sie fh thoK the f ins n \$ n , and the h Claxtonawfs un ehe ie an tlae defence Molit \$ eMe hnawfs \$

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Introduction.....	1
The Research Method	2
The Sources.....	3
The Usual Process.....	5
The Studies and Reports	7
Chapter 1 “The Red Cross with Guns”	9
Chapter 2 Non-Governmental Studies	13
Chapter 3 Academic Studies	39
Chapter 4 Studies and Reports of the Senate of Canada.....	65
Chapter 5 Reports of the House of Commons.....	77
Chapter 6 A Summary: Theory and Practice.....	101
Gaining Influence by Influencing the ‘Usual Process’	101
Advice for the Academic Defence Research Community:y	

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“In my five years as an assistant deputy minister in NDHQ, I cannot recall one instance in which the senior officers and public servants in the building – the so-called ‘level 1s’ – were briefed on or discussed even superficially any academic or parliamentary report. My colleague, the assistant deputy minister for Public Affairs, explained why.

“‘The drill here’, he said plainly, ‘is this: Whenever one of these reports arrives in the building we look at the dog. If the dog sleeps on, we simply record the report. If the dog wakes up, we put it back to sleep as quietly and as quickly as we can. If the dog howls, we have a problem and then I take care of it. The dog is the media.’”

A conversation with an assistant deputy minister who served in the Department of National Defence from 2000 to 2006

“It is simply not possible to determine with any degree of certainty the influence research institutes and think-tanks have on the public policy process.”

Professor Donald Savoie

Equity and Justice in the Public Policy Process
Equity and Justice in the Public Policy Process

(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), p. 155.

of the ‘truth as they wish to hear it’ is the bureaucracy. Guarding that bureaucratic domain from all challenges is critical not only to the integrity of the department’s policy process, but also to public servants’ credibility and reputation as being “reliable” before ministers and in the minds of superior public servants in the Privy Council Office and political members of the Prime Minister’s Office.

External reports reviewed during this period often offered ministers challenging assessments of their policies – ‘truths’ that, if accepted by ministers, might have derailed difficult-to-reach consensus DND officials had worked hard to establish inside the department, within the Canadian Forces, and with other government departments and the central agencies. More dangerous for senior officials, however, was the possibility that these truths might have raised awkward questions in the House of Commons or worse, embarrassed the prime minister. As every senior public servant knew then (and as they still know), these dangers could only arise if these studies tempted the media to take serious notice of them and cause a public fuss. Thus, again as the evidence suggests, in DND during this period, officials in most every instance stood ready to guard the minister’s door and slay intruding truths lest the ‘dog’ awake.

The Research Method

This research project is based on requests made through the *Ceeguuvq* *kphqt o cvkqp* *Cev* (ATI) mechanisms for DND responses to studies and reports offered to governments in the period generally from 2000 to 2006, including reports from the Senate of Canada, the House of Commons, the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, the Royal Canadian Military Institute, the Centre for Strategic and Military Affairs at the University of Calgary, and the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University.³ In all, approximately 3,500 pages of ATI responses to research were reviewed. The documents were supported by interviews with authors of the studies, members of the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD), former members of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA), public service officials, and officers of the Canadian Forces.

The objectives of this study were, first, to assess the manner in which such papers were managed by DND; that is to say, how they were received, processed, and reviewed, by whom, and for what purposes. Second, we were interested in looking for evidence that described how the minister of defence and the government generally were informed of these reports and how, for

instance, “briefing notes” were prepared and by whom, and to see if there were any common features in the way they offered their advice to ministers. Third, we tried to assess from email traffic at the time how senior officials and Canadian Forces officers and their subordinate staff officers reacted to the publications at ‘a bureaucratic level’. We were especially interested in observing how the two entities in the integrated public service/military officer centre for defence decision making, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), expressed their differing approaches to how governments developed and managed their national defence policies and especially those closely or critically related to responsibilities senior military officers believe fall within their customary “rightful authority.”⁴ How, indeed, did the two professions interpret their duty to the government of the day, to the members of the Canadian Forces, and to Canada?

These objectives set the background for the deeper purposes of this study: how might researchers and authors of external studies and reports better contribute to the public policy process on matters of national defence and security? How are national defence policies formulated and managed in detail in DND? What is the nature of political/public service/military relations in Canada?

While ‘the policy’ is often at centre stage in discussions of national defence and security in Canada, understanding the public administration of defence policy necessitates that we understand clearly who in government sets before ministers the ‘choice of policy choices’ and how they do that. The constant ebb and flow of policy making is cloaked, out of sight of researchers and even parliament, but it is the stuff of bureaucratic politics and far more germane and important to policy outcomes than are public policy declarations. This project, we hope, may help to lift the cover if only a little to expose at a particular time and in particular circumstances this dynamic and perhaps encourage others to follow this story.

The Sources

A brief word on sources is necessary to a better understanding of this research project’s summary. Although we accessed fifteen studies and reports, the ATI returns were uneven. This outcome is not unusual in the ATI world, but that fact forced us to rely upon a few studies and available ATI returns to paint a wider picture. This result was anticipated in that a central thesis of the project was that we expected to see studies and reports that created little media interest also produce little interest inside NDHQ and vice versa and thus few pieces of correspondence.⁵

Of all the academic, non-governmental, and parliamentary reports accessed under the *CVK* (understanding that many documents we received included duplications from separate offices), some produced no correspondence at all. The 2001 study by the Royal Canadian Military Institute, *Ycmg/Wr*, yielded but five pages. The norm, however, was between 20 and 45 individual notes per study/report request. One batch of papers, DND officials' assessment for the Libehb

which to comment on the paper if the minister were asked to do so by the media or in the House of Commons, for example. These types of notes often go through several drafts and move up the chain of responsibility where they are routinely redrafted and amended.

Officials, meanwhile, watch for and measure reactions to the studies, reports, conferences, and workshops from the media and the government's political opponents. They also keep an eye on the political season. If the House is not sitting and the media is silent and moves on, then the public affairs staffs merely record the event and may not produce any written work at all. Certainly very little is put on paper in the ATI age for fear of exposing facts and figures best kept in-house.

If the House is in session, then the usual process quickens in time with the so-called media cycle. Public affairs officials alert NDHQ whenever a study or report is about to be released. They follow the event carefully and provide their superiors with a quick review of the work. If the dog appears interested and likely to stir, the public affairs staff will be joined by 'policy officials' and – depending on the 'sensitivity' of the issue or event – these staff officials together will prepare one or two pages of concise "Talking Points" for more senior officials and officers and for the minister's political staff. These first points might then serve as the basis for the preparation of a more detailed "Briefing Note for the Minister."

Officials may in several stages and brainstorming sessions *eqorqug* – and that is the operative word for the development of what some might term "the spin" – sets of anticipated "Qs & As" (Questions and Answers). These approved Qs & As then form the official basis of the minister's or his or her parliamentary associate's responses in the House or in media scrums, or for a Canadian Forces staff officer (and very rarely a DND official) sent to answer media questions in public about the study or report or event of the day.

It is obvious from the internal documents we examined that the most critical variable conditioning how much effort officials put into preparing Briefing Notes and Advice for ministers is not the content of these documents, but the attention they receive or might receive from the media. Attention, however, should not be confused with influence, for as the record suggests, studies and reports that appeared to officials as having the potential to influence (i.e., upset) extant government policy were carefully managed in ways meant to negate any such possibility.

Arguably, there is one exception to this common scenario. The 2003 study conducted by Queen's University and the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, *Ecpcfc"ykvjqwv"Ct ofg"HqteguA*, arrived by chance

only days before Paul Martin became prime minister. Unbeknownst to DND officials (or so it seems), Martin had for weeks been privately consulting several expert defence scholars and senior retired Canadian Forces officers and others trying to find a way out of the defence policy crisis Chrétien had bequeathed to him. The day the report was released, officials followed ‘the usual process’ and berated the study only to discover late that same day that the soon-to-be prime minister had made a personal call to the principal author of the report asking for a description of its conclusions and main ideas. Alerted by public affairs officers to the conversation, senior officials in NDHQ became confused and trapped simply because suddenly they did not know which truth the prime minister wished to hear.

The Studies and Reports

In this study, we trace the “usual process” by looking at fifteen studies and reports prepared by non-governmental agencies, academic researchers, and most importantly, parliamentary committees (reports and recommendations on aspects of national defence and security policy prepared by the Senate of Canada and the House of Commons between 2000 and 2006).⁷ These documents include:

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É" *C"Ycmg/Wr"Ecnn"hqt"Ecpcfc<"Vjg"Pggf"hqt"c"Pgy"Okkvctf*. a Proposal by the Royal Canadian Military Institute (Toronto), May 2001

É" *Ecwi"jv"kp"vjg"Okffng<"Cp"Cuuguogp"qh"vjg"Qrgtcvkqpcn"Tgcfkpguu"* *qh"vjg"Ecpcfkcp"Hqtegu*. The Conference of Defence Associations, 27 September 2001

É" *C"Pcvkqp"cv"Tkum<"Vjg"Fgenkpg"qh"vjg"Ecpcfkcp"Hqtegu*, The Conference of Defence Associations, 2 October 2002

É" *Vjg"Urgekc"Eqo okuukqp"qp"vjg"Tguwtewvwtkpi"qh"vjg"Tgugtngxu<"Vgp"[gctu"Ncvgt*, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, 24 September 2004

Cecfgoke"Uvwfkgu

É" *Vq"Ugewtg"c"Pcvkqp*. The Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century, 9 November 2001

É" *Ecpcfc*"ykvjqwv" *Ctogf*"*Hqtegu*A. School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, 3 December 2003

Vjg"Ugpcvg"qh" *Ecpcfc*"ô"Vjg"Uvcpfkpi" *Eqo okwvgg*"qp" *Pcvkqpcn*"
Ugewtkv{"cpf" *Fghgpeg*

É" *Ecpcfkcp*"Ugewtkv{"cpf" *Oknkvtct*"*Rtgrctgfpguu*, February 2002

É" Vjg" *Fghgpeg*"qh" *Pqtvj*" *Cogtkec*"C" *Ecpcfkcp*" *Tgurqpukdknkvt*{, 3 September 2002

É" *Hqt*"cp" *Gzvtc*"&352" *Dwemu*" í " *Wrfcvg*"qp" *Ecpcfc*çiu" *Oknkvtct*"*Hkpcpekn*"
Etkuku"C" *Xky*"*htqo*"vjg" *Dqvvo*" *Wr*, 12 November 2002

É" *Ecpcfc*çiu" *Eqcwknkpgu*"Vjg" *Nqpiguv*" *Wpfgt*/*Fghgpfjf*" *Dqtfgtu*"kp"vjg"
Yqtnf, 29 October 2003

É" *Ocpckpi*" *Vwtoknk*"Vjg" *Pggf*"vq" *Writc*fg" *Ecpcfkcp*" *Hqtgkip*" *Ckf*"
cpf" *Oknkvtct*" *Uvtgpi*vj"vq" *Fgen*"ykvj" *Ocuukxg*" *Ejcpig*, 5 October 2006

Vjg" *Jqwug*"qh" *Eqo oqpu*"ô"Uvcpfkpi" *Eqo okwvgg*"qp" *Pcvkqpcn*"
Fghgpeg"cpf" *Xvgtcpu*" *Chhcktu*

É" Vjg" *Rtqewtgo*gpv" *Uvwf*{, 14 June 2000

É" *Fgrctv*ogpv"qh" *Pcvkqpcn*" *Fghgpeg*"4223/4224" *Guwko*cvgu" *Rctv*"*KKK*"ô"
Tgrqtv"qp" *Rncpu*"cpf" *Rtkqtkvkgu*, 12 June 2001

É" Uvcvg"qh" *Tgcfkpguu*"qh"vjg" *Ecpcfkcp*" *Hqtegu*" *Tgurqpug*"vq"vjg" *Vgt*/
tqtuv" *Vjtgcv*, 7 November 2001

É" *Hckpi*" *Qwt*" *Tgurqpukdknkvgu*"Vjg"Uvcvg"qh" *Tgcfkpguu*"qh"vjg" *Ecpc*/
fkcp" *Hqtegu*, 30 May 2002

CHAPTER ONE

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‘protecting the government’s policies’ became impossible to separate from the tendency to protect the government’s or the prime minister’s partisan interests. The contrary notion – that the government alone, in public and in the House of Commons, was responsible for protecting its policies and partisan interests and that the duty of the public service was in all instances to support ministers with expert assessments of policies and with frank explanations of policies’

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pressure came from the American government ... as well as from the arms manufacturers and military lobbyists for whom no amount of money is ever enough. The Canadian Forces always claimed it needed more ... but I wasn't sure that its self-interest was the same as the national interest.¹⁴

Officials conditioned to tell the truth politicians wanted to hear acted – indeed were instrumental – in defending the government's policies. It was this public service habit that became the root cause of significant discord within NDHQ. When, as the internal documents illustrate, senior military officers challenged officials' caustic responses to outside studies and the validity and value of their Notes and Advice to ministers, their exchanges reveal the fundamental divide and the weaknesses, conceptually and organizationally, that confound decision making in the supposedly harmonized Canadian Forces and DND headquarters.

CHAPTER TWO

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A Wake-Up Call for Canada: The Need for a New Military, a Proposal by the Royal Canadian Military Institute, May 2001

In 1890, the officers of the Toronto Garrison founded the Royal Canadian Military Institute (RCMI) to promote interest in Canada's national defence. The RCMI has since evolved into a prestigious, private establishment dedicated to raising public interest in national defence policy and policy studies especially related to Canadian military heritage and contemporary Canadian security. The RCMI "proposal," *C" Ycmg/Wr" Ecm" hqt" Epcfc*, was researched and developed in this tradition.¹⁵

Balkans ... and a host of other contributions [to NATO]” contradicts the RCMI’s position.²⁰

The RCMI concludes that Canada is not a “leader” in “NATO peace-keeping operations” (meaning mainly operations in the former Yugoslavia). The official claims that Canada’s commitment to the NATO operation in Bosnia refutes this assertion, but he/she does not say how this is so. Where the RCMI questions the readiness of the Canadian Forces to meet the government’s defence commitments, the DND assessor gives a familiar non-entirely-convincing answer: since 1994, the Canadian Forces *jcwg* met all these

acknowledgement to the research committee of the RCMI after their report was received and assessed by officials in NDHQ.

The assessment did not engage the officials as one would expect if the RCMI proposals were actually “welcomed” and likely to be “considered” in future defence policy reviews. The recommendations, for instance, were not ‘staffed’ to expert branches of NDHQ and no follow-up papers exist describing how the recommendations were considered beyond the single ADM (Policy) assessment.

There is no evidence in the response to our ATI request for “all documents referring to the Royal Canadian Military Institute paper” that *C Ycmg/Wr"Ecmm"lqt"Ecpcfc* had any direct influence on defence policy. The reality then and afterwards was that the *3; ;6" Fghgpeg" Y jkg" Rcrgt* was defended against any demand for a comprehensive review by loyal DND officials who understood that the government had no interest in a review of any kind. We shall see in these studies and reports continued calls for a defence review and, as in this case, officials in their ‘advice and talking notes for the minister’ always prompting ministers that if asked about such demands to respond as they did with regards to the RCMI proposal: “We began an internal process with the view to updating our existing defence policy ... This is part of ongoing efforts to meet challenges in security and defence as they emerge and plan for the future.”²⁷

The remark then and in later ‘advice’ with regard to other reports and studies was offered merely for public consumption and was not meant to be taken literally within the government establishment. The *3; ;6" Fghgpeg" Y jkg" Rcrgt* remained ‘policy’ until after Chrétien left office.

Caught in the Middle: An Assessment of the Operational Readiness of the Canadian Forces, the Conference of Defence Associations, 27 September 2001²⁸

The principal focus of The Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) study, *Ecwi jv"kp"vjg" Okffng*, was the state of the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces. The study, according to its authors, “... shows in detail how the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces and their ability to fulfill operational commitments has been [negatively] affected by shortfalls in the funding of DND. The factors used in the CDA assessment to measure the state of operational readiness in the armed forces are common to most such studies made by the Canadian Forces and by allies. Information on the state of the Canadian Forces [was] drawn from DND, in both published

sources and through the Access to Information requests.” Other information flows from open sources originating in academia and the analyst community in Canada.²⁹

The CDA on 24 September 2001 gave formal, advance notice and copies of the study to the minister of national defence, the chief of the defence staff, and several other senior Canadian Forces officers and DND officials. The report was made public on 27 September 2001 at a media briefing held that day in Ottawa. When NDHQ received the study, the acting ADM (Policy), Daniel Bon, immediately put a marginal note on his copy of the CDA notice instructing his officials: “1. Have this reviewed. 2. We’ll need a note – as MND [sic] is sure to want one as soon as the doc. hits the street, ON THURSDAY.”³⁰

The public service and military staffs swung into action to prepare a response before the CDA’s planned press conference on the noted Thursday. By noon on 26 September – the day before the official release of the study – the staff had prepared a typical list of “Questions & Answers” (Qs & As)

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tives and concludes with a self-congratulatory flourish: “While more needs to be done, we have made good progress and we are on the right track.”³³

This format and positioning of the government’s policy is common in these staff efforts. There are no direct comments on any issue raised by the CDA report; rather, the DND comments though meant to seem positive, were especially defensive and vague. For example, while the government might ‘remain committed to maintaining combat-ready forces’, the fact is Canadian Forces operational readiness was declining as the CDA’s internal sources illustrated. The DND statement that ‘our men and women respond ...’ is devious. Of course the men and women of the Canadian Forces respond – they are legally obliged to respond to lawful orders. For the minister (and his officials) to use this obligation as a sign of high operational readiness and enthusiasm in the ranks for the government’s decisions to commit them to risky operations is at least unethical, if not sinister.

The final sentence and claim – “We have made good progress and we are on the right track” – is similar in intent to the opening sentence of false welcome meant to convey the “trust us” theme typically in these types of assessments. It was also problematic, as the CDA report shows, that “[The] government has shown its commitments to address these long-term funding pressures facing the Canadian Forces,” as Prime Minister Chrétien, as we have already noted, was clearly opposed to any significant increase in “future funding for the Canadian Forces.”³⁴

The Qs & As memorandum prepared by officials in response to the CDA report, of course, follows in considerably more detail the themes used

What is particularly interesting and instructive about the ‘usual process’ is that in this case the senior Canadian Forces officer who drafted the Briefing Note to the Minister, (inadvertently it seems) marching out of step, suggested to his political and military superiors that the CDA study had merit. On 26 September 2001, Lieutenant Colonel Francki, a senior staff officer in the Defence Force Planning and Program Coordination branch (DFPPC), apparently at the direction of his chief, Commodore Daniel McNeil, prepared a draft Briefing Note for the Minister setting out the military’s assessment of *Ecw i jv"kp"vjg"Okffngg* – *g S tkv§ Ogv*

of National Defence, Art Eggleton, on 27 September. At this point the control within NDHQ between what most everyone knew and what they were expected to acknowledge in front of the minister inexplicably broke down.

On the first page of the final 27 September note, Lieutenant Colonel Francki committed an unpardonable bureaucratic sin when he suggested to the minister: “Overall, the [CDA] document provides a fairly accurate representation of the current situation within the Canadian Forces.” He continued apace: “[the CDA] ... makes a strong case for additional resources” and their claim that armed forces’ “... modernization has been hampered by lack of capital funding is acknowledged.” He concluded his note with four succinct recommendations, the first three of which were clearly unacceptable to the minister:

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within the Canadian Forces' is poorly placed and should have had some stronger caveat embedded than 'fairly.' When taken out of context this could give an entirely wrong impression. My belief is that the rest of the briefing note provides sufficient mitigation to this problem. Nevertheless, if this poor choice of phrasing caused any discomfort to you or the department, I am truly sorry.

D.G. McNeil
Commodore.⁴³

Later the same day, the CDS sent a nearly identical note to Eggleton. "As a follow-up on our discussion earlier today, the following provides additional comment with respect to the Briefing Note on the CDA Report prepared for you by the VCDS's staff." General Henault supported his staff and told the minister that the Briefing Note "... is basically well done and valid, with one exception. Specifically, the general conclusi

between the military staff and the department's policy staff and minister's political staff. Senior military officers argued that it was imperative in the circumstances of the gathering crisis of post-9/11 to bring the true state of readiness of the Canadian Forces to the attention of the government and that the CDA study, because it was based on the department's own facts, provided a way to open the issue without the CDS appearing opportunistic to the cabinet. The policy and political staffs, on the other hand, clearly understood that Eggleton's reputation in the PMO was strained and that the prime minister was fundamentally opposed to rebuilding the armed forces. Eventually, the department's civilian policy staff and the military operational planning staff settled the issue by preparing "a compromise briefing note" strongly tilted to the CDS's opinion. It was, however, completely

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Minister” dated 9 October 2002⁵⁵ in which the drafters report immediately that the new CDA report simply “reiterates” in more detail the Association’s views presented the previous year in the study, *Ecwi jv"kp"vjg"Okffng*, implying that the new report did not require significantly different responses from those given in the assessment of the former paper. Nevertheless, the Briefing Note did attack the CDA authors’ assertions and arguments vigorously.

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between the worrying problems they dealt with every day and their duty (as some saw it) to defend in public the government's right to deny there were any problems at all.

This Briefing Note exemplifies this quandary. If, for example, the "messages are not new," then they were obviously known to the author of the NDHQ summary and his/her superiors. In this case, senior policy officials (and others) might have suggested to M (s phgdmis

pre-emptive public affairs tactic” for handling bothersome criticisms. That is to say, they advise the minister to acknowledge the document, pointing at the same time to its complexity and thus the need for detailed (implying lengthy) reviews before making a detailed public response to the report. Should anyone in the House of Commons or the media ask a question about the report, the “we’re reviewing this complex paper” response was expected to put the House and the dog back to sleep. In this case according to the ATI responses we received, the House took no notice and the dog, indeed, wandered off to other business. The CDA document apparently produced no internal NDHQ communication after 10 October, eight days after it was first passed to officers and officials in NDHQ.

Nonetheless, the “Advice” included additional information and suggested responses for the minister obviously intended to avoid creating a controversy while at the same time dismissing the CDA’s report as “nothing new.” The minister was advised to acknowledge “certain challenges” none of which are “apocalyptic and have never kept the Canadian Forces from doing their job.” He was also advised to warn audiences that “we must ensure that we have an affordable . . . defence program” while emphasizing that “we are energetically addressing these challenges” and making “significant increases in defence spending.”⁶¹

Officials realized that some members of the House of Commons and the media were given copies of the report. They, therefore, added two additional “If pressed” notes to the Advice to protect the minister from detailed challenges. One concerned the report’s complaint that the government was using money intended for equipment purchases for its personnel “quality of life” program and another concerned the state of Canadian Forces “capabilities” – another key issue in the CDA report. On the first issue, the minister was advised to acknowledge the fact but to explain the operational importance of sound quality of life policies and to suggest that “. . . the Department remains committed to *tgwtpkpi* *ecrkvcn* *urgpfpki* to appropriate levels.”⁶² Here again, unintentionally it seems, the Advice seemed to confirm the CDA’s assertion that capital spending was not at appropriate levels.

In response to the second issue of capabilities, the minister, “If pressed,” was advised to repeat the claim that the Canadian Forces had “never failed to carry out their missions” and to support the claim with praise from American officers for the Canadian battalion deployed in Afghanistan. But the statement was meant to end on the side of low expectations: “That said, however, we are facing challenges, and they are being addressed. As with any armed force, our capabilities are finite.”⁶³ There is, in fact, no ATI evidence or evidence from interviewees that the minister was every “pressed” in the

House of Commons or elsewhere on any defence issue raised in the CDA report *C" Pcvkqp" cv" Tkum*) Typically, therefore, there is also no evidence that anyone in NDHQ other than the public affairs and policy watchdogs paid much attention to the CDA report after the Briefing Note had been sent to the minister.

There is, however, an unusual note in the *C" Pcvkqp" cv" Tkum* file, a personal letter from Minister of National Defence, John McCallum, to Lieutenant General Evraire, then Chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. In it the minister offers an apology for his six-month "delay in replying" to Evraire's covering letter to the CDA study that had been sent to his office in early October 2002. He states that "My officials and I read with interest the Conference of Defence Associations study *C" Pcvkqp" Cv" Tkum" Vjg" Fgenkpg" qh" vjg" Ecpcfkcp" Hqtegu*." He then continues in two pages to make the case that the "government remains committed to providing the Department of National Defence with ~~the~~ the h

“total force” concept – the Canadian Forces’ organizing principle for the new century and beyond.

Machineries of government grind and rattle noisily, signaling not imminent collapse, but rather the sound of business as usual. Nevertheless, an occasional inspection and a drop of oil may be needed from time to time to ensure the machine remains on its intended course and free of burrs and hotspots.

In 2004, two of the original three authors of the 1995 SCRR, Professor Granatstein and General Belzile (Chief Justice Dickson having died in the interim), suggested to the CDS, General Ray Henault, that it was time to “review what had happened since [1995] with regards to the implementation of the [government’s] approved [SCRR] recommendations, which ones have been altered and the rationale behind such alterations, and finally, given the current circumstances, what suggestions have been dropped and what decisions, if any, have been taken as an alternative.”⁶⁹

General Belzile explained to the CDS that the project was sponsored by the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary and that their report would be presented at a conference there in late 2005. Unlike all the other lead researchers in the non-governmental studies examined in this monograph, Belzile asked for formal assistance from the CDS to conduct the study:

This letter seeks your support to have access to your staff in order to be able to gather up to date information, beyond what is available in the documents mentioned above. Informal approaches with the CLS [Chief of the Land Staff] involved with the Land Forces Reserve Restructure [LFRR project] have made it clear that a survey such as the one proposed would be welcome and timely as they continue with Phase II of their programme. While the LFRR is likely to be the most complex and \$ nt Mqnor“ Mm t] i e i y\$ uile

bring the Militia community howling to his doorstep. On the other hand, to simply deny this request from two prominent Canadians (General Belzile was a former commander of the army) might embarrass them and cause, as well, equally prominent members of the Reserve lobby to ask in public: “What is the minister hiding?”

General Belzile and Professor Granatstein acknowledged in their letter that their review would be done in light of the “rapidly changing circumstances” of Canadian Forces operations, needs, and Regular/Reserve Forces relations since 1995. Thus, the CDS had to co/R m /R m /

remain valid and many have been implemented, others are no longer relevant

other correspondence to the contrary was found in the ATI search, one can only assume that this brief note was the sum of the NDHQ analysis of the 13 recommendations contained in the report of the *Urgekcn"Eqo okuukqp"qp"vjg" Tgwtwevwtkpi"qh"vjg" Tgugt xgu"3; ; 7<"Vgp" [gctu"Ncvgt*.

It is important to understand that despite the curt Briefing Note and the lack of any evident post-report paper trail in NDHQ, the reaction to the SCRR+10 in NDHQ was not negative or dismissive. The entire project from the first approach to General Henault was positive, if guarded, and the cooperation of various staff officers was exceptional.

Vjg"Urgekcn"Eqo okuukqp"qp"vjg" Tgwtwevwtkpi"qh"vjg" Tgugt xgu<"Vgp" [gctu"Ncvgt was released by the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary" on 24 September 2004 – an event to which, according to DND media officers, “all national defence media have been invited.”⁸⁰ The release of the publication was supported a week later at the annual meeting of the influential civilian Canadian Forces Liaison Council held in Calgary.⁸¹ In early December, the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute convened another three-day conference on the same theme which brought together the authors of the study, senior Canadian Forces officers (including senior Reserve Force officers), and academics to discuss aspects of the study and the place of the Reserve Force in Canada’s national defence in general. Again, participation by senior members of the Canadian Forces in these two events was notable, even though, to understate the point, not every senior officer in the Reserve Force in attendance at these meetings was keen on the government’s proposed Reserve Force and Militia policies.⁸²

The positive management in NDHQ of the Dickson and SCRR+10

the Bercuson Study. Unlike the assessment of the RCMI study cited earlier, officials in this case could find nothing with which the EU could negotiate.

be in 2008, 2013, and 2018, assuming the extant policies and funding levels of 2003 continued unchanged in the immediate future? The methodology was straightforward and the research data for it were readily available and, indeed, much of the data were drawn from publicly available DND files, reports, and studies and from interviews with NDHQ project officers and

The researchers then charted the life-cycle profile for each capability and overlaid it with the estimated acquisition timeline. In many cases, the capability reached its end-of-life date before it was possible to complete a regular replacement acquisition. Moreover, the study found that many critical capabilities would reach this state together or very near each other. Defence funding, unfortunately, would have little positive influence on this difficulty because the acquisition timeline assumed at the time in NDHQ was in many cases quite inflexible. There were, at the time, some ways the government could mitigate the “impending crisis,” but at the time of the study no such decisions had been taken and the plans that did exist – the

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However, Melanie Rushworth, a junior, civilian member of the DND Public Affairs branch, seems to have been the first to sense that the study might need “watching” after the CDAI announced on 1 December a media event to launch the study on 3 December. Although she had not read the study, she warned her superiors “You may want to pay attention to the release of this paper – there is a section on training and ... a section on capital and MAT and O&M etc.”⁹⁶ A colleague offered: “I’ll keep an eye on this to see if there is any discussion of recruiting ...” and he noted the television documentary. That afternoon Rushworth emailed other junior public affairs officers that “I have an advance copy. It is 127 pages and touches on the ‘Personnel Crisis.’”⁹⁷

Another public affairs official had, by early Monday morning, 3 December, read part of an advance copy of the study. He suggested to Rushworth,

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in-house message was not ready and did not get out to the public until two days after the study was, in media terms, yesterday's news. This delay was caused by the need to respond credibly to the complexities and details of the study that covered defence policy fundamentals, the state of various military feets, the procurement system, the personnel problem, and the "gathering crisis" of defence and foreign policies handicapped by failing capabilities.

Putting the message together demanded information from most of the central bureaus and staffs on the military and departmental sides of NDHQ and the collation of that information into a politically acceptable framework. The usual process was to "recycle" terms, facts and figures, and comforting views of the future and that approach dominated the preparation of talking and briefing notes for the deputy minister and the minister. The "Talking Notes" went through four major drafts and each passed through the hands of the ADM (Policy), ADM (Public Affairs), the VCDS, the CDS, and the deputy minister before being sent to the minister on 4 December.¹⁰³

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our forces are overstretched ...”; “No doubt Defence has made significant progress ...”¹⁰⁶

The first sentence was amended several times and finally in the fourth version read: “While **we** [I deleted] have not had the opportunity to fully review it **at this time**, [I understand that the paper – deleted] *Ecpcfc*” *ykvjqwv*” *Ctogf*” *Hqtegu* **appears to be** [presents – deleted] an interesting **report on the state of the Canadian Forces [dialogue for Canadians to consider – deleted].**” An unknown senior official found even this soft sentence too much and wrote in the margin beside it: “We don’t do book reviews – political polite dialogue!”¹⁰⁷ The text was shortened and detailed references to ‘policies’ included in the first version were mostly eliminated. The text, otherwise, remained much the same through the third and fourth drafts.

The “Final Version,” however, concluded with a rather ‘trust us and look to the future when things will somehow be better’ editorial meant, one supposes, to hearten the minister’s confidence when in reality he had not much more than hope as policy to offer the Canadian Forces or Canadian citizens:

We also recognize that our forces are stretched. To better manage the impact of the operational tempo on our people, we continually reassess our military commitments around the world and try to balance our deployments from among the three environments, as best we can under the circumstances.

We are also working hard to ensure the best possible opportunities for members of the Canadian Forces. Recent recruiting efforts have been very successful, pay rates have increased and we are working to improve the Terms of Service to help with retention of our members.

There is no doubt that Defence [sic] has made significant progress over the last decade. However, we must ensure that the Canadian Forces continue to adapt to the new security environment and are prepared for the challenges of the future.¹⁰⁸

The Briefing Note to the minister follows the usual format with a statement of the “Issue,” a “Background” explaining, in this case, the main points in the CWF? study, and three pages of “Observations” (a fact that exposes the falsehood the minister was advised to advance: “We have not had the opportunity to fully review it ...”). The background notes are mostly fair and accurate summaries of the longer arguments and conclusions contained in the study. The observations, however, are decidedly negative and dismissive; in fact, it appears from the comments of officials that the CWF? authors got nothing right. Military officers were much less sure this was true.

fact not suggest to seasoned officials that they ought to consider seriously what ‘these experts’ are saying and that they should explain to their political leaders that these people are not all wrong all the time?

If individuals inside and outside government and in the Canadian Forces keep bringing to ministers the same messages does that fact not suggest to officials that to some degree the government’s policies are failing to address

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for simplicity's sake and added clarifications where necessary to explain NDHQ acronyms and jargon and to identify individuals. It is important to note, also, that the emails involved discussions within the ADM (Policy) and DGSP staffs and between members of both – joined occasionally by public service public affairs officials – and that they escalated quickly into a strong positioning by Vincent Rigby, ADM (Policy), and his immediate subordinate, Daniel Bon (Director, Policy Development, D Pol Dev), contra Major General Douglas Dempster, Director General Strategic Planning (DGSP) and his subordinate officers.

From: Eyre LCOL WD@VCDS DGSP DDA@Ottawa-Hull

Sent: Thursday, December 04, 2003 4:15 PM

To: Cessford Col MP@VCDS DGSP DDA@Ottawa-Hull

I have just read with interest this report [note to the minister] on the Bland report and have some observations on ADM(POL)'s observations:

- Very defensive on the continuing relevance of the 94 White Paper. A more balanced observation would be that while parts remain relevant, it should be significantly updated.
- Although I agree that the three defence mission areas (dom, cont, and intl) [domestic, continental, international] remain valid, they should concede that they will continue to merge.
- A more effective recapitalization counter-argument is required. Transformational technologies are okay, but at what cost? What would be useful is a colour-coded spreadsheet (with red for rust) showing capabilities against time – basically what we have and will have for how long. This would make much more of an impact and the logic flow would be right in front of us. MGS arguments don't cut it. Recent strategic choices (modest budget increase, internal reallocations) as mentioned do not address the looming problem.
- Even an 11 year acquisition cycle will still leave us tripping over our own decision cycle as a nimble and adaptive enemy adopts what is on the shelf.
- MCCRT is vaunted.¹¹³

I guess what irks me [Eyre] the most about these observations is their negativity and defensive tone. Did the Bland report get nothing right? Here we have a report that can perhaps be used to gain some leverage in im-

proving the Canadian Forces, yet is being shot down by the bureaucratic machine intent on mitigating political embarrassment. Then again, maybe I just don't get it.

I just talked to Mae [Ms. Mae Johnson, staff officer, D Policy Dev] about this. Broad agreement did not occur. Sensationalism aside, there is a message that should be capitalized on, and not buried by CYA. [Cover Your Ass]

From: Cessford Col MP@VCDS DGSP DDA@Ottawa-Hull

Sent: Friday, December 05, 2003 9:07 AM

To: Dempster MGen D@VCDS DGSP@Ottawa-Hull

Sir,

Wayne's [LCol. Wayne Eyre] observations are trenchant and useful. This report will be read broadly – by our internal and external audiences. We need to be very careful about discounting this work in its entirety – there are some findings that are sound and helpful.

MP Cessford

Col

DDA [Director Defence Analysis]

From: Dempster MGen D@VCDS DGSP@Ottawa-Hull

Sent: Monday, December 08, 2003 5:42 PM

To: Rigby V@ADM(Pol) D Pol Dev@Ottawa-Hull;
Taymun SM@ADM(PA) [Public Affairs]@Ottawa-Hull

Allow me to share this view with you. I believe that we need to learn to accept outside views as part of the challenge process, to help outside stakeholder groups where we can and to recognize the truth that the 1994 White Paper, no matter how good at the time, now needs updating to handle the new security environment, changed Canada-US relationship, operational lessons learned and positive government fiscal circumstances. Indeed the government has stated its intent to update its policy, so why should we be reticent about this?

- In the end, I believe that our note is far from “defensive” or “negative”. It is simply trying to provide the Minister with a balanced and accurate assessment. As for a “CYA” attitude, let’s not “CYA” that. % le 10/11/2017 17:07

thinks is likely to meet with the voters' approval in the next elections). The government, in other words, is elected to serve the country, not to do the bidding of its departments or of the Canadian Forces. For their part, DND and the Canadian Forces are there to serve the government's policy line -- which is the country's policy line as approved through the ballot box -- whether DND or the Canadian Forces like it or not. No one in DND or the Canadian Forces should ever, therefore, under any circumstances, imagine or presume that he or she is free to seize upon any external reports or opinion to push and prod our Minister, the government and the country towards meeting what can only be defined as corporate interests. In a democracy, there can be no legitimate defense policy or direction other than that set by the government in office. **[redacted]** No one in the Canadian Forces -- or in the Department of National Defence, or even in the Policy Group -- has to like the government's defense policy (and, by the way, defense policy is the government's policy, not DND's and not the CF's), everyone is free to totally disagree with it, **[redacted]**

3. None of what precedes should be taken to mean that individuals and groups outside DND and the Canadian Forces are not entitled to their opinions or have to agree with any government's defense policy or choices. Academics, experts, allies, etc. are all free to disagree and to criticize to their hearts' content -- and we, who are serving in DND or the Canadian Forces are also free to agree with those critics privately as well as in our own internal processes -- but that's it. **[redacted]**

Doctors, nurses and hospital administrators are free to criticize government health policy because they are not part of government in its decision-making dimension. Because members of the Canadian Forces, through the senior levels of their chain of command, are part of the government decision-making apparatus, they do not have that latitude any more than their Public Service colleagues. Personally, I think that is something that RMC and the Canadian Defence Academy could usefully emphasize in their teaching.

In a note such as the one at issue, we owe the Minister something that is useful to him, that provides him, in particular, with a fair description of the contents and contentions of the report, as well as with a solid set of points about some [of] its strengths and weaknesses. (Not to provide him with such a note would be to do him a disservice, since it could lead him to appear ill-informed and, therefore, open him to justified media critiques.) What he most certainly doesn't need from us is an opportunistic pamphlet pushing our own corporate preferences. I believe D Pol Dev's note fully met all the requirements to qualify as an excellent note.

From: Johnson MM@ADM(Pol) D Pol Dev@Ottawa-Hull
Sent: Tuesday, December 09, 2003 10:10 AM
To: Hébert PJP@ADM(Pol) D Pol Dev@Ottawa-Hull;
Rigby V@ADM(Pol) D Pol Dev@Ottawa-Hull

When I spoke with Wayne on this I recognized his point that another approach could have been taken. What he would've liked is to have had the note and the MND say publicly: "Yes: White Paper is crap and should be pitched. Everything (capital, personnel, policy etc) is in the toilet. The report is 100% correct. Now give us lots of money to fx everything."

My point to Wayne was that while we would've possibly (re)gained some allies like Bland et al, we would've done a disservice to what has been achieved so far in terms of certain equipment, budget increases, personnel improvements, etc. Plus, some of what the report says is just not the plain old truth. Why can't we point out these (un?)intended inaccuracies. Maybe there's lots more to fx, but how would the MND have looked if he ignored four consecutive budget increases? I think the basis for our disagreement was essentially strategy: what's the best way to respond to these kinds of reports? I defended a more balanced (and, might I say, accurate) approach - - while he wanted to throw the baby out with the bathwater. I also don't think we can ignore the fact that reports like this show a considerable amount of public relations strategizing on the part of Bland et al. You don't usually get headlines with measured, nuanced reflection - - but "mass extinction" will earn you 5 minutes of fame.

From: Taymun SM@ADM(PA)@Ottawa-Hull [Scott Taymun supervised to some degree the PA "Talking Note" exercise]
Sent: Wednesday, December 10, 2003 8:32 AM
To: Bon DL@ADM(Pol) DG Pol Plan@Ottawa-Hull;
Rigby V@ADM(Pol) D Pol Dev@Ottawa-Hull;
Dempster MGen D@VCDS DGSP@Ottawa-Hull;
Eyre LCOL WD@VCDS DGSP DDA@Ottawa-Hull

Before this goes further, may I offer a few observations and consider-

and well-being of the Canadian Forces as an instrument of defence policy and an important national institution. That is why 12, 14, 16 hour days is foreign to none of us **[redacted]**

Second, I do not believe it is our job to defend Government policy or Government decision-making. That is the Government's job. Our job is to provide the Government with the highest quality advice and information on the merits and demerits of different policy choices so they can make informed decisions, and to provide quality information more generally to Canadians so that our duly elected representatives in Parliament can debate the merits/demerits of the Government's decisions. In this vein, I believe we all agree, as MGen Dempster and Vincent both noted, that what is required is a balanced and accurate approach rooted in factual information. I, for one, for example, strongly believe that if we are going to communicate defence spending as a % of GNP, we are obligated in the spirit of informed decision-making to also communicate defence spending in actual dollars. Both statistics have value and meaning, and I compliment D Pol Dev's paper for continuing to articulate both statistics.

As a third and final point, **[redacted]**

If we have concerns, we need to dialogue at the front end, help each other out, and recognize any constraints we face such as 24 hour turn-around times.

If anyone feels the need to discuss further, may I suggest **[redacted]**

Scott

From: Rigby V@ADM(Pol) D Pol Dev@Ottawa-Hull

Sent: Wednesday, December 10, 2003 9:09

To: Taymun SM@ADM(PA)@Ottawa-Hull

[redacted]

I found LCol Eyre's comments both inaccurate and inflammatory and felt they deserved a response. I made my point, and agree that it's time to move on. Mike Cessford and I have discussed

[redacted] As you say, we're all part of the same team and I see this as no more than a frank exchange of views on an important issue. I have the utmost respect for my VCDS colleagues.

as she managed the assembly of the Talking Notes for her superiors in the days soon after the study was made public. On 30 December, when asked by the Special Assistant to the Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs) for a copy of the CWF? study, she responds: “This [a copy of 4 December Talking Notes] might help you understand what the 120 pages from Queen’s says – without having to read the Queen’s report in full.”¹²⁰ Her suggestion seems quite practical under the circumstances, for the Talking Notes alone, not the study’s text, apparently were good enough for most every senior officer and official in NDHQ.

However, the final evaluation of *Ecpcfc"ykvjqwv" Ctogf" HqteguA* in NDHQ and its likely influence on Canada’s defence policy had already been delivered on the day it was released in a meeting on 3 December in a comment attributed to the Deputy Minister, Margaret Bloodworth: “At the end of the day the only question left is one for ADM(Policy) to answer and that is[:] why was \$200K [sic] given to Queen’s for a special arrangement described by Dr. Bland in the opening two pages of his report, if the \$200K has only brought us more criticism?”¹²¹

CHAPTER FOUR

require a government-wide response,¹²³ wrote a short Briefing Note for the minister of national defence, and then filed the report for later reference.

Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002

The Senate Committee on National Security and Defence in 2001/2002 conducted a detailed investigation into Canada's national security and defence policies and programs and released its first report, *Ecpcfkcp"Ugewtkv{"cpf"Oknkvt{"Rtgrctgfpguu*, in February 2002.¹²⁴ The report, in 100 pages of detailed text, set out the major 'preparedness' issues facing Canada in the 21st century and addressed security in several particular aspects, including, for instance, matters of immigration and border security. The Committee made four main recommendations touching on defence policy: an increase of 15,000 positions in the regular force; an immediate increase of \$4 billion to DND's baseline budget; future annual budget increases which are realistic, purpose driven, and adjusted for inflation; and foreign policy and defence policy reviews.¹²⁵

Officials in NDHQ reviewed the report and produced the usual "Briefing Note for the Minister of National Defence," which the Deputy Minister, Jim Judd, sent to the Minister, Art Eggleton, on 5 March 2002.¹²⁶ The Briefing Note's two-page "Summary" of the 100-page Senate report gave a fair and accurate description of its content.

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military officials [sic] and they may have provided different insights into the nature of the problem.¹²⁸

The reviewer noted in other observations that:

The Committee considers that sweeping changes are needed in Canadian Defence policy. The Report does not explain, however, what is wrong with current policy.

The Committee recommends that the government provide DND with additional funding before a new policy is adopted. This seems to stand logic on its head ...

The Committee appears more interested in improving our ranking within NATO in terms of defence spending as percentage of GDP than in ensuring that Canadg'

to the Senate Committee at all. Mr. Eggleton, just in case someone might have asked him to make a comment, was given seven ‘bullets’ to use in response to questions about the Senate report:

I welcome the report ... [etc., as usual].

I understand that this report is ... the Committee’s introductory survey of major defence and security issues.

I expect that the Senate Committee will make a valuable contribution to the discussion of security and defence issues and I look forward to working with the Committee.

The views and recommendations of the Senate Committee will be taken into account as the Government looks at options [concerning] future security challenges.

There is no doubt that the Canadian Forces are facing serious challenges.

This Government has demonstrated a long term commitment to address e s \$ n

The committee made several recommendations on the need for the government to develop a “national security strategy,” to strengthen the defence of Canada’s coastal areas, to improve the interoperability of Canadian and American armed forces, and to enhance army capabilities for operations with the United States in North America. With regard to the army, the committee recommended:

That Canada and the U.S. upgrade their joint capacity to defend North America through the use of ~~af~~ and ~~for~~ hree £ pe ; s ys

particular Committee recommendation. There is no evidence that the Brief

K"j cxg"pqv"uggp"vjg"Ugpcvg"Eqo okvvgg"tgrqtv it is a welcome addition to the ongoing and productive dialogue on defence."¹⁴⁶ It seems, however, perhaps odd for the NDHQ staff to then offer the minister ten speaking lines that implicitly undercut the Senate report that he had not read. The minister was probably safe enough as he was advised, as usual, not to talk about the report, but rather to reassure anyone who would listen that “protecting Canada’s sovereignty [is taken] very seriously by the Canadian Forces” and that the government had “Shortly after September 11th ... created an Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism ... [to] ensure that government-wide security initiatives are coordinated.”¹⁴⁷

The Deputy Minister of DND, Margaret Bloodworth, sent a five-page departmental Briefing Note to the minister on 31 October 2003 that in the usual format first summarized the main issues raised in the 70 pages of research and expert witness testimony presented by the Senate committee with regards to coastal security. The Note, in one page of “observations,” assessed the Senate’s conclusions and recommendations in a less defensive and dismissive tone than usual. The deputy minister concurs with, and who would not, the committee’s opinion “... that Canada’s proximity to and relationship with the United States makes [Canada] “less secure is both true and untrue.” To the committee’s main recommendation for improved maritime security, the deputy minister simply observed that implementing the recommendation “... would require new funding or departmental reallocations” which was, of course, the essential message the Senate was sending to the government.¹⁴⁸

The Briefing Note was critical of only two arguments the Senators put forward. The Committee had concluded that the navy’s capabilities for “interdiction close to shore” were inadequate but caused more by the navy’s “attitude” than by any real lack of resources. The navy’s commitment to its primary role, “blue water engagement,” according to the Senators, was such that the navy was “unlikely to attach any kind of priority to upgrading its coastal defence capabilities.”

The deputy minister responded that “The committee does not seem to recognize that the navy’s supporting (rather than leading) role in interdiction close to our coasts is a question of [internal Canadian] jurisdiction rather than attitudes.” Implementing the changes the committee recommends would, she warns, “... provoke a great deal of controversy within Government.” Despite the deputy minister’s anxiety, one would hope that the mere bother of a controversy in Ottawa’s bureaucracy did not inhibit John McCallum from presenting to cabinet the Senate’s concerns for matters of national defence.¹⁴⁹

Second, the deputy minister concedes that the committee “makes two legitimate points” with regards to naval patrols in Canada’s coastal waters: “first, the navy has important responsibilities at home and abroad; and two, if the navy were to take the lead in interdiction along our coasts ... it would require a new class of vessels, smaller and less expensive than a frigate ...” Ms. Bloodworth, then, uncharacteristically for an experienced senior public servant, appears to mock the Senators by suggesting to the minister of national defence that given the Committee’s call for smaller vessels, “It is surprising, therefore, that the Committee should not have seen in this a role for the Naval Reserves, given its constant preoccupation with the roles of the Reserves.”¹⁵⁰ A senator might have pointed out to the deputy minister that the Naval Reserve, a “component” of the Canadian Forces, is assigned to the navy.

But is Ms. Bloodworth’s remark merely petty sniping? Taken in the context of this record of how bureaucrats attempt to situate reports and studies in ways that allow them to present to ministers ‘the truth they want to hear’, what is, perhaps, more instructive in this final sentence in the Note to John McCallum is Ms. Bloodworth’s willingness to challenge the Senate and her complete unwillingness, even in private Notes to the minister, to acknowledge weaknesses in the government’s policies confirmed in her

Forces, and the second, that provided specific recommendations on how best to resolve these problems.¹⁵² *Opcikpi Vwt o qkn* outlined a number of “profound international and domestic” changes that the Committee concluded would emerge in the 21st century. The committee also concluded that if current defence and security policies were not significantly amended, then Canada would be unprepared to meet these serious challenges effectively.

Opcikpi Vwt o qkn made specific recommendations to address this changing environment and to improve foreign aid policies and the capabilities of the Canadian Forces. In particular, the Committee recommended increasing defence funding to 2 percent of GDP; improving defence procurement procedures; cancelling the proposed stationing of a “rapid [Canadian Forces] Response unit in Goose Bay”; setting up a “Defence Foundation” scholarship fund; improving parliamentary oversight of defence policy; improving military capabilities; entering into discussions with the United States on “Ballistic Missile defence”; increasing the “transparency of special operations”

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CHAPTER F

trying to do what is best for the Canadian Forces and to recommend that to the government. So I have been very impressed with the tone of the way the committee has operated and I think the fact that this is a unanimous report, all members, all five parties signing on to it is confirmation of that.¹⁵⁸

This unanimity, the quality of the study, and the fact that it was produced by a committee dominated by Liberal members of parliament might lead one to assume that the study was treated with special respect in NDHQ. Yet, officials responded to the report very much as they had to every other study or report on Canada's defence policies.

The SCONDVA report touched on subjects and made recommendations for change in policies that fell under the responsibilities of several departments of government including DND, Public Works/Government Services Canada (PWGSC), and Industry Canada as well as the Treasury Board. The detailed report made 38 recommendations which might, if implemented as the committee chairs concluded, "... [make] the procurement process ... leaner. It could be expedited. It could be made more effective to make sure that every defence dollar that is spent allows us to have the best product possible at the most favourable price and in a timely fashion and so the committee had some real concerns about those points as the process is now constituted."¹⁵⁹ Other members of the committee stressed also the critical importance of the SCONDVA study, and the committee's accord with its recommendations. As Member of Parliament Elsie Wayne put it: "This is a unanimous all-party strategy that we have adopted and that we are presenting today."¹⁶⁰

The committee concentrated its attention on the critical need to ensure and improve inter-departmental planning and decision-making coordination in the entire procurement process in ways that would best bring the policies and procedures of the several departments involved in military procurement procedures into line. The SCONDVA recommended among other fundamental reforms that a new process be based on "the concept of performance-based specifications," that DND "clearly identify its estimated [equipment] deficit," and that it adopt a strategy "for increasing the capital projects portion of its budget to a minimum of 23% [of the] defence budget." The Committee asked for significant changes to the expenditure "approval authority levels" in DND to allow the department greater control over its plans and projects system. Members of the committee were especially determined to increase the SCONDVA's oversight of defence spending and to see "[t]hat all federal government departments and agencies involved in defence procurement ... facilitate the reforms necessary to increase the efficiency

and effectiveness of defence procurement” and to “improve coordination between departments to eliminate redundancy in the procurement process.”¹⁶¹

The remainder of the recommendations for the most part set out ways in which the SCONDVA thought coordination and planning could be improved. Most of these suggestions, derived from the “dozens and dozens of witnesses, many, many briefs”¹⁶² that were presented to the Committee. These reports, briefings, and discussions with witnesses were technical in nature and dealt as often with complex areas of defence policy and military planning. The Committee asked, for example, for a complete review of the *3; ;6' Fghgpeg" Y jkvg" Rcrgt*, the formation of a “defence industry advisory board” and that “operational considerations” take priority over allocation of “Industrial Regional Benefit” policies. On the surface, the SCONDVA challenged the government and the federal public service to commit to a significant, government-wide rebuilding of the defence procurement process.

At its heart, however, the committee’s principal aim seems to have been to expose the dire situation of decaying defence capabilities and to add its (supposed) authority to the growing call, even within the governing Liberal Party, for a fundamental and expensive multi-year program to build a new generation of military capabilities for Canada’s national defence. It is ironic – but perhaps no surprise to those who deride parliament’s influence on policy – that it was “... the committee’s non-partisan way [and its] spirit of trying to do what is best for the Canadian Forces ...” that immediately put the government and its officials on guard.

On 22 June 2000, Mr. Ian Green, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Operations), “suggested” to Mr. Jim Judd, Deputy Minister of DND, that he and the deputy minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada “jointly take the lead in preparing proposals for the Government’s response to the SCONDVA” report on defence procurement.¹⁶³ Jim Judd duly coordinated the assembly of a government response to the 38 recommendations in the *Rtqewtgogpv"Uvwf{}* most of which fell under the responsibilities of DND, PWGSC, and, to a lesser extent, the Treasury Board.

The staff response in NDHQ to this committee report was different than the staffing of reports and studies presented to governments by the Senate and academics and non-governmental organizations. The DND process for developing a response to the House of Commons was typically assigned directly by the deputy minister to assistant deputy ministers of specific branches in the department, whereas most other responses were managed and answered almost entirely by the policy and public affairs branches acting alone, though with input (sometimes) from military and technical staffs. This

On 26 June 2000, Department of National Defence officials began the long process of developing an inter-departmental response to the Committee's detailed report.¹⁷⁰ The project within DND and other departments was, as is common practice, divided between 'subject matter expert' staffs, each instructed to prepare a response to one or more of the 38 SCONDVA recommendations. The trail here, too, is difficult to follow in detail as few of the staff reports were available and most pages of those that were available were redacted. Nevertheless, the final government response was provided under the ATI, and though it appears the SCONDVA asked for a response by November 2000, the Committee did not receive the government's report until after 15 March 2001, even though the bureaucrats had a response ready in late October 2000. Eventually, the response was delivered to the House of Commons sometime on or near 21 October 2001. These delays were due entirely to the vagaries of parliamentary politics at the end of 2000.

Briefly, the SCONDVA report was presented in June 2000 to the Second Session of the Thirty-Sixth Parliament, but the government's response did not reach parliament before the end of the Thirty-Sixth Parliament.

many of the recommendations may have been overtaken by new policies or procedures; the available report seems in places to indicate that outcome.

Whether it was relevant when it finally reached the House of Commons, the government's 21-page response was comprehensive if not necessarily encouraging in its comments on the Committee's work.¹⁷⁴ In its introduction, the government seems to welcome the committee's report which it "... has considered carefully." Furthermore, the House of Commons is informed: "The Government shares the concerns of the Committee over the need to reform the procurement process. This is important in order to ensure that the Government's requirements for goods and services are effectively met, Canadian taxpayers get value for money, and Canadian economic and industrial interests are supported." This message of "concern" is reinforced by the 'cut and paste' statement used repeatedly in responses to House of Commons recommendations: "The government recognizes the importance of open and transparent reporting to support effective communications with Parliament and Canadians."¹⁷⁵

In general, however, the government responded to House of Commons recommendations in two ways. The most common response addressed recommendations with an explanation of what the government policy was and how it would be implemented.

government countered the committee's recommendation for a review of the 3; ;6" Fghgpeg" Y jkv" Rcrgt by "pointing to several procurement projects it kpvpgfgf to fund – new search and rescue helicopters, a major upgrade of the CF18 fleet, the purchase of Upholder submarines, and the replacement of the “ageing Sea King fleet” – as “... significant progress ... made since the [white paper was issued] in making the Canadian Forces more combat capable.”¹⁷⁹

As with all the Senate and House of Commons committee reports and studies, there is no record that the House of Commons took any action to challenge the government's responses to this report or to hold ministers to account for the government's stated intent

was again on a sound footing, it became reasonable to expect an injection of new funding for the Canadian Forces. Some progress has been made in this regard, but more is needed.¹⁸⁰

The Committee's review of the DND *Guvk o cvgu*" and the accompanying departmental *Tgrqtv"qp"Rncpu"cpf"Rtkqtkvkgu* produced recommendations aimed at strengthening defence capabilities by taking action on the much delayed Maritime Helicopter project; increasing Canadian Forces personnel levels; building the capital budget, strategic sea and airlift, and air-to-air refueling resources; and increasing the overall defence budget.

Officials within DND kept a close watch on the committee's work and the media after the report was made public. Public Affairs officials reported several critical reports published by the *Qvvc yc"Ekvk/gp, Vjg" Ic/gvvg."Vjg" Jkmn"Vko gu."* the *Vqtqpvq"Uwp,* and *Vjg" Ejqpkeng" Jgtcnf.* among others. This media attention prompted DND public affairs and Finance branch officials to prepare "Advice for the minister" in the usual format. The advice, intended for use in the House or in media scrums, begins with the usual opening remark: "I welcome SCONDVA's Report on the 2001-2002 Report on Plans and Priorities as a clear demonstration of the important contribution Committees can make. The Government will review it carefully and will respond as appropriate."¹⁸¹

This welcome is then followed by seven 'bullets' suggesting ways in which the minister, Art Eggleton, could reassure Canadians that "[t]he Government is committed to ensuring that the Canadian Forces has the people, equipment, and training it needs." The bullets provide the minister with the recent history of defence budgets and recent supplements to DND 2000-2001 funding. The advice switches in the fifth bullet to a statement of the government's support to "quality of life" programs introduced in the Canadian Forces in the previous year. Only at the sixth bullet does the advice suggest the minister speak directly to the Committee report: "Looking ahead, our objective is to increase our equipment expenditures to around 23% of the total defence budget by investing in Canadian Forces modernization priorities, such as strategic sea and airlift capabilities." This often-stated capital expenditure goal announced in many defence policy statements has rarely been achieved by any government since 1956 and was never even close to being achieved by the Chrétien government.¹⁸²

Officials provided the minister with additional facts and figures dealing with recruiting and quality of life policies for use "if pressed" in the Commons or by the media. His senior staff, however, provided no advice on the actual recommendations made by the Committee or any hint on how

this “welcomed” report might be incorporated into government plans and priorities.¹⁸³

The government’s response to the House of Commons – due in November – was prepared quickly. The staff simply addressed each recommendation and in six pages rehearsed government policies and accomplishments.¹⁸⁴ As with other such public remarks, the government made its best case for its defence policy and its allocation of funds to it. For example, the Committee’s recommendation to “proceed as quickly as possible with the Maritime Helicopter Project to ensure delivery of replacements ... in 2005” is countered with the simple assurance that the government “... intends to proceed as quickly as possible with the implementation of the project.”¹⁸⁵ The response suggests that a delivery of the new aircraft is possible in 2005, but cautions that the project is large and complex and “... sue ~ x a o\$ f - e’s/

The other group that could potentially comment on the SCONDVA report and the Government Response is the defence academic community. Like the defence associations, the themes of budget shortfall, the need for more spending on the capital program and personnel shortages are commonly included in academic commentary. For example, when appearing before the Committee on April 3, 2001, Professor Douglas Bland of Queen's University expressed concern over each of these issues.

Of particular interest on the academic side will be the pending release of a report by a group calling themselves the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century. The group, chaired by Professor Jack Granatstein and Senator Laurier LaPierre, is undertaking a comprehensive examination of Canadian security policy in anticipation of what they believe may be a defence policy review. The core assumption of the study is that Canada needs combat-capable forces to meet the challenges of the new millennium. Contributors to the Council include virtually every well-known Canadian defence academic, several retired members of the Canadian Forces ... and a number of notable Canadians including former Defence Minister Jean Jacques Blais.¹⁹⁰

The following 'comments' paragraph to this section was redacted from the ATI release.

Other than making this formal response to the House of Commons, there is no evidence in the ATI files that the government or DND took any action to reshape or otherwise amend its policies in response to the House of Commons committee report or its recommendations.

State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces: Response to the Terrorist Threat, 7 November 2001

Two months after the terror attacks on North America, SCONDVA tabled an interim report – Uvcvg"qh" Tgcfkpguu"qh"vjg" Ecpckcp" Hqtegu" Tgurqpug"vq"vjg" Vgttqtuv"Vjtgcv f a! nte])

national defence and disaster response capabilities of the Canadian Forces that challenged the government's national security policies and its future federal budget priorities.¹⁹²

Although it is evident in the memoranda written by senior staff officers in NDHQ to other officers and officials in both DND and other departments that the report was a major concern, the limited number of documents provided by DND in response to our ATI request is curious. In all, we received only four memoranda: an announcement of staff meetings; a list of "proposed OPIs & OCIs"¹⁹³ identified to prepare comments on specific recommendations; an undated and unaddressed summary of the SCONDVA report (it has the appearance of a Briefing Note for the minister); and a copy of the final government response to parliament. What is missing from the file are the usual "advice to the minister;" policy and public affairs correspondence concerning the report even though memoranda refer to "statements by the minister"; a "media action plan"; and internal emails or other drafting documents.

The available documents display, again, senior public servants and military officers acting to support the government's pre-September 2001 policies even when the advice they provide seems problematic in the circumstances facing the Canadian Forces already in difficulty because of almost ten years of underfunding and operational stress. The internal DND summary of the

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wpfgt"eqpukfgtckqp"d{"Pcvkqpcn" Fghgpeg." The second bullet, again typical in such notes, remarks that "SCONDVA's report downplays many of the efforts that DND/Canadian Forces have made in recent years. Nor is there sufficient recognition made of recent budget increases or equipment purchases when [the Committee is] highlighting the so-called 'crisis' the Canadian Forces is in the midst of." The writer complains that "[t]he Committee's report could easily leave the impression that the Canadian Forces are currently ill-prepared to deal with the current threat environment ..." – which was, without a doubt, the essential message the Liberal Party-dominated SCONDVA was making. Finally, the Summary observes, "... there appears to be insufficient appreciation by the Committee that funding will remain limited and also fails to put a dollar figure on how much their proposed recommendations will cost."¹⁹⁶

The formal "Government Response" to the SCONDVA report on the "terrorist threat" reflects in more detail and careful language the sense of the Summary Note.¹⁹⁷ The 12-page response addresses each recommendation in order. The "Introduction" to the response indicates immediately that the government would treat the SCONDVA assessment much as it had the earlier SCONDVA "Report on Plans and Priorities" of 2001; that is to say, in a not-quite-dismissive manner, but in a rather condescending and lecturing tone:

Clearly, the events of September 11 have had an impact on the security environment in which Canada finds itself. Canadians have expressed concern

The “response” claims to provide parliament with “... a concise over-

consultations with Parliament will continue to be part of the Government's ongoing management of Canada's security interests.

Recommendation 10: That Canada acquire additional heavy transport aircraft and replace older models to ensure the strategic lift and tactical airlift capabilities [of the Canadian Forces].

Response: The Canadian Forces' current airlift capacity is based on the CC150 and the CC130 Hercules, as well as on the use of chartered heavy lift aircraft, when required. The Government has made a clear commitment to ensuring that the Canadian Forces will continue to be equipped to provide an effective and rapid response capability. DND has identified this as a planning priority.

Recommendation 11: That the Government place a higher priority on providing the Canadian Forces with additional sealift capability.

Response: The Government is committed to maintaining a modern, deployable and sustainable military capability ... [and] will consider the issue of sealift in the context of addressing the broader challenges facing the Department and the Canadian Forces.

Recommendation 16: That more training be provided to the Reserve ... on the detection and on measures to deal with the consequences of nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks so they can operate safely ... if they are deployed to assist civilian authorities.

Response: The Department is assessing the requirement ... in light of the events of September 11.

Recommendation 18: That [DND] bolster the ability of the Reserves to contribute to disaster relief and to the military's response to terrorist attacks in Canada.

Response: The Reserves are an important component of the Canadian Forces ... The Department's Land Force Reserve Restructure project is intended to further enhance the Reserve Force.

The Government's responses to the committee's other recommendation dealing with matters of the integration of security and disaster organizations and so on were treated generally with 'explanations' of the status quo and hints at future assessments. The wonder is that if parliament's recommenda-

military “contributions to international stability,” the defence of Canada, and the state of military personnel generally. The committee built its assessments and recommendations from evidence presented by witnesses and from the background it had gathered in its four previous reports.²⁰²

The committee sets out the political context of their report in the first

day the report was tabled in the House of Commons, and amended on 5, 12, and 19 June. Typical of the ‘usual process’, once the first draft of “advice” was completed, it, and not the report *regarding*, became the overriding focus of NDHQ staff effort and the deputy minister’s attention. In the midst of this work, officials also prepared a “Briefing Note for the Minister” and sent it to the minister’s office on the 11 June.

In their first draft Advice, officials in NDHQ advise the minister to state that “[t]he Government welcomes SCONDVA’s report tabled this morning and will carefully consider its recommendations.” They suggest also that the minister state, “We expect that many of the issues identified in SCONDVA’s latest report would be considered as the Government moves forward with the Defence Update.”²⁰⁵ In the second draft, the first recommendation is merely to thank the Committee for its report while holding to the promise to consider the report as it reviewed Canada’s defence policy.²⁰⁶ In the third and fourth drafts, there is no ‘welcome’ nor any commitment to consider the report in the future at all.

The third and fourth drafts concentrate solely on “defence funding and capabilities.” In these concise notes, the first four ‘bullets’ are meant to remind parliament and the media that “[t]he Government is committed to ensuring that the Canadian Forces has the people, equipment, and training it needs to protect Canadian sovereignty.” They emphasize the government’s planned increases in defence spending “that will total approximately \$5 billion by March 200-

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Officials, on the other hand, took issue with most of the Committee's other recommendations. They repeated the government's claim to adequate defence funding and criticized the Committee's recommendation to meet a so-called NATO standard base on GDP ratios.²¹⁶ The Briefing Note challenges the Committee's use of statistics on Canada's defence funding: "The report fails to mention that not all statistics are as unflattering for Canada" and suggests that by simply changing the funding measurement from GDP to total dollars spent annually would make things look brighter. In the Note, they continue: "The Committee does not acknowledge the budget increases provided in the 1999, 2000, and 2001 budgets."²¹⁷

The Committee's recommendation to increase parliament's oversight of security and defence issues is met with a flat statement that "A number of parliamentary committees are already very much involved in discussion [sic] of security and defence issues and already provide an oversight function. And the Department is always very interested in receiving their views."²¹⁸ [um

where the Observation Section commences. It is our view, however, that the Observations section is entirely off the mark.

Ten minutes later, the VCDS, LGen George Macdonald, contacts MGen Dempster (Turner's superior):

From: Macdonald LGen G@VCDSOttawa-Hull
Sent: Monday, June 10, 2002, 2:54 PM
To: Dempster MGen D@DGSP@Ottawa-Hull
Subject: BN [Briefng Note] ADM (Pol) Return on SCNDVA
State of Readiness Report

I have not seen the BN, but was under the impression that our offer to coordinate [it] was rejected [by the deputy minister]. Please bring me up to date verbally on where we are at with this and our own analysis. This is a little tricky to staff to the DM/CDS and higher if we are not in agreement [with the policy staff].

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command and control and air defence capability may not require the one for one replacement of the four Tribal class destroyers”; and that the Government has a “unique process” to begin to replace the Sea King helicopters but warns that “the possibility of delays exists.”²²⁸

The Chrétien government never did issue a new direction for national defence. The ships project announced in 2002 is still being developed in 2011. There are no keels laid for new replenishment ships. The Sea King continue to fy, more or less. No reliable readiness system was developed. The defence procurement system is still cumbersome and overly staff-ridden. Recognition that “the Canadian Forces have challenges” brings forth rhetorical “commitments” to this and that project delivered by skilled bureaucrats who dutifully concoct improbable strategies expressed in pulp mills of paper plans supported by an ever-ready panacea of fast-fading, fantastic management frameworks. Nothing, however, is suggested in the response to the clear demand from the House of Commons: deliver a national defence policy to modernize and enhance Canadian Forces operational capabilities.

The SCONDVA’s # 1 Recommendation to the government – that “The government increase the annual base budget for [DND] to between 1.5% and 1.6% of GDP with the increase to be phased in over the next three years and continue to move towards the NATO average” – was the *ukpg"swc"pqp* underpinning the committee’s broader aim “... of helping the Canadian Forces recoup, and indeed enhance, some of what they need to carry on as a professional fighting force.”²²⁹

The government’s response to this fundamental recommend \$
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CHAPTER SIX

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Gaining Influence by Influencing the 'Usual Process'

The documents and the interviews used in this study suggest strongly that it is not the quality of external studies and reports that influences de-

“Advice” even when these notes dismissed entirely the substance of the report at hand. Liberal government ministers appeared to accept without question the dismissal by officials of reports prepared by Senate and House

work and effort displayed in the many preceding studies that had gradually raised public and media awareness and interest in the state of the Canadian Forces and defence policy generally. It was the climax, as it turned out, of a long effort by academics, senators, members of parliament, and other national leaders and opinion makers to convince Liberal and Conservative politicians that they could no longer safely neglect national defence policy or the circumstances facing members of the Canadian Forces.

External studies and reports were somewhat influential to the extent that they created over time a public awareness that the defence of Canada and the nation's place in the world were in serious disrepair. The reports, from inside and outside parliament, repeatedly warned citizens of the weaknesses in the Liberal government's defence policy and created gradually a public appetite for change. They also figured prominently in the formulation of the Conservative Party's defence policy studies and the defence policy they introduced in parliament once they were in office.²³⁴

These effects should not be overstated as other factors were in play at the same time. When, for instance, the "defence deficit" the reports explained were verified dramatically by images such as the burning submarine, *JOEU* *Ejkeqwvok*, adrift in the Atlantic Ocean on 5 October 2004, in Canada's inability to respond in a timely fashion to the humanitarian disaster in Indonesia in December 2004, and in the Canadian Forces' very limited ability to join in the attacks on Afghanistan-based terrorist units after September 2001, the titles and findings and images from these reports – *Ecwi jv"kp"vjg" Okffng; C"Pcvkqp"cv"Tkum; Hqt"cp"Gzvtc"&352"Dwemu; Ecpcfc"ykvjqwv"Ct ofgf" HqteguA*; and others – came to life in the public's mind.

The collective influence of these events and these reports and studies was demonstrated by Prime Minister Paul Martin's energetic, but ultimately too late, attempts to radically change the Liberal government's national defence policies. He was unable, no matter the sincerity of his efforts, to convince Canadians and members of the Canadian Forces that the Liberal Party was on a new track and recognized the need for a significant defence policy review and appropriate defence funding.²³⁵

The new direction Prime Minister Martin intended to promote was captured first in a speech he gave in Toronto in early December 2003 while campaigning for the post-Chretien leadership of the Liberal Party. In his speech titled, "Canada's Role in a Complex World," Martin acknowledged many of the findings in the reports and studies reviewed in this monograph, but, of course, without direct reference to them.²³⁶ The concepts in his Toronto speech became eventually the framework for Martin's foreign and defence policies doctrine:

[The] attention Canada paid to its international instruments [declined] as priority was given to getting our domestic house in order. Our diplomatic network, our foreign and trade policy capacity our defence capabilities, and our commitment to development suffered as a result. Canada will have to do

Sending finely researched papers to parliament and NDHQ produces few positive results without prior public interest. Sending advance copies of studies to NDHQ simply allows officials a head start in preparing their (typically) dismissive notes. Modern policy influencers prepare careful media events, provide the media with ‘cut and paste bullets’ explaining their study’s major findings, recommendations, and arguments, and gets them out (under embargo) several days before the public release of the study.

The release strategy for the Queen’s/CDAI study, CWAFF?, is an example of this process aimed at overcoming the ‘usual process’. In their assessments of the report, officials confirmed unintentionally the usefulness of the strategy in their complaints that the authors were unfairly using the media to advance their views: “I also don’t think we can ignore the fact that reports like this show a considerable amount of public relations strategizing on the part of Bland et al. You don’t usually get headlines with measured, nuanced reflection – but ‘mass extinction’ will earn you 5 minutes of fame.”²⁴⁰

Every release plan should include a schedule of related events over several days: pre-release lures for the media; careful attention to the ‘news cycle’; a t-Mt é 20c?r pÆ ? m c? Ø r

the chair and the members very carefully mapped out before any hearing the principal issues to be addressed, the strategy for digging information out of sometimes reluctant ministers and officials and officers and their plan to maximize the presentation of their findings and recommendations. These particular subject strategies then formed the framework for calling witnesses, for the questions and the challenges that would be presented to them, and the follow-on information the committees would demand from governments.

The third innovation was the decision to “take the show on the road.”²⁴¹ The intent, and a successful idea, was to take questions on policies and practices directly to the officials and workers and soldiers and sailors who were obliged to implement the governments’ policies. These field trips, for instance, to Afghanistan, to major Canadian ports and airport handling facilities, and to military bases and communities provided unequalled access to ‘witnesses’ who would only rarely have the means or be allowed to travel to Ottawa to meet otherwise immovable committees of the Senate and the House of Commons.

Fourth, the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence purposely designed and formatted their reports to make them clear, readable, and pointed. The texts were, in almost all cases, addressed not to expert readers and members of the Senate and the House of Commons and especially not to federal bureaucrats, but to the media and to the lay public. The conclusions were especially highlighted and reinforced with direct quotes from the “ordinary Canadians we encountered in our research travels.”²⁴²

Finally, this Senate committee very deliberately tracked the responses of governments to their recommendations and published the committee’s reaction to them. This “recall procedure” helped the Senate in some respects to overcome the inhibiting custom that governments have no obligation to respond to Senate reports (unless the Senate asks formally for such a response). The gambit allowed the Senate committee to simply recall witnesses to ask them what action had been taken to implement the Senate’s recommendations. The “threat of such confessions”, as one senator described it, seemed to sharpen officials’ and officers’ initial testimony and the attention of members in the PCO as they prepared their responses to reports.

We must note, however, that while these procedures and practices greatly highlighted and enhanced the committee’s reports, the policy in force was at best uneven. Nevertheless, the Senate’s security and defence committee was especially effective and influential in bringing to the public’s attention the insecurity in Canadian ports and in the negligent handling of stowed cargo at Canadian airports. The committee can take a great deal

of credit for significantly influencing the government's security policies in these areas and in the reallocation of government funding for national security policy generally. The prime mover in these cases was the media, well primed by a (mostly) non-partisan committee and its energetic chair, Senator Colin Kenny.

Five Key Recommendations for National Defence and Security Committees of Parliament

1. Act as though parliament does not intend to be treated with contempt by ministers, officials, or other servants.
2. Conduct specific inquiries, not wide-ranging, whole-of-policy studies. For example, study in detail the specifics of individual military acquisitions and not the entire government, multi-departmental procurement apparatus. Reports on comprehensive studies merely provide governments and officials great opportunities to deliberately "miss" the vital points committees might be trying to make and give officials and their masters reasons to delay, sometimes for months, governments' responses to committees' recommendations.
3. Develop a process of "will-say" interviews to take place (perhaps in-camera) before witnesses are called to testify in public as a means of determining lines of inquiry for committees dealing with complex matters. This process is commonplace in other types of inquiries and in the production of public affairs media shows. These pre-interviews could very well be managed directly by senior, well-informed committee research staffs.
4. Always demand a comprehensive response from government for every House of Commons report – and put them on short timelines to respond. For the Senate, always use provisions that allow for committees to make demands for timely responses from governments.
5. Always conduct follow-up committee hearings and re-call witnesses to review governments' formal responses to every parliamentary report. Failure to do so not only leaves recommendations hanging in the air, but also provides a huge incentive for governments (and their officials) to return to parliament gaseous responses devoid of meaning knowing that their responses will never be challenged once they are received by the Senate or the House of Commons.

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1. Donald Savoie, *Eqwv" Iqxtpogpv" cpf"vjg" Eqmcrug" qh" Ceeqwpvcdkkv{"kp" Ecpfc" cpf"vjg" Wpkvgf" Mkpifqo* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), p. 267.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
3. The study's timetable and final monograph were in large measure determined by the response of the DND to ATI requests. In almost all cases, responses were delayed for several months over some three years of research planning, requests to government, delays in responses, and assessment of records which often resulted in new ATI requests, most of which had to be accomplished before the records and responses and interviews could begin.
4. The m e ? Mq] en B ft e

10. Canada, *EcpfcuikpvgtpcvkqpcnRqnkefUvcvgo gpv<C" Tqng"qh"Rtkfg"cpf"kpew/gpeg"kp"vjg" Yqtnf*, Ottawa, 2005.
11. Chrétien, *Of" [gctu"cu"Rtkog"Okpkwgt*, p. 304. See also p. 54.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 304.
13. One strong minister of national defence who tried early in the Chrétien era to argue in cabinet for a strong national defence policy and a rebuilding of the Canadian Forces after the federal deficit was brought under control stated privately that he was stopped in mid-sentence by the prime minister's dismissive wave of the hand: "Look, why bother with this, there aren't any votes in it." – whereupon the discussion turned to other matters. Interview.
14. Chrétien, *Of" [gctu"cu"Rtkog"Okpkwgt*, p. 303.
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30. DND, CDA Letter. Minute, Acting ADM(Pol) 30923, 24 September 2001. (Capitalization in the original.)
31. DND, DGSP, "Briefing Note For the Minister: Conference of Defence Associations Report on Readiness of the Canadian Forces," 27 September 2001.
32. DND, ADM(Pol), "Advice to the minister: CDA Report – Canadian Forces Capabilities," 27 September 2001.
33. DND, ADM(Pol), Advice for the Minister, "CDA Report – Canadian Forces Capabilities" 28 September 2001. The prime minister repeated this confident theme in a formal letter of congratulations to the CDA for its "exemplaire rapport" (Canada, Prime Minister Chrétien to Lieutenant General Belzile, President of the CDA, 30 October 2001).
34. See especially Chrétien, *Où l'«gcttu"cu"Rtkog"Okpkwgt*, p. 303.
35. DND, "BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER: CONFERENCE OF D D, \$ é n , \$

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46. See Chrétien, *O! "gctu"cu"Rtkog"Okpwgt*, p. 304.
47. Interview, McNeil, December 2010
48. Interview, McNeil, December 2010, and General Ray Henault (retired), December 2010. General Henault in this interview emphasized his great difficulty at the time in working with the Deputy Minister of DND, Margaret Bloodworth, who took her guidance on defence matters from the Privy Council Office.
49. Interview and personal correspondence: McNeil, December 2010.
50. Ibid. Commodore McNeil went on to p dwe D \$ s

Ibid. ComMé a Ò Ibid. Co

64. DND, Letter, Minister of National Defence, John McCallum to Lieutenant General Evraire, then Chairman of the Conference of Defence Association Institute, 28 April 2003. (Emphasis added.)
65. *Vjg"Urgekcn"Eqo okuukqp"qp"vjg"Tguvtwewtkpi"qh"vjg"Tgugtxgu<Vgp" [gctu" Ncvgt#"*Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary," 24 September 2004. The study was also known as the Dickson Study, named after its chairman, the Right Honourable Chief Justice Brian Dickson.
66. As quoted in Douglas L. Bland, ed., "Hellyer's Reorganization" in *Ecpcfciù" Pcvkqpcn" Fghgpeg."Xqmwog"4." Fghgpeg" Qticpk/cvkqp* (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, 1998), p. 113.
67. *Tgugtxgu"4222* was a Reserve (mostly Militia) lobby group intended to use the Reserves' political clout to protect them from harmful, arbitrary decisions (as they saw them) taken by the CDS or governments.
68. Colonel (ret'd) Peter Hunter, "Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves: 10 Years Later – Selected Conference Speaking Notes," *Lqwtpcn" qh"Oknkvtf"cpf"Uvtcvgike"Uvwfkgu* (Winter 2005-2006, Vol. 8, Issue 2), p. 1.
69. Private Letter: Lieutenant General (ret'd) Charles Belzile to General R.R. Henault (CDS), 24 September 2004. Interview, Jack Granatstein, November 2010.
70. Ibid.
71. DND, Email Captain (N) JGV Tremblay, "SCRR Plus Ten," 13 October 2004.
72. DND/NDHQ Minute Sheet addressed to the CDS: "The enclosed letter reflects revisions recommended by JAG at your meeting last Friday." 25 October 2004.
73. NDHQ Letter, General R.R. Henault to Lieutenant General Belzile, 25 October 2004.
74. Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, "Message from the Director of Programs," 12 September 2005. There is some confusion over release dates in the ATI messages. It seems that this notice was sent in advance of the official release that, based on NDHQ message traffic, seems to have been nearer 28 September 2005.
75. LGen Caron had not been closely involved within the LFRR program in 2004-05 and had not, it seems, had much contact with the reports' authors.
76. NDHQ, Email Tabbernor to Caron, 09:20 AM, Tuesday, 6 October 2005.
77. NDHQ, Email Caron to Tabbernor, 10:28 AM, Tuesday, 6 October 2005.
78. NDHQ, "Briefing Note for the CDS," SO Comms, LFRR, 31 October 2005.
79. Interview, Jack Granatstein, November 2010.
80. DND, email, Marcotte Lcd5 , @VCDS RC \$Â re to eneral Reser and Cad tsj@Ottawa-Hull t various of ces in NDHQ, T ues y
81. The Canad/ian Forces Liaison Cou cil is composed of more than two hu

conduct "... its own **People's Defence Review**" (emphasis in the original). One wonders what might have occurred had the minister sat with the principal members of the Council in 2001 and worked out an honest way to incorporate some of their main ideas into the "defence Update" that was issued in 2002. (See "CCS21 Discussion Board Participants" signed by J.L. Granatstein, 21 March 2003.) But speaking directly with authors of studies or engaging them in a critical review of their work was not the 'usual process' in NDHQ or in government generally.

94. Douglas L. Bland, ed., *Ecpcfc" ykvjqwv" Ct ogf" HqteguA* (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, 2003). (The study was conducted with and supported by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, Ottawa.)

95. At times in the late 1990s and early 2000s, defence officials would attempt to discredit researchers from outside DND who pointed to the need to replace aging military equipment by suggesting that such demands were invalid if they suggested (and they usually did to officials in public discussions) that the critics were wed to a one-for-one exchange of old equipment for new ones of the same number, type, and capabilities when in the future this equipment might be replaced by new technologies and need not be acquired at all. Thus, so they argued, such demands were unfounded or unsophisticated and must be dismissed. The point past this sophistry was to ask officials what then were the signed, funded programs that would replace old capabilities with new, 'high tech' capabilities? During the Chrétien era officials could only answer: "There are none." The CWAFF? study only exposed the dead end of current equipment and did not suggest beyond generalities any specific replacement capabilities.

96. DND, Monday, 01 December 2003, 14:12 PM, Rushworth to Scanlon. ATI 000312. "MAT" is ADM Materiel; "O&M" is operations and maintenance.

97. DND, Monday, 01 December 2003, 14:56 PM. Rushworth to White. ATI 000311.

98. DND, Monday, 01 December, 2003, 07:19 AM, Taymun to Rushworth. ATI 000297. (Em

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119. DND, email, From Agnew Cdr J@CAS D Air PA to Bastien MGen R@CAS CAS Exec, 15 December 2003, 9:37 AM.
120. DND, email, From Rushworth MS@ADM(PA) to Browning SA@ADM(PA), Tuesday, 30 December 2003, 12:12 PM.
121. DND, email, Harper Capt(N) JE@ADM(HR-Mil) DTEP to Murphy Cmdre RD@ADM(HR-Mil) DGHRPP, Wednesday, 3 December 2003, 3:39 PM. The remark was recorded, according to this email, by Colonel, later Lieutenant General, Walt Semianiw, who was present at the meeting.
122. DND, Email, Miller I@ADM(Pol) D Parl A to ADM (Pol) et al, Wednesday, 29 October 2003, 11:57 AM. There is no ATI record of a request ever having been made by ~~Miller I@ADM(Pol) D Parl A~~ ~~Miller I@ADM(Pol) D Parl A~~ r.s! DNDD i - 2d e

140. DND, ADM (Policy), "Briefing Note For The Minister of National Defence,"
Hqt"cp"Gzvtc"&352"Dwemuc"Wrfcvg"Qp"Ecpcfcùu"Oknkvt{"Hkpcpekn"Etkuku<"
C"Xky"htqo"vjg"Dqvwqo"Wr. 21 November 2002.
141. Canada, Senate of Canada, *Ecpcfcùu"Eqcuvnkpgu<"Vjg"Nqpi gu"Wpfgt/*

173. Canadian governments continue to make announcements about new “national shipbuilding strategies,” but no keels have ever been laid down.

174.

196. Ibid., pp. 2-3. (Emphasis added.)
197. The response is undated, but the draft was passed to the PCO on or about 20 December 2001 (DND memorandum) and was due in parliament by 5 February 2002 and we assume, therefore, that it was produced near that date.
198. Ibid., p. 2. (Emphasis added.)
199. Canada, House of Commons, *Uvcpfkpi"Eqo okvvgg"Qp"Pcvkqpcn" Fghgpeg" Cpf"Xgvtcpu"Chhcktu, Hcekp i"Qwt" Tgurqpukdkmkvkgu"ô"Vjg"Uvcvg"qh" Tgcfkpguu" qh"vjg" Ecpcfkcpc" Hqtegu*, 30 May 2002," Ottawa. Hereinafter, *Vjg"Uvcvg"qh" Tgcfkpguu"qh"vjg" Ecpcfkcpc" Hqtegu*.
200. Among his blunders, McCallum confessed that he had never heard of the Canadian Second World War landing at Dieppe, France, a celebrated (if failed) Canadian attack, second only as a national military icon to the First World War successful attack at Vimy. The minister later compounded his first error when he confused Vimy with the Second World War French collaborator regime housed at Vichy, France.
201. As quoted in Canada, DND, "Background: Defence Update (SCONDVA Report)," Adam Fisher (D Parl A 2-3), 3 June 2002.
202. *Oqxkpi" Hqtyctf<"C"Uvtcvgike" Rncp" hqt" Swcnkv{ "qh" Nkhg" K o r t q x g o g p v u" k p" v j g" Ecpcfkcpc" Hqtegu*; the *Rtqewtgo gpv"Uvwf{*, June 2000; the *Tgrqtv"qp" Rncpu" cpf" Rtktkvkgu*, June 2001; and the *Uvcvg"qh" Tgcfkpguu"qh" Pcvkqpcn" Fghgpeg<" Tgurqpug"vq"vjg" Vgttqtuv"Vj tgc*v, November 2001.
203. *Vjg"Uvcvg"qh" Tgcfkpguu"qh"vjg" Ecpcfkcpc" Hqtegu*, p. 1/3. (Emphasis in the original.)
204. DND, Email, Fawcett MW@DFPPC@Ottawa-Hull, June 03, 2002, 11:31 AM. (Emphasis in the original.)
205. Canada, DND, "Advice for the Minister – Defence Update (SCONDVA Report), 30 May 2002.
206. Canada, DND, "Advice for the Minister – Defence Update (SCONDVA Report), 5 June 2002.
207. Canada, DND, "Advice for the Minister – Defence Funding/Capabilities (SCONDVA Report), 12 June and 19 June 2002.
208. Ibid. On the continuing arguments in 2003 for a status quo 1994 defence policy see the comments in this monograph on the report, *Ecpcf" ykvjqwv" C t o g f" HqteguA*
209. Ibid.
210. See the defence policy discussions in *Ecpcf" ykvjqwv" C t o g f" HqteguA* noted earlier in this monograph.
211. Canada, DND, Briefng Note for the Minister of National Defence, "House of Commons Report on the State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces." 11 June 2002, p. 1.
212. Ibid., p. 3.

213. Ibid., p. 4.
214. Ibid., p. 3.
215. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
216. Ibid., p. 3.
217. Although DND officials argued that going to a NATO equivalent would force the Canadian government to increase the defence budget of “\$4-5 billion to reach 1.6% of GDP and would need to be double its current level to reach 2.2%” the point is – or ought be – that the defence budget should be pegged at a level that produces outcomes commensurate with the government’s defence policies and commitments, notwithstanding the GDP input of other nations.
218. Briefing Note, 11 June 2002.
219. Ibid, p.5.
220. The Clerk of the Privy Council Office assigned DND as the ‘lead department’ responsible for coordinating the preparation of the government’s response to the House of Commons.
221. Canada, “Government Response to the Report of the Standing Committee On National Defence and Veterans Affairs: Facing Our Responsibilities – The State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces.” p. 1/9. Hereafter, Government Response. See also: Canada, DND, “Government Response to the Report of the Standing Committee On National Defence and Veterans Affairs” ‘News Room’, 25 October 2002. www.forces.gc.ca/news.
222. Government Response, p. 1/9.
223. Government Response, p. 1/9.
224. Ibid., p. 2/9.
225. Ibid., p. 4/9. This commitment is repeated verbatim in response to Recommendation 12, p. 5/9.
226. Ibid., pp. 5/9 and 6/9.
227. Ibid., p. 9/9.
228. Government Response.
229. *Vjg"Uvcvg"qh" Tgc f kpguu"qh"vjg"Ecpc f kcp"Hqtegu*, p. 1/3.
230. Government Response, pp. 1/9 and 2/9. Interestingly, the wording in this response to this committee’s most important recommendation is remarkably similar to the defence funding policy of Pierre Trudeau’s government as stated in its defence white paper, *Fghgpeg"p"vjg"92iu* “A decision on the appropriate size of the defence budget c] u f ! f ? f! ` duMthe de \$ c]

Minister

The Minister holds office during pleasure, has the management and direction of the Canadian Forces and of all matters relating to national defence and is responsible for

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a) Minister of National Defence is responsible for the management and direction of the Canadian Forces and of all matters relating to national defence and is responsible for

Regular Force

There shall be a component of the Canadian Forces, called the Regular Force, that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for continuing, full-time military service.

Reserve Force

There shall be a component of the Canadian Forces, called the Reserve Force, that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service when not on active service.

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Dr. Douglas Bland was Professor and Chair of the Defence Management Studies Program in the School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, from September 1996 to 1 April 2011. His research and publishing interests are concentrated in the fields of defence policy making and management at national and international levels, the organization and functioning of defence ministries, and civil-military relations.

Richard Shimooka was a Research Associate in the Defence Management Studies Program at Queen's University. He has written several studies on a variety of topics, ranging from defence and foreign policy making, open source organizations, and procurement practices. Richard holds a Master's of Strategic Studies from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, and resides in Surrey, British Columbia.

