WHAT NATO FOR CANADA?

WHAT NATO FOR CANADA?

Edited by
David G. Haglund

With a Foreword by Roman Jakubow

Centre for International Relations, Queen's University
Kingston, Ontario, Canada
2000

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Main entry under title:

What NATO for Canada?

(Martello papers, ISSN 1183-3661 ; 23)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-88911-890-6

1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization – Canada. 2. Canada – Military policy.
I. Haglund, David G. II. Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.). Centre for International Relations. III. Series.

UA646.5.C3W42 2000 355'.033571 C00-932936-6

The Martello Papers

The Queen's University Centre for International Relations (QCIR) is pleased to present the twenty-third in its series of security studies, the *Martello Papers*. Taking their name from the distinctive towers built during the nineteenth century to defend Kingston, Ontario, these papers cover a wide range of topics and issues relevant to contemporary international strategic relations.

This volume represents the fruits of a workshop organized by the QCIR in late June 2000, the purpose of which was to stimulate discussion about the future of Canadian involvement in the Atlantic alliance. We would like to express our gratitude to the Department of National Defence, both for the project support extended for this initiative by the Directorate of Strategic Analysis and for the ongoing program support offered through its Security and Defence Forum. As well, David Haglund would like to acknowledge with thanks Irwin Publishing for permission to draw upon some materials included in his recent monograph, *The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited*; Stephen Walt similarly expresses his appreciation to the editors of *The National Interest*, for allowing him to use material previously published in that journal.

As is the case with all *Martello Papers*, the views expressed here are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the position of the QCIR or any of its supporting agencies.

David G. Haglund
Director, QCIR

Joel J. Sokolsky
Senior Fellow, QCIR

Contents

The Department of National Defence asked the Queen's Centre for International Relations to undertake an independent inquiry into the broad agenda being pursued by NATO while it seeks effectively to meet the challenges of the new millennium and to provide security for years to come. To ensure a diversity of perspectives, an international team of researchers — American, British, Canadian, and Russian — was formed and the following chapters present the results of their inquiry.

None of the key policy areas examined is particularly new, but they are all fundamental issues that will likely be part of the security debate for a long time. The first involves Europe's old but recently revived aspirations for a more autonomous "pillar" of defence — known as the European security and defence identity (ESDI) in North America and as the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) in Europe. The second is the alliance's adaptation to the new "fundamental tasks," that is, the shift of emphasis from the collective defence of its own territory to its ability to deal with conflicts on Europe's periphery. The third relates to the possible further enlargement of the alliance from the current nineteen members.

Each of these three areas of concern has implications for Canada, which are considered in an attempt to determine if the Canadian rapprochement with NATO during the 1990s will persist.

Although this study was undertaken to meet the needs of defence policymakers, we hope that it will stimulate reflection and discussion within a wider audience — government, the academic community, and the Canadian public. Finally, we owe much gratitude to David Haglund for the leadership demonstrated during this research project and to him and Joel Sokolsky, Pavel Baev, Neil MacFarlane, and Stephen Walt for their scholarly contributions.

Roman Jakubow
Director of Strategic Analysis
National Defence Headquarters

with the evolution of Canadian peacekeeping (away from the UN and more toward NATO and "coalitions of the willing"), the orientation of Russia toward the alliance, the implications for Canada of a more cohesive European "pillar" of defence, and the American debate on NATO's future.

Canada and the Formation of NATO: Also Present at the Creation

In the fifty-one years since the signing of the Washington treaty memories have become clouded about the origins of the Atlantic alliance, regrettably not only in the United States.[4] Many observers, including not a few in Canada, seem to regard NATO as an American-designed mechanism for the accomplishment of one aim only, the containment of Soviet expansionary communism. They are wrong on two counts. The alliance was something into which a reluctant US had to be drawn, and its purposes have from the outset transcended the goal, however essential, of providing collective defence to Western Europe and North America.

To read some of the latest American scholarship on NATO's founding, however, not only was America "ready, aye, ready" to forge a multilateral security arrangement with other Western states in the late 1940s, but such an arrangement was virtually dictated by concern for the preservation of gains made in the *domestic* political-economic arena. All politics, an Irish-American speaker of the House of Representatives once intoned, is local, and for the newest wave of American multilateralists, so apparently was NATO! No doubt the "new multilateralists" realize there were other countries around at the time of NATO's birth, but these appear to have had no part in the obstetrics.

In the words of the doyen of the new multilateralism, John Ruggie, what eventuated in the postwar Atlantic world — i.e., the elaboration and spread of a web of multilateral organizations at whose centre was the alliance — was "less the fact of American *hegemony* ... than it was the fact of *American* hegemony." Or, as two other scholars put the same self-centred thought, the "overall political character of the West is really an extension of the political character of the United States."[5]

It would serve no purpose to seek to minimize or deny the indispensable American contribution to the construction of postwar atlanticism. Nevertheless, there were others present at the creation of that order, for reasons related both to their security needs and their political-ideological convictions. Canada was prominent among the small group of states that forged postwar atlanticism. The story has been told often enough, although evidently not recently enough. Suffice it to recall that after the Czechoslovak coup of February 1948, London and Ottawa began to redouble their efforts to entice Washington into tripartite discussions that might lead to a multilateral, collective-defence scheme intended to enhance Western security and promote Western values. Already in November 1947 the three capitals had begun exploratory talks, in secret, about alternative security arrangements

to the United Nations, by now seen to be entering a period of paralysis engendered by the rapidly emerging Cold War.

US attitudes, especially in Congress, toward a robust multilateral defence scheme were nothing if not lukewarm, notwithstanding the later reconstruction of those attitudes by today's new multilateralists. Outside pressure from respected countries — and at the time Britain and Canada were America's chief and perhaps only security partners — was needed to convince Congress that if it authorized such a radical departure from America's historic policy of peacetime aloofness from the European balance of power, it would not be left doing all the work singlehandedly.

Intergovernmental discussions between Canada, Britain, and the United States resumed in Washington on 22 March 1948 — discussions that would eventually involve France, the Benelux countries, and Norway, and would result in the treaty signed on 4 April 1949 creating the alliance, whose charter members would include all the above plus Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, and Italy. A month after the initiation of the tripartite talks, Louis St. Laurent, secretary of state for external affairs and soon to be prime minister of Canada, addressed the House of Commons in a wide-ranging review of world affairs. St. Laurent's speech of 29 April 1948 was important, not only for its impact on Parliament but also for its effect on Congress.[6]

What transpired in February in Czechoslovakia, said St. Laurent, should come as a dire warning to democratic governments throughout the West. The "lesson is that it is impossible to co-operate with communists. They do not want co-operation. They want domination." Thus they must be resisted, but to do this required much more unity of purpose than the democracies had heretofore demonstrated. Because collective security under the United Nations looked to be becoming a will-o'-the-wisp, an alternative means of achieving security needed to be developed.

Canada had a special role in that development, he continued. What was required was the creation of an association of all free states in the West, linking North America with the five signatories (the UK, France, Belgium, the Nether-

The latter would eventually be realized through the construction of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its attendant military commitments and institutional arrangements. The former were prefigured in Canada's successful attempt to endow the alliance with a charter obligation to work toward political and economic community-building — an obligation found primarily in the Washington treaty's "Canadian" article (article 2), and also in article 4, enjoining the members to take seriously the requirement of consultation on important matters.

In later years, it would be objected that NATO concentrated almost exclusively

spending; moreover, Canada's defence/GDP ratio remains what it has been for

Lester B. Pearson, in 1955, prompting Germany's ambassador to Ottawa, Herbert Siegfried, to report that Ottawa's European policy was "remarkably naive."[10] Three years later, another European would issue a more colourful, though equally unflattering, judgement: Paul-Henri Spaak, NATO's secretary general, quipped (in private, he thought) during a 1958 visit to Ottawa that the Canadians had become "the Yugoslavs of NATO."[11]

But it would be Pierre Trudeau who took Ottawa's assessment of NATO to another plane altogether, "singularizing" Canada within the alliance in his belief in the effectiveness of minimal deterrence at a time when the other allies were trying to enhance the credibility of extended deterrence, and telling Canadians that "one of the most compelling reasons" to stay in NATO inhered in the alliance's usefulness as a means of pursuing détente.[12]

The third source of Canada's lessened commitment to the defence of Western Europe resulted from the belief that the Europeans, as they recovered from the war, would be able to do more for their own defence, and therefore should do more. This conviction mingled with a related belief on the part of some Canadians (usually policy intellectuals on the left) that attention to Europe and its "needs" was depriving Canada of the ability to focus its limited resources on parts of the world where the case for assistance was even greater — and the entitlement more justified. This perception of a jaded and selfish Western Europe arose at a time when, because of the Vietnam War, some Canadians were prepared to conclude that NATO was itself complicit in misplaced interventionism if not aggression, leading them to demand that Canada withdraw from the alliance altogether.

Pro-neutrality sentiment never made great inroads among the Canadian public, and the one federal party that did as a matter of principle advocate Canada's leaving NATO, the New Democrats, could hardly be said to have benefitted from the advocacy. But if Canada did not "go neutral," it certainly looked, especially with the advent of the Trudeau government in 1968, as if NATO was to be deemphasized in the country's grand strategy. Trudeau himself promised as much in an important speech in Calgary in April 1969, when he asked whether it made any sense for NATO to continue to determine the country's defence policy, and for the latter to determine the country's foreign policy? He kept this promise.

Ever since the Trudeau years, Canada's perspective on the defence of the Western Europeans remained relatively constant, up to and beyond the ending of the Cold War. Membership in the alliance would be periodically reaffirmed, but so too would be reaffirmed the country's aversion to regarding atlanticism as simply an alternative way of saying "the defence of Western Europe." And always, there was a lack of desire (and means) to continue paying for as much of a military effort as the allies would have liked Canada to make. There would, it is true, be moments, in the mid 1970s and again, in the late 1980s, when Canadian governments would sound and act as if they were willing to make an enhanced contribution to Western Europe's defence (sometimes for reasons having little to do with defence per se), but in the end other priorities would prevail, rendering the decision

to withdraw Canada's stationed forces from Germany a relatively easy one to reach in 1992.

By the early 1990s, then, it looked as if what John Holmes had prophesied twenty years earlier was about to come true: for Canada, the "triangular Atlantic community [was] nearing the end of a long death."[13] What he meant was that a combination of factors related both to the alliance and to the broader state of political and economic relations within the North Atlantic Triangle was pointing in the direction of one inescapable conclusion: the ocean that separated Canada from Europe was widening.

(WTO), and in so doing transform NATO from a predominantly military into an increasingly political organization, whose new mandate would stress cooperating with, not containing, the east. That was the relatively easy part of the alliance's transformatory quest, even if its logical sequel tended to be an initiative, NATO

Can the Rapprochement Last?

These three areas of concern bring us to the contemplation of Canada's future relationship with the alliance, which will be my task in the concluding chapter. There, I will try to determine whether the Canadian rapprochement with NATO of the 1990s can be expected to persist. If not, will we once more witness a desire on the part of Canadian policymakers to distance Canada from security involvements with the allies (or at least the *European* allies, given that the country's current strategic planning seems to presuppose a deepening of military integration with the US)?[17]

If the past is any guide, Canadian commitment to NATO's activities — even to the more "political" agenda of the "new" NATO — can be expected to wax and wane depending upon a) the costs and risks associated with such commitment, b) the degree of voice Canada gets in exchange for the effort it contributes, and c) the extent to which NATO and the allies are congruent with and useful for the attainment of broader Canadian security interests (this last being the topic of Joel Sokolsky's chapter).

Before turning to the Sokolsky chapter, it might be useful to draw this overview chapter to an end by reflecting upon Neil MacFarlane's reminder that some analysts (MacFarlane cites Peter Katzenstein) consider Canada to have the world's first "post-modern" grand strategy. It would take more time (and good humour) than any of us possesses to plumb the depths of the "post-modern" phenomenon, and all that I can do here is to note that there seem to be three ways in which "post-modernism" and Canadian grand strategy can become entangled with each other.

First, post-modernism can be held to be synonymous with a "post-Westphalian" system, the latter meaning an order in which the balance of power has become obsolete as a means of preserving peace within the group (as in, say, the Atlantic "security community"). In this context, post-modern really means post-balancing, and it is applied to only a portion of the planet, with lands and peoples located outside the contemporary Western "zone of peace" being relegated either to the modern or, worse, pre-modern worlds, with all the sorrows and tribulations such status connotes.

Secondly, and flowing directly from the above, post-modernism conjures up leadership potential for countries that may not otherwise be militarily well-endowed or "powerful" in the conventional sense, and this on the basis of its elevating effect upon ideas and ideals as power assets (otherwise known as *Idealpolitik*) — above all, on the basis of something called "soft power." One of the most contentious debates in contemporary Canadian strategy rages over the ability of Canada to rely upon soft power — held to be the power to attract not compel others, and to do so through one's values and ability to communicate them — at the expense of investing in "harder" assets, such as military forces, or even economic assistance.

Currently, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade seems convinced that Canada does possess and can employ soft power. Department officials may be correct. But to the extent they are, it is worth stressing that Canada's power to attract inheres in its geopolitical setting as well as in the ideals it seeks to promulgate, and both are a function of atlanticism, with the latter (the ideals)

9. Quoted in David J. Bercuson, "Canada, NATO, and Rearmament, 1950-1954: Why Canada Made a Difference (but not for Very Long)," in *Making a Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order*

2. *Over There With Uncle Sam: Peacekeeping, the "Trans-European Bargain," and the Canadian Forces*

Joel J. Sokolsky[1]

Introduction: From UN "Blue" to NATO "Green"

In December 1997, the *Globe and Mail* ran an article on Canada's "shrinking peacekeeping role." It noted that the 250 Canadian Forces (CF) soldiers on various United Nations operations represented the lowest level since Lester Pearson won the Noble Peace Prize forty years earlier. It also mentioned, parenthetically, that there were 1,300 Canadian troops in Bosnia. According to the *Globe*, these forces did not count because they were "part of a NATO rather than UN force."[2]

Since then, the imbalance between Canada's UN and NATO peacekeeping commitments has become even more pronounced. As of 1 June 2000, there were some 2,756 CF personnel on overseas operations. Of these, 1,596 were with the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and another 522 served with the alliance's Kosovo Force (KFOR). In support of NATO operations in the Balkans, Canada deployed 118 personnel with the allied air forces at Aviano, Italy. If the 225-strong ship's company of *HMCS Fredericton* sailing with NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) is added, it means that 93 percent of all CF personnel overseas were deployed in support of NATO and its new peacekeeping operations.[3] In addition, Canada has continued to maintain a naval presence in the Persian Gulf, where *HMCS Calgary* is deployed. Only some 220 personnel, 190 of these on the Golan Heights and the remainder in small contingents nne

The imbalance is even more telling when it is considered that the CF has deployed to the NATO operations its most advanced equipment: CF-18 aircraft, Coyote reconnaissance vehicles, Leopard main battle tanks, and the patrol frigates. In comparison with NATO's other middle powers, such as Belgium and Spain, Canada has a higher percentage of its available forces outside its borders, 6 percent as opposed to an average of 2 percent.[5] While the prime minister might declare that "[g]enerally speaking, we are very reluctant to join an intervention that is not under the umbrella of the UN,"[6] the reality is otherwise.

The discrepancy between the UN "blue helmet" commitments and the US-organized and -led NATO "green helmet" commitment tells the whole story of international peacekeeping in the 1990s and highlights what had happened to this quintessentially Canadian (and supposedly un-American) role for the CF. It also tells the story of what has happened to Canada's relationship to NATO and the American role in the alliance. In the 1990s, Canada has been "over there" — the classic over there, Europe — with Uncle Sam.

This chapter argues that three closely related factors have contributed to this phenomenon, which was hardly foreseen when the Cold War ended over a decade ago. First, there has been the "Americanization" of peacekeeping, especially with regard to NATO and its activities in Eastern Europe. Second, there is the new "trans-European" bargain, which has become the core of Washington's policy toward NATO. Through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, the US has transformed the alliance into a collective security organization that utilizes this new American-style peacekeeping. Indeed, PfP might as well stand for the "partnership for peacekeeping," or maybe even the "pretense for power-projection."

The third factor accounting for the overwhelming NATO emphasis in CF operations is directly related to the previous two. As stated explicitly in "Strategy 2020," the Canadian Forces have made interoperability with the US the central focus of doctrine and force development. This has reinforced the importance of the alliance, in its new guise, for the country's defence policy.

Thus the irony: when the post-Cold War era began, NATO's salience for Canada seemed to be on the decline, while UN peacekeeping was clearly on the ascendancy. But that very emphasis upon peacekeeping has brought Canada full-circle back to the NATO-dominated defence policies, and especially force structure decisions, that so characterized the Cold War. By transforming the alliance into a trans-European bargain one of whose major components is a vigorous peacekeeping role for NATO and its new partners, Washington has again made NATO a major determinant of Canadian defence policy and a key element in bilateral defence relations.

Canada and the Americanization of Peacekeeping in the 1990s[7]

At the beginning of the 1990s, the "Canadianization" of US defence policy seemed to be at hand as the UN, with considerable American support, launched a series of

peacekeeping operations that in a few years saw nearly 80,000 blue helmets being deployed from Cambodia to the former Yugoslavia.[8] With American global security interests contracting and with the Security Council now able to reach a consensus more easily, peacekeeping offered Washington the prospect that the UN would be able to respond to regional crises and civil strife without the need to deploy US forces. The UN also undertook to intervene in countries on humanitarian grounds in response to starvation or atrocities brought on by these internal struggles. Despite some early successes, it soon became clear that UN peacekeeping forces were not able to deal with all situations. In contrast to Cold War peacekeeping operations, the blue helmets were now being sent to areas where the fighting had not stopped, where in fact there was "no peace to keep."[9] UN forces soon became bogged down in Somalia and at serious risk in Yugoslavia.

This led to a new variation in UN peace efforts. Rather than sending in lightly armed multinational forces under UN command, the Security Council authorized a coalition of states, usually led by the US, to intervene more forcefully in civil conflicts and impose a peace or at least a cease-fire. Such was the approach in

early 1990s. Within a few years, nearly 5,000 CF personnel were abroad, mostly in the former Yugoslavia, but with small numbers dispatched to Latin America and Cambodia. All of this reflected the longstanding Canadian desire to play an active role in international security affairs as well as a distinctively Canadian one. The 1994 white paper on defence stressed the importance of contributing to international security efforts and responding to humanitarian disasters. It stated that the CF would also maintain a global combat capability. With cuts to the defence budget and personnel, it became increasingly difficult to argue that Canada had anywhere near such a capability. Indeed, the heavy peacekeeping demands of the

In many ways, the US military is better suited to promote this agenda than the CF. It can draw upon the nonmilitary skills of its large reserve forces who bring to

Defence Command (NORAD), and the defence of Western Europe, through NATO, declining in relative importance, the focus of bilateral defence relations has shifted to what used to be called "out of area."

From Washington's standpoint, Canada has been a welcomed contributor to NATO and other more vigorous peacekeeping operations the US has organized and led. Admittedly, the Canadian contributions have been small in comparison to what the US can deploy. Although in a "unipolar world" the US may not need the Canadian contribution from a military standpoint, politically it is important to

its seemingly intractable and inherently contradictory problems of a strategic and, above all, political nature. True to the messy nature of democratic governance itself, this collection of democracies managed to surprise and confound its critics and attain victory in the Cold War by adopting a series of initiatives that placed political compromise above military and strategic orthodoxy and intellectual rigour. The end result was that the allies stayed allied and in doing so, achieved ultimate victory in the Cold War. The same approach has been followed in the post-Cold War era, and this accounts for the continued centrality of the alliance in European and global security.

The alliance was quick to respond to the breath-taking fall of the Warsaw pact and then the Soviet Union itself. Beginning in the early 1990s, it revised its stra-

bargain, American links to the former Warsaw pact members and Soviet republics

security and prosperity, the United States can afford to accept the solutions of powers whose interests are directly engaged."[19]

Huntington regards Washington's efforts to impose its solutions on regional problems as guaranteed to lead to the gradual alienation of its allies, leaving America a "lonely superpower." He concedes, though, that "[h]ealthy cooperation with Europe is the prime antidote for the loneliness of American superpowerdom."[20] To this extent, the new trans-European bargain can be seen as part of an American effort to sustain the relevance of the old transatlantic bargain. At the same time, the shift of America's focus to the east is having an impact on the character of the alliance.

For the older members, NATO remains a collective defence organization. But given the absence of any kind of threat to Western Europe and the inability of the Western Europeans to develop any common policy toward the east, it is not surprising that the links now binding America to Europe run over and around these countries. Even the admission to the alliance of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic may be viewed as less the accession of these states to NATO and more the formalization of their security ties to the US. To be sure, the Western European allies and Canada are deeply engaged in the PfP process. Moreover, they are also concerned about the relationship between the countries of the east and the European security and defence identity (ESDI) and the .0002 Tw 4(ene c r(opc -0.)eu87rHar)6

> community," but the advantages of securing it are worth the diplomatic labor it takes. A resolution or consensus eases consciences both in America and abroad, and helps protect U.S. allies from their respective critics at home (though not in Washington, of course).[22]

The dominant position of the US provides a favourable climate in terms of broader public opinion, but in a peculiar fashion. As Stephen Walt explains, "US preponderance and the state of public opinion are inextricably linked. Americans are not interested in foreign policy because they recognize how favourable the current situation is. So they elected a president who promised to spend less time on the phone with foreign leaders and more time on domestic issues, and they elected a Congress whose disdain for foreign affairs is almost gleeful."[23]

The operation of the trans-European bargain can be glimpsed by looking at NATO's new "northern flank" and the security relations now developing within the north and between that region and the alliance.[24] The ultimate aim of developing a web of relations intended to secure NATO's new northern flank (which now encompasses the other two Scandinavian countries and the Baltic republics) is less to enmesh the north into a new European security framework, whether through the ESDI or the EU, and more to solidify the ties that bind it to Washington through NATO.

For the Baltic states especially, PfP is viewed as a "stepping stone toward the ultimate vehicle for providing ... security and stability, namely full NATO membership."[25] As the Lithuanian foreign minister explains:

> The Baltic region is an integral part of Europe and of the newly emerging European security structure. We remain optimistic regarding our prospects for membership in the European Union ... and NATO, which in turn acts a catalyst for further reform and for regional cooperation initiatives.[26]

For its part, the US government has adopted what the undersecretary of state, Strobe Talbott, has called an "open door language" policy toward Baltic membership, indicating "in the strongest possible terms" that the Baltic states are "not only eligible for membership" in the alliance but that they are making "very real and 5pc states 1 TJ 9 0 eTw [(only el "nli.8(yvF)2s 0w wha)5.shingtonsn, iitiatce7n " 30

Although extended deterrence placed Canada at risk, by bolstering the transatlantic ties it ultimately fostered a stable strategic environment where war seemed less likely and thus made Canada more secure. It did this without imposing high demands for conventional forces. Moreover, the politics of the alliance, with its formal equality of participation, offered Ottawa a seat at the most important international table consistent with its aspirations toward middle powermanship. Finally, there was the hoped for, though not always achieved, counterweight objective, with the Western European allies being looked upon to counter the influence of the US on Canadian defence policy.[28]

Though the new dispensation may offer less scope for counterweight dreaming, the trans-European bargain can offer advantages to Canada, nonetheless. Its overwhelming political character accords with Ottawa's longstanding desire to obtain maximum participation at minimal cost in defence expenditure. Thus while their military forces left Germany in 1994, Canadians remained active participants in the new NATO's eastward thrust, as well as in the panoply of alliance political activities. As with the US, there is for Canada also a sense now that ties to European security extend through Western Europe to the emerging CEE democracies. Ottawa, for example has cultivated a special relationship with Ukraine and is assisting in educating officers and defence officials from many countries in democratic civil-military relations.

At the same time, the new trans-European bargain, to the extent that it has generally diminished the role of the older Western European allies and enhanced the already dominant role of the US, has certainly raised new questions about NATO's serving as a counterweight to American influence on Canadian defence policy. This has been exacerbated by the apparent inability of the Western Europeans to deal with the problems of Eastern Europe on their own. Thus Canada finds itself caught between an EU to which it does not belong and that has proven ineffective in promoting stability in Europe on its own, and a "unipolar" superpower that believes it must step in to sort out the mess.

Ottawa may share some of the Europeans' lack of confidence in the consistency of American leadership, as well as their concern over Washington's desire to avoid military casualties. Nevertheless, Canada has found itself, just as have the older Western European allies, being pulled along by the American emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, in part because of Washington's efforts to accentuate NATO's eastern vocation, the Canadian Forces have been on active duty in Europe almost continually since the end of the Cold War. At the start of a new century, the CF has nearly as many personnel deployed in Europe as it had when the Cold War ended a decade previously. More importantly, and unlike the Cold War deployments in Europe, the CF has been involved during the 1990s in actual military operations, increasingly so as the decade wore on. Not surprisingly, therefore, being able to operate with its NATO allies, especially the US, has again become the focal point of military planning.

"With the Best": Interoperability as Strategy

The 1994 white paper on defence declared that the CF must be prepared to "fight with the best against the best." After half a decade of intensive operations in South-eastern Europe it may not be clear who the opposing best is, but it is clear whom the CF wishes to fight alongside. In "Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020," this is made explicit. The CF must strengthen its "military to military relationships with our principal allies ensuring interoperable, forces, doctrine and C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence)." In particular it calls for expansion of the "joint and combined exercise program to include all environments and exchanges with US."[29]

Given the record of the post-Cold War decade, which saw the CF deploy abroad along with the US and its principal allies in a host of UN and especially NATO

off by the purchase of those stores and munitions without which not even the smallest fighting body can suddenly be placed in the field."[30]

It is not surprising that the tempo of Canadian involvement in NATO operations has resuscitated the old burdensharing complaint, exacerbated this time by the interoperability thrust. In a speech last year on bilateral relations, the US ambassador to Canada urged Ottawa to continue to sustain the "world's most unique security partnership." One of the requirements for doing this, in the US view, is that Canada increase its defence spending.[31] Joseph Jockel bluntly suggests that the downsizing of Canadian army units from brigades to battle groups makes them "unfit for combat" alongside American allies.[32]

British analyst Richard Sharpe, editor of *Jane's Fighting Ships*, pointing to the 23-percent cut in defence spending over the last four years and to the fact that Canada now ranks 133rd (out of the 185 UN countries) in defence spending as a share of gross domestic product, has declared that Canada's military is "losing its heart because of severe under funding and the 'political myopia' of the federal government."[33] Even NATO's secretary general, Lord Robertson, has gotten into the act, using the occasion of a meeting of allied defence ministers in Toronto to admonish Ottawa for its poor record on defence spending and advising it to allocate its budgetary surplus to the military.[34]

It would, however, be fundamentally misleading to claim that history is simply repeating itself, with Ottawa again failing to appreciate strategic and military realities. Today's situation is unique in a way that makes the current size and structure of the CF both logical and dangerous at the same time. In the past, for example the interwar period, Canadian governments, while not wishing to spend a great deal on defence, also followed a policy of avoiding commitments abroad. To this extent, there was no so-called "commitment-capability" gap, because while capabilities might have been few, so were the immediate commitments. In the Cold War, Canada assumed specific commitments and in that contest's early years did build up the capabilities to meet them. As the Cold War progressed, the size and capabilities of the CF declined and thus the gap emerged.

But there was always a measure of subjectivity (indeed unreality) about this gap, which made it easy and understandable for political leaders largely to ignore it. This was due to the nature of the international strategic environment, specifically the centrality of nuclear weapons and the overall Western goal of containment and deterrence. In the nuclear age who could say with certainty what was necessary to maintain the strategic balance, much less to "win" a war that few believed anyone actually could win? How important were conventional forces, especially those of middle powers like Canada, in the presence of the larger forces of allies and atomic weapons? If Canada had deployed double the number of Leopard tanks it did in the mid 1970s, would NATO have stood a better chance of holding back the Soviets? How many Canadian City-class frigates were needed to secure the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) to Europe? If Canada had closed the gap,

as the 1987 white paper on defence promised to do, would the country have been any safer?

In this situation, it really does matter if there is a gap between the ability of the CF to perform its roles, and thus support the foreign policy objectives of government, and the specific commitments Ottawa makes. It is the drastic budget reductions and continued real commitments abroad that make the current gap seem to some to be so serious and which place a premium on finding the proper force structure. What this means, broadly, is that if Canada is going to contribute to NATO it must have interoperable forces — interoperable in a way that it did not have it the Cold War when interoperability was not expected to be important beyond a few days, or maybe even hours. But what does this mean in specific terms?

Assessing Canadian Capability in an Alliance Context

The report by a ministerial committee monitoring change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces noted that the CF does have the capability to contribute to the foreign policy objectives of the government when Ottawa decides to make a commitment. The Kosovo operations are cited as evidence of this.[35]

At sea, the navy today is in better shape than it has been for more than two decades. The City-class frigates do need helicopters, but they have seen wide service on behalf of the UN, NATO, and multilateral coalitions in the last few years. Helping to maintain embargos that may be of little practical value may be questionable. On the one hand, it is often not a particularly dangerous role, although it does require a high degree of maritime sophistication. Above all, this role constitutes the very kind of niche activity that well suits Canadian capabilities and is in direct support of foreign policy objectives.

There is also the old, and still valid, argument that naval forces can be used to support domestic sovereignty protection roles as well as broader overseas commitments. Here, the new fleet of maritime coastal defence vessels and *Upholder* submarines will be useful. Domestic search and rescue operations will benefit from the new land-based Cormorant helicopters. The revival of the Sea King replacement program should further enhance maritime capabilities. Maritime forces could become a liability should a high operations tempo and associated maintenance costs degrade training and lead to some ships being mothballed.

Similarly, it may be necessary to put more CF-18s into storage if funds are not

combat capability may reduce the country's ability to contribute rapidly to the air dimensions of some operations, but other countries, principally the United States, can presumably deploy greater numbers of sophisticated aircraft if needed.

The burden of overseas deployments has fallen most heavily upn the army, which has been strained in the past decade. It is probably the case that it no longer possesses a capability for heavy-armour combat overseas. The Leopard tanks, even with improvements, are fading and there remains the problem of strategic lift. Although several Leopards did serve in Kosovo in a noncombat capacity, it may well be that in narrowing its capabilities, Canada will simply have to exclude

- three separate battle groups or a brigade group (with combat support and combat service support) of up to 6,456 personnel, with 54 tanks, 24 155-mm guns, 12 ADATS, 642 APCs, 1,600 vehicles, and 24 Griffon helicopters;
- an infantry battalion group (with approximately 1,000 personnel) with six 105-mm guns and 325 vehicles;
- a wing of 24 fighter aircraft (with appropriate support); and
- a squadron of tactical transport aircraft with 8 CC/KC-130s and 793 personnel.

A planning study conducted by the office of the vice chief of the defence staff noted that the vanguard elements could be prepared to deploy within twenty-one days, while the MCF would take ninety days.[38] The study looked at an initial deployment of six months, "including 60 days of 'combat' at average consumption/casualty rates," with the remainder of the six months at "'operations other than war' rates." On this basis, the study concluded that the CF is "capable of generating the major combat equipments, material, and personnel for the MCF described in the White Paper," and that personnel requirements "should be within the capability of the Regular Force." It further noted that the MCF could be sustained for a period of six months given existing stocks and personnel levels.

Problems arise with regard to deployment. DND planning does not specify a particular location, which complicated assessments of deployment. It was concluded, nevertheless, that "[a]ssuming use of maximum available transport aircraft," the deployment of the vanguard forces "might take up to 73 days," but the CF does not have the aircrews to sustain this usage. For the MCF, deployment would take up to ninety-five days, "assuming the availability of charter ships and aircraft." Canada would have to rely upon allied countries or civil charter for deployment. Given a shortfall in deployment capabilities, "it could take up to six months from a decision to deploy to put the full MCF into a theatre. Also, it is not

multilateral operations overseas? From the government's perspective, the current level is probably just about right. To be sure, the CF is probably not able to deploy its presently maintained forces as quickly as the military would like to all parts of the world where the government might send them.

Yet, is this really a problem, one that needs to be rectified by significant increases in spending on air and sea lift capability, especially for NATO operations? The answer surely is no. It may well be that some crises will require the rapid deployment of international forces from outside the region. However, in these instances Canada will simply have to say that it cannot get there quickly with its

Britain (and perhaps soon, Germany) have the ability and willingness to do so, and even so, the capability (and willingness?) remains mainly restricted to the European theatre. Compared to the rest of the alliance, Canada's capabilities, and its willingness to use them as evidenced by the record of the first post-Cold War decade, stand up rather well. Ottawa has been prepared to assume a fair share of the burden of the new NATO, perhaps even *more* than its share given that Canada is not a European country.

When it comes to Canada's future in NATO, the question is not, as Joseph Jockel puts it, one of "soft power and hard choices." The decisions facing the government are not terribly difficult ones. The prime minister and the cabinet are aware the public will not accept major increases in defence spending and that Canada's allies, including the US, will accept whatever contributions Ottawa can make. Canada, along with other allies of comparable size, does not have the resources to keep pace with the US in the gamut of technologies associated with the "revolution in military affairs." Yet as the president of the US Army War College recently admonished, "trust, not technology, sustains coalitions."[40]

What most needs doing is to maintain the existing capabilities with some modest improvements here and there, and continue to participate in coalitions to the extent one is able. Given the multifaceted nature of current operations, with their mixture of advanced weapons and lighter forces, there will likely be many roles for the CF to perform. Thus far, no Canadian contribution has been spurned by a coalition partner. Government decisions may only be hard on those who have to carry them out, should too many missions be undertaken and should insufficient capabilities be deployed to specific commitments. Given the nature of the new NATO, Ottawa does have a measure of discretion. Thus the CF can indeed operate "with the best," in part because the operations in which it will take part within the new NATO will not be against the "best."

Whether or not the alliance will remain for Canada, in David Haglund's phrase, the "NATO of its dreams,"[41] it can be argued that for the Canadian Forces at least, allied trends have been more than they could have dreamed of in the early 1990s. In the post-Cold War era, Canada is once again over there in Europe, indeed in parts of Europe where it has never gone before. The CF have been performing a wide variety of peacekeeping roles consistent with the alliance's seemingly oxymoronic transformation into both a collective defence and a collective security organization. In many ways the new trans-European character of the security bargain suits Ottawa quite well. It is consistent both with its desire to remain engaged (but not excessively and expensively so) in European security and with its human security agenda. This combination has provided Canada's military with a solid and politically acceptable justification to remain a force primarily dedi-os(v)12x3nd 2.8(er gone CF (,)3(aere inar)10(y with)]TJ maA)115(T)1not J TTication to rei

Notes

1. The views expressed are those of the author alone and not of the Royal Military College of Canada or any other agency of the government of Canada.
2. Paul Koring, "Haiti Pullout Reveals Shrunken Peace Role," *Globe and Mail*, 15 December 1997, p. A1.
3. "Current Operations," www.dnd.ca/menu/Operations/index_e.htm, 9 June 2000.
4. "UN Needs Upgrade to Keep Peace: Panel," *Kingston Whig Standard*, 24 August 2000, p. 13.
5. David G. Haglund and Allen Sens, "The (Not So) Free Riders: Belgium, Canada, Portugal, and Spain," in *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: International Citizenship, Selective Indignation and Collective Action*, ed. Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, forthcoming in 2000).
6. Kevin Ward, "Canadian Troops Could Help EU Army," *Kingston Whig-Standard*, 27 June 2000, p. 12.
7. Portions of this section are based upon my *The Americanization of Peacekeeping: Implications for Canada*, Martello Papers 17 (Kingston: Queen's University Centre for International Relations, 1997).
8. United Nations Association of the United States, *Washington Weekly Report*, 22 (14 June 1996), p. 4.
9. Brad Bergstrand, "What Do You Do When There's No Peace to Keep?" *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 23 (March 1994): 25-30.
10. "UN OKs Slashing Peacekeeping Budget," *Herald Sun* (Durham, NC), 8 June 1996, p. 2.
11. John Hillen, "Superpowers Don't Do Windows," *Orbis* 41 (Spring 1997): 241-57.
12. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO/SFOR: Fact Sheet, CIMIC, 20 December 1996.
13. Speaking notes for Art Eggleton, minister of national defence, "Canadian Lessons from the Kosovo Crisis," Harvard University, 30 September 1999.
14. "Operations Update," www.dnd.ca/menu/weeklybrief/jun00/01NwsConf_m_e.htm, 1 June 2000.
15. It was a duality noted in Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p. 383.
16. Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security* 21 (Spring 1997): 49-88.
17. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," *Foreign Affairs* 78 (March/April 1999): 47.
18. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Erosion of American National Interests," *Foreign Affairs* 76 (September/October 1997): 36.

34. Jeff Sallot, "NATO Head Hits Canada on Defence Spending," *Globe and Mail*, 31 October 1999, p. A3.
35. Canada, Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, "Interim Report-1999" (Ottawa, 1999), pp. 119-20.
36. Matthew Fisher, "Allies in Kosovo Envy Canada's Hi-Tech Weaponry," *Maple Leaf*, 14 July 1999, p. 16.
37. These figures and descriptions are taken from various public briefings supplied by the Department of National Defence, and from the document "White Paper Staff Check and Mobilization Planning," produced by the office of the vice chief of the defence staff, 4 September 1998. (Emphasis in original.)
38. "White Paper Staff Check and Mobilization Planning."
39. Fisher, "Allies in Kosovo Envy Canada's Hi-Tech Weaponry."
40. Robert H. Scales, Jr., "Trust, Not Technology, Sustains Coalitions," *Parameters* 28 (Winter 1998-99): 4.
41. David G. Haglund, "The NATO of Its Dreams: Canada and the Co-operative Security Alliance," *International Journal* 52 (Summer 1997): 464-82.

3. *Selective Engagement and Permanent Crisis: Entering the Second Decade of NATO-Russia Relations*

Pavel K. Baev

Introduction: From Post-Cold War to Post-Kosovo Europe

There is an old NATO bromide about the rubber stamp that had known many years of use at the alliance's Brussels headquarters during the Cold War. The stamp read, "At this crucial moment for the Alliance..." For the decade of the 1990s, an equally useful stamp would have been one carrying the words: "At this crucial juncture in NATO-Russia relations..." If such had existed, it would certainly have received a workout during the past few years. The end of the decade witnessed a particularly low point in the trajectory of the NATO-Russia relationship, with the alliance's formal enlargement ceremony coinciding with its air war in Yugoslavia. Since mid 1999, however, the relative stabilization in Kosovo and the smooth transition of power in Russia have opened certain possibilities for improvement, which policymakers on both sides are eager to grasp; for these officials, the shadow of Chechnya appears to be neither long nor dark.

The central methodological problem posed by any examination of the future trajectory of NATO-Russia relations is that it does not and cannot possess any precise formula or internal logic. Calculating the balance of forces that has caused a particular twist in the trajectory can be an exciting analytical task, but the analyst's excitement must always be tempered by the recognition of the essential unpredictability of the undertaking. To be sure, this problem is hardly unique to the study of NATO-Russia relations. Accordingly, the best one can hope to do is

to outline certain frameworks that might assist our thinking about the next phase in relations between Russia and the West.

My point of departure for this exercise is the massive shift in the very foundation of European security system that occurred at the end of the 1990s. This shift has nothing to do with the much abused cliché, the "end of the millennium." Nor can it be reduced to the resonance from the Kosovo war. Nevertheless, the simplest way to indicate the shift is to distinguish between "post-Cold War Europe" and "post-Kosovo Europe." The combined effect of the introduction of the euro and "securitization" of the EU, NATO enlargement and engagement in the Balkans, the second Chechen war, and the transition of power in Russia has been to impart a new quality to all of the key security-related interactions in Europe. As yet, this new quality defies definition, but it does render obsolete and irrelevant most habitual theoretical schemes and analytic instruments.

Taking as a given the above-noted qualitative shift in European security, this chapter proceeds into the uncharted territory of the future from the conviction that there is absolutely no need to revisit the experience of the 1990s; this has been done elsewhere.[1] As such, this chapter is largely an exercise in future-gazing, in which, after an initial discussion of personalities, four "scenarios" are developed. The first is a middle-of-the-road assessment, in which it is assumed that major current trends in NATO-Russian transformations continue uninterrupted. This scenario may be no more probable than three others I introduce, which examine the possible impact of various disturbances, but its more detailed analysis at least allows us to skip redundant explanations further on, in the other three scenarios.

Putin and Friends

Because personality has played such an important part in shaping Russian-NATO relations, I would be remiss if I did not begin with some discussion of this factor. Indeed, many Western analysts emphasize the decisive role of President Boris Yeltsin in achieving compromise with NATO in spring 1997,[2] while the strong drive towards NATO enlargement during the second Clinton administration was largely generated by powerful individuals, especially the secretary of state, Madeleine Albright.[3]

Personal factors might play a rather different role in the early years of this new century. Vladimir Putin — unlike Boris Yeltsin, for whom "hugging" appeared to be a tremendously important exercise — does not believe in personal ties with Western counterparts. While eager to use his professional "recruiting" skills, Putin perceives gatherings in the "leaders' club" not in terms of confidence and trust, but of horse-trading and outsmarting.[4]

What makes Putin's behaviour even more rigid is the deep shadow of Chechnya: unlike Yeltsin, he has taken full personal responsibility for launching and waging

the war, and cannot shift it down the line even after the electoral usefulness of this "technology" has expired. Therefore every mild criticism of "indiscriminate and excessive use of force" immediately acquires personal character, making Putin defensive and emotional.

For all his excessive concentration on this local conflict, Putin — unlike his

Russia expertise to be more of a liability than an asset, linking him to a series of failures in the design and implementation of reforms. While Gore's rival, George W. Bush, would in all likelihood care very little about things Russian once in the White House, a President Gore would have to distance himself from every engagement that might be potentially incriminating. Generally, the departure of Boris Yeltsin signifies that the time for the compassionate experts like Strobe Talbott has passed, and that of such "sleek and steely" Realpolitikers as Condoleezza Rice has arrived.[6]

the government, thereby instrumentalizing squabbling and infighting within the central bureaucracy and enabling the president to play the role of arbiter. A more difficult part is to cut some "oligarchs" down to size and generally keep big business from pushing its interests too high on the political agenda, watching most closely the Gazprom empire and the ambitious oil companies. Perhaps the most difficult task is to reestablish control over the provinces, placing the governors and republican presidents on a short leash and reversing the dangerous trend of regionalism. Immediately after taking office, Putin introduced a series of decrees and draft legislation to that end, but the main battles still lie ahead.[10]

There is an obvious incompatibility between the liberal economic agenda and the authoritarian political tendencies of Putin's leadership, and the frequent references to South Korean and Chilean "models" cannot diminish this. The expectations of Putin's team are that rigid political stability will provide for better market conditions and predictability; thus, foreign investors will be able to forgive the inevitable curtailing of democratic reforms. However, authoritarian methods of political control generally belong to the pre-globalization era and can hardly provide much stability for modern societies.[11] Besides this weak point in macropolitical design, there is also the Chechen problem.

What had been started as an "electoral war" refused to go away as its political usefulness was exhausted. This local war has escalated to the level of existential conflict, becoming not just a test of credibility for Putin's leadership but a matter of Russia's integrity and even survival. Society has accepted the war as a point of departure for the ambitious project of restoring Russia's "greatness" and rebuilding its power. The apparent deadlock in fighting threatens not only to deplete military capabilities but also to erode the whole system of rigid central control. Any sign of defeat could trigger a massive backlash in the regions against Putin's recentralization.

Uncertain Partnership and Crisis Management

These personality factors and basic trends foretell a generally stable pattern of NATO-Russia relations, with occasional peaks and valleys. Unlike the paradoxical ways of the late 1990s, when productive cooperation developed behind the cloak of hostile rhetoric, the early years of this decade (whatever we end up calling them) will most probably see more balanced and engaging presentations, yet a rather uncertain partnership.

On the Russian side, the key problem would be to keep Chechnya off the Atlantic agenda. Weathering spurts of criticism, Moscow can try to play the US against the Europeans (as well as less critical Europeans, like the UK, against the others), reversing the old Cold War games. Arms control could become a key instrument for resolving this problem, and Russia could try to demonstrate its commitment to the revised CFE, perhaps even taking new steps in troop

withdrawals from Georgia and Transdniestria. Moscow is interested in developing an intensive bilateral dialogue with the US on arms control, exploiting various American strategic rationales for downplaying Chechnya. The most controversial area here would be strategic defence, and Russia, while bargaining hard for every compromise, might also try to play on European doubts.[12] These maneuverings inside NATO would require much diplomatic dexterity, but double and triple intrigue might generally become a trademark of the Putin-Ivanov foreign policy.[13]

On the NATO side, the key problem would be enlargement. Continuing engagement in the Balkans and complicated transatlantic rebalancing will not only lead to but perhaps even necessitate a two- to three-years pause in this process.[14] It would certainly be impossible (as well as undesirable) to close NATO's doors, but the "go-slow" approach provides for focussing political efforts on the priority issues, avoiding unnecessary complications, and keeping Russia on board.[15] At the same time, it is obvious that NATO-centred political frameworks built during the 1990s are not quite sufficient for the qualitatively new situation in Europe — much the same way as the NACC, invented in 1991 for handing NATO relations with the USSR, was never able to play a central role during the 1990s. For one thing, the nine states who now advocate a "big bang" enlargement[16] would require some institutionalization of their status, which might help in further postponing the "second wave" for a few years.

As far as Russia is concerned, some new forms of interaction might usefully complement the Founding Act, which both sides now view as a rather inadequate compromise.[17] An area in which some new frameworks, perhaps under the umbrella of the Permanent Joint Council, might be particularly helpful is the Balkans, where both sides have an interest in upgrading cooperation. On the Russian side, a typical feature of the engagement in the Balkans during the 1990s was a gap between foreign policy, which oscillated between supporting and opposing the West, and defence policy, which dealt with the nuts and bolts of joint operations with NATO partners. That gap was not necessarily a bad thing, since it facilitated the isolating of Russian battalions from the quarrels of the Contact Group. But now, in the more vertically integrated style of Putin's leadership, Moscow would probably want a better link between its major efforts.

For its part, NATO is interested in increasing Russia's military contribution to the operations in the Balkans and in keeping its political initiatives in concert with Western strategy. To achieve the latter, the alliance needs to create some permanent political structure with Russia as a full-time participant. Many allies, Canada among them, had reservations about decisionmaking in the Contact Group and would probably object to its recreation; but the alternative would be to count on new "Chernomyrdin-miracles" (which to all intents and purposes helped NATO to achieve its victory in Kosovo), and these may be in short supply. Having Russia on board would be a major capacity-building means of handling the brewing crises in Macedonia and Montenegro.

now undertaking serious pro-Atlantic public-relations efforts, focussing particularly on the "Russian threat."[23]

The near-term perspective of "Atlanticization" of the Baltic states is guaranteed to increase tensions in NATO-Russia relations. Russian officials since early 2000 have been sending persistent signals that NATO enlargement in this direction is absolutely unacceptable, and that President Putin, unlike his predecessor, would not stage a meaningless public scandal but come equipped with "real counter-measures."[24] Such signals may turn out to be entirely misleading. Putin indeed is not interested in any noisy quarrels leading to unsatisfactory compromises, but neither is he interested in any confrontation with NATO. The latter is certainly a partner he understands best (or, at least, believes he understands) and with which he wants to bargain, promoting Russia's interests and prestige. Both in his thinking and in his practical approaches Putin remains a politician more from the era of détente than from that of partnership.[25] So he will try to make a better deal on the "second wave" of NATO enlargement than Yeltsin did on the first one, or, for that matter, than Gorbachev did on German reunification.

Overall, this scenario leads towards restructured and strained, but nevertheless constructive, relations between NATO and Russia; one important condition for this to happen is for the situation in Russia to remain stable and controllable by the centre. The following two scenarios examine possible disturbances short of a total catastrophe.

against (unlike in 1995 and 1996) allocating any significant resources to reconstruction programs, which besides being a burden on the budget, are hardly popular. It does not take much insight to see that the Kremlin strictly rules out any possibility of letting Chechnya go, or accepting a face-saving compromise to cover its failure.

The main line of this scenario leads toward the proposition that a military victory in Chechnya is indeed possible; it is not a figment of imagination of the general staff, frustrated by the current deadlock.[28] The objective for such a victory would be the systematic destruction of the middle part of Chechnya, between the River Terek and the mountains, in which narrow belt are concentrated all the republic's urban centres; in addition to their liquidation, the decisive victory would require killing about 100,000 people (mostly men), or some 20 percent of the current population. This could be achieved by unrestricted application of deadly military force, including "carpet" bombing by long-range aviation. Multilayer mining of the key mountain valleys would restrict the maneuver of the remaining rebel groups. Russian forces would then solidly control lowland Chechnya to the north of the Terek.

While such a Stalinist victory is indeed achievable, its regional impact could be much more destabilizing than that of both Chechen wars. Ingushetia would have to accept some 250,000 refugees and could become a new base for terrorist groupings; Daghestan might slip into a quagmire of various ethnic conflicts; Georgia quite possibly will face new troubles with its secessionist provinces. Therefore, Russia would have to reorient and broaden its military efforts from Chechnya to other parts of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasus as well. Besides the fundamental issue of resources, Moscow would have to deal with the foreign policy repercussions and interactions with NATO in particular.

While the alliance has been remarkably cautious so far in its reaction to the second Chechnen war, leaving it to the EU and the Council of Europe to threaten sanctions (unconvincing as those threats have been),[29] Russia's massive violation of human rights, bordering on genocide, would force NATO to cut some ties and freeze some contacts. Moscow, quite possibly, could show high sensitivity and seriously overreact, pushing the escalation of a new crisis in its relations with NATO, which might spread into the arms control area.

The worst consequences can be expected if this scenario develops in combination with the previous one: i.e., if Russia attempts to crush Chechnya and NATO accepts failure in and withdraws from Kosovo. An angry Moscow might then attempt to undermine the alliance's damage-limitation efforts in the Balkans (by cancelling its participation in SFOR and giving more direct military support to Serbia). And if NATO indeed goes for another round of rapid expansion, including the Baltic states, Russia's reaction (despite all Putin's Eurocentrism and

Alternative Future III: Recentralization Backfires

The main feature of this scenario is Putin's failure to strengthen the system of central political control both horizontally (over the regions) and vertically (through various state bureaucracies). While Putin arrived in office with a loose but demanding mandate to rebuild a "strong state," his core federal initiatives so far remain unconvincing, while the series of his mistakes (e.g., the abandonment of allies on the right in the Union of Rightist Forces, the alienation of liberal media

unsympathetic) countries. The notion of breaking loose from Moscow's rule might suddenly prove popular and powerful, while for the central authorities it would be quite difficult to counter. Even were NATO bending every effort to stay away from this crisis, Moscow still might try to play on military-strategic threats, ascribing "Atlantic intrigue" to German, Polish, and even Lithuanian policies.

Potentially even more devastating consequences might appear in northwestern Russia, particularly on the Kola Peninsula. While regional separatism is hardly much of a threat here, deterioration of the massive military infrastructure, involving hundreds of nuclear warheads and other nuclear-related assets, objectively constitutes a source of unacceptable risks. Falling morale and discipline in naval units exponentially increases the risks of technological incidents, which might escalate to the level of catastrophe. And this brings back the spectre of mutinies, which so haunted the Russian navy during the early years of the twentieth century.[32] Chaotic developments in Murmansk oblast could necessitate NATO military interventions in various formats, from "search-and-rescue" to actions aimed at securing nuclear installations, on Moscow's invitation or possibly even against its will.

Conclusion

The balance of opportunities and risks in the near-term perspectives of NATO-Russia relations shifts heavily toward the latter. That is the bad news conveyed in this chapter. The good news is that opportunities, while limited, are nevertheless constructive: these involve primarily cooperation in conflict management in the Balkans. But the risks are multiple and include broad destabilization in the Caucasus with a new chain reaction of conflicts (similar to the one in 1991-92), violent internal crisis in Belarus, political confrontation over the next round of NATO enlargement, perhaps complicated by secessionist tendencies in Kaliningrad, technological catastrophes in the Kola Peninsula involving nuclear assets and naval mutinies in the Northern Fleet. This risk assessment requires more attention and resources than the alliance could possibly mobilize.

Notes

1. One of the most comprehensive attempts to analyze NATO-Russia relations is Richard Kugler, *Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996). Also see David Yost, *NATO Transformed* (Washington: United States Institute for Peace, 1998). Among the most useful journal articles are Jonathan Eyal, "NATO's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision," *International Affairs* 73 (October 1997): 695-719; Ronald Asmus and Stephen Larrabee, "NATO and the Have-Nots: Reassurance after Enlargement," *Foreign Affairs* 75 (November/December 1996): 13-31; and Derek Averre, "NATO Expansion and Russian National Interests," *European Security*

7 (Spring 1998): 10-54. Among Russian experts, see Alexei Arbatov, "NATO and Russia," *Security Dialogue* (June 1995): 135-46; and Dmitri Trenin, "NATO: How to Avoid Confrontation," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, no. 7 (1995), pp. 29-37. The monograph *Rossia, NATO i Novaya Arkhitektura Bezopasnosti v Evrope* ("Russia, NATO and New Security Architecture in Europe"), edited by A. Makarichev, Nizhni Novgorod University (1998) is useful. The Council on Foreign and Defence Policy has produced several reports on this issue; see, for one, "Russia and NATO," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 21 June 1995.

2. Leon Aron gives Yeltsin credit for "masterfully" splitting the élite opposition, while Coit Blacker reminds us that Yeltsin in fact "undermined the bargaining position of his own foreign minister." See their chapters in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., *The New Russian Foreign Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998).

3. See Yost, *NATO Transformed*, pp. 109-10.

14. See Roland Dannreuther, "Escaping the Enlargement Trap in NATO-Russia Relations," *Survival* 41 (Winter 1999-2000): 145-64.

15. One astute commentator has recently argued that if Russia "is to have any hope of delaying the further expansion of NATO — which would be good for most Europeans, and not just Russia — it must work hard in Europe to show it can be a genuine long-term partner." Jonathan Steele, "Empty Encounters," *Guardian*, 2 June 2000.

16. This idea was proclaimed at a meeting of foreign ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in Vilnius. See William Drozdiak, "9 NATO Candidates Pledge to Join in a 'Big Bang' Bid," *International Herald Tribune*, 20-21 May 2000.

17. Dmitri Trenin, arguing for a fresh look at the Founding Act, points out that it "was neither fundamentally flawed nor necessarily doomed — it desperately needed carefully calculated strategies and a healthy dose of luck to succeed over time." Dmitri Trenin, "Russia-NATO Relations: Time to Pick Up the Pieces," *NATO Review* 48 (Spring/Summer 2000): 19-22, quote at p. 19.

18. On the costs of Chechnya, see Mark Galeotti, "Costs of the Chechen War," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 12 (January 2000): 8-9. On the underfunding of the navy and new *Kursk*-related expenditures, see Evgeni Pakhomov, "We Are in One Boat," *Itogi*, no. 34, 23 August 2000; and Evgeni Kuznetsov, "The Barents Sea: The Kursk on the Bottom," *Russki Zhurnal*, www.russ.ru/politics, 22 August 2000.

19. For a good presentation of several perspectives, see *Belorussiya na Pereputye: V Poiskakh Mezhdunarodnoi Identichnosti* ["Belarus at a Crossroads: In Search of International Identity"] (Moscow: Carnegie Center, 1998).

20. During his first visit to Belarus in April 2000, President Putin downplayed security cooperation and placed the emphasis on settling economic accounts, much to Lukashenko's disappointment. See Aleksandr Golts and Dmitri Pinsker, "Nothing Personal. Strictly Business," *Itogi*, no. 17, 26 April 2000.

21. Chief of Russia's General Staff Kvashnin and Defence Minister Sergeev, visiting NATO headquarters respectively in May and June 2000, pressed forward their criticism of KFOR routines and ultimate aims. See Igor Korotchenko, "Cooperation Will Go in Stages," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 14 June 2000.

22. Russian media delivered a barrage of critical comments on the first anniversary of the ending of the war and the deployment of KFOR, reporting particularly on the limited effectiveness of NATO air strikes. See, for instance, Vladimir Katin, "NATO's Big Bluff," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 11 May 2000. The weekly *Itogi* dedicated a special issue to Kosovo and the Balkans (no. 24, 15 June 2000).

23. A good example is the strong statement about the possibility of Russian military attack against the Baltic states, which "by implication will be an attack on NATO," by Latvia's president, Vike-Freiberga, on 30 April 2000. See *RFE/RL Newsline*, 3 May 2000.

24. See "Russian Experts Warn of Tension With NATO Over Baltic," in *Johnson's Russia List*, no. 4353, 8 June 2000.

25. See Dmitri Glinski Vassiliev, "The Views of the Russian Elite toward NATO Membership," PONARS Memo no. 126, May 2000, Harvard University.

26. For a professional but self-congratulatory evaluation, see Vladimir Bochkarev and Vladimir Komoltsev, "Russian Mountain Storm," *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, no. 7, 25 February 2000. For a more balanced evaluation, see Michael Orr, "Second Time Lucky? Evaluating Russian Performance in the Second Chechen War," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 8 March 2000, pp. 32-36.
27. General Troshev, commander of Russian forces in Chechnya, made a public statement in this regard in early June 2000. See Elizabeth Piper, "Russian Commander Calls for End to Chechen War," *Johnson's Russia List*, no. 4350, 6 June 2000.
28. For my more elaborate analysis of this option see Pavel Baev, "Will Russia Go for a Military Victory in Chechnya?" PONARS Memo no. 107, February 2000, Harvard University.
29. See Sarah E. Mendelson, "Explaining the International Community's Response to the War in Chechnya," PONARS Memo no. 143, April 2000, Harvard University.
30. Gleb Pavlovsky, one of the new Kremlin insiders, points out that breaking up of the old Yeltsin political system was not compensated for by the building up of new political structures, with the result being that the empty space got filled by various myths and "phantom wars." See "Gleb Pavlovsky: All Procedural Processes Are Under Question," www.polit.ru, 14 June 2000.
31. On the process of creeping disintegration of power sructures, see Pavel Baev, "Why

4. *Canada and the "European Pillar" of Defence*

S. Neil MacFarlane

Introduction

"The decisions taken at Cologne and Helsinki signal a clear departure from the EU's long tradition of politico-strategic non-existence."

Further decoupling concerns emanate from the increasing focus in US defence

quietly somewhere in between for much of the period, seeking to sustain good relations with both its Anglo-Saxon and French partners.

Toward the end of the period there was, however, evidence of movement, largely in response to specific problems. In 1995, for example, the UK and France co-operated in the establishment of a Bosnia rapid reaction force, and in October of that year, John Major and Jacques Chirac agreed on closer consultation on nuclear issues, while France and Germany also moved towards closer defence cooperation through the establishment of a joint arms agency in Bonn and an agreement on the development of reconnaissance satellites. Moreover, the period as a whole was one of active parallel discussion within NATO of the concept of combined joint task forces (CJTF) — that is to say, operations by coalitions of alliance members using NATO logistical assets and outside the normal chain of

This reluctance stemmed in considerable measure from differences in perspective between the UK and French governments. These in turn reflected not only the Major government's susceptibility to "euro-skepticism," but also the lingering influence of longstanding disagreement over the role of the US and NATO in European security and defence.

circumstances where the US and NATO did not want to come to the party, and, further, an understanding that many in the US resented what they perceived to be European unwillingness to manage their security affairs and the consequent Europeans' dependence on America to pull their chestnuts out of the fire as arguably happened in the former Yugoslavia.

These developments have differing implications for at least five categories of state actor involved in European security: those that are members of both the EU and NATO; those that are members of the EU but not of NATO (i.e., Austria, Ireland, and Sweden); those that are members of NATO but not of the EU (i.e., Canada, the US, Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary), those that are members of neither but want to be (Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, the Baltics, and various CIS states); and those that are members of nei-

pressure placed on Prime Minister Blair by President Clinton who wrote in August 1999 that he believed that transatlantic defence industrial cooperation was "essential to ensuring the continued interoperability of Alliance armed forces."[15]

In both these respects, one could be forgiven for the conclusion that, although Britain is more interested than it was in the past in exploring the potential for European defence cooperation, it remained far from choosing Europe if that choice implied significant risks in its defence relationship with the US. To the extent that this was so, then the potential for further deepening of this cooperation depends strongly on the nature of the American response to it.

Before commenting further on this point, I need to mention three additional factors that ostensibly limit the potential dimensions for the emergence of a robust European defence identity. One is that there is little indication that the Europeans involved are willing to invest the substantial amounts of money necessary for the creation of autonomous force-projection capability. The declaratory positions generally recognize the need for substantial new investment; defence budgeting decisions reflect something different: a varying degree of willingness to invest in defence, on the part of leading allies. For instance, during the last half of the 1990s British and American defence spending remained fairly steady in nominal terms, while France and German displayed significant reductions over time. In part this reflects the desire to realize the peace dividend, if belatedly. As of 1999, the US was spending around 3.2 percent of its GDP on defence, and Europe as a whole was committing about 2.1 percent, with the UK on the high end at 2.9 percent, France at 2.5 percent, and Germany at 1.5 percent.[16]

Arguably, there is considerable scope for greater bang for fewer bucks, given the existing structures of both French and German armed forces and of defence procurement. Military reform in the French and German cases may produce smaller and more capable forces that are better suited to the Petersberg tasks (see below). Professionalization and downsizing through the abandonment of conscription will produce savings, particularly in training and in the elimination of unnecessary infrastructure. However, there are obviously limits to such savings. And, despite the potential for efficiency gains, it is worth remembering that Britain — the major European power that has gone furthest in streamlining and professionalizing its forces and in preparation for force-projection roles — spends a higher proportion of its GDP on defence than its two counterparts, France and Germany.

As Nicole Gnesotto put it recently,

> Overall it is of course for the Union less a matter of dramatically raising defence budgets than of allocating available resources in a different way. But since the defence expenditure of European nations varies widely, it is hard to see how the credibility of military forces can be maintained without more or less painful efforts in the end being taken by all of them.[17]

On the whole, there seems to be little budgetary will to close the technological gap between European and American forces so evident in the Kosovo operation. One could extend the point to ask where the money to put together the independent

European capability envisaged in the latest Franco-British summit declaration is to come from. Without the spending, particularly in the areas of strategic lift and intelligence, it is unclear how the capability will emerge.

Second, one must ask whence the challenges to which ESDP is a response are likely to come. As the Kosovo case has demonstrated, these challenges give impetus to cooperation among European states in this field. As George Robertson put it in Bremen in May 1999: "in Kosovo we have all come face to face with the European future, and it is frightening." But is Kosovo the "European future"? An absence of such challenges may cause the impetus to dissipate.

When the Petersberg tasks were formulated, Europe thought it was facing a

> the CFSP mechanisms are not necessarily best suited to achieving a consensus among fifteen — soon more — member countries. What purpose would a European force serve if the unanimity rule that applies to CFSP elaboration prevented the Union from making any decisions?... It is difficult to see how the Union will be able to continue to evade the question of the way it makes decisions on foreign policy issues, in other words of the conditions under which its military instruments are to be used.[22]

Underlying all of this, for many of us living in Europe, there is a certain unreality to the apparent deepening of security cooperation in the larger context of evolving relations among the three states. Western Europe has achieved levels of cooperation — if not collective identity — far beyond what might reasonably have been envisaged in 1945 or 1957. That said, substantial potential for identity-based constraints on the process of integration remains. Security integration engages the most sensitive aspects of identity. Progress in this direction presumes a degree of closure in the broader identity conflicts of states that pursue it. The last few months provide ample evidence that these issues remain unresolved. The heat of the dispute between Britain and France over beef was felt in every British supermarket. The behaviour of the French on this question raised legitimate doubts in the minds of many citizens of Britain about French reliability as a partner. One is also struck in this context by the recent — and hugely popular — French production of *Joan of Arc* (Luc Besson). As one (British) reviewer commented:

> the weight of the blame for her brutal trial and death falls squarely on the English. It's English ruffians who burn, pillage and rape — and gobble like neanderthal cannibals while gloating on the carnage. Later, the Duke of Bedford snarls: "Torture the bitch." Yet the trial records, some of the fullest extant for a medieval figure, show that of the more than 100 assessors who attended the protracted ecclesiastical trial in Rouen and finally condemned Joan for heresy, only eight were English-born, and, of those, only three heard the evidence on more than three occasions. The heroine of French resistance was, unfortunately, destroyed by her own warring compatriots in the University of Paris and by the Burgundian supporters of the English cause.[23]

The lingering identity tensions in Franco-German relations are evident in the raft of French publications in the past three years warning of the implications of recrudescent German power, and especially in the ruminations of France's interior minister, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, about Germany's Nazi reflexes when he was confronted with Joschka Fischer's vision of a federal Europe.[24] Clearly, we remain a long way away from the emergence of the kind of cohesive identity that generally underpins the use of force by states.

Evidence of the Emergence of a Common Policy

The previous section probably reflects my own deep skepticism about close multilateral cooperation in the realm of security and defence. It may be overly

pessimistic. Indeed, it is striking in this context just how committed senior British civilian defence officials seem to be to the project in private conversation, and this notwithstanding their continuing squabbles with the French. These officials really appear to believe that their future lies in this direction, largely because of growing doubts about the long-term course of US foreign policy and about the sustainability of the Euro-American link in its present form. They also clearly believe that there is substantial potential for the use of European capabilities well out of area, as in African crises such as that in Sierra Leone.[25]

In a larger sense, there may be something in the rather lugubrious proposition that the ESDP "is condemned to succeed." Considerable political and bureaucratic capital has been invested. Retreat is difficult, given the personal engagement of key European political leaders and the unacceptable effects of retreat on the credibility of the European project as a whole.

procurement of transport, intelligence capability, and firepower, although it is probably true that the force reduction "will reduce the overhead costs of a bloated force structure."

Despite all of this, it is obvious that the emergence of ESDI/ESDP has disturbed that thin layer of Canadians who think about security and defence policy. The Canadian materials I have seen, although somewhat ritualistically supporting the development of the EU initiative and raising the possibility of Canadian participation in EU crisis responses, display several common characteristics. First is a somewhat Shakespearean protestation of Canada's deep and concrete commitment to European security. This begins with an account of Canada's engagement in World Wars I and II, and continues through the Cold War. The emphasis is on the sacrifices made by Canada in behalf of the Europeans. Then the continuing Canadian engagement in peace support operations from UNPROFOR through IFOR and SFOR to Operation Allied Force (where Canada flew nearly 10 percent of the strike sorties and, unlike a number of other allies, demonstrated a significant capacity to interoperate with US units) and KFOR is stressed.

A second common theme is the stress on the primacy of NATO's role in collective defence and as the preferred organization for crisis response. NATO should have the "right of first refusal." In those cases where the alliance as a whole eschews crisis response, the release of any logistical and other assets to the EU

into this necessity for the past fifty years. Moreover, NATO's viability, and being in NATO, satisfy what Arnold Wolfers once referred to as "milieu goals" for Canada. Without the connection to Europe hitherto embodied in NATO, we would apparently be a very junior partner of the US in security affairs, which constitute an important element of the fabric of foreign policy. Being a member gives us a seat at the table. This may not produce much in concrete terms. But it is perceived to enhance Canada's status in the councils of the euro-atlantic community and to distinguish us from the US. In this context, the development of ESDI/ESDP is profoundly threatening to the conventional wisdom of this élite and to the objective of sustaining a distinct Canadian identity in international relations.

At this stage, it is worth underlining the intimate link in Canadian security thinking between ESDP and NMD. In this instance, many Canadian policymakers see a North American security future in which — whether Canadians like it or not, and whether they participate or not — they are going to be dragged along in a continental security project over which they have no influence and no control. While Americans worry about inadvertent decoupling, we worry about involuntary coupling. This is the nightmare that NATO has traditionally served to dispel. The combination of challenges to Canada's traditional approach to the identity aspects of security policy is profoundly disconcerting.

Beyond general questions of identity differentiation there are also bureaucratic political considerations relevant here. Those who advocate Canada's European and alliance vocation in foreign policy are under increasing challenge from other elements of the bureaucracy who wish to redefine the country's security directions along more innovative lines (e.g., Foreign Minister Axworthy's focus on "human security," the discourse on peacebuilding, etc.).[31] A weakening of the transatlantic security link would greatly weaken the rationale for resisting this truly post-modern security agenda. In this context, phenomena such as ESDP may be threatening the position of the atlanticist contingent within the Canadian domestic debate.

The fundamental question in assessing the meaning of ESDP in Canadian security policy lies in what is being secured by Canadian security policy. I suspect the problem is that it is a particular traditional understanding of Canadian identity that is being secured by our association with NATO. This explains the obvious discomfort in Canadian policy circles despite the relatively minor material stakes involved. It is somewhat ironic in this context that the Canadian response to the problem that ESDP creates for our security identity has pushed us into adopting a posture that is largely indistinguishable from that of the US in ongoing discussions of transatlanticism.

American ambivalence over the coalescence of an autonomous ESDI and policy is evident, as the chapter by Stephen Walt makes clear. On the one hand, such a development might ease tensions over burdensharing. It would also reduce Americans' resentment at having to bail Europe out of situations where American security interests were not obviously engaged, as a result of Europe's incapacity to handle

its own problems. On the other hand, at the very least, American policymakers oppose versions of ESDI that might dilute NATO's capabilities and cohesion, "subtracting value" from the alliance. And there appears to be a clear preference in Washington for the principle that autonomous European actions — particularly those requiring NATO resources — require approval by NATO. In the area of defence industry cooperation, while favouring European consolidation, Americans are nervous about its potential effects on transatlantic cooperation in this field, as well as on US access to European markets.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Although the reservations of Canadian policymakers regarding ESDP are understandable, they perhaps do not do sufficient justice to the ways in which the emergence of a credible European intervention capability may serve both broader Canadian foreign policy objectives and Canada's identity concerns. In the first place, one of the key deficiencies in the pursuit of peace and human security has been the reliance of the international community on US capability where heavier forces are required for intervention. The US has proven to be distinctly reluctant to deploy its forces in harm's way. The development of an autonomous EU capability may go some distance towards resolving this issue, not least since key

capability. For this reason, meaningful relations with an emergent EU security structure are predicated to an important extent on continuing Canadian force modernization and the increased spending that goes with this. Third, it makes sense to explore with the EU how to design efficient and transparent institutional linkages with other organizations with human security and peace support functions and of which Canada is a member. The focus thus far has been on NATO-EU mechanisms. The same case can be made for strengthening EU-UN and EU-OSCE links.

Notes

1. Nicole Gnesotto, prefatory remarks in Stanley R. Sloan, *The United States and European Defence*, Chaillot Papers 39 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, 2000), p. v.
2. William Pfaff, "America's Infatuation with Missile Defence Baffles Europe," *International Herald Tribune*, 8 June 2000, p. 10.
3. Thomas Ricks, "Changing Winds of U.S. Defense Strategy," *International Herald Tribune*, 27-28 May 2000, p. 1.
4. The most significant initiative during this period in the area of European defence collaboration was the founding, in 1992, of the Franco-German Eurocorps. This generated strong opposition from a US worried over the degree to which the corps might displace NATO and undermine domestic support for continuing American involvement in Europe. See David G. Haglund, "Who's Afraid of Franco-German Military Cooperation?" *European Security* 2 (Winter 1993): 612-30.
5. The CJTF concept was approved at the January 1994 Brussels NATO summit, and envisaged the dual use of NATO forces and structures for alliance operations and for WEU initiatives, allowing the European allies to undertake missions with forces

92c2452 6.4 E m3gCuu8(cl9s and stru9)f44ra15isa.7w x57eT u2wxcc(i4.8csb)20.ia]TJ 5a55.9i

9. Moens, "Developing a European Intervention Force."
10. Anne Deighton, "The European Union and Kosovo: Towards the Glass Ceiling," a paper presented to the conference Allied Force or Forced Allies: Alliance Politics in Canada and Europe from the End of the Cold War to Kosovo, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 30 September-1 October 1999, p. 8.
11. "European Council Declaration: On Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence," 4 June 1999, http://europa.eu.int.
12. The Petersberg missions are: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. See "Western European Union Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration," Bonn, 19 June 1992, http://www.weu.int/eng/comm92-petersberg.htm.
13. UK Government, FCO, "Joint Declaration by the British and French Governments

26. For a good summary account of the emergence of two groups (BAE Systems and EADS), see Burkard Schmitt, "EADC Is Dead – Long Live EADS!" *Institute for Security Studies Newsletter*, no. 28 (January 2000).
27. In this latter context, see Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair, and Gerhard Schröder, "The Test Ban Treaty Needs American Ratification," *International Herald Tribune*, 9-10 October 1999.
28. François Heisbourg, "Germany Points the Way to a Strong Self-Sufficiency," *International Herald Tribune*, 24 May 2000, p. 8.
29. Frederick Bonnart, "U.S. Starts to Fret over EU Military Independence," *International Herald Tribune*, 24 May 2000, p. 8.
30. I confess that this seems rather quixotic. Article 19 of the Consolidated Treaty on European Union states that: "Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora. In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions."

5. *NATO's Fragile Future*

Stephen M. Walt

Introduction: The Past as Prologue[1]

Politicians on both sides of the Atlantic are fond of describing NATO as the most successful alliance in modern history. Who can blame them? The transatlantic partnership between Europe and America brought peace to a war-torn continent, overcame the Soviet challenge, and provided a safe haven in which to nurture European political and economic integration. Security ties between Europe and America also facilitated transatlantic cooperation on a host of other issues, and helped foster a remarkable period of material prosperity.

Given these achievements, it is hardly surprising that few voices now call for an end to the alliance, even though its original raison d'être has evaporated. Indeed, NATO continues to display remarkable signs of life: it has expanded to include three new members, developed a new strategic concept to guide its force planning in the post-Cold War era, and revised its doctrinal procedures and institutional arrangements to reflect the momentous changes that have occurred since 1989. After an embarrassing period of vacillation, NATO helped bring the bloody war in Bosnia to a halt (at least for the moment), and just last year, NATO waged a successful military campaign to halt Serbia's repression in Kosovo. At first glance, therefore, the transatlantic partnership seems to be confounding the widespread belief that alliances are bound to dissolve once the threat that brought them together is gone.[2]

Unfortunately, these events mask a more troubling reality. Although energetic diplomacy has kept transatlantic security ties intact thus far, deep structural forces are already beginning to pull Europe and America apart. Instead of becoming the core of an expanding security community, united by liberal values, free markets, and strong international institutions, the "transatlantic partnership" that fought

and won the Cold War is already showing unmistakable signs of strain. No matter how many new states join NATO and no matter how many solemn reaffirmations emerge from the endless parade of NATO summits, the highwater mark of trans-

threatened to establish hegemony in Europe or Asia. Europe faces no comparable threat today, and there is not even a credible threat on the horizon. Whatever America's forces are doing in Europe, they are not there to protect its wealthy and stable allies from external aggression.[5]

No Threat, No Alliance

Western Europe and the United States were brought together by the raw power of the Soviet Union, its geographic proximity to Europe, its large, offensively oriented military forces, and its open commitment to spreading world revolution.[6] Because the Europeans were loathe to sacrifice their independence and the US was loathe to let any single power dominate the entire Eurasian landmass, the industrial democracies of Europe and North America had ample reason to downplay their differences in order to preserve a common front.[7]

The disappearance of the Soviet threat has eliminated this overriding common interest, and though Europe and America still share some common goals, these objectives are nowhere near as significant as containing the Soviet Union was. The US and Europe are separated by geography, language, historical experience, and relative capabilities, and the American interest in Europe is neither as obvious nor as significant now that there is no potential hegemon perched on NATO's doorstep.[8] The absence of a powerful enemy is to be welcomed, of course, and it would be foolish — and dangerous — to conjure up new foes merely to keep the West together. Inevitably, however, this fundamental shift in the landscape of world politics is already having adverse effects on the transatlantic partnership.

First, conflicts of interest are becoming more visible and significant. The sad history of the Bosnian conflict offers eloquent testimony to the growing divisions between Europe and America, and only the realization that NATO might collapse brought a belated commitment on common action. America's European allies rejected the policy of "dual containment" in the Persian Gulf, and — with the partial exception of Great Britain — are no longer willing to endorse US policy toward Iraq. Europe and America also hold profoundly different views on the Middle East peace process and the proper approach to Castro's Cuba. NATO was able to achieve and sustain a fragile consensus during the war over Kosovo, but divisions within the alliance limited its military effectiveness and the aftermath of the conflict has left deep resentments on both sides of the Atlantic. Europeans question the strategic judgement of US leaders, while taking full notice of America's reluctance to put its own forces at risk. For their part, American politicians increasingly resent having (once again) to bail out their European allies in a region that is not a vital US interest.[9] Moreover, the persistent bloodletting within Kosovo casts further doubt on whether the entire operation was well-conceived in the first place. And insofar as preserving regional peace has become NATO's main mission, its inability to devise a workable solution in the Balkans calls its own self-proclaimed rationale into question.

Second, these differences reflect an even more fundamental conflict of interest between the US and its European allies. Although some Europeans have long resented Washington's predominant role, their doubts were always suppressed by the more imminent danger posed by the Soviet Union. Now that the Soviet Union is gone, however, the threat from America's preponderant power looms much larger in the eyes of many European élites. Although the threat is mitigated by America's geographic isolation from Europe, leading European politicians are acutely conscious of the dangers posed by unchecked US power. France's foreign minister, Hubert Védrine, has routinely warned of America's "hyperpuissance" and declared that a central aim of French foreign policy was to "make the world of tomorrow composed of several poles, not just one." German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has expressed similar concerns, declaring that the danger of US unilateralism is "undeniable."[10]

To be sure, Europeans do not regard the United States as the same sort of threat that the Soviet Union was, if only because the US has neither the desire nor the capacity physically to conquer the continent. But they do worry that the US casts too large a shadow over the other major powers and is too willing to throw its weight around. Not surprisingly, therefore, even America's closest allies would like to put a leash on their more powerful partner.

Third, the lack of a common foe exacerbates the familiar problem of credibility. So long as Soviet forces stood on the Elbe, the US had an obvious interest in keeping Western Europe independent of Soviet control. Although it was occasionally necessary to make symbolic gestures to reaffirm the US commitment, what made these gestures credible was the underlying American interest in European independence. Now that there is no real threat, however, its allies have real grounds to question America's staying power. It can hardly be reassuring, for example, that the US entry into Bosnia was accompanied by open handwringing in Congress, by repeated reminders that the involvement would be of limited duration, and by an all-too-visible reluctance to risk even trivial US casualties. No matter how often or how eloquently the president or his senior advisors reaffirm the US commitment, Europeans now have ample reason to doubt it.

Fourth, the collapse of the Soviet Union has given each of these states a wider

Europeans and Americans are increasingly willing to consider new ways to obtain security, which means that seemingly immutable institutions — including NATO — may evolve rapidly and unpredictably.[11]

All of these divisive elements are evident in Europe's recent decision to build up its own military capability. The decisive break occurred at an Anglo-French summit in Saint-Malo in December 1998, which called for the European Union to "play its full role on the international stage" and committed the EU to acquire "appropriate structures and a capacity for ... strategic planning," as well as "suitable military means" to conduct its own foreign policy.[12] This process intensified after the war in Kosovo demonstrated that Europe could not even handle a minor power like Serbia without relying primarily on US military might.

So long as Europe remains dependent on American military power, its leaders will have less influence over how NATO's assets are used. True, NATO's European members can shape allied strategy at the margins (as they did during the Kosovo campaign), but Washington can veto virtually any operation and retains predominant influence over where, when, and how NATO forces will fight. This situation has made Europe's leaders increasingly uncomfortable, and they are now formally committed to developing the independent capacity to maintain a force of 60,000 troops in the field for a period of one year. One may question whether the Europeans will achieve even this modest goal, but the decision illustrates Europe's growing dissatisfaction with its subordinate role.[13]

partner and a substantial target for US foreign investment, although its stake in Europe was still a relatively small share of the US economy.[14]

This source of unity is of declining importance as well. Asia surpassed Europe as the main target of US trade in 1983, and America's trade with Asia is now more than one and a half times larger than its trade with Europe.[15] US direct foreign investment in Europe is still larger than investment in Asia, but the gap has begun to close. In either case, the sums involved are too small to have a decisive impact on US security commitments.[16]

The shift in US foreign economic activity has been accompanied by a simultaneous trend towards *regionalization*.[17] This trend is also reflected by renewed progress towards European integration, beginning with the Single European Act in 1986 and proceeding through the Maastricht treaty in 1991 and the debut of European monetary union in 1999. A similar tendency may be observed on the other side of the Atlantic as well, most notably in the 1992 North American free trade agreement among the United States, Canada, and Mexico.

These developments threaten transatlantic ties in at least two ways. First, although economic connections do not determine security commitments, the shift in economic activity from Europe to Asia will inevitably lead US policymakers to devote more energy and attention to the latter. Major security challenges are more likely to arise in Asia as well, which is why former Secretary of State Warren Christopher took office warning against an overly "Euro-centric" foreign policy.[18] Because time and resources are finite, these trends herald an inevitable decline in the level of attention devoted to Europe.

It is no accident that President Clinton went all-out to obtain Congressional approval for China's entry into the World Trade Organization, while proposals for a "transatlantic free trade association" have languished throughout his administration. Although area specialists and bureau chiefs will continue to keep watch on their appointed regions, high-level officials will devote less time, less energy and most importantly, less political capital to an area whose relative importance is declining. European leaders may try to fight this trend, but they will eventually react by paying less attention to Washington. The inevitable result will be an erosion in transatlantic cohesion.

Second, the expansion of the European Union is bound to create further tensions between Europe and America. NATO expansion and European political and monetary union have been described as mutually supportive initiatives, which will bring new and old democracies together in an expanding liberal order. These initiatives *may*

US-European relations remain troubled by recurring trade disputes, and these tensions are likely to grow if Europe becomes more powerful economically and more cohesive politically, especially once America's economy eventually slows down.[20] Europe's political integration will eventually eliminate any need for a residual US military presence, and when that happens, European deference to US wishes will evaporate. Moreover, the structural shifts that are pulling America and Europe apart will be reinforced by domestic developments on both sides of the Atlantic. These developments will be difficult if not impossible to reverse, further weakening the glue that has kept the transatlantic partnership together for the past four decades.

Demographic Shifts and Generational Change

The US traces its origins to European civilization, and many Americans still have ancestral ties there. These common historic and cultural ties are sometimes invoked to justify current commitments, and to explain why the country remains deeply interested in European affairs. If nothing else, ancestral ties explain why Polish-Americans have been among the most fervent supporters of NATO expansion.

Yet this source of transatlantic solidarity is often overstated. The original settlers and founding fathers were not exactly *loyal* Europeans, and many of the immigrants who populated North America did not harbour affectionate sentiments toward their former homes. Cultural and ethnic ties between Europe and America did not prevent the US from staying out of Europe's conflicts during the nineteenth century, and they did not make America's leaders eager to enter either world war. Indeed, the US "melting pot" may have reinforced its traditional isolationism, by making it more difficult for Washington to take a firm position against any individual European state.

Moreover, to the extent that ethnic or cultural ties did reinforce an American interest in Europe, their impact is probably diminishing. Not only is the percentage of US citizens of European origin declining, but the main waves of European immigration occurred several generations ago and assimilation and intermarriage have diluted the sense of affinity with the "old country."[21] More recent immigrants from Asia or Latin America are likelier to retain these cultural affinities and to hold strong views about US policy toward their homelands.

Furthermore, the past four decades have witnessed a profound westward shift in the US population. In 1950, approximately 27 percent of Americans lived in the northeast, while the west contained a mere 13.7 percent. In 1995, by contrast, the latter had grown to 21.9 percent of the US population while the former had fallen to 19.6 percent. The US Bureau of the Census also predicts that the fastest growing states in the period 1993-2020 will be Nevada, Hawaii, California, and Washington; California (already the most populous state in the country) is expected

to add another 16 million residents by 2020.[22] Thus, the centre of gravity of the US population is shifting steadily westwards, which could also encourage a gradual shift in geopolitical focus.

The third and most important trend is generational change. We are now wit-

soundly endorsed NATO's eastward expansion.[26] Americans continue to see Europe as an important interest and citizens on both sides of the Atlantic apparently retain a high regard for one another.[27] Perhaps most important, US public opinion has given qualified support for NATO's efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo, at least so far.

On the other hand, there is growing evidence of a declining willingness to engage in costly overseas commitments. Although 65 percent of Americans still believe the US should take "an active part" in world affairs (at least when the alternative response is "staying out"), their support wanes when this role might entail real sacrifices.[28] Support for the US deployment to Bosnia, for example, was clearly predicated in the assumption that this would not cost American lives.[29] A similar reluctance to bear any burden also explains why the Clinton administration kept lowering the estimated cost of NATO expansion as ratification approached. Americans may favour expanding NATO, but not if it is going to cost them very much.

To be sure, Americans still want to retain military superiority, but support for the country's current level of defence expenditure is unlikely to survive the generational changes noted earlier and the fiscal constraints that loom ahead.[30] Barring the rise of a major and direct threat to the country's security (and it is becoming increasingly difficult to locate one), US military power will continue to erode. And with that decline will come even greater reluctance to engage in potentially dangerous international activities.

To reiterate: wartime alliances rarely survive the enemy's defeat. Given this expectation, NATO is already something of an anomaly. Its members remain committed to mutual defence even though the threat that brought them together has vanished, and are trying to sustain a high level of policy coordination even though their interests and goals are gradually diverging. NATO has redefined its mission

like telling themselves that they are the "one indispensable power" — to use Madeleine Albright's self-flattering phrase — and it even seems appropriate when the US economy is booming and when one has at one's disposal the enormous military establishment acquired during the Cold War.

Second, the Atlantic alliance is heavily bureaucratized, and no organization goes out of business quickly or willingly. We would not create NATO now if it did not already exist, but keeping it going seems easier and less risky than letting it collapse.

Third, the US is able to extend these new commitments because other states have been only too happy to free-ride on its protection. Why should the Europeans do the heavy lifting when Uncle Sam is still willing to do most of the work? Why would Poland or Hungary *not* want the prospect of US protection, even if it is a guarantee that Americans would never really want to honour? The US remains Europe's ideal ally, not least because it is an ocean away and does not threaten to subjugate them. Although its allies do resent America's highhandedness and seek to rein in its occasional enthusiasms, for the most part they have been letting it have its way.

Given these conditions, one can envision an optimistic scenario in which the transatlantic partnership holds together and gradually expands, peace deepens, and prosperity grows. In this scenario, NATO does not in fact have to do much of

Conclusion

The above example illustrates the fundamental problem once again: shorn of an overarching threat to focus the mind and compel Western unity, the US and its traditional European partners will have less and less reason to agree. Although they retain certain common interests and will undoubtedly continue to cooperate on a variety of issues, consensus will neither be as significant nor as automatic in the future as it was in the past.

Instead, the Atlantic alliance is beginning to resemble Oscar Wilde's Dorian Gray, appearing robust and youthful as it grows older and ever more infirm. The Washington treaty may remain in force, the various ministerial meetings may continue to issue optimistic communiqués, and the NATO bureaucracy may keep

largely on its own. The good news is that US power is unlikely to be a malevolent force in Canadian affairs, although it is certain to require awkward adjustments from time to time.[32]

The waning of transatlantic partnership is no reason to rejoice. NATO was a great source of stability during the Cold War, and its existence helped manage the potentially dangerous interregnum that followed the collapse of the Soviet empire. But nothing is permanent in international affairs, and NATO's past achievements should not blind us to its growing fragility. Instead of mindlessly extending guarantees to every potential trouble spot, and instead of basing their foreign policies on a presumption of permanent partnership, it is time for Europe and the United States to begin a slow and gradual process of disengagement. It is going to happen anyway, and wise statecraft anticipates and exploits the tides of history, rather than engaging in a fruitless struggle against them.

Notes

1. This paper draws upon research previously published in "The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America Are Drifting Apart," *National Interest*, no. 54 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 3-11; and "The Precarious Partnership: America and Europe in a New Era," in *Atlantic Security: Contending Visions*, ed. Charles A. Kupchan (Washington: Council on Foreign Relations/Brookings Institution Press, 1998).
2. See Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," *International Organization* 50 (Summer 1996): 445-75.
3. See John J. Mearsheimer, "The Future of America's Continental Commitment," in *No End to Alliance: The United States and Western Europe*, ed. Geir Lundestad, (New York: Macmillan, 1998); and Idem, *Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, forthcoming).
4. See Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

clearly *not* located in Europe. For typical examples of this sort of propaganda, which is routinely invoked to justify the US commitment, see Richard Holbrooke, "America: A European Power," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (March/April 1995): 38-51. Not surpris-

Investment Statistics Yearbook, 1996 (Paris: OECD, 1996); *International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1995* (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1994).

17. See Jeffrey T. Frankel, *Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System* (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1997), pp. 112-13, 229.

18. One might even argue that the debacle in Bosnia was a godsend for Europhiles, because it forced the Clinton administration to pay more attention to Europe than it otherwise would have done.

19. See C. Fred Bergsten, *Weak Dollar, Strong Euro? The International Impact of EMU* (London: Centre for European Reform, 1998).

20. For a pessimistic summary of US-European trade relations, see Peter W. Rodman, *Drifting Apart: Trends in U.S.-European Relations* (Washington: Nixon Center, 1999), pp. 21-24.

21. The proportion of US citizens of European origin will decline from 80 percent in 1980 to 64 percent in 2020, while the share of Hispanics will rise from 6 percent to 15 percent, and of Asians from 2 percent to 7 percent. See *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1994* (Washington: US Bureau of the Census, 1994), p. 18.

22. See *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1996*; and *Population Profile of the United States 1995*, Current Population Reports, Special Studies Series P23-189 (Washington: US Department of Commerce, 1995).

23. In the last two presidential elections, decorated World War II veterans were defeated by a man born *after* the war and who had avoided military service. This is a far cry from the days when military service was virtually obligatory for national office, and SOted

policy problems, the most frequent response (at 21 percent) was "don't know." Support for traditional overseas commitments was also at an all-time low in this survey. See John E. Rielly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).

29. In October 1995, for example, the Gallup Poll reported that 69 percent of respondents supported the US deployment to Bosnia (with 29 percent opposed), *assuming* that no American lives would be lost. When asked to assume that the mission would lead to twenty-five US deaths, however, only 31 percent of the respondents supported deployment and 64 percent were opposed.

30. In 1998, US defence expenditures alone were roughly one-third of the world total. America spent 55 percent more than NATO Europe combined, nearly five times more than Russia, eight times more than Germany, and seven times more than China or Japan. Put differently, the US spent more than than the next six countries combined, and four of those six are its formal allies! Military superiority is a good thing, but too much of a good thing is hard for anyone to sustain. On the fiscal constraints that will limit defence expenditures in the years ahead, see Cindy Williams and Jennifer Lind, "Can We Afford a Revolution in Military Affairs?" *Breakthroughs* 8 (Spring 1999).

31. This may also require revising the existing strategic concept, which commits NATO to preserve peace and stability in and around NATO territory, even if NATO countries are not under attack. For a general discussion of the desirability of the sort of "minimal NATO" prescribed here, see Michael Brown, "Minimalist NATO: A Wise Alliance Knows When to Retrench," *Foreign Affairs* 78 (May/June 1999): 204-18.

32. As former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau famously remarked, being America's neighbour "is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly or even tempered is the beast ... one is affected by every twitch and grunt." Quoted in Louis Turner, *Invisible Empires* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), p. 166.

6. *Conclusion and Policy Implications*

David G. Haglund

For more than half a century, NATO has been a presence in Canadian grand strategy. At times, it has loomed so large as to be seen by some Canadians as capable of dictating the country's foreign and defence policies. At other moments, its shadow has receded so far as to raise among the country's allies deep concern about its ongoing "commitment" to their security. Rarely has the relationship between Canada and the alliance been without some elements of controversy, even though it is true that Canadian publics have tended to remain rather favourably disposed to NATO, and do so today.

Thus any policymaker or political actor in Canada would do well to resist the temptation (if that is what it is) to argue for a dissolution of the country's alliance bonds. Neutrality has never been a saleable electoral commodity in the post-Second World War period, as the federal New Democrats were reminded time and again during the 1970s and 1980s, with no apparent effect on their learning curve. Nor does the current phase of Canadian foreign policy, characterized as it is by an abiding concern for "human security," suggest that the alliance has become irrelevant to Canadian purposes. As some of the chapters of this volume have argued, the contrary is rather the case. Does this mean, however, that future governments in Ottawa should decree that, in the case of NATO policy, the best rule remains "noli me tangere"?

Hardly. In the first place, as all the contributors have argued, changes in the structure and perhaps even content of international politics have rendered change for the alliance a necessity not a luxury, and it follows that with NATO in a con-

for Canada no less than for any other ally, even if policy élites in this country might give the appearance of being more allergic to interest-based calculations than their counterparts elsewhere in the alliance.

Apart from the fact that the public seems to like membership in NATO, why should Ottawa want to continue a linkage with a security organization some claim has been rendered obsolescent by the passing of its former historic adversary? In the shortest answer, it should want this because the linkage advances at a reasonably affordable cost a set of interests (including those political interests we might call "values") that Canada wishes to defend and promote. To be sure, should that security organization become so "obsolescent" as to be virtually useless, then a different calculus might emerge, even in a country such as Canada, which is an

and future defence review, it might be possible to conclude that alliance relations constitute a domain of policy that warrants little review, and no change.

To so conclude, however, would be premature, and likely foolish, for there are developments in international security that really do suggest that the status quo may be untenable. The developments can be lumped into three categories, discussed variously in the pages of this book. The three categories relate to the alliance's structure, its purpose, and its size. I address these here in reverse order.

How large NATO should become has been a question that has preoccupied policymakers in Ottawa as elsewhere since the mid 1990s. Initially, it seemed as

latter would constitute a commitment that Canada would not want to make, and that if it made would hardly wish to honour if doing so meant a dangerous reversal in a pattern of relations with Russia that, Pavel Baev reminds us, has become reasonably (though not excessively) "cooperative."

This brings us to a second factor of change, the purpose of the alliance. NATO's charter mandate, as is well known, is collective defence. It is equally well known that it possesses no great-power foe against whom such defence appears now to be needed. Some see this absence as a guarantee of the declining utility of the alliance; Stephen Walt is in this group, and there is logic as well as the weight of historical evidence to buttress this "structural-realist" expectation. But the expectation applies to a future that cannot, by the very nature of things, be observable to anyone. Whatever else the future may be, it never is "foreseeable," if that adjective is to possess any meaning.

Were Ottawa decisionmakers to be enamoured of structural realism, they should wish the speedy demise of the alliance, and begin making designs for advancing Canadian interests through alternative means (which for American structural realists seems to require building up martial capability, with the only feasible short-term option for Canada being to acquire nuclear weapons). But that kind of "structural realism" seems singularly unrealistic in the Canadian case, and in any event that kind of structural realism has no adherents in Ottawa decisionmaking circles. But "realism" of a different sort abounds, and is reflected in the recognition that NATO *has*, as Joel Sokolsky argues, been evolving, *pace* the theoreticians, into something more than just a collective-defence entity, and that that evolution has been congruent with, and supportive of, the promotion of a Canadian strategic agenda that does makes sense to Ottawa decisionmakers.

The implication here is that Canada will or should want to do what it can to continue the progression of the alliance along the path of cooperative security. If this is so, Canada will desire for its own reasons to promote the "trans-European" bargain through the mechanisms associated with the alliance's Partnership for Peace. It will want to continue to foster a relationship with Ukraine that some describe as "special." Since cooperative security under PfP auspices focuses on the twin goals of dialogue and conflict management, core initiatives in this respect will continue to be found in the areas of civil-military relations and peacekeeping. These are areas of alliance activity that appeal to Canadian strategic-cultural sensibilities, and are also areas in which it can be maintained the country does have some comparative advantage.

This leads to the last item of the trio: the debate over NATO's structure and its potential impact on Canada. More than at any time in recent decades, there exists a conviction that a more integrated Western European defence entity — variously referred to as the European security and defence identity (ESDI), the European security and defence policy (ESDP), the European "pillar" of defence, or simply the "Europe of defence" — will be achieved. If achieved, the implications for

Canada's alliance interests, being potentially vast, would demand a policy response. But what are those implications expected to be?

At one extreme, they can be regarded as sinister, in squeezing Canada out of its

sense of *déjà vu* occasioned by this vision. Let it be recalled that in the twentieth century's two world wars Canada *did* indeed play such a role in European security, during crises from whose resolution America tried — between 1914 and 1917, and again between 1939 and 1941 — to remain aloof. The experience was not generally a positive for Canada, nor was the two North American countries' relative separation on the vital issues of European security a factor that contributed to a healthy relationship between them.

In the end, Canada's policy toward the evolving NATO cannot be shaped independently from its policy toward defence cooperation with the United States. For

Canada may, in the not too distant future, find itself having to answer that question. For the moment, greater practical utility might attach to a policy review intended to enable Canada to do what it can (which may be more than is sometimes thought) to preserve the alliance structure most congenial to its European and, even more importantly, world-order interests. In what would such a congenial structure consist? We have already glimpsed some of its features. It would be an alliance in which the trans-European bargain compensated for whatever fissiparous tendencies were being unleashed, no matter how inadvertently, by the Europe of defence. It would be an alliance geared more toward the projection of cooperative security and Canadian world-order interests, and less dedicated to the more narrow task of defending Western Europeans against an unknown adversary (even if the unknown lurks within Western Europe itself). It would be an alliance that continues to matter to Americans. And, because the defence of "Europe" cannot be allowed to become for the Canada of the early twenty-first century what it was for the Canada of the early twentieth century, it would be an alliance that imposes the fewest possible risks and the lowest cost upon a country that no longer does or should regard itself as a "European power."

NATO membership continues to make sense for Canada, but not because it is the means of ensuring the security of the Western Europeans. It is good for Canada that Western Europe remain what it has been for half a century, a "zone of peace." But if that were all that NATO entailed, it would become increasingly difficult to understand why a middle-ranking North American power whose ethnic composition grows less and less European should see itself as being perpetually charged with the responsibility to look after the security needs of the rich and sometimes large European democracies. This would be so even if the Europeans actually understood the true extent of the Canadian involvement in the security affairs of their continent. Generally, however, the Europeans do not, and seem still to believe that Canada somehow "left" Europe militarily — this notwithstanding that the same proportion of the country's military remained deployed in Europe a decade after the Cold War's ending as was there while that contest was still being waged.

Many things are worth fighting for, and some are even worth dying for. But preserving (or, in this case, resuscitating) a "counterweight" that has rarely been anything other than metaphysical is a cause for neither. Nor, let it be emphasized, can it be the explanation for, much less a justification of, Canada's ongoing involvement in NATO.

Contributors

Pavel K. Baev is a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), and editor of *Security Dialogue*.

David G. Haglund is director of the Centre for International Relations and professor of political studies at Queen's University.

S. Neil MacFarlane is Lester B. Pearson professor of international relations and director of the Centre for International Studies at the University of Oxford.

Joel J. Sokolsky is professor of political science and acting dean of arts at the Royal Military College of Canada.

Stephen Walt is professor of international relations at the Kennedy School, Harvard University.