

WAR WITH IRAQ

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CANADA'S STRATEGY IN THE PERSIAN GULF
1990–2002

Sean M. Maloney

Centre for International Relations, Queen's University
Kingston, Ontario, Canada
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The Martello Papers

The Queen's University Centre for International Relations (QCIR) is pleased to present the twenty-fourth in its series of security studies, the *Martello Papers*. Taking their name from the distinctive towers built during the nineteenth century to defend Kingston, Ontario, these papers cover a wide range of topics and issues relevant to contemporary international strategic relations.

"War with Iraq," whether as a call to arms, a slogan of dissent or a matter for more detached speculation, has been the dominant motif of international debate in the latter half of 2002. The casual observer might be excused for concluding from this that we are not already at war. Sean Maloney reminds us here that, in the absence of Iraq's full compliance with the arms control regime and other conditions of the 1991 ceasefire which ended Desert Storm, a *de facto* state of war has

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Glossary

AAA	Anti-Aircraft Artillery
ACE	NATO's Allied Command Europe
ALCM	Air Launched Cruise Missile
AOR	operational support ship which provides logistics to naval forces
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
B-52	heavy bomber carrying air-launched cruise missiles
BW	biological warfare
C-130	Lockheed Hercules tactical transport
CANUKUS	tripartite intelligence-sharing arrangement between Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CF	Canadian Forces
CF-18	Canadian version of the F-18 fighter-bomber
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPF	Canadian Patrol Frigate, City-class FFH
CW	chemical warfare
DDE	anti-submarine destroyer, not equipped with a helicopter
DDH	destroyer equipped with one or two helicopters
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

DMZ	demilitarized zone
DND	Department of National Defence
E-3, E-3A, E-3N	Sentry AWACS aircraft

1. Introduction

The attack and defence of overseas expeditions are governed in large measure by

seized Iranian minelayers, while French and American fighter aircraft duelled with the Iranian air force on a number of occasions, one of which resulted in the destruction of an Iranian F-4 in August 1987. In time, American naval commanders developed a comprehensive strike plan to destroy Iran's power grid and oil production facilities which amounted to 70 percent of the Iranian economy.¹⁰

Though the plan was never implemented, the firing of Iranian Silkworm anti-ship missiles and the mining of a US warship in April 1988 produced Operation PRAYING MANTIS in which three US Navy surface action groups raided and destroyed two major Iranian oil platforms and then destroyed half of the Iranian navy when the latter attacked American-flagged shipping.¹¹

The accidental destruction of the Iran Air airliner and its passengers by the American Aegis cruiser USS *Vincennes* in 1988 produced some pause, as did the end of the Iran-Iraq War and its mediation by the UN. Though an act of terrorism was conducted against the cruiser's captain and his family, Iranian operations against American targets wound down and the events of the 1990–91 Gulf War signalled an end to overt clashes involving military forces.¹²

Canada's role in the Iranian-American campaign, with the exception of concealing the details of the Arrow Air crash and the deaths of several hundred US MFO troops at Gander, Newfoundland, was limited to assisting in the overlapping end-game as the UN was called upon to broker the Iran-Iraq peace. According to the UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, Canada played no significant role in the diplomacy ending the war: the P5 members of the Security Council saw that any continuance of the wars was inimical to everybody's interests and acted accordingly.¹³ As a non-P5 member, a non-combatant, and a non-regional player, however, Canada was in an ideal position to help generate stability by contributing to the United Nations' Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group

were the only Canadian representatives in the region. As part of the observer mission, these men were in a position to gather valuable information about the belligerents' military capabilities, particularly the Iraqi Republican Guard. Unfortunately, the collation of this information was not at all systematic and consequently any use of it in the 1990–91 hostilities was squandered.¹⁹ According to advice given to the minister of national defence by the deputy minister and chief of defence staff, the benefits of keeping the Canadian UNMOs in place after Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 outweighed the risks to their personal safety. It appears as though these benefits may have been more than symbolic.²⁰

another level, the US Navy history of the Gulf War explains, “maritime interception operations provided an opportunity for nations leery of ground commitment on the Arabian Peninsula to join in the international effort. The multinational nature of the blockade sent a clear signal to Saddam Hussein that the global community was unified in its determination to end his occupation of Kuwait.”

of the elected officials to make a timely decision on deployment doomed Op BROADSWORD. Instead, a field hospital with an infantry company group to protect it joined the DESERT STORM forces in 1991 (Op SCALPEL).²⁹

Canada participated in the 1990–91 hostilities through its NORAD commitment. US Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites serving NORAD to detect Soviet ballistic missile attacks during the Cold War had their software modified and were used to spot Iraqi SCUD launches. NORAD personnel monitored the Middle East and passed warning information to US Space Command liaison teams with CENTCOM and then to Patriot missile batteries. NORAD also handled satellite communications supporting this activity. Ballistic missile warning was passed to NDHQ in Ottawa and then to Canadian units in Bahrain.³⁰

Canada also participated in the coalition air campaign, again through the NORAD connection. Eleven E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft tasked for NORAD air defence operations were deployed to Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Usually seven of the 40 to 50 crew members Canada assigns to the AWACS force were sent on regular rotations with the USAF AWACS squadrons.³¹ Similarly, Canadians serving with the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF) deployed to Turkey when the NAEWF sent E-3A Sentry's to Turkey along with NATO's ACE Mobile Force (Air) in 1990–91.³²

A series of small sub-operations were conducted by Canadian forces to support various Persian Gulf efforts. These included Operation SPONGE, where C-130 aircraft were deployed to move environmental clean-up equipment; Operation UNCLENCHED FIST which logistically assisted American units in Germany; Operation UNARMED WARRIOR, which was prepared to assist American medical units in Germany if casualties started pouring in. Canadian engineers were deployed to Kuwait City to restore the Canadian embassy (Operation NECESITY).³³ These sub-operations were of a supportive tactical nature.

NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SNFL) contributed to Operation MED NET. This operation was designed to monitor the Mediterranean and its approaches for "ships of special interest" in the event that Iraq used terrorism against the sea lines of communications supporting DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. CinCAFSOUTH assessed the threat to consist of

Iraqi merchant ships, seven of which were located in the Mediterranean at the commencement of hostilities, and those of Iraq's potential allies, who in addition possessed other capabilities in air, surface and subsurface warfare. Iraqi merchant ships, hired flags of convenience or even commandeered ships might be used for mining choke points or blocking the Suez Canal.... Few ships in which NATO took an interest remained unobserved for any significant period.³⁴

A Canadian destroyer, the usual contribution to SNFL, participated in this operation.

Despite acrimonious debates over the use of force and the staffing problems inherent to any headquarters with a calcified expeditionary capability, Canada's

1990–91 operations demonstrate increased interest in the region and an expansion beyond that envisioned in 1988. The same goal, however, underlay both efforts: military stability of the Persian Gulf region was important for economic reasons.

4. The Iraq War: Phase II

The 3 March 1991 ceasefire at Safwan and the 31 March Iraq agreement to comply with UNSCR 686 ended the first phase of the Iraq War. In April, however, the basis for the second phase was laid. UNSCR 687, which prohibited Iraq from manufacturing or possessing nuclear, biological or chemical munitions and the means to deliver them went into effect on 3 April. Two days later, UNSCR 688 was passed. It demanded that Baghdad end the repression of the Kurdish population of northern Iraq. To complicate matters, Iranian aircraft attacked Kurdish rebel bases in Iraq and Iraq responded with air action, which broke the coalition-imposed ban on flying.³⁵

On 27 April 1991 Iraq admitted that it had lied about the existence of stocks of nuclear materials in its possession and stalled on the specifics of how the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) would go about its business in the country. With much prevarication, Iraq finally agreed to a Status Agreement for UNSCOM on 18 May. Continued Iraqi obstruction produced UNSCR 707 which demanded that Iraq cease any nuclear weapons developments, fully disclose all information, and allow UNSCOM teams to move without prohibition.³⁶

Unlike a traditional war where the defeated country is completely occupied and stripped of its military capability, the Iraqi regime was left in power and retained its conventional military capability. The debate over why this was done

personnel, and funding quickly” and the UN peacekeeping force proposal was shelved.⁴⁵

Op PROVIDE COMFORT included an armed component from its inception to December 1991. On 10 April, Iraq was warned not to interfere with any coalition activity in northern Iraq and a no-fly zone was established north of the 36th parallel. On occasion, coalition aircraft were engaged by Iraqi air defence forces.⁴⁶


These facts were understood by those formulating Canadian policy toward the Persian Gulf region. Though small and innocuous, Op ASSIST contributed to coalition objectives which were related to putting pressure on the Hussein regime

anticipation of a UN request, DND determined that Canada could provide an infantry company, UNMOs, and combat engineers to the force. The company was to come from the UNFICYP commitment in Cyprus. The CDS approved such a deployment if the UN asked for it.⁵⁶

Then the P5 killed the inclusion of the infantry battalions, apparently due to cost, but increased the number of observers to 300. Informally, Canada was sounded out about providing ten UNMOs, a combat engineer troop for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and “advice on [the] possible use of overhead remote sensing technologies as an aid to the observation function.”⁵⁷

This last request produced betrayed overlap in function between the projected UNIKOM and UNSCOM. The Arms Control and Disarmament Division of External Affairs saw this as an opportunity to raise its profile and generated paperwork indicating that Canadian “aerial and space-based systems” could be used to satisfy the need to handle boundary demarcation, DMZ monitoring, removal and destruction of WMD, monitoring of specified armaments and embargo operations.⁵⁸ Despite this manoeuvre, DND planners concluded that the Canadian UNIKOM contribution could eventually include a portion of the planned 1,440 personnel: an engineer unit, and infantry company, an aviation element, and logistics support.

Figure 1: UNIKOM Deployments



Source: United Nations, Department of Public Information, Cartographic Section.

The provision of Canadian UNMOs and combat engineers clearly indicates that Canada supported the concept of UNIKOM, that is, containing the Hussein regime's aggression and providing demonstrative substance to the international community's presence to warn and deter.

UNIKOM continues to play an important role in the post-war activities of the United Nations in Iraq and Kuwait. The continued presence of the peacekeeping force is necessary to prevent any deterioration of the current situation and the contribution made by the Canadian field engineer contingent helps make this possible.⁶²

It is also possible that a complementary Canadian domestic political objective was to claw back an incorrectly perceived "loss" of Canadian credibility within the UN by participating in the 1990–91 hostilities as a combatant. Certainly, the opposition was highly critical of Canadian combat operations since they argued that it would "damage" Canada's peacekeeping image.⁶³

permitted to supervise the elimination of Iraq's nuclear, biological, chemical, and long-range ballistic missile capabilities. The UNSCR mandate was to conduct "immediate on-site inspections and destruction ... based on Iraq's declared stock-piles and locations." UNSCOM tasks were to include:⁶⁷

- Destroy, remove or render harmless all chemical and biological weapons as well as all stocks of agents and related subsystems, including all research and development, support and manufacturing facility items.
- Supervise the destruction of all ballistic missiles with a range of 150 km or greater, as well as all related parts, maintenance, and manufacturing facilities.
- Assist the UN secretary-general in implementing the plan for long-term

missiles could be modified to deliver biological or chemical weapons. Such modifications were easily within Iraq's technological capabilities. There is a significant amount of open space in an SA-2 airframe: all that is required is a timer to cut off the fuel, more fuel tanks, and a nose-cone capable of carrying the biological or chemical agent. Essentially, the SA-2 SAM could be converted into a free flight surface-to-surface rocket with a deadly cargo that can be dispersed over a wide area. The SA-2 is mounted on a mobile launcher and can be readied for firing in 45 minutes. Canadian inspectors, released from the Canadian Forces and contracted to DFAIT, underwent special training in the United States at Huntsville, Alabama. They then deployed as part of UNSCOM and subsequently examined and tagged some 200 or 300 SA-2s to keep track of them.⁷²

Another factor in continuing Canadian participation in UNSCOM throughout the 1990s was that External Affairs was responding to an agency or ally who evidently thought that Canada could play a useful role on behalf of that agency or ally in influencing the structure and operations of UNSCOM through Canadian participation.⁷³ The purposes behind this request must remain speculative but it is logical to suggest that the ally was the United States and/or the United Kingdom. The extent of Canadian influence on UNSCOM structure is unknown, with the exception of the Information Assessment Unit established by UNSCOM's Rolf Ekeus.

The relationship between UNSCOM and national intelligence agencies became a *cause celebre* and was used as a propaganda lever by Saddam Hussein to excuse his non-compliance with the UNSCRs at various times, but most particularly after 1995.⁷⁴ Yet portrayal of UNSCOM as a mere tool of such agencies is too simplistic: that UNSCOM serves national purposes is not unusual, particularly if the national members through the UN deem that UNSCOM's activities serve everybody. Tim Trevan, an UNSCOM inspector, explains this in relation to Canada's role.

[Ekeus] assembl[ed] an Information Assessment Unit (IAU) so that UNSCOM could in future independently assess both Iraq's declarations and the various other intelligence reaching the commission. Geoff St John was recruited from Canada to head up this operation, Roger Hill from Australia, Patrice Palanque from France, and Scott Ritter from the US. The nationalities of these expert analysts was no accident. Given the sensitivity of the intelligence received, and its provenance (the vast majority from US or British sources at that stage) the decision was made to recruit from CANUKUS countries. To do otherwise would have meant that UNSCOM would simply have received much less intelligence, the providers being unwilling to hand over intelligence to countries they did not trust.⁷⁵

Canada clearly wanted UNSCOM to be as effective as possible.

The nature of UNSCOM operations in the 1990s was unlike that of any arms control verification mission undertaken by Canadians. The situation facing UNSCOM in Iraq is best characterized by UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter.

Iraq had refused us access, defying UNSCOM and the Security Council and threatening the safety of the inspectors. Mass demonstrations of thousands of civilians, who had been handed eggs and vegetables by the eggs and vegetables quartermasters of the regime, had pelted us as we sat in our cars. This onslaught had failed to pry us loose from the perimeter of the ministry, and now the Iraqis tried a more direct tactic. They assaulted us with skewers and knives. Unarmed and with no mandate of self-defense, the team had no choice but to withdraw.⁷⁶

UNSCOM inspections were subjected to varying forms of harassment short of lethal military force and became an elaborate political theatre staged by the Hussein regime: "UNSCOM became convinced that, in 1991, Iraq had decided to create a 'concealment mechanism' designed to hide documents, computer records, and possibly items of equipment related to WMD prohibited under UNSCR 687."⁷⁷

This forced UNSCOM teams to use surprise inspection tactics, U-2 reconnaissance plane imagery, and other means to outwit the Special Security Organization and Special Republican Guard. This continuous cat and mouse game lasted from 1991 to 1998, when UNSCOM was finally withdrawn and the Operation DESERT FOX bombing commenced in December 1998.⁷⁸

UNSCOM, with effective Canadian participation, succeeded in destroying the following:⁷⁹

- 38,000 chemical weapons munitions;
- 480,000 litres of chemical agents;
- 48 operational ballistic missiles;
- six TEL's for those missiles (Transporter-Erector- Launcher vehicles);
- 30 BW and CW warheads for those missiles;
- large quantities of CW production equipment; and

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2. Produced its own uranium products.
3. Planned to divert highly enriched uranium that was subjected to IAEA safeguards and use the material in the production of a nuclear weapon.

<i>Disease</i>	<i>Weapon</i>	<i>Incubation Period</i>	<i>Fatality Rate</i>	<i>Contagious?</i>	<i>Weapons Loading?</i>
Anthrax	Vapour or	1-5 days	90% when	No	Missile war-

As for delivery systems, Iraq had a number of existing missiles, and plans to combine systems of less than 150-km range to circumvent the UNSCR's ban on 150 km range missiles. Some analysts believe that two SCUD-B and up to 20 Al Hussein are unaccounted for, and that the Al Samoud (tested in 2000) and J-1 (tested in 1993) programs could provide Iraq with a more than adequate WMD delivery capability.⁸⁶ CIA analysis released in 2001 suggests that numerous L-29 jet trainer aircraft have been modified into unmanned aerial vehicles for the delivery of biological and chemical weapons and that:

pursuit of UN-permitted missiles [less than 150 km range] continues to allow Baghdad to develop technological improvements and infrastructure that could be applied to longer ranged missile program.... development of the liquid-propellant Al-Samoud SRBM probably is maturing ... [witness the appearance of four Al-Samoud TELs with airframes at the 31 December 2000 Al Aqsa parade.... Ababil-100 SRBM-two

such airframes were [also] paraded on 31 December. If economic sanctions against Iraq were lifted Baghdad probably would increase its attempts to acquire missile-related items from foreign sources regardless of any future UN monitoring.... Iraq probably retains a small, covert force of SCUD-type missiles.⁸⁷

Indeed, the 1995 interception in Jordan of 240 missile guidance gyroscopes removed from dismantled Russian SS-N-18 submarine-launched ballistic mis-

Figure 4: Iraqi Chemical Weapons

<i>CW Agent</i>	<i>Declared by Iraq (Metric tons)</i>	<i>Unaccounted for Chemicals</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
VX nerve agent	4	1.5 tonnes of bulk CW agent 300 tonnes of precursor chemicals	Iraq lied about VX production until 1995 defections disclosed program.
Sarin nerve agent	100–150	360 tonnes of bulk CW agent 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals	
HD blister agent (Mustard)	500–600	200 tonnes (est)	
<i>Delivery System</i>	<i>Estimated Pre-1990 Numbers</i>	<i>Unaccounted for</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Missile warheads for Al-Hussein	75–100	45–70	UNSCOM destroyed 30 CW/BW warheads
Rockets	100,000	15,000–25,000	UNSCOM destroyed 28,000
Aerial bombs	16,000	2,000	
Artillery shells	30,000	15,000	
Aerial spray tanks	?	?	

Sources: Anthony Cordesman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East* (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2001); JIC, *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government* (September 2002).

WMD capabilities. For example, the number of estimated concealed ballistic missiles changed from “up to 12” to “up to 20.” The “dossier” confirmed that the 1998 predictions on Iraqi capability were in fact valid, including the belief that the Hussein regime could acquire a limited nuclear capability within one to two years from 2001.⁸⁹

Unlike previous studies, however, *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction* added possible intent to capability. Why was Hussein so obsessed with retaining a WMD capability?

Figure 5: Iraqi Missile Ranges



Source: Joint Intelligence Committee, *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The*

less well targeted nuclear weapons could wipe out 75 to 95 percent of all Saudi oil production ... it is unclear when that capacity could be restored; it could take decades.”⁹¹

Crisis Rhythm, 1993–1999

The nature of the war with Iraq in many ways resembles aspects of the Cold War between NATO and the Warsaw Pact: shows of force, covert operations, pre-deployed equipment and reinforcement exercises, and aggressive aerial intelligence gathering.⁹² Unlike the Cold War, the allied coalition actively engaged and continues to engage enemy targets with lethal military force on a regular basis: a form of coercive airpower or “Tomahawk Diplomacy.”⁹³ From 1993 to 1999, a distinct “crisis rhythm” between the coalition and the Hussein regime emerged. It is the context for continuing Canadian military engagement in the region, given that engagement’s unique operational characteristics.

With the draw down after the 1990–91 round of hostilities, the coalition ground presence in the region consisted mainly of American and Gulf Cooperation Council forces. Drawing on the NATO REFORGER and 1990 DESERT SHIELD experiences, the decision was made to station a complete pre-positioned set of equipment in Kuwait enough for a heavy mechanized brigade and pre-position an entire armoured brigade on ships stationed at Diego Garcia, Saipan, and Guam. This was in addition to the pre-positioned US Marine Corps mechanized division-equivalent stationed on maritime pre-positioning ships at Diego Garcia. By 1996, movement was made to pre-position another heavy armoured brigade in Qatar.⁹⁴

Just having the equipment in-theatre, clearly, is not enough of a deterrent. Therefore an annual exercise series, Exercise INTRINSIC ACTION was initiated in 1992 (DESERT SPRING replaced INTRINSIC ACTION by the late 1990s). A battalion-sized unit in the United States is selected, flown to Kuwait, married up with its equipment, and then conducts exercises. In addition to acclimatizing the earmarked units to the region, it serves as a deterrent manoeuvre by demonstrating that the coalition has the capability to respond promptly to Iraqi provocation.⁹⁵

In addition to pre-positioned equipment, there was Operation DESERT FALCON: this was the code-name for the deployment and maintenance of two Patriot air defence artillery battalions to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain in October 1991. DESERT FALCON is expressly designed to counter Iraqi ballistic missile attacks. It also includes a light infantry battalion, usually an airborne battalion, as a force protection unit.⁹⁶

In October 1994, the Hussein regime decided to test the international community’s resolve by moving significant mechanized forces toward the Kuwait border. The reasons for doing so, according to a former CIA analyst,

Faced with mounting internal threats, a deteriorating economic situation, and no relief in sight, Saddam decided to try and force the issue. At the beginning of October, Iraq issued a number of ominous warnings, promising unspecified consequences

Operation VIGILANT SENTINEL was activated in August 1995. Three more carrier battle groups, another amphibious ready group with the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit embarked, as well as USMC maritime pre-positioning ships were activated and deployed to the region. A US Army heavy brigade deployed by air to pre-positioned equipment in Kuwait. Exercise BRIGHT STAR, a regular joint exercise held in Egypt involving six nations was accelerated to cover Jordan.¹⁰⁴ Iraq then withdrew its forces and VIGILANT SENTINEL wound down in December.

US forces in Saudi Arabia were then subjected to two terrorist attacks. The first occurred in Riyadh on 15 November 1995 when a support complex was bombed (five killed) and the second was the Khobar Towers barracks bombing in June 1996 (19 killed). Operation DESERT FOCUS was conducted by American and Saudi forces to support intelligence efforts to track down terrorist cells and determine if there was any connection between the Iraq War and the attacks or if they were the work of other organizations. These attacks were not perceived to be random events and were considered to be asymmetric attacks probably related to operations against Iraq and designed to interfere with the American-Saudi Arabian relationship.¹⁰⁵ The perpetrators, their specific motives beyond the expulsion of coalition military forces from Saudi Arabia remain obscure.¹⁰⁶

The next round of coalition military activity was Operation DESERT STRIKE which was conducted in September 1996. The lead-up for DESERT STRIKE involved the Byzantine rivalries and politics in and around the Kurdish-held regions of northern Iraq. The two primary Kurdish factions, the KDP led by Masoud Barzani and the PUK led by Jalal Talibani, were unable to sort out their differences. The KDP had Turkish backing (the KDP assisted Turkey in tracking down members of the radical PKK Kurdish terrorist group) and the Turks were antagonistic toward the PUK, which developed a relationship with Iran. In the summer of 1996, Iranian military forces entered PUK-held Iraqi territory tracking down members of KDP-I, which was the Kurdish separatist movement inside Iran. The KDP then requested Iraqi military support. Two Iraqi mechanized divisions at-

personnel for the armoured brigade pre-positioned in Kuwait were flown in, a squadron of F-117 was deployed to Kuwait, and a squadron of F-16L SAM-suppression aircraft was moved to Bahrain.¹⁰⁹

It is important to understand the relationship between air defence systems and ground operations. As the 1973 Yom Kippur War demonstrated, armoured and mechanized forces operating in open desert terrain are vulnerable to air strikes.¹¹⁰ These strikes are off-set by the deployment forward of missiles, radars, and anti-aircraft guns which provide an umbrella over the attacking mechanized forces. Such an umbrella, then, becomes a pre-condition for any offensive action. Therefore, if the air defence system is degraded, the ability to mount a mechanized attack is compromised.

On 3 September 1997, 14 Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from a US Navy surface action group and another 13 air-launched cruise missiles launched from B-52 bombers hit a variety of Iraqi targets and were designed to “significantly restrict Iraq’s ability to conduct offensive operations in the region and protect the safety of coalition aircraft enforcing [the no-fly zone].”¹¹¹ The next day, another 14 Tomahawks were fired from US Navy surface ships and a submarine. Opera-

NBCW reconnaissance unit; and other ground commitments from the Czech Republic and Romania. Additional F-117s and B-52s were also moved in.¹¹⁵

On 13 November, UNSCOM was ordered out of Iraq, though a skeleton staff stayed behind in Baghdad, prompting a Security Council demand for continued UNSCOM access to all sites. In a bid to increase pressure on Iraq, more American troops were deployed to Kuwait in January 1998, which brought the DESERT THUNDER deployment up to 35,000 ground personnel. More and more coalition naval assets deployed to ensure that sanctions remained in place in the face of increased smuggling and other sanctions-busting activities. The United Kingdom, for example, brought in two aircraft carriers, HMS *Invincible* and HMS *Illustrious* and their escorts. Ultimately, 50 coalition ships and submarines and some 200 naval aircraft were available for DESERT THUNDER.

Carl Vinson and *Enterprise* participated as well as Jaguar and Tornado fighter-bombers of the RAF. A brigade was flown into Kuwait on an INTRINSIC ACTION rotation and the British brought in special operations forces.¹²⁰

DESERT FOX attacked 100 targets in four nights. It expended 325 Tomahawk

Air Operations: NORTHERN WATCH and SOUTHERN WATCH from 1991 to 1998

Operation NORTHERN WATCH (ONW) is essentially a re-named PROVIDE COMFORT as of 31 December 1996 (see Figure 6). ONW enforces a no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel and is designed to enforce Iraqi compliance with UNSCRs 678, 687, and 688.¹²⁴ UNSCR 688, as we will recall, specifically condemned the Hussein regime for brutally suppressing its civilian population in the north (the Kurds) and the south (the Shi'a muslims), as well as for widespread human rights abuses. The air operations conducted under the auspices of PROVIDE COMFORT and later NORTHERN WATCH were directly related to protecting the Kurdish enclave which was established in April-May 1991.

In general, PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH was a quiet theatre until 1993. On 15 occasions from January to August, PROVIDE COMFORT aircraft were engaged by Iraqi air defence systems (radar lock-on, SAM firings, AAA firings) and responded 15 times. A typical example of this tit-for-tat game: on 17 January, Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery fired on two PROVIDE COMFORT F-16s. A nearby French Mirage reconnaissance aircraft was engaged, so an F-4G Wild Weasel fired an anti-radiation missile at the tracking station. Then an F-16 shot down an Iraqi MiG. US ships in the Persian Gulf then fired 45 Tomahawks at the Zarfaraniyah nuclear fabrication facility in retaliation.¹²⁵

Operation SOUTHERN WATCH was established in August 1992. Like PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH, its purpose was to also to enforce UNSCR 688. Consequently, a no-fly zone was established south of the 32nd parallel.¹²⁶ Throughout early 1993, Iraq continued to defy the UNSCRs which produced responses like the employment of 75 French, British, and American aircraft against the air defence system on 18 January.¹²⁷ Time and again, coalition aircraft were engaged in an air defence war and the linkage between PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH remained in place. In another incident in September 1996, Iraq launched a mechanized attack to support the Kurdish Democratic Party (see

Figure 6: No-Fly Zones

Source: Central Command Fact Sheet.

aircraft from Tinker Air Force base in Oklahoma may be deployed for the monitoring of the No-Fly zone over Southern and Northern Iraq. The decision by France, the United Kingdom and the United States to impose and patrol No-Fly zones over Iraq is based on a combination of UNSC Resolutions 678 (29 Nov 90) and 688 (5 Apr 91).¹²⁹

At any given time in the 1990s, the Canadian contribution to NORTHERN and SOUTHERN WATCH was about seven personnel.¹³⁰ During the DESERT THUNDER phase of the war, this was probably increased to conform to the buildup in January-February 1998.¹³¹ When shooting incidents involving NORTHERN and SOUTHERN WATCH aircraft became nearly daily events after 1998, they must

important contributions to US policy. For the Iraqi people who live in both the north and south, the no-fly zones provide a degree of protection from Saddam Hussein. The no-fly zones are a constant reminder of coalition resolve, and are thus a key component of America's deterrent posture. Moreover, by limiting training opportunities for the Iraqi air force, the no-fly zones have helped degrade Iraq's military capabilities. These operations also yield valuable intelligence concerning Iraqi forces, and provide an invaluable margin of early warning regarding potential threats to Kuwait. The additional warning margin afforded by the southern no-fly zone ensures that we are much better prepared today to deal with Iraqi threats to Kuwait than we were in 1990. In this regard, our readiness posture is aided by constraints on Iraqi ground deployments (thanks to the no-enhancement zone established in the south by UN Security Council Resolution 949 in October 1994).¹³³

Naval Operations: The MIF

As we have already seen, Canada contributed a three-ship task group to the Persian Gulf and assisted the coalition with another destroyer through SNFL operations. The Op FRICTION task group was assigned to Multinational Interception Force (MIF) operations enforcing UN sanctions against Iraq throughout 1990–91: these operations included monitoring shipping and boarding vessels of interest to ensure that contraband was not being delivered to Iraq. During the course of hostilities, the FRICTION task group shifted from embargo enforcement to power projection in support of the multinational force implementing DESERT STORM. This shift was connected to UNSCR 678 passed on 29 November 1991. The offensive support role remained in effect for the rest of the 1991 hostilities period.¹³⁴

HMCS *Huron*, a DDH-280 class destroyer with two Sea King helicopters embarked, left Halifax on 24 February 1991 for the Persian Gulf to relieve HMCS *Athabaskan*, which had reverted to the MIF sanctions enforcement role. The *Huron* deployment, called Operation FLAG, lasted from April to June 1991. The FRIC-

The [MIF] continues to enforce the sanctions regime against Iraq. In September and the first half of October four north-bound and five south-bound vessels were diverted to various ports in the Gulf for sanctions violations. Several of these vessels contained illegal cargo hidden beneath humanitarian shipments and over 3 million gallons of illegally exported Iraqi petroleum products were intercepted. The expeditious acceptance of these recent sanctions-violating vessels by Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates greatly contributed to our strong deterrent posture and provides further evidence that the MIF is a valuable resource in sanctions enforcement. We

the USS *Abraham Lincoln* carrier battle group which was part of the MIF operations. Note that US Navy aircraft carriers and Tomahawk-armed cruisers and destroyers also supported Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in addition to MIF operations, so the two missions and support for them overlapped. In general terms, forces allocated to the MIF also ensured that the vital Straits of Hormuz were kept open, that is, acted in a sea control capacity as well as in a sanctions interdiction capacity.

“Integration” of a Canadian FFH and American carrier battle groups became the hallmark of successive Canadian MIF deployments. In public statements, the minister of national defence would regularly remark that:

The Canadian Forces have been participating in the enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq for the past 10 years. Our contribution is important in promoting our national interests and is viewed as crucial by our allies.... This operation is extremely beneficial in ensuring our interoperability with our allies and particularly the United States. It will further strengthen our Navy’s relationship with the US Navy and reaffirm our commitment to peace and stability in this region.¹⁴¹

Coast Guard vessels executed these Ops under the cloak of darkness. The intensive Op took place in the northern extremities of the Arabian Gulf. The ships launched their Rigid-Hulled Inflatable Boats for a co-ordinated take-down and search of three supervised cargo and oil smugglers that attempted to sneak past UN checkpoints. Several airborne helicopters supervised the take-down. All smugglers were apprehended and escorted to a holding area to await further processing.¹⁴³

HMCS *Regina* was also present in the region for the buildup to Operation DESERT FOX. The USS *Constellation* Battle Group covered off the SOUTHERN WATCH no-fly zone while simultaneously conducting MIF operations.¹⁴⁴

From June 2000 to October 2001, there were three Op AUGMENTATION rotations: HMCS *Calgary* (working with a US Navy surface task group); HMCS *Charlottetown* (USS *Harry S. Truman* Battle Group); and HMCS *Winnipeg* (USS *Constellation* Battle Group).¹⁴⁵ *Winnipeg's* deployment was notable.

Of all the Canadian warships sent to the Gulf in the past decade, the *Winnipeg* has been the busiest, costing Saddam Hussein more money in lost oil revenue than in any other.... As one of the benefits of being a close friend of the United States, Canada is the only country permitted this close a working relationship.... The *Winnipeg's* fleet commander, an American Rear Admiral, designated the Canadian ship "on-scene commander" of the northern portion of the Gulf for the week of June 17–24, a first for a Canadian warship. That essentially gave Commander Williams command of a fleet of his own, from four countries. He was responsible for five frigates and destroyers, three patrol boats, various helicopters and patrol planes and one US Navy SEAL team.¹⁴⁶

All US Navy carrier battle groups were engaged in enforcing Op SOUTHERN WATCH as well as conducting MIF operations.¹⁴⁷

What was the impact of the MIF and Operations SOUTHERN and NORTHERN WATCH? US Central Command commander in chief, General Anthony C. Zinni explained in 1998 that:

A lot of attention has, over the years, been focused on the effects of sanctions on the Iraqi people by groups in Europe and North America who view the UN sanctions regime as inhumane. This attention has been accompanied by demands

5. *Is there a Canadian Strategy in the Persian Gulf Region?*

Is there a pattern to the Canadian Forces' regional involvement in the Persian Gulf or is this merely a list of reactive operations which have no connection other than geographic? It is extremely tempting to fall back on the simplistic argument that for the past ten or twelve years Canada has merely reacted to the requests of the United Nations and its organs for military forces to carry out the will of the Security Council. This assumes either a "chaos theory" of Canadian military commitment or that there is a defined UN strategy to deal with the Hussein regime and that Canada's interests are completely subordinated to it. Similar arguments may be advanced to suggest that Canada is merely reacting to American requests for involvement and that Canada has lost any freedom of manoeuvre by subordinating its actions to those of the Americans. Accepting that these positions are valid may comfort those who argue that Canadian action should always be subordinated to the United Nations or those who regularly decry "getting into bed with the Americans." Neither position permits Canada to have national interests nor a choice in the projection of its military power.

Any analysis of these questions must take into account Canada's unique approach to the employment of military forces within the context of Canadian strategic tradition. In doing so we perhaps need to move beyond generalized American or British conceptions of national strategy. It is first helpful to distinguish between three different yet overlapping elements.

Strategy, policy, and strategic tradition are all different, yet tend to be used by many commentators and analysts interchangeably. In an ideal sense, government sets foreign and defence policy, communicates it explicitly to those who must implement it and in theory the professional armed forces develop a coherent means of carrying that policy out globally and in-theatre with military forces: strategy and operations that are cast within the general tenets of the policy. There is then a

policy statements, approved by the governments of the day, posed as Canadian strategy. The military component in strategy formulation was completely subsumed by the Trudeau government's tampering with the professional civil service and the means by which Canada's senior uniformed representative gave professional advice to elected officials.¹⁵³ Foreign policy was set by an extremely vague and general 1970 series of policy statements, *Foreign Policy for Canadians*. All of these documents amounted to a misleading public "declaratory strategy" for Canada and did not seek to explain the real motives or mechanisms by which the Canadian government set its objectives and went about achieving them.

When the Cold War ended, the pattern repeated itself. The Mulroney government groped around for a time and conducted internal analysis of the new strategic environment, but did not bring forth a new policy or strategy. Only when the Chrétien government took over in 1993 did a new Defence White Paper emerge (1994), as well as a foreign policy statement (*Canada and the World*, 1995). These documents, however, are not strategy in that they do not allocate or balance military resources to achieve national interests. The 1994 White Paper and *Canada and the World* are documents that recognize that the world system has changed dramatically after 1990; they lay out some very broad principles (and hopes) for Canadian global activity, but do not specifically emphasize or give priority to one area over another. *Canada and the World*, however, contains strong elements of UN fetishism but without serious or detailed justification.¹⁵⁴

Consequently, *any* form of Canadian overseas military operation which was capable of actual implementation in the 1990s could be made to fit both the defence policy and the foreign policy. The practicality of this state of affairs is debatable, but its appeal is understandable. The 1994 and 1995 policy statements are hopelessly caught in between the "deep time" guidance provided by Canadian strategic tradition and something resembling Canadian strategy. They do not, there-

fence relationship with the US; and third, contribute to peacekeeping and stability operations, arms control verification, and the provision of humanitarian assistance. The author and contributors understood that the strategic situation was dominated by “A New World Order more violent, anarchic, and fragmented than anticipated” and that there was in progress a “proliferation of regional conflicts ... with the UN overburdened.” It was also dominated by the fear of “proliferation of weapons and weapons technology attributable to the disintegration of the former Soviet Union” and that “economic globalization was now a factor.”

The paper noted that there was an emerging role for the UN. Notably, “In the wake of the Gulf War, the UN itself has greater confidence, UNIKOM is a form of imposed peacekeeping and there is a willingness to discuss preventative deployments and talk of peace enforcement units.” Similarly, “with increasing frequency the UN is prepared to entertain the idea of intervening in areas which would previously have been considered the purview of individual states.” Most importantly in relation to the Canadian Persian Gulf context, “the line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement is becoming more difficult to discern. Peacekeepers have always been able to use force in self-defence including protection of the purpose of the mission. In cases where there is a higher likelihood of peacekeepers being attacked, there is a corresponding greater likelihood of the need to use force in response. The basic distinction between the impartiality of peacekeeping operations and the partiality of enforcement operations still remains.” The Gulf War was seen by analysts in ADM(Policy and Communications) as a precedent for enforcement operations.¹⁵⁷

The characterization of the situation in Iraq as of October 1992 included the following points:¹⁵⁸

1. Hindering of UN inspectors, intimidation of Kurds, refusal to accept UN conditions for resuming oil exports, and attacks against Shi’a rebels together constitute a challenge of Security Council ceasefire agreements.
2. Iraq remains in a weakened position, weapons of mass destruction largely destroyed, Kurdish autonomy a reality.
3. Western establishment of an exclusion zone in the south barring flights of fixed-wing aircraft will further limit Iraqi options.
4. Threats to neighbours, despite rhetoric, remains relatively low, although pressure exerted by continued sanctions, looming partition of the country makes long-term vitality of regime difficult to predict.

It was, perhaps, overly optimistic in 1992 to suggest that coalition pressure would produce ethnic fragmentation and a regime change in the near future. The study also examined other areas of Canadian interest: former USSR, former Yugoslavia, and Somalia. Iraq was the third priority on the list of Canadian concerns after the former Yugoslavia.

To deal with conflict in the 1990s, four models of Canadian involvement were developed:¹⁵⁹

Cyprus: This model represents a situation in which a force is put in place to monitor an existing agreement.

Cambodia: The model is taken to represent a situation in which a major civic action-type program is required to create a semblance of order.

Yugoslavia/Somalia: This model represents a situation in which a force intervenes to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and/or impose a ceasefire or settlement. An agreement may or may not exist and the intervention may require a degree of force or coercion.

Gulf model: At the high end of the spectrum is the Gulf War model in which a force is put in place to impose a settlement.

Collectively, these amounted to “stability operations” with only the Cyprus

provide enough military forces to dominate the formulation of coalition regional strategy in each of these areas. In many cases, Operational Influence remained out of reach. Canada is therefore dependent on the agency that formulates the regional military strategy in each of those areas.

For the Balkans, that agency was the UN until 1995 and then NATO. For Central and South America, it was the UN and then only when it was involved in post-Cold War cleanup operations like ONUCA and ONUSAL. In Pacific/Asia, Australia was in the lead (INTERFET in East Timor and to a certain extent, UNTAC in Cambodia). For Africa, there was no regional strategy. Outside intervention was situational and reactive, with the UN dominating many of the processes but in a fragmented manner. In the Persian Gulf and in the Caribbean, the United States-led coalitions dominated regional strategy. The only area that Canada contributed to in the development of regional strategy was in the Balkans through NATO. It is not a coincidence that the bulk of Canadian military activity in the 1990s was in the Balkans and that there is a connection between participating in regional strategy and the numbers of forces involved.

If we envision the various regions that have Canadian stabilization commitments in them as “theatres of war” comparable to the European and Pacific Theatres of Operations during the Second World War, we could liken the Balkans to the “European” and the Persian Gulf to the “Pacific.” During the Second World War, Canada prioritized its commitments to Europe but remained engaged in the Pacific. The priority for Canada’s long-term commitment of military forces in the 1990s was the Balkans, the secondary was the Persian Gulf. Other operations like Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Cambodia, and East Timor were comparatively peripheral in nature to the two main efforts and were not sustained commitments (see Figure 7).

What gave the Balkans and the Persian Gulf regions priority over these other areas? Instability in the Balkans generated by a combination of ethnic tensions released after the Cold War and the designs of a totalitarian state (Serbia) threatened the de-communization process in eastern Europe and also threatened to generate problems between Turkey and Greece. After the United States, the European nations are collectively Canada’s next largest trading partners. Balkans operations are, in effect, an extension of Canadian-European stability operations going back to World War II.¹⁶⁰ In the Persian Gulf, the designs of a totalitarian state (Iraq) threatened the stability of an extremely volatile region which provides 65 percent of the world’s petroleum. Canada’s closest trading partners in a globalized economic system, the United States, Europe, and Japan, are dependent on a secure flow of petroleum for their industrial needs.¹⁶¹

Policymakers in DFAIT and DND understood throughout the 1990s the importance of these very basic facts. Canada’s most important interest in the Persian Gulf region is the continuous flow of oil through the Straits of Hormuz to Cana-

Stab = stabilization pk = peacekeeping obs = peace observation		
Balkans		
HARMONY (Stab)	92 ----- 95	
CAVALIER (Stab)	92 ----- 95	
AIR BRIDGE (Stab)	92 ----- 96	
SHARP GUARD (Stab)	93 ----- 95	
ALLIANCE (Stab)	95 -- 96	
PALLADIUM (Stab)	96 ----- ?	
MIRADOR (Stab)	97 ----- 99	
BOLSTER (obs)	91 ----- 94	
ALLIED FORCE (Stab)		99
KINETIC (Stab)		99 -- 00
FORAGE (Stab)		00
Persian Gulf/Middle East		
FRICION (Stab)	90 -- 91	

North American economic system. Related to this was the belief that it is easier for Canada as an oil producer to go along with the existing oil industry pricing structure dominated by OPEC than it would be to establish mechanisms to compete with, say, Norway and Venezuela, particularly if the flow from the Persian Gulf was interrupted or cut off.¹⁶²

Connected to this is the diplomatic leverage (dare we suggest prestige?) that Canada enjoys when Canada is seen to be “on board” with the United States. There was a perception among Canadian policymakers that if Canada is contributing to an American-led effort, the effort *must* be important since Canada is no mere pawn of the United States and has in fact been antagonistic to American global aims at times. Naturally, this situation can be used in the ongoing Canada-US dialogue in a variety of ways profitable to Canada if leveraged properly.¹⁶³

Canada does not deploy a large enough military contribution to the region to

Canadian theatre within the context of a Canadian global strategy to secure Canadian interests in the 1990s global stabilization campaign.

6. *Conclusion*

Continued Canadian involvement in the Persian Gulf region and the possible expansion of Canadian military activities in it has a strong precedent. To suggest that Canada is not or has not been involved, or that Canada has no interest or business operating in the region is incorrect and short-sighted. From the early days of uncertainty in the wake of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, to assisting in disengagement of the belligerents after the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, deploying forces to fight the Hussein regime in 1990 and then providing forces to contain Iraq for the next decade as part of a US-led coalition, Canada is by no means a neutral bystander in the Iraq War (1990– ?) nor should it be. Canada has a number of defined interests in ensuring that the Hussein regime is kept under control and in no position to threaten them. Until the Hussein regime ceases to be a threat, Canada should remain committed to the Persian Gulf.

The United States is not acting unilaterally in its application of a Persian Gulf regional strategy, as is alleged by some commentators who lack an historical perspective of Canadian military activity. Canada acts and has acted alongside the United States and other members of the coalition. Canadian and American interests in the region coincide and Canada commits military forces as necessary not only to demonstrate involvement but to contribute to a military strategy to achieve Canadian policy objectives. Canada, therefore, has by no means been dragged into the problems of the Persian Gulf by the United States and has chosen several courses of action which demonstrate that the neutralist thinking endemic throughout Canada's punditocracy is not compatible with either reality or Canada's interests.

Iraq War Chronology

1990

- 6 August: UNSC imposes comprehensive sanctions.¹⁶⁸
- 17 August: MIO Ops start.¹⁶⁹
- UNSCR 661 (established economic embargo).
 - UNSCR 665 (naval forces to enforce embargo).
 - UNSCR 687 (Gulf War ceasefire, authorized shipment of food, medicine, UN approved goods).
 - UNSCR 986 (oil for food deal).
- August 1990–
April 1991: Operation FRICTION: naval task force, CF-18 squadrons.¹⁷⁰
- 29 November: UNSCR 678 authorized states to use all means necessary to ensure Iraq comply with 1 August 1990 demands of UNSC.¹⁷¹

1991

- 1991: Operation FLAG: HMCS *Huron* in PG.¹⁷²
- 1991: Operation FORUM: Canada and UNSCOM.¹⁷³
- 9 January: Aziz-Baker talks: nuclear threat made to deter Iraq chemical weapons use.¹⁷⁴
- 27 February: Coalition declares end to ground war.
- 3 March: Ceasefire talks at SAFWAN.
- 31 March: Iraq agrees to comply with UNSCR 686.
- April–May: Operation ASSIST: Canadian involvement in PROVIDE COMFORT.¹⁷⁵

- 3 April: UNSCR 687 adopted by UNSC: prohibits Iraq from manufacturing and using WMD, long range ballistic missiles.¹⁷⁶
- 5 April: UN Resolution 688 demanded that Iraq end repression of its civilian population. President Bush orders CinCEUCOM to assist the Kurds in northern Iraq.¹⁷⁷
- 6 April: Iraq accepts 687.¹⁷⁸
- 11 April: Formal ceasefire in effect.¹⁷⁹
- 12 April 1991–
April 1999: Operation RECORD Canada and UNIKOM.¹⁸⁰
- 27 April: Iraq admits to lying about stocks of nuclear materials.¹⁸¹
- 18 May: Iraq accepts Status Agreements re: UNSCOM.¹⁸²
- June: Iraq forces fire warning shots at IAEA inspectors as they try to intercept nuclear-related equipment.¹⁸³
- 15 August: UNSC Resolution 707: Iraq must cease any nuclear weapons development and fully disclose all information and allow teams to move without inhibition.¹⁸⁴
- September: IAEA inspectors kept in car park at gunpoint for four days for refusing to turn over seized incriminating nuclear program documents.¹⁸⁵
- October: Hussein regime announces that UNSCOM plans are unlawful. UNSCOM inspectors attempting to enter Ministry of Agriculture threatened. Iraq objects to UNSCOM's use of helicopters.¹⁸⁶
- October: UNSCR 715: Approves plans for UNSCOM and IAEA for the ongoing monitoring and verification to implement UNSCR 687. Iraq will not accede to this until November 1993.¹⁸⁷

1992

- 1992: Operation BARRIER: HMCS *Restigouche* in the Red Sea.¹⁸⁸
- 5 April: Iranian aircraft attack rebel bases in Iraq, Iraq responds with aircraft, breaking ban on flying.¹⁸⁹
- 26 August: Operation SOUTHERN WATCH starts.¹⁹⁰
- November: No-fly zone established to by-pass Iraqi non-compliance with UNSCR 688.¹⁹¹

1993

- January: UNSCOM not permitted by Iraq to use its own aircraft to fly into Iraq.¹⁹²
- 6 January: US UK FR RU issue joint ultimatum to Iraq: demand withdrawal of all SAMs south of 32nd Parallel.¹⁹³
- January: Continued cat and mouse games over SAMs.
- 13–18 January: Op SW attacks Iraqi IADS targets, TLAM used against targets in response to non-compliance with UN WMD inspection requirements.¹⁹⁴
- 45 cruise missiles fired at Zarfaraniyah nuclear fabrication facility.¹⁹⁵
 - 75 UK, FR, FR aircraft attack Bashiqaq airfield and missile sites.
- June–July: UNSCOM attempts to install remote monitoring cameras at two key missile sites interfered with.¹⁹⁶
- 27 June: 23 TLAMs use against Iraqi intelligence facilities in response to assassination plan against Bush.¹⁹⁷
- 21 December: Ground clash between Op PROVIDE COMFORT forces and Iraqi army at Faydah in northern Iraq.¹⁹⁸

1994

- October–December: Op VIGILANT WARRIOR: Show of force operation.¹⁹⁹ (PHOENIX JACKEL is the air movement operations)²⁰⁰
- Objective: compel redeployment of Iraqi ground forces and demonstrate coalition resolve in enforcing UNSC resolutions.
 - 28,000 US troops deployed, pre-positioned equipment used.
 - 200 additional aircraft.
 - 300 coalition aircraft: GCC and French and British aircraft.
 - 20 coalition ships.²⁰¹
- 15 October: UNSCR 949: condemned Iraqi aggression, demanded Iraq withdraw forces to previous positions.²⁰²
- 20 October: US demarche, Iraq pulls back forces north of 32nd parallel.²⁰³

1995

- 1995: Op VIGILANT SENTINEL: increased alert and exercises with Jordan, movement of pre-positioned equipment from Diego Garcia.²⁰⁴
- 1995: Operation PROMENADE HMCS *Fredericton* in Abu Dhabi.²⁰⁵
- 1995: Operation TRANQUILLITY HMCS *Calgary* and HMCS *Regina* in the Persian Gulf.²⁰⁶
- 6 August: USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT Battle Group moved to a position off Israel in response to unusual Iraqi troop movements and a possible attack on Jordan.²⁰⁷
- August–

- destroy Republican Guard facilities;
- disrupt illegal export of gas and oil; and
- disrupt IADS.

11 September: F-117s ordered to the Gulf, plus 2 X B-52s.²¹⁵

31 December: Operation PROVIDE COMFORT officially ended.

1997

1 January: Turkey approved Operation NORTHERN WATCH.

February–
August: Operation PREVENTION (HMCS *Regina*).

October 97–
November 98: Operation DESERT THUNDER show of force operation.²¹⁶
(PHOENIX SCORPION is the air movement operation)²¹⁷
– in face of interference with UNSCOM, prevent WMD proliferation, secure UNSCOM access, neutralize IADS.

June: Iraq forces interfere with UNSCOM helicopter operations and threaten the safety of their crews.²¹⁸

October: Iraq demands that UN U-2 overflights cease.²¹⁹

13 November: Iraq expels US weapons inspectors serving with UNSCOM, all UNSCOM withdrawn.²²⁰

15 November: Additional carrier battle group deployed to the Gulf.²²¹

1998

January: Iraq continues to deny UN inspectors full access.²²²

January–
December: Operation MERCATOR (HMCS *Ottawa*).

1 January–
29 February: Operation DETERMINATION: HMCS *Toronto* and KC-130 to Persian Gulf.²²³

February: PHOENIX SCORPION II conducted:

- 31 October: Iraq announces it was ceasing cooperation with UNSCOM.²²⁷
- 11 November: Operation DESERT THUNDER deployment of forces and

5 June
6 June
14 June
25 June
26 June
7 July
10 August
14 August
25 August
28 August
30 August
4 September
9 September
18 September
20 September
21 September
27 September
2 October
13 October
27 November

2002

Coalition aircraft engage Iraqi air defence system with precision guided munitions in response to hostile threats to coalition aircraft in the SOUTHERN

25 August

27 August

29 August

30 August

5 September

6 September Coalition aircraft attack anti-ship missile facility threatening MIF operations.

7 September

9 September

15 September

24 September

25 September

26 September

27 September

Appendices

Appendix A: Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Contributors

Australia (75 persons: administration, medical, engineers)

Belgium (155 persons: communications, medical, logistics)

Canada (120 persons: medical, aircraft, logistics)

France (2,141 persons: aircraft, helicopters, airborne forces, engineers, communications, medical, logistics)

Germany (221 persons: aircraft and helicopters)

Italy (1,183 persons: aircraft, helicopters, medical, airborne forces, engineers, special forces, military police, logistics and signals)

Luxembourg (43 persons: infantry, logistics, medical)

Netherlands (1,020 persons: helicopters, medical, Marines combat group, engineers)

Portugal (19 persons: aircraft and logistics)

Spain (602 persons: helicopters, airborne troops, signals, medical)

Turkey (1,160 persons: aircraft, helicopters, medical, bases, infantry battalion)


United Kingdom (4,192 persons: aircraft, helicopters, Marine Commando brigades, special forces, engineers, medical, logistics)

United States (18,285 persons: Aircraft, helicopters, special forces, signals, engineers, military policy, Marine Expeditionary Unit, Airborne Combat Team, aircraft carrier task force)

Source: Statement of Lt Gen John M. Shalikashvili, US Commander, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT to the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Defense Policy Panel, 4 September 1991.

Appendix B: UNIKOM Contributors

Argentina (UNMOs and engineers)
Austria (UNMOs, medical unit, logistics, infantry company)
Bangladesh (UNMOs, medical team, troops)
Canada (UNMOs, engineer unit)
Chile (helicopter unit)
China (UNMOs)
Denmark (UNMOs, logistics, infantry company)
Fiji (UNMOs, infantry company)
Finland (UNMOs)
France (UNMOs)
Germany (medical unit)
Ghana (UNMOs, infantry company)
Greece (UNMOs)
Hungary (UNMOs)
India (UNMOs)
Indonesia (UNMOs)
Ireland (UNMOs)
Italy (UNMOs)
Kenya (UNMOs)
Malaysia (UNMOs)
Nepal (infantry company)
Nigeria (UNMOs)
Norway (UNMOs, medical unit)
Pakistan (UNMOs)
Poland (UNMOs)
Romania (UNMOs)
Russia (UNMOs)
Senegal (UNMOs)
Singapore (UNMOs)
Sweden (UNMOs, logistics)
Switzerland (air unit)
Thailand (UNMOs)
Turkey (UNMOs)
United Kingdom (UNMOs)
United States (UNMOs)
Uruguay (UNMOs)
Venezuela (UNMOs)



Appendix D: Maritime Interception Force Contributors 1990–2002

Australia
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
France
Greece
Italy
Kuwait
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Spain
United Kingdom
United States

Most nations have provided a single frigate or destroyer per rotation, while the United States contributes an aircraft carrier battle group which can include some six to eight ships (Aegis cruisers, destroyers, and frigates). During the 1990–91 phase of the war, mine countermeasures vessels from most of these countries as well as from Japan conducted clearance operations in the Persian Gulf. Maritime Patrol Aircraft contributors have included Canada, New Zealand, and the United States). The primary contributors are Canada, Australia, Kuwait, The Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States. Kuwait and Bahrain provide basing facilities.

Sources: Morin and Gimblett, *Operation FRICTION*; Marolda and Schneller, *Shield and Sword*; William S. Cohen, *Report to Congress on US Military Involvement in Major Smaller-Scale Contingencies Since the Persian Gulf War March 1999* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1999).

Appendix E: Air Operations Contributors

Operation NORTHERN WATCH

Canada (AWACS personnel)

Turkey (F-104 recce squadron, ground bases, security, logistics support, radar support)

United Kingdom (Operation WARDEN: Jaguar GR3 recce half-squadron and VC-10 tankers)

United States (two squadrons of F-15 and F-16 fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft, EA-6B EW aircraft, AWACS)

Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

Bahrain (basing and support)

Canada (AWACS personnel)

Notes

1. The exception, as far as I can tell, is my piece in *Maclean's*

special operations forces acting in the region, particularly with respect to Lebanon. It is equally possible that US special operations personnel were aboard the Arrow Air jet and were taken out by Hizbollah or other declared or undeclared Iranian-

Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany 1951-1993 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1997) and Sean M. Maloney, "Missed Opportunity: Operation BROADSWORD, 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade and the Gulf War, 1990-1991," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* 5, 1(2002):24-31.

22. Morin and Gimblett, *Operation FRICTION*, p. 27.
23. Though more clearly articulated after the 1990–91 Gulf War in an 1992 ADM(Pol) study, these sentiments were present in the Department of External Affairs and the DND policy community. See ATI DND, "Review of Defence Policy Governing Stability, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Activities," 1 October 1992.
24. See Sean M. Maloney, "ORD Project Report PR 2002/01: Canadian Forces Opera-

40. ATI DND, DCDS Tasking Order "Humanitarian Relief-Kurdish Refugees," 9 April 1991.
41. ATI DND, message EXTOTT to BNATO, "Kurdish Situation: Canadian Response," 9 April 1991.
42. ATI DND, message USCINCEUR to JCS, "Deployment of Canadian Medical Elements in Support of Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT," 10 April 1991; Maloney, *War Without Battles*, ch. 7.
43. ATI DND, message PRMNY to EXTOTT, "Gulf: Humanitarian Assistance," 17 April 1991.
44. Ibid.
45. ATI DND, message ANKRA to EXTOTT, "Iraqi Refugees: UN Relief Effort," 15 May 1991.
46. US EUCOM, "Chronology of Significant Events.
47. Robert Baer, *See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2002). For another view by a CIA analyst, see Kenneth M. Pollack, *The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq* (New York: Random House, 2002), pp. 68-73.
48. Baer, *See No Evil*, pp. 171-219 and Pollack, *The Threatening Storm*.
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50. ATI DND, memo DGMPO "Kuwait-Peacekeeping," 25 February 1991.
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About the Author

Born in Kingston, Ontario, Dr. Sean M. Maloney currently teaches in the War Studies Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada and is a Research Fellow at the School of Policy Studies, Queen's University. Dr. Maloney served as the historian for the Canadian Army's NATO commitment in Germany and is the author of that formation's history, *War Without Battle: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951-1993* (McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1997). Another NATO-oriented work is *Securing Command of the Sea: NATO Naval Planning, 1948-1954* (Naval Institute Press, 1995). After conducting extensive field research on Canadian UN and NATO operations in the Balkans and UN operations in the Middle East, Dr. Maloney is also the author of the groundbreaking and controversial first history of Canadian peacekeeping policy, *Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means 1945-1970* (Vanwell, 2002); *Chances for Peace: Canadian Soldiers in the Balkans 1992-1995* (Vanwell, 2002); and the forthcoming *Operation KINETIC: The Canadians in Kosovo 1999-2000*. Among his other works, he has also completed and published two other Balkans monographs dealing with Operation BOLSTER (the European Community Monitor Mission) and Operation SHARP GUARD (the Adriatic maritime interdiction force). A frequent contributor on Canadian national security issues in both professional journals and in the print media, Dr. Maloney continues to contribute to the wider understand-

