

North American Security

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America's Response, Canada's Role

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In Memoriam

Nils Ørvik

1920-2005

Founding Director

Queen's Centre for International Relations

The Martello Papers

The Queen's University Centre for International Relations (QCIR) is pleased to present the latest in its series of security studies, the *Martello Papers*. Taking their name from the distinctive towers built during the nineteenth century to defend Kingston, Ontario, these papers cover a wide range of topics and issues relevant to contemporary international strategic relations.

Each year the QCIR hosts Visiting Defence Fellows from the armed forces of Canada, Germany and the United States. One of their tasks is to undertake research on some aspect of security and defence, for publication by their respective services and by the QCIR. Not surprisingly, many of the American VDFs have been attracted to topics exploring Canada's participation, current or prospective, in the defence of North America.

This *Martello Paper* is the fruit of three such studies by recent American VDFs. In the first, Lt Col Jeffrey Turner (US Army, 2004-5) describes the nightmarish but not improbable scenario of a terrorist attack on the continental US with a nuclear weapon. He sets out with brutal clarity the strategic logic that would compel Canadian cooperation with a threatened or wounded America, and the impact of that country's response on the global order. If we think the consequences of September 11, 2001 were revolutionary for world politics, they would likely pale compared to what would follow in this case.

If the threats to North America have mutated and multiplied, the institutional response by Canada and the US has proved innovative. Lt Col Bruce Johnson (USAF, 2002-3) was at Queen's when the new American Northern Command was stood up in the fall of 2002. His paper describes the thinking behind that decision, the structure of the new command, and the debates to which it gave rise in Canada. While he suggests that early fears for Canadian sovereignty were unfounded, he also highlights the connection to NORAD's future. Writing before the discreet modification of NORAD's role and the Martin government's subsequent decision not to participate in the missile-defence scheme, Johnson is prescient in laying out the choices Canada will have to face.

The third paper, by Lt Col David Miller (USAF, 2004-5) is, in effect, a sequel to Johnson's study, using a model of defence-policy decision-making, modified from its original American application, to suggest how Canada might respond to the prospect of a more elaborate North American defence architecture. Such a scheme would be built on the foundations of the US Northern Command, the new Canadian Command, and an extension of the NORAD model — if not NORAD itself — to land and sea. Miller's model underlines the domestic and institutional interests to which any Canadian government would have to pay heed in its decisions on this issue.

We are, as always, grateful to the Security and Defence Forum of the Department of National Defence, whose ongoing support enables the Centre to conduct and disseminate research on issues of importance to national and international security. As is the case with all *Martello Papers*, the views expressed here are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the position of their services, the QCIR, or any of its supporting agencies.

Charles C. Pentland
Director, QCIR
July 2005

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North American Security Cooperation

What Can America Need From Its Neighbours?

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Turner
United States Army

Introduction

“Canada’s defence problem is that it has no defence problem.”¹ Dr. Joel Sokolsky’s observation may lie at the heart of the importance of the United States forcing North American security cooperation. Failure in this task would have catastrophic consequences for not only the United States but also the world, its system of states, and the international organizations established to serve their interests.

By way of explanation, I set out to examine the security and defence relationship between the United States, Canada, and Mexico post September 11 in light of the security deliberations underway in the Bi-national Planning Group. Out of a fascination with the “New World Order” writings of the early 90s after the fall of the Berlin Wall, I chose Samuel Huntington’s three-dimensional chessboard analogy as a framework for analysis. In *The Clash of Civilizations*, Huntington describes the competition between nations on military, economic, and soft power planes. A nation can be in a position of power on one plane and have its overall status undercut by losing on another plane. Given the different perspectives of the countries involved, this seemed like a valid framework for analysis.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

technologies for a massive conventional explosion, chemical, or biological attack may differ, the risk of attack and North American security considerations are similar enough to treat the nuclear attack as representative of this class of security problem: Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In its potential impact on world order a nuclear attack may be the worst case, but the impact of a successful significant chemical or biological attack could well be of a similar magnitude. In that regard, the nuclear case also represents the entire class Americans call WMD.

This study examines the viability of terrorists putting together or stealing a nuclear weapon. It will look at how they could gain access to the United States and what kind of immediate outcome America could expect. Lastly, it will postulate possible American reactions in the international arena. In conclusion, the study will examine the type and extent of North American security cooperation needed to reduce the likelihood of a terrorist succeeding in such an attack.

If It Hasn't Happened In Sixty Years, Why Now?

Nuclear weapons have not been detonated in anger since 1945. With the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world perceived the risk of nuclear war to be greatly reduced. But the demise of this former world power also increased the risk of nuclear weapons, materials, and technology proliferating. This is the so called "crossroads of radicalism and technology" cited by the President as the "gravest danger our Nation faces."⁵ Decreased control of Soviet stockpiles, dire economic circumstances in Russia, less control of and support for former client or ally states, and less incentive for the United States to compromise in international negotiations (including arms controls) have made the world a more dangerous place.⁶

In order to stage a successful attack, a terrorist would need fissile material and the technology to build a bomb or a working weapon, the will to employ the device, and access to the United States.

Access to Fissile Material

The Soviet Union designed its nuclear materials security system with the assumption that people could be monitored and controlled. By contrast, the United States' system assumed that people were the weakest link. As a result, the post-Soviet system lacks many of the redundant safeguards that prevent access to weapons or nuclear material contained in the U.S. system.⁷ Additionally, if access to fissile material is gained, it is less likely than in the U.S. system that the loss would be discovered through an accounting system. Russia's homegrown automated accounting system has yet to prove more reliable than the "shoe box" manual system it was designed to replace.⁸ With the breakdown of Soviet society, the guarantee

that people can be controlled has largely been replaced with a “kleptocracy.” The Soviet social safety net has been replaced with a self-help system that seems to know no bounds.⁹

During a radio interview in 2003 Chairman of the Russian Financial Monitoring Committee Victor Zubkov announced that “criminal activity in Russia accounts for up to 50 percent of the country’s total income”.¹⁰ That sentiment is not limited to the civilian sector. Reports of theft and misappropriation among military commanders remain common. In 2002, “a Russian military court found General Georgy Oleynik (former head of the military budget and financing department of the defence ministry) guilty of abuse of office. General Oleynik had authorized the transfer of \$450m to Ukraine as payment for materials which were never delivered.”¹¹ Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief Igor Khmelnov was sentenced in 1997 for diverting the proceeds from the sale of 64 excess ships, including two aircraft carriers, to his personal use.¹² In 1992, Yuri Smirnov was arrested for stealing three pounds of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the Luch Scientific Production plant south of Moscow. He took the material from his employer 50 grams a time over a five month period.¹³

The physical security of Soviet nuclear materials took a trajectory similar to that of Russian society. Again, the Soviet system relied more upon the ability to control people than on physical safeguards and accountability designed to protect against a single person or conspiracy intent upon stealing fissile material. Before the break-up of the Soviet Union, there was no market for fissile material accessible in Russia. As the economic situation in the former Soviet Union reached new lows, there was little enthusiasm to spend what little money was available on building a new physical security system to address society’s changes. The immediate result was not only less security but in many cases, abandonment in place as programs ceased to function and people stopped being paid.¹⁴ In 1993, the U.S. Department of Energy removed 1,278 pounds of HEU from an abandoned Soviet production facility in Kazakhstan. This nuclear submarine fuel plant was abandoned in the late 1980s. The uranium in the facility was secured with a single padlock. There was enough uranium fuel to make twenty-two crude atomic bombs.¹⁵ While members of the G-8 have pledged two billion dollars a year to help secure former Soviet Union nuclear weapons and fissile material, there is wide agreement that there is much left to do.¹⁶ By the end of 2004, only 26 percent of Soviet nuclear materials had been secured with a comprehensive security upgrade. At the same time, only 46 percent of an estimated 600 tons of Russian HEU and separated plutonium had undergone even a rapid (hasty) security upgrade.¹⁷ Experts estimate that at the current rate of effort, it will take 12 years to complete the job of securing nuclear materials in Russia alone.¹⁸

This effort largely does not extend to civilian research and power applications of HEU around the world. At these sites, power generation and research must compete on an economic basis with fossil fuels. As a result, security expenses

must be factored into the competition. At civilian power stations, the most valuable products may be sitting out back in a waste storage pond.

Weapons grade HEU is highly desirable to a terrorist because it doesn't require a complicated implosion design to detonate as a bomb. Spent nuclear fuel rods contain plutonium. While plutonium requires a complicated bomb design to work,

massive financing. Russian organized crime's pervasiveness and ruthlessness is legendary. This strong force is capable of being motivated by al Qaeda's financing. Before 9/11 it was estimated that al Qaeda's budget was \$30 million per year. There are no good estimates available of al Qaeda's post 9/11 financing.²⁴ While some inroads into reducing al Qaeda's cash flow have been made, there is general agreement that it remains well financed.²⁵ There have been numerous reports in the last few years that bin Laden is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. It has been reported that he has offered up to a million dollars for an atomic bomb. He has declared that it is a religious duty to acquire this capability. At one point, he claimed to already possess nuclear and biological weapons as a deterrent but declined to give any details.²⁶ There is at least one report that the 40 Chechen terrorists that raided the Moscow theatre in 2002 initially considered attacking a Russian nuclear material storage site.²⁷ The Russians have reported that they "twice thwarted terrorist efforts to reconnoitre nuclear weapons storage sites in 2002."²⁸ Chechen terrorists have demonstrated their ability to operate deep in Russian territory in large, well organized, suicidal groups. This represents another strong force (other than organized crime and disenfranchised citizens) possibly attempting to acquire nuclear materials in Russia.

Assuming that a bomb or highly enriched uranium could be made available: would a terrorist organization be able put the pieces together and carry out an attack?

The Technology to Build a Bomb

Al Qaeda ("the base") has exhibited more than mere competence as a guerrilla or insurgent organization. It exhibits sTf1 Tw099sHw53 Tm0.0nothessug4 Tha4/e ggent o004s

between safe harbours in dispersed political jurisdictions. Globalization guarantees that these means, required to be open and free for the functioning of the world economy, remain available to support guerrilla operations. One should not underestimate the advantage this quantum leap in freedom and scale of movement represents. Al Qaeda's mastery of global communications is unique in history. The genius of venture capital terrorism is found in avoiding the limitations and risks of central planning, preparation, and logistics. In place of vulnerable centralized operations, al Qaeda has essentially hung out a sign to all potential jihadists saying "bring us your good ideas and we'll fund you to carry them out." Like a venture capitalist, al Qaeda has the very brightest and most motivated potential terrorists lined up at its virtual door waiting to be vetted, trained, and funded. Somewhere in line is the terrorist equivalent of the inventor of "Velcro" or the silicone chip waiting for a CIA-trained mentor and a million dollars in terrorist venture capital. That genius is uniquely positioned to gain control of a nuclear weapon or enough highly enriched uranium to build one.

If there is any question about an al Qaeda subsidiary's ability to hide a bomb in development, one only has to look to al Qaeda's success in preparing and executing the September 11th

bankrupt itself and suffer the Soviet Union's fate, again leaving the Middle East to him.³⁶

I believe that all of these considerations point to bin Laden being much more likely to employ a nuclear weapon at his first available opportunity rather than

estimate based upon the Japanese experience, a census estimate, and an unclassified nuclear weapon effect prediction from Harvard. One could make a case for doubling the casualties based upon the presence of daytime workers. If we only considered half of the estimated casualties to be a more accurate number, the results of the exercise would be identical.

On September 4, 2002 William C. Thompson Jr., Comptroller of New York City, estimated that the four-year fiscal impact on gross city product from the September 11th attacks would be between \$82.8 and \$94.8 billion dollars. This estimate was based upon a year of study and the experience gained from recovering from the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing.⁴³ It is not hard to imagine even an ill placed nuclear device easily causing a trillion dollars in fiscal impact.

The Twin Towers attack on September 11th did not include a radiological clean up. While immediate and residual radiation were factors in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki blasts, they were airbursts. At an altitude of about 1,600 feet above ground, their fireballs never touched the earth and fallout was completely absent.⁴⁴ A terrorist bomb delivered in a van would burst at surface level. A surface detonated bomb would irradiate soil and debris hundreds of feet from the center of the blast, pulverize or vaporize this radioactive material, and loft it high up into the air. Much of that radioactive debris would fallout almost immediately within a mile or two of the site depending upon wind direction and speed. While the actual fallout would depend upon a myriad of factors, one can gain a point of reference by looking at a similar device tested in 1957 in New Mexico.

The Boltzmann shot consisted of a 12kt bomb detonated 150 meters above open ground (no skyscrapers).⁴⁵ One should expect that our 10kt terrorist example detonated at ground level to produce more fallout and irradiate more local debris. The Boltzmann shot produced two plumes of radiation. The first started at ground zero and extended about 35 miles north (down wind). The second started about eighty miles north of ground zero and extended about twenty miles north of that point. The dose rates in those plumes were above 100 milliroentgen per hour soon after the shot.⁴⁶ Radiation levels decrease in time. That level of radiation did not pose a significant health hazard if victims were to leave the area and did not ingest any fallout. The only medically significant radiation was found right at ground zero. Still, it is unlikely that citizens and public officials in New York, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey would tolerate this level of contamination.

Our Manhattan ground zero would pose a health risk for some time after the blast. Heavily contaminated buildings, roads, and rubble would have to be land

take the risk that residents would not suffer health effects later in life. Given America's response to the Three Mile Island incident, I doubt that the public would expose their families to detectable levels of radiation even though the level might not be medically significant.

Nuclear devices emit an electro-magnetic pulse (EMP). Our blast would destroy most modern electronic and many electrical devices for a mile around. This pulse basically overloads sensitive circuits in computers. Nearly every modern device relies on these circuits to operate: phones, radios, heating and air conditioning controls, and automobiles all contain electronic circuits. EMP is a tricky thing to predict. The phenomenon is believed to be caused by (negatively charged) electrons rushing out of the blast faster than the heavier, slower (positively charged) nuclei. If the rush were uniform as in a stable atmosphere, there wouldn't be an EMP. In our blast, the ground and nearby buildings would ensure that the rush was not uniform. As the blast moved out through, over, and around the local terrain, distortions would form electrical lobes projecting our EMP. The lobes, hence the EMP, would not be uniform. In some directions, a fairly strong effect might be felt miles from ground zero. In other directions there would be very little effect. Virtually anything that we use in our modern information-based society could be at risk up to several miles from ground zero.

Lastly, the well understood effects of blast and thermal radiation would overwhelm any response New York City could mobilize. Unlike September 11th where

financial damage would rival or exceed the annual federal budget of the United States. The trauma, drama, treatment, and clean-up would monopolize the news for weeks if not months.

U.S. Response

The greatest damage that may come from al Qaeda acquiring a nuclear weapon might not be the physical destruction such a weapon could cause in a major urban center like New York City or Washington, D.C. The greatest damage might come from the mobilization of the United States and its allies to a full wartime footing and their deployment into the Middle East, North Africa, and the Pacific region. Their targets could be the perpetrators, nuclear proliferating and terrorist sponsoring regimes, as well as governments which were ineffective in cleaning out radical Islamic sanctuaries in their own countries. In short, it would lead to World War III. This is reflected in America's response to the September 11th attack and in its published policy. The second greatest effect would be reforming or replacing ineffective international institutions as happened after World Wars I and II.

I have found fairly little written on possible U.S. responses to a nuclear event on its home soil since the Cold War. During the Cold War theorists were concerned with fighting an escalating nuclear war or mutually assured destruction. There were variations on targeting strategies, but those theories are of no use in considering this problem. To address the problem, I examined limitations in America's capabilities to wage war, rationales for targeting countries, and which countries might belong in each target group. The analysis in no way provides a blue print for a response but I believe that it can provide some insight into the future.

Capacity

The world was shocked when the United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq

Recalling the sentiment after September 11th, I believe that Americans would support a military draft after a domestic nuclear detonation. Even a crude nuclear detonation would represent a one or two order of magnitude increase in death and destruction over the September 11th attacks. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that motivated a neutral isolationist American public to support a world war created less than one-tenth the damage of a nuclear attack and did not even strike the mainland. The risk of a follow-on nuclear attack would border on threatening the survival of the nation. The time separation between the First and Second World Wars is not unlike the time separation between the Vietnam War and today. I doubt that the public's feelings about war on the eve of WW II in light of WWI were any less vivid than America's current feeling in light of Vietnam. Memories of the draft, maimed soldiers, and the Great Depression were over shadowed by calls for patriotism, defence and revenge. The so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) has significantly reduced the number of people required to effect regime destruction. Compare the forces arrayed for the rolling start of the second Iraq war to the iron mountain start of the 1991 Iraq war. Next, consider that the 1991 Iraq war was an RMA war. Arguably, picking up the pieces (regime change or stabilization) could be left to the remnants of the destroyed regime and concerned international actors. Forcibly disarming a nuclear program need not involve controlling an entire nation. Does a war of revenge necessarily have stabilization and rebuilding phases? Manpower need not be a limiting factor.

Allies and International Pressure

Clearly, an order of magnitude increase in American aggression is not only possible (as a percent of GDP and through the draft) but entirely likely after a nuclear event. The ensuing conflict would provide the now expanded NATO with an opportunity to reciprocate America's support in World War II and the Cold War and justify its continued existence. The United States could also probably count on Russia's support in exchange for political support in fighting Chechen terrorists and some level of forgiveness if the nuclear material used in the attack originated in Russia. New allies could be found to be "with us." They might want to make sure that they didn't make the "against us" list as after the second war with Iraq. They might want to settle old regional scores. They might want to use this opportunity to adjust the power balance in their region.

World public opinion and ruling elite opinion may split over anti-Americanism, national interest, and the path to stability in the world. The choice of whether America reacts strongly or not is a false choice. The no action option could lead to a second strike and further damage to the world's economy. It would signal withdrawal of American leadership from the world stage. Failure to react would be a failure for globalization. It would signal a return to American isolationism, could lead to a global depression, and speed the eventual change to Chinese

leadership in the world. That said, the real choice is between America acting multilaterally with many allies under an international organization's banner or America acting unilaterally with few allies. Absent a smoking gun, I doubt that the United Nations or a consensus of NATO members could see through their national interests quickly enough to underwrite any American military response. The 2003 pre-Iraq invasion political formula works well for most nations' national interests. If certain countries gridlock the multilateral institutions, everyone except America can get off the hook for paying for the invasion, claim the moral high ground in public opinion, reap soft power benefits for not using hard power, and at the end of the day still enjoy the international order created by American leadership and military power.⁵⁰ Justifications for being an ally or not as dictated by national interests have little bearing on the American response. America is politically prepared and militarily equipped to act unilaterally if necessary. Allies and international sanction need not be a limiting factor.

There does not appear to be a natural limit to the capacity for American aggression in an economic, manpower, or political form. Human history is one of warfare. Despite the wishes of interest groups and worldwide rise in anti-American sentiment, it is unlikely that world peace will break out and that America will not respond militarily to a nuclear attack. Without knowing the future in order to see which countries assisted the nuclear attackers, it is still possible to examine which countries might be at risk.

Targets

I believe that there will be three sets of targeted countries in World War III based upon America's political rhetoric. The first set will be countries found to have participated in the attack or supported the attackers. These could be viewed as revenge attacks. The second set will be regional nuclear powers that fail to disarm and fully submit to International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring. These are disarmament attacks. The third set will be countries that fail in their sovereign duties to prevent terrorists receiving sponsorship, sanctuary, or support within their borders. The last set of attacks is designed to "drain the swamps." Not surprisingly, these three lists have some commonality in America's political rhetoric.

The first set of targeted countries will likely be those responsible for the attack as it was after September 11, 2001. This list can't be formed until an investigation is begun after the attack. We can expect to see two kinds of states on the list. Countries that were home to the functioning al Qaeda cells that prepared the attack would have some tough questions to answer. Half measures in shutting down recruiting and sheltering sanctuaries for al Qaeda would not be acceptable. Tacit government support for terrorists would be fatal. Given the global, networked nature of al Qaeda, this effort would likely involve several countries. Somewhere there would also be a nuclear material barn door that needed to be closed. This

represents the second kind of states with some responsibility for the attack: nuclear powers, proliferators, and marketing states. If a state was found to have passed nuclear material to a terrorist, it could be considered an act of war worthy of retaliation. States which were found to be mere sources of loose nuclear material or had trading and smuggling rings would also have questions to answer.

operations security will be important to avoid a miscommunication or misinterpretation of America's intentions.

Those that might argue that it is too much to demand that a state give up the Holy Grail of security would do well to re-read the National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The section titled "Prevent Our Enemies From Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends With Weapons of Mass Destruction" mentions North Korea by name. It lists "Proactive counter-proliferation efforts" as the first item on the "comprehensive strategy to combat WMD" list. The key capabilities in counter-proliferation are "detection, active and passive defences, and counterforce capabilities." The WMD section goes on to justify the case for pre-emptive actions.⁵⁵ Those with lingering doubts might consider the case for America's second war with Iraq as well as its current fascination with North Korea and Iran. Given America's current engagement in this area, this part of the war might start before enough evidence has been gathered to start revenge attacks against the nuclear perpetrators in the first set.

The third set might be those states that fail in "denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists ... (and) accept their sovereign responsibilities."⁵⁶ A nuclear detonation in the United States would likely signal that the waiting period for sovereign states to shoulder their responsibilities was over. Those found wanting would be subject to regime change or regime destruction. This group might include Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Sudan. Pakistan heads my list as the chief nuclear proliferator, likely home to bin Laden and his followers, and as a country with significant sympathy and support for radical Islam. In America's eyes Iran and Syria actively support and export militant radical Islamic terrorism. Saudi Arabia is the home of Wahhabism, a puritanical branch of Islam associated with intolerance and extremist teachings. Much of the private money needed to fund madrassas preaching extremist views around the Middle East is believed to come from Saudi Arabia.⁵⁷ Whether some or all of these governments go may depend upon their actions immediately following the nuclear attack. Some may resemble Pakistan's turn away from the Taliban after September 11th and earn a second chance in the Administration's eye. Some may model Afghanistan's adherence to principle in the same period and become a footnote in history.

A New World Order

Lastly, much like the building or re-building of international institutions after the First and Second World Wars, I would expect a call to scrap those institutions that were perceived to have failed to prevent this calamity. The current American Administration's position on the value and efficiency of the United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is well known. The IAEA probably has a future with some added protocols including surprise inspections and

accountability down to the corporation and individual levels. The UN is probably headed the way of the League of Nations given its reputation for inefficiency, corruption, and stalemate. With the lack of a defined threat, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is showing signs of bi-polarity. The delay principally led by France in planning for the defence of Turkey prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq was an early sign of this bi-polarity. If the European Union (EU) forms a strong defence policy and begins to wield party discipline in NATO, the result could be a permanent polar standoff between America and the EU in NATO similar to the situation in the UN Security Council.⁵⁸

program into a career. It may be time to shift management motivation of this program to a pay for performance contract and get it out of the hands of the Department of Energy.

It is not clear that U.S. intelligence is focused on this matter in an operational way. Given our fifty year obsession with the Soviet Union, the United States should have the intelligence capability to cooperate with Russia in crushing fissile material theft and smuggling rings inside and around the former Soviet Union if Russia could be convinced to cooperate. Honey pot or sting operations could go a long way in providing both a negative incentive to theft and trading in fissile materials and in vacuuming stolen materials out of the hands of thieves and back into government accounts. The fear of exposing corruption close to the ruling elite makes deeper cooperation in Russia problematic. Russian security concerns prevent direct U.S. access and assistance at their Federal Agency for Atomic Energy site where most of the material of proliferation interest is stored.⁵⁹ Sadly, these same concerns slow the economic and political reforms needed to correct societal problems that gave rise to the fissile material security problem.

One international institution with some promise is the International Atomic

enough without crippling trade. The idea is that America only has to inspect three percent of the containers entering the country if they are the right three percent. That is, intelligence makes surveillance effective as a both a barrier and a deterrent. The reality is that a terrorist only has to evade detection once to be successful. This reality benefits from human nature that wants to make a profit smuggling drugs, goods, and people into the country as well as the human nature that wants to consume them. The Government Accountability Office lists the Customs and Border Protection's lack of a "comprehensive set of assessments vital for determining the level of risk for ocean-going cargo containers and the types of responses necessary to mitigate that risk" as an "emerging area of high risk."⁶¹ That ranking means that the money spent on border security today is among the most questionable investments of taxpayer money in all of government. There is room for great improvement in border security but it should never be a cornerstone of an effective counter terrorism program.⁶² It is more like painting a bridge. You have to do it all the time to prevent a near term failure but in the end the bridge is going to rust anyway.

North American Military Cooperation

The fact that the primary jurisdiction for border security lies in the hands of civilian organizations does not mean that military cooperation has no role in avoiding WW III. Military aid to civil power in an interception or consequence management scenario can be enhanced through military cooperation. Cooperation welds shut national boundary gaps in coverage. It brings additional, unique assets to consequence management when host nation assets are scarce, likely to be exhausted, lacking in expertise, or directly affected by the disaster.

Military cooperation also brings a level of uncommitted resource to intelligence sharing and situational awareness not available in the civilian side of government. Civilian agencies have primary and additional duties other than defending the homeland. Their expertise lies in regulating the flow of airplanes, enforcing the law, safety on the water, responding to natural disasters, and a myriad of other tasks. The military, by contrast is not encumbered with another primary mission. It trains, rehearses, executes, and learns from its experiences. It fuses intelligence and maintains situation awareness as a primary mission. Improving the timeliness, accuracy, and clarity of information is the heart of the Revolution in Military Affairs.

In this dimension, a greater interagency coordination (including the military) and coordination across national boundaries can have an impact on keeping WMD out of an American city. It is difficult to put a value on the synergy that exchanging military staffs and deputy commanders can have in a military cooperation or coordination system. Living in the neighbour's society and working for their leaders brings not only an appreciation of values and many dimensions of understanding,

it also breeds trust. Trust is a key and essential component of any information system. More than precision or even speed, an information system that is to extend across national boundaries must have the trust of the leaders and decision makers that would keep nuclear weapons and terrorist operatives out of America. That is the real value that military cooperation can bring to this problem.

Making the World Safe from the United States: International Institutions

There is a universal call for better international institutions today. The Europeans would like to see the rule of law and multilateralism restrain the unilateralist actions of the United States. The United States would like to see a more efficient, less corrupt international forum in which to exercise its leadership. While both positions are reasonable, they are at odds with each other. Moreover, there is no evidence that an ideal system could work in the real world. An ideal international system based upon the rule of law and a multilateral security guarantee should eliminate a regional (or global) power's need for nuclear arms. The first resolution of the United Nations in 1946 called for the elimination of "weapons adaptable to mass destruction."⁶³ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) represents as near an ideal example of a multilateral security organization for common defence as exists in the real world. Even this arrangement found states needing to develop indigenous nuclear weapons and states that felt they needed to provide or receive nuclear weapons to and from other allies. This was the situation at the height of the Cold War when NATO had a common enemy to promote solidarity. In a time without a common enemy, the UN as a much larger group of nations with divergent interests has little hope of achieving a better security arrangement than NATO achieved at its best.

Lord David Hannay was a member of the most recent United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. In his keynote remarks to the Symposium on the Future of the United Nations, he called his panel's work "the most far-reaching official review of the UN's role, in particular in the fields of peace and security, since the founding fathers met in San Francisco in 1945."⁶⁴ His panel broadened the threat agenda past terrorism and WMD to include failed states, poverty, environmental degradation, pandemic diseases, and organized crime. Regarding unilateral use of force, the panel "set out certain guidelines ... for reaching such decisions ... so giving a greater degree of predictability ... and some deterrent effect, to decision-taking in this matter." In his remarks, Lord Hannay cautions not to let the issue of membership of the Security Council dominate the agenda for change. Overall, this most recent recommendation for improving the United Nations doesn't seriously address America's lack of confidence in the United Nations or individual states' insecurity that motivates them to possess WMD in the short term. It does attempt to dig at the roots of problems that lead to conflict and improve treaties to make the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) more effective. It also endorses President Bush's call for criminal penalties in all countries for nuclear material and technology traffickers.⁶⁵

I conclude from this that an improved United Nations would not provide enough of a security guarantee to persuade regional powers to give up their nuclear arms. It is equally unlikely to give the United States enough of a security guarantee to rely on it for a multilateral security solution. Similarly, even in the close community of NATO allies, national interests will undermine confidence in the protection that the multilateral organization can provide and confidence that it can act offen-

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and Canada will have to make some difficult decisions to retain its influence in the security of in North America.

Overhaul of the US National Security Policy

After the January 2001 inauguration of President George W. Bush, the new Republican administration began the task of developing its own *United States National Security Strategy (NSS)*

tax rates. It is interesting to note that the only mention of Canada in the *NSS* is in the section discussing the importance of resolving ongoing trade disputes.³


It is difficult for foreigners, including Canadians, to comprehend the enormous impact the attacks had on America's psyche. The attacks shattered the American psychological myth of invulnerability. It changed how the United States perceived its security. It forced the United States to react to a direct threat to the territory of the United States and resulted in a global "war on terrorism." In response to the threat, the Bush administration established a cabinet department for homeland security and restructured the military. Lastly, the Bush administration and *NSS* placed disrupting and destroying "terrorist organizations with a global reach" as the top US security priority.⁴

To achieve the aim of destroying the terrorist organizations, the United States will work within the framework of multinational institutions like the United Nations (UN), Organization of American States (OAS) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and will look for "coalitions of the willing" to augment these institutions in the "war on terrorism."⁵ The United States views Canada as a reliable ally, as a co-member of these institutions and as part of the coalition of the willing. It also looks to Canada to fulfill its obligations in the security of North America. The *NSS* goes on to state, quite controversially in the view of American allies, that "while the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, [the United States] will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively."⁶

Canada's role in the defence of North America is small but politically important for both Canada and the United States. NORAD serves the dual purpose of protecting Canadian sovereignty while giving the United States an integrated aerospace defence of North America. That the *NSS* does not mention Canada should not be viewed as an oversight, but rather as a compliment in terms of the faith the US government places in Canada as a trusted ally defending the northern flank of North America. Canada is the only US ally with a role in providing for the defence of North America and the territorial United States. The *QDR Report* states, as part of the planning of the US force structure, that the US forces will provide strategic deterrence and air and missile defence and uphold US commitments under NORAD.⁷ The United States recognizes that Canada is difficult to defend by itself, given its large geographic area and its relatively small population. Some American officials, such as US Ambassador Paul Cellucci, view Canada as unwilling to pay for an adequate defence on its own.⁸ As Joel Sokolsky points out, the reality is that the Canadian government will "not spend significantly more on defence because it [does] not believe it [has] to in order to secure vital Canadian interests — the security of the country and its prosperity."⁹ The key for Canada is to continue providing sufficient defence so that in light of the shifts in the North American security landscape, Canada does not become perceived as a security threat or vulnerability to the United States.

One final observation is how little the Clinton and Bush administrations' National Security Strategies really differ once the effects of the September attacks are put aside. In Western democracies, security strategies are mostly driven by national values, interests and perceived threats and are for the most part apolitical. Clinton's strategy, like Bush's, discussed the importance of enhancing security

Figure 1. Unified Commands/ Areas of Responsibilities



Another noticeable change is the assignment of Russia, Canada and Mexico to a unified command for the first time. Previously, these countries were under the auspices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and were not assigned to a unified command. For several years, the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff debated the merits of assigning Russia to the United States European Command. Once that decision was made, and the need to establish a NORTHCOM developed, all countries including Canada were assigned to a unified command's area of responsibility.

In a subsequent change to the *Unified Command Plan*, the Chairman transferred United States Space Command's responsibility to United States Strategic Command and dissolved United States Space Command effective 1 October 2002.¹⁴

Standing Up NORTHCOM

The press conference held on 17 April 2002 by Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers announced the establishment of NORTHCOM, effective 1 October 2002. This announcement, with the provision to include Canada in the command's area of responsibility, raised concerns in Canada about the intentions of the United States. The concern was overblown, mostly generated by some on the Canadian political left who made the misguided assumption that Canadian forces would eventually fall under NORTHCOM.¹⁵ In reality, NORTHCOM was set up as a US-only, unified command focused on the mission of homeland defence. The fact that Canada was assigned to NORTHCOM's area of responsibility has no more significance than Great Britain having been assigned to United States European Command's area of responsibility over 50 years ago. The geographic assignment gives a combatant commander the responsibility for regional defence planning, security cooperation and military coordination with friends and allies within the region.¹⁶

The Department of Defense created NORTHCOM in order to rectify a security vulnerability. Since the establishment of a unified command structure in 1946, the United States had never included the continental United States, Mexico or Canada in any regional combatant commander's area of responsibility. This changed with the establishment of NORTHCOM. It was driven by the realization that the American military was not organized to best support homeland defence and to defend itself against the emerging terrorist threat from al Qaeda. While the establishment of NORTHCOM is predominantly an American phenomenon, the event does have some implications for Canada.


Northern Command's mission is to provide homeland defence and civil support. Specifically, the command's mission is to:

Conduct operations to deter, prevent and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility,

and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations.¹⁷

The mission is focused introspectively on the United States. The only exception would be if American interests outside of the United States were threatened in a way that included the security of Canada. This is not a divergence from, but a

Figure 2. NORTHCOM's Command Relationship



military engagement activities such as military exercises and continuing the military officer exchange programs. Good cooperation between NORTHCOM and the Department of National Defence is increasingly critical, as the complementary functions performed at JFCOM and the operational planning role in NATO's Allied Command Atlantic were dissolved.

As the United States organizes its Department of Homeland Security, and NORTHCOM matures and the US leadership shapes its missions, roles and responsibility, it is important that Canada protects and pursues its interests. And in fact, the Canadian government has done just that. As part of discussions between Canadian and US officials to improve the safety and security of citizens through enhanced cooperation following the events of 11 September 2001, the governments have concluded an agreement to enhance Canadian security cooperation with the US. As part of the agreement, the Department of National Defence has

Changing Roles for JFCOM and ACLANT

As of 1 October 2002, United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) surrendered the geographic area of responsibility it inherited from United States Atlantic Command to NORTHCOM, United States Southern Command and United States European Command. It also transferred its responsibilities of providing the military assistance to civil authorities and planning the territorial land and maritime defence of the United States and Canadian region to NORTHCOM.²¹ JFCOM was responsible for bi-national US-Canada defence planning. The bi-national land defence planning was mostly inconsequential. There was no viable land threat other than terrorism, and the US and the Canadian armies only occasionally worked together in defence of North America. But JFCOM was the source of the close bi-national naval planning and coordinating of US-Canadian naval exercises and operations outside of NATO. Now, this planning has been transferred from JFCOM in Norfolk, Virginia, to NORTHCOM in Colorado Springs. Meanwhile, the United States Atlantic Fleet Headquarters remains in Norfolk and is now nearly a continent away from the planning activity.

Standing Down USSPACECOM

Initially *Unified Command Plan 2002* made no provisions to modify United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), but a subsequent change transferred

Force's Strategic Air Command was disbanded in the early 1990s, the Air Force reassigned the intercontinental ballistic missile wings to Air Force Space Command. Nor did many notice that Air Force Space Command was assigned as component command to both USSPACECOM and USSTRATCOM. Nor did the public take notice that, starting in the early 1990s, the United States Air Force went one step further and integrated the missile and space career fields, and the Canadian officers were working with US missile officers in space planning and operations. But the biggest bugaboo, the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), could change public perceptions, particularly when USSTRATCOM has both the offensive and defensive nuclear capability under its command, and the Canadian general officers in NORAD take their turn in rotation as the potential assessors, ready to confirm that North America is under attack and authorize the employment of BMD interceptors.²⁴

The Future of NORAD

While America has modified its national strategy and restructured its military, NORAD has functionally and organizationally remained unchanged. Its governing document is the NORAD Agreement that is renewed approximately every five years. The Agreement was last renewed early in June 2001, a year early in order to avoid the pending contentious US decision to deploy a missile defence. Now, with President Bush having withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and committed the Department of Defense to deploying the BMD system, the very nature and structure of NORAD is at risk.

NORAD is responsible for providing the aerospace defence for the United States and Canada. That includes providing territorial air defence against hostile aircraft and cruise missiles, ballistic missile warning and space surveillance. Since 1991, NORAD received the additional responsibility of reporting counter-drug surveillance information to law enforcement agencies. After the September 11th terrorist attacks, the importance of air defence was revitalized, and NORAD received the additional responsibility of assisting the US Federal Aviation Administration and Nav Canada in tracking North American air traffic and in detecting internal aviation threats.²⁵

NORAD is a bi-national military command of which the commander is traditionally an American, and the deputy commander is traditionally a Canadian. The commander is the chief of the strategic aerospace defence forces for both countries, and reports to each country's national command authority. Within the United States, the commander reports to the US President through the Chairman of the

The headquarters is located at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, on the same installation that headquarters NORTHCOM. The daily command and control of NORAD forces is managed from the NORAD Command Center (NCC) in the Cheyenne Mountain Complex. The other NORAD centers process air, missile and space surveillance information and report to the NORAD Command Center. The Air Warning Center (AWC) is the focal point for all air defence matters. Below the AWC, NORAD's air defence responsibilities are assigned to three NORAD regions: Canada, Continental United States (CONUS) and Alaska. They use military assets such as fighter aircraft, radar sites, AWACS aircraft and other assigned resources.

The space surveillance and missile warning missions use only US assets and are assigned to USSTRATCOM but are under the operational control of the NORAD Command Center. The Missile Warning Center (MWC) provides ballistic missile launch warning only. Currently, there is no ballistic missile defensive capability, and only the US has a ballistic missile counter-strike capability. The Space Control Center (SCC) processes and provides space surveillance data to the NORAD Command Center. The other USSTRATCOM work centers operationally reporting to the NORAD Command Center include the Operational Intelligence Watch (OIW), System Center and Weather Center. All the centers are manned 24 hours 7 days a week.²⁶ The complex command structure of NORAD is diagrammed in Figure 3.

There are several things NORAD does well. Historically what it has done best is to provide deterrence during the Cold War by protecting the deterrent — the United States. However, NORAD is also important in that it serves to preserve Canada's sovereign role of defending its part of North America. Canada's large area and limited population and wealth inhibit it from providing a level of aerospace defence adequate to satisfy America's security interests. But Canada, partnered with the United States, is able to provide the air defence resources sufficient to maintain its own air sovereignty, and when necessary, can approve of additional US military assets to augment Canada's air defence. Consequently, some have viewed NORAD as providing Canada "a defence against help" from the Americans.

A concern for both Canada and the US is the future of NORAD. If Canada continues to balk at cooperating in the BMD program, it could put the entire space-operations portion of NORAD at risk. Canada contributes only marginally to the space defence mission with no military space assets, and without Canada's political support for BMD, it is foreseeable that NORAD could be returned to an air-defence only command.²⁷ Canada would lose its access to Air Force Space Command and US intelligence. The Chrétien government put off these concerns and took a politically safe approach to "wait and see" before committing Canada one way or the other. This attitude did not strain the US-Canadian relationship unduly, principally because on his watch there was no impetus to resolve the issue on either side of the border. With President Bush's decision to field the

BMD system, time began to run out, pushing the Canadian government toward a decision it preferred not to make.


mission. They provide F-18s on alert for intercept, 280 military personnel assigned to NORAD, AWACS crewmembers and the North Warning Radar network.²⁸ The combined US-Canadian aircraft surveillance and counter-air capability is adequate. The only significant vulnerability is in cruise missile detection and surveillance, and the United States Air Force, Army, Navy and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency have on-going research and development activities to resolve this vulnerability.²⁹ Cruise missile defence could become a

the elimination of nuclear weapons. While the Canadian government has stated that missile defence need not be incompatible with arms control and disarmament, it has also stated that strategic missile defence capabilities are potentially destabilizing and may encourage states to renew a nuclear arms race. According to the Canadian government, its ultimate decision whether to support America's BMD lies with its own national interests and its concern with operational concepts which alienate Russia and China or do not sustain non-proliferation and disarmament regimes.³²

The United States government has been in consultation with the Russians,

Management, Command, Control and Communications (BMC3) element. As depicted in Figure 4, the architecture is designed to use the DSP early warning satellites to detect and track the ballistic missiles, and provide the initial launch data for the BMD system. As the ballistic missile comes over the horizon, an upgraded Early Warning Radar will take over the tracking of the missiles until BMD system can hand them off to the X-Band Radar or the Cobra Dane Radar. These radars will discriminate the warheads from the decoys, and will improve the intercept solution for the ground based interceptor missiles. The BMC3 element will hosts the battle management staff that would assess whether the United States is under a ballistic missile attack and make the decision to launch interceptors to destroy the incoming warheads. The proposed Ground-based Midcourse architecture will be able to augment its radar coverage with 15 upgraded Aegis BMD Destroyers and Cruisers from the Sea-based Midcourse System program.

The plan is to field an initial capability that includes: deploying 16 interceptors in Alaska, deploying 4 interceptors in California, and upgrading the Early Warning Radars in California and Alaska, and later in Greenland and in Great Britain. The



Sea-Based X-Band Radar will be deployed in the Pacific Ocean and probably

Notes

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Glossary

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACLANT	Allied Command Atlantic (NATO)
ACO	Allied Command Operations (NATO)
ACT	Allied Command Transformation (NATO)
AFB	Air Force Base (American)
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System (E-3 Sentry, American)
AWC	Air Warning Center (NORAD)
BMC3	Battle Management, Command, Control and Communications
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense (American)
CFB	Canadian Forces Base (Canadian)
CONUS	Continental United States (American)
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canadian)
DND	Department of National Defence (Canadian)
DOD	Department of Defense (American)
DSP	Defense Support Program (early warning satellite, American)
ITW/AA	Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (NORAD)
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff (American)
JFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command (American)
JF HQ-HLS	Joint Forces Headquarters – Homeland Security (American)

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCC	NORAD Command Center
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NORTHCOM	United States Northern Command (American)
NSS	<i>National Security Strategy</i> (American)
OAS	Organization of American States
OIW	Operational Intelligence Watch (NORAD)
PJBD	Permanent Joint Board on Defense (Bi-national)
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review (American)
RAF	Royal Air Force (British)
SBX	Sea-Based X-Band Radar (American, BMD)
SCC	Space Control Center (NORAD)
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO)
UCP	<i>Unified Command Plan</i> (American)
UEWR	Upgraded Early Warning Radar (American, BMD)
UN	United Nations
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command (a.k.a JFCOM)
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command (a.k.a NORTHCOM)
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USSPACECOM	United States Space Command
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
XBR	X-band radar (American, BMD)

realities, leaders on both sides of the U.S.-Canada border have attempted to address with appropriate capabilities and structures, the aerospace, land, maritime and information threats that could endanger Canada and the United States (CANUS). These threats may include state and non-state actors that sympathize with terrorist activities or permit the transit of illegal material (such as drugs, weapons, explosives, etc.) or persons bound for the CANUS Region.¹

The Future of North American Defence Cooperation

The terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 made it clear that the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans no longer insulate the U.S. and by extension, Canada, from foreign aggression.² Postulating that an attack on one nation affects the safety, security, economy, and well being of the other nation, U.S. and Canadian decision makers began exploring new strategies for protecting their homelands and strengthening the existing CANUS partnership to meet new challenges to common interests. By working more closely together, they contend that both nations can better meet the challenges of the new security environment.³

The Bi-National Planning Group

In 2002, by mutual agreement between Canada's Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State, the two nations created the Bi-national Planning Group (BPG) to address the future of the relationship. To ensure that the perspectives of both nations had been considered, the BPG team was fully integrated with members of the Canadian Forces (CF), and U.S. representatives from North American

very little could be taken for granted as to the future of any such cooperation. It was in my quest for a better understanding of the mechanics of this relationship that this project began to take shape.

It is a pleasure for me here to acknowledge the generous aid of the Fellows and staff at the QCIR for assisting and challenging me throughout this undertaking. I am especially grateful to Dr. Charles Pentland for his patience in working through the study. Others such as Brig Gen (ret) Don Macnamara, Dr. Douglas Bland, and Dr. Joel Sokolsky inspired me with their considerable efforts in exploring many of these same issues. Finally, I am grateful to my wife and sons for their support throughout this adventure in an almost foreign land.


The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defence. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

Aerospace Defence (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). The group is led by the Canadian General who also serves as the Deputy Com-

Table 1. BPG Current Assessment

conducted an analysis of the information and intelligence, maritime defence and MDA, land defence, and CS mission sets as each related to the five operational functions. This analysis helped determine the “mechanisms” by which to ensure effective and efficient mission accomplishment.”⁹ According to the BPG, these mechanisms are not necessarily synonymous with “organizations” — they may be net-centric, web-based, plans, policies, procedures, agreements and/or organization-centric approaches.¹⁰ The relationships between the mission areas, functions and potential mechanisms for implementation are depicted in below in Figure 1.

Figure 1. BPG Interrelationship Analysis




Source: Bi-National Planning Group, Canada and the United States Enhanced Military Cooperation, Interim Report, 13 October 2004, 58.

In conducting its analysis, the BPG highlighted four levels of cooperation that decision makers may consider in order to determine the appropriate organizational changes to achieve a new CDSA. The four levels the BPG considered are

- Level 2: Parallel Commands with the use of a Combined Operations and Intelligence Center and with Liaison Officer exchanges.
- Level 3: Bi-National, Joint Command that has regionally based subordinate commands — *an air, land, maritime* “NORAD”
- Level 4: Bi-National, Joint Command that has functionally-based subordinate commands — the most robust integrated structure

Figure 2 below overlays these levels of cooperation along a historic CANUS defence cooperation timeline in order to depict a functional assessment of co-operation levels.

Figure 2. BPG Assessment – Levels of Cooperation




Source: Bi-National Planning Group, Canada and the United States Enhanced Military Cooperation, Interim Report, 13 October 2004, 60.

Ultimately, the BPG proposed that the desired end state for the future is a command that would address the *global domain* (aerospace, maritime, land): “The NORAD concept can be expanded to integrate all domains in a coherent military strategy that will seal our common seams and gaps.”¹² Figure 3, below depicts the BPG’s “level 3” structure of cooperation — a bi-national command with regional sub-commands. This is the level of cooperation that most closely represents adding

the land and maritime domains to the existing NORAD command and control structure. It is such an organization that most analysts seem to evoke when assessing the prospects for enhanced continental defence cooperation into new mission areas. Therefore, it is useful to visualize such an organization — albeit only one of four discussed in the BPG’s comprehensive report — as one considers the prospects for an enhanced CDSA.¹³

Figure 3. Bi-National Command with Regional Sub-Commands – an “Expanded NORAD”



Source: Bi-National Planning Group, Canada and the United States Enhanced Military Cooperation, Interim Report, 13 October 2004, 66.

A Continental Defence and Security Agreement (CDSA) providing national authority and intent could replace the current NORAD Agreement and provide the mechanism that streamlines national policy with regard to bi-national defence and security. Such an agreement is envisioned to provide the national policy authority under which an all domain command would be established, enabled and matured. According to the BPG, “if a CDSA is adopted by both Governments, an expanded, multi-domain *North American Defence Command* could be established before the end of 2005.” The result: “through enhanced military cooperation, the defence of our two nations can achieve the synergy required to defeat the threats that we collectively face in this new millennium.”¹⁴

A Challenge to Enhanced Cooperation?

The prospects for such a negotiation are complicated by the February 2005 decision of the Government of Canada not to participate further in the US missile defense program.¹⁵ This decision, while certainly the right of a sovereign nation to take in its pursuit of national interests, came as something of a surprise to observers in Canada and the U.S. Indeed, the Government of Canada had projected increasingly positive signals in the months, weeks and days prior to the Prime Minister's announcement, yet it ultimately chose to "opt out."¹⁶

be made between them. National security refers to protecting Canada, its citizens, and its interests through the potential or actual use of power. "Power is A's ability to get B to do something that B otherwise would not have done (compellence). It is also A's ability to stop B from doing something B would have done (deterrence). The sources of power are numerous. Among the tangible sources are geography, population, natural resources, industrial capacity, and military capability. Intangible sources include national character, image, morale, and leadership."²³ Canadian defence policy is therefore but one component of Canadian national security. The military component, in turn, consists of numerous tangible and intangible elements, including the size and structure of a force, the quantity and quality of weapons, and the kind of strategy and tactics pursued.²⁴

Other major components of Canadian national security are economic and political power. Economic power depends on a country's natural resources and broad economic capacity. It is most commonly used to compel and deter through sanctions and incentives affecting international trade, international finance, and international aid.²⁵ Political power is usually exercised through diplomacy, which can be defined as "the formation and execution of foreign policy on all levels, the highest as well as the subordinate."²⁶ Diplomacy is conducted by representing interests, gathering and interpreting information, sending and receiving signals, negotiating agreements, and managing crises.²⁷

Canada's three enduring core national security interests are outlined in its first-ever *National Security Policy (NSP)* document published by Prime Minister Paul Martin's government in April of 2004.²⁸ Foremost is "to protect Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad" — "the right to life, liberty and security of individuals as elaborated in the Canadian *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*." Second "is to ensure that Canada is not a base for threats to [its] allies." The *NSP* explains that the interconnected nature of the modern world makes it impossible to isolate Canada from the effects of any serious threatening event or activity. Third is to continue Canada's long tradition in "contributing to international security." A Canadian formulation, according to the *NSP*, of exercising the military, political and economic components of national security on the world scene in pursuit of Canada's interests is via the situational marriage of "defence, diplomacy and development (the '3 Ds')."²⁹

It is also important to note that power is a complex concept, the components of national security are highly interrelated, and the components affect and are affected by both international and domestic factors. Power is complex in that it is dynamic, subjective, relative, and situational. It is dynamic in that it changes over time. The *perception* of power matters in that a potential aggressor will draw on that perception in determining whether or not to act. Power is assessed in relation to the actor against which it is directed. It is also assessed in relation to the situation in which it is being threatened or used. Although U.S. military power succeeded during the early phases of Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, its results in the ensuing insurgency have been less clear cut.³⁰

Diplomacy, for example, may be strengthened if backed by a credible threat of economic sanctions or military force. Economic and military powers are also highly interrelated. It is difficult for a state to sustain a military if it does not have sufficient economic vigour. Likewise, foreign military sales can strengthen political

defence for the duration of the war, but established the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD). This board, on which Canada would meet the U.S. on equal footing, inaugurated an unprecedented integration of the strategic efforts of the two nations.³⁹ The PJBD continues its work to this day.

The Cold War: During the early years of the Cold War Canada's government undertook an understandable reduction in military forces from World War II levels, yet remained engaged both bilaterally with the U.S. as well as on the international scene. The Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) was established

is Canada's strategic culture — how Canadians think about national security and defence. Dr. David Haglund argues convincingly that Canada's experience in overcoming various internal separatist challenges inculcated certain domestic values that ultimately inform Canada's strategic thinking. "Thus, through its emphasis on inclusiveness (and its assumption that this must mean negotiation and the search for compromise), and because of the stress it places on conflict management, cooperative security can be linked to a Canadian foreign policy style that is synonymous with a 'Pearsonian [or internationalist] tradition' itself characterized by a distrust of dogma, an abhorrence of grand designs, a belief in compromise, and a disposition towards pragmatism — all attributes that Denis Stairs holds to be derivative of a domestic political culture whose 'ultimate origin ... lies in the application of the basic principles of liberalism to the governance of a polity composed of too few people, of too heterogeneous a composition, living in a space too large with a topography too varied'."⁶² Internationalism in its various forms — collective security, cooperative security, human security — is at the core of Canada's strategic culture.⁶³ Canada's strategic culture can then be understood as a subset of its political culture which is often described as liberal, democratic, multicultural and collectivist. To this strategic culture should be added the reality of Canada's sharing a continent and long border with an economic giant and the world's only remaining superpower. The implications of this relationship mani-

demands, and expectations. Overwhelmingly negative feedback creates inputs to end a strategy, policy or program. Mixed feedback falls somewhere between these two extremes. A decision in any of these directions, however, results in additional inputs for the actors involved in the defence policy process.⁶⁷

The Actors: The defence policy process model assumes that individuals and organizations are the most important actors. More specifically, the Prime Minister (and his cabinet), Parliament, the bureaucracy, interest groups, the media, and public opinion are the principal actors in the Canadian defence policy process. Interest groups, the media, and public opinion serve as communication channels — the second box in the model — and “provide for the aggregation, organization, and representation of needs, wants, demands and expectations” to the government institutions. The Prime Minister, Parliament, and the bureaucracy are conversion structures — the model’s third box. They “receive the varied, and frequently conflicting, system inputs and convert them into decisions of government.”⁶⁸

Each of these actors has its own sources of influence. Under the Canadian Constitution, legislative authority rests with the Parliament of Canada — consisting of the Queen (represented by the Governor-General), the House of Commons and the Senate. Executive government and authority rests with the Government of Canada — consisting of the Queen (again, the Governor-General) aided and advised by the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada. By custom, ‘the Government’ consists of the Prime Minister and other Cabinet Ministers — who are the “active” Privy Councillors.⁶⁹ As the Queen’s representative, the Governor-General has been the head of state and commander-in-chief of Canada’s armed forces since the earliest colonial days. With the development of the Canadian system of parliamentary government, however, the actual centre of political and legal authority over defence policy has changed along with the formal mechanisms by which this control is exercised. Thus, while the Governor-General remains the symbolic head of the Canadian Forces, Parliament and, more specifically, the Cabinet has become the dominant defence policy-making player in Canada.⁷⁰ Ultimately, the Prime Minister is wholly accountable for the economy, security and other national concerns and since Canada’s legislative and executive branches are effectively fused because of the Prime Minister’s very close controls over his Cabinet and party caucus in Parliament.⁷¹

This unity is most evident in the House of Commons and especially in the governing party. The government maintains its position and advances its policies by controlling the day-to-day activities of the Commons — it sets the agenda, schedules votes, and defines or limits debates. The government’s grip over its own Members of Parliament is such that members must vote with the party or risk their political future. “Party loyalty coupled with party discipline ensures that the government (and even minority governments for long periods) can force, if necessary, most any legislation through the House of Commons. The Opposition may criticize, delay, and at times embarrass the government and some of its

members, but it rarely changes anything of substance once the government has set its collective mind on a particular course or policy.”⁷² Parliament may vigorously debate any policy decision and can even bring down a government on a matter of significant disagreement through a “no confidence” vote, which equates to a drastic, but legally available check on the government’s power.

The Senate of Canada, whose members are appointed by the government and serve until retirement age, can delay legislation, but essentially “rubber stamps” matters under consideration. Although both the Senate and the House of Commons routinely establish committees focusing on matters of national defence, these committees do not have budgetary authority and, thus, rarely act outside the interests of government.⁷³

The bureaucratic element of Canada’s decision-making process is comprised of functional departments or ministries directed by elected members of the governing party. Key DND civilian leaders are appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the prime minister. This power of appointment over the public servants in DND combined with the responsibilities afforded to the Minister of Defence via the defence portfolio enables the Prime Minister to set and oversee implementation of DND policy through control over his ministers and the professional lives of senior public servants.⁷⁴ This control extends into the Canadian Forces in that the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is similarly appointed by the Prime Minister. “Prime ministers, of course, exercise control in other customary ways by, for instance, opening and closing the doors to the treasury, supporting favoured projects, and championing the armed forces in public. In return, he expects and gets compliance, good order, and discipline in the ranks, and public support for his policy from the chief of defence.”⁷⁵ Thus, bureauc6.9(tm-orting lip(F6asties in oth87.lecteu“elem

they hold those views. This divergence of opinion is represented by the concave lenses in each of the model's middle boxes.⁷⁸

Because there are numerous actors and each has its own powers and perspectives, converting inputs into outputs requires coalition building. Achieving agreement among the actors is made easier by what Halperin and Kanter called "widely shared values and images of international reality" and certain rules of the game." These images and rules are associated mainly with the actors' common strategic and political cultures and are represented by the convex lenses in each of the model's middle boxes. They also result from the constitutional provisions,

from previous outputs, the international environment, and the domestic environment. Canada's future role in North American defence arrangements, in general, and a Continental Defence and Security Agreement, in particular, will be determined by the way these inputs interact with the other elements of the policy process.

International Environment: In *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, Prime Minister Martin emphasized that "the September 11 attacks demonstrated the profound effect an event in the United States could have on Canadians and the need to work together to address threats. Canada is committed to strengthening North American security as an important means of enhancing Canadian security."⁸³ President Bush has described the CANUS relationship as "vital" stating, "We share the same values: freedom and human dignity and treating people decently." Further, within his *National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America* he states, "... there is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada ..."⁸⁴ Additionally, during his November 2004 visit to Canada Mr. Bush reaffirmed, "The relationship between Canada and the United States is indispensable to peace and prosperity on the North American continent."⁸⁵

Prime Minister Paul Martin states it simply: "All Canadians understand that our most important relationship is with the United States. As a government, we treat it that way, devoting energy and effort to ensuring the relationship remains strong, sophisticated, productive and focused on common goals, such as the security of our borders, the health of the North American economy and the free flow of trade between our nations."⁸⁶ The former Canadian Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Gen Ray Henault, echoes that the "U.S. is Canada's most important ally and defence partner. Our defence relations are longstanding, well entrenched, highly successful, and mutually beneficial."

leaves little doubt as to specific U.S. desires from Canada — enhanced intelligence analysis capabilities, a larger and more capable JTF2 special operations unit, some form of strategic lift, and a rapidly deployable brigade-sized strike force — in order that Canada may “punch above its weight” in the international security ring.⁹⁰ Mr. Cellucci joins those in the BPG calling for an enhanced and expanded NORAD — a CDSA: “We can’t defend North America alone. Canada occupies a huge piece of territory here in North America and we need Canada’s help in defending the air, the land and the sea.”⁹¹ It is safe to say that the U.S. government has sent the message that it desires more from Canada continentally and internationally. Given the future force outlined in Canada’s proposed defence budget, it is also reasonable to assert that the government of Canada has received the message.⁹²

Feedback from Previous Strategies, Policies and Programs: As stated earlier in this report, for Canada, alliance commitments and the nature of international relations have been major influences on the historic content of defence policy.⁹³ Throughout the past sixty years, bilateral continental defence cooperation provided Canada a cost-effective means of gaining a seat at the table with the U.S. while imposing few constraints on Canada’s European and internationalist defence policy orientations. Specifically, NORAD participation allowed Canada to stake out and *protect* “the Canadian interest in a lopsided continent.”⁹⁴ In this sense continental collective defence forces assist in protecting Canadian sovereignty. This is what has been called the *defence against help* role of Canada’s armed forces, and it applies especially to North American defence. The concept, originated by Nils Orvik, is based on the premise that, without a Canadian military contribution to the defence of North America at sea in and particularly in the air, all continental defence tasks would be assumed by the U.S. Canada would be unaware of measures that the U.S. might be planning for the defence of the continent.⁹⁵ “Defence against help,” then, means safeguarding Canadian sovereignty against unwanted U.S. “help.” Understanding this concept is helpful when considering official Canadian government statements regarding a CDSA.

The Canadian government’s recent decision to “opt out” of BMD will have an impact on CDSA outcomes as well. CANUS relations may not have been irreparably damaged, but there will be work for Prime Minister Martin to rebuild trust with his U.S. partners. His challenge will be in doing it while not alienating the significant part of the Liberal party that thinks he has been right all along.⁹⁶ Indeed, some players inside his political caucus remain at least sceptical if not hostile toward *any* close cooperation with the current U.S. government. In the wake of his BMD decision “Mr. Martin said that Canada remains committed to the defence of North America, as shown by [the] \$12.8 billion increase in funding for

attractiveness to both North American and overseas firms as a location from which to serve the North American market.¹⁰¹ “Many plants in Canada now have North American product mandates and are producing for the entire Canada-U.S. market, while those in the U.S. operate in the same fashion. That means a huge amount of cross-border trade is now intra-company trade.”¹⁰²

Canada is especially sensitive to anything that could slow (or halt) the cross-border flow as happened just after the 9/11 attacks and again at the start of the war with Iraq.¹⁰³ In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, border waits for trucks hauling cargo increased from just a few minutes to 10-15 hours, delaying shipments of parts and perishable goods. One crossing point saw a 36 kilometre line of trucks backed up awaiting entry into the U.S. The auto industry was hit hardest, resulting in the closure of Ford plants in Ontario and Michigan due to “just-in-time” parts halts.¹⁰⁴ To the extent that Canadian participation in a CDSA can be linked to securing Canada’s profound economic dependence on access to the U.S. market — either from a future post-attack border closure or simply the US economic fallout — the prospects for achieving a CDSA will be strengthened. Such a linkage, must however, be reconciled with Canada’s other above-mentioned domestic priorities.

Communication Channels

Interest Groups: In Canada, as in many countries, are found groups that organize for the purpose of enabling their members to act collectively to influence government policy in the direction of their common interest. These groups vary greatly in their degree of organizational rigor, the scope and depth of their interests and objectives.¹⁰⁵ Some examples include:

- *Business/economic interests*

There is no shortage of voices representing a broad spectrum of interests. Each of these groups produces reasoned (or at least impassioned) arguments advocating its particular view of the proper approach to promoting Canada's interests and determining its role in North America and the world. From so-called "big ideas" — linking security, defence and trade in one comprehensive agreement with the U.S., to big departures from historic paths such as extricating Canada from the US influences on the very same issues — exploring other market relationships and other defence roles and partners, to small agendas and steps in discrete policy areas — such as niche roles for the Canadian Forces; ideas, data, and policy options, decision makers and the Canadian public can draw upon a wide array and volume of interest group advice.

Furthermore, Canada's decision makers have established links to various groups in order to tap into their efforts and ideas. Thus, in some sense, a symbiotic relationship exists between the interest groups, the decision makers, the media, and

Canadian concerns. Similarly, a bare majority of 50 percent of anglophones trust the United States while 60 percent of francophones do not.¹⁰⁹

Almost four out of five (79 percent) Canadians provide endorse the view that the “U.S. is behaving like a rogue nation — rushing into conflicts without attempting to first find solutions by working with its friends and allies” — 54 percent *strongly agree* with this statement. The Bush administration’s so-called doctrine of pre-emptive actions with or without multilateral sanction does not find a receptive audience in Canada.¹¹⁰ While Canadians are still more likely to believe the US is a force for good rather than a force for evil, there is a Canadian consensus that the U.S. is acting like a rogue nation.¹¹¹

Additionally, Canadians may be strongly oriented toward taking an active role on the world stage — 75 percent supported an “engaged” international policy, yet 81 percent do not support doing so if it means doing without things in areas like healthcare and education.¹¹² An April 2004 poll found that 55 percent of Canadians advocated increased government spending on fighting terrorism in Canada and 54 percent believe the national defence budget should be increased. This level of support by Canadian for the military is indicative of an “opt-in” attitude.¹¹³

If, as stated in the previous chapter, public opinion in Canada establishes the broad parameters and the boundaries beyond which the public executive must not transgress, these parameters and boundaries may be summarized as follows:

On balance, polling data would seem to suggest that Canadians desire free and unfettered trade, its resultant economic prosperity, and the associated societal benefits prosperity can underwrite. If defending Canada’s continental (i.e., trade and economic and security) interests against terrorism implies closer cooperation with the U.S., however, it appears Canadians are divided on their perception of whether the U.S. would treat them fairly in any such arrangement. Furthermore, Canadians appear willing to be internationally engaged, but much less so if such engagement comes with a hefty bill attached. It follows that a CDSA may receive cautious public support and that the support would rapidly erode if a CDSA required substantial capital outlays at the expense of highly prized social programs.

The Media: The media appear to occupy an important position in the defence policy making process in Canada, serving to inform and educate the general public as well as interest groups and to help establish the general boundaries within which the political leadership and the bureaucracy must act. The media, especially the print media, have been influential in defining and reciprocally, in reflecting, the broad contours of what is acceptable to the Canadian public in security matters.¹¹⁴ On the CDSA issue substantial print and electronic coverage is available. While various reporters and op-ed page editors tend to focus on the *politics* of the policy matters relating to a CDSA, through well-established relationships with various interest group “experts” the media have served as a means to convey the *substance* of a CDSA and its implications for the government and

the people of Canada.¹¹⁵ Additionally, while the media do occasionally publicize dramatic defence issues, especially those that serve to embarrass the government of the day — such as the current government’s reportedly clumsy management recent BMD decision — they do so only on an intermittent basis.

Again, it is in the media that Canada’s political and public opinion landscape has been painted in broad brush strokes. One such element of the scene is a somewhat muted perception of the terrorist threat to Canada under girded by the notion

Conversion Structures

Parliament: Parliament has a role in generating public awareness of issues such as CDSA through debate and a daily House of Commons question period regarding important decisions. Also, given the government's current minority status, it is impossible for the Prime Minister to ignore the potential perils of misreading the will of all the parties that came together to allow him continue governing. Getting a CDSA decision "wrong" might not bring the government down, but it certainly would not strengthen a government's future political prospects — which are directly reflected in the makeup of Parliament. As previously stated, it was this dynamic that is widely reported to have been responsible for Canada's decision regarding ballistic missile defence. As Jean Lapierre, the Transport Minister, stated to Liberal convention delegates in March, "I must tell you that the decision by the prime minister and cabinet on missile defence will make the task easier for us to rebuild and regain ridings in Quebec" and, thus, capture a majority government.¹²⁰

Nonetheless, as related earlier in this report, given the relatively low priority of defence matters (more mundane than BMD) to the Canadian public and political decision makers when compared to other matters on the national agenda as well as the virtual fusion of the executive and legislative branches of government, the political executive in Canada has been free to conduct defence policy without having to constantly defer or refer to Parliament.¹²¹ Still, the Senate and House of Commons defence committees have provided a forum in which senior military and civilian defence officials have had to explain policies and provide information on the activities of the forces. In that role, these committees perform a public education function and contribute to the national dialogue on CDSA. For example, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence has recently produced several reports that are central to the CDSA discussion. One, entitled *Canada's Coastline: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World* focuses on how best to plug the surveillance, policing and defence gaps in Canada's coastal waters.¹²² Another report from the same committee is *For an Extra \$130 Bucks: Update On Canada's Military Financial Crisis A View From the Bottom Up*. These reports and others like them chronicle the challenges Canada faces in fielding and funding a force capable of playing a meaningful role in either continental defence or international security. To the extent that parliamentary committees draw on the research efforts and ideas of interest groups or deal with controversial issues, some momentum has been generated that again, is reflected in public declarations of decision makers.

Nevertheless, recognizing its own inherent inability to implement desired defence policy changes, the Senate committee observes that none of its "recommendations has the slightest chance of being implemented unless the central agencies of the Government of Canada — the Prime Minister's Office, the

Privy Council Office, Treasury Board and the Department of Finance — join forces to expedite the rejuvenation of Canada's armed forces, instead of dragging their heels to resist it."¹²³

The Bureaucracy: "The Department of National Defence, like other departments and agencies, must compete for a limited amount of government revenue. And it must do so in a political environment in which national security and defence issues are rarely a high priority for the prime minister and his cabinet. This competition must also take place in a political culture in which there are very few votes to be gained by spending more on defence."¹²⁴ As one expert notes, "In the choice between 'guns and butter,' the Canadian public may want some of the former, but they want a good deal more of the latter. Thus, at the highest political level, where decisions and trade-offs must be made ... DND often finds itself in somewhat of a disadvantaged position."¹²⁵ The government's 2005 budget, then, appears somewhat of a departure from past decisions in that while generous in traditional domestic policy areas, it also set forth substantial new dollars for defence. While not universally embraced across Canada, this budget has been widely understood to have generated enough appeal among diverse constituencies to enhance the prospects for survival of the current minority government.

It appears that the voices calling for improvements in CF manning, operations and maintenance and capital account funding have found a sympathetic ear in the current government. "Not only does the budget signal the government's intention to increase defence spending, it also indicates *what kind* of military capability it wants by allocating monies to particular military objectives."¹²⁶ In reviewing these implications, it is important to note not only *what* the government is willing to buy, but also how the government intends to allocate the funds over *time*. The bulk of the 2005-2008 dollars are for sustainment (operations/maintenance and infrastructure) and land force troop strength increases. New equipment, however, is not significantly funded until 2009-2010.¹²⁷

The government has directed that the \$12.8 billion added to DND over the years 2005-2010 be spent to address the following shortfalls and acquire the following capabilities:¹²⁸

- \$3.0 billion to expand the CF by 5,000 regular and 3,000 reservists
- \$3.2 to address sustainability (infrastructure and "the base")
- \$2.8 billion to acquire medium capacity helicopters, logistics trucks, arctic utility aircraft, and to expand JTF2 SOF facilities
- \$3.8 billion for post Defence Policy Review requirements (most likely strategic lift — a mix of sea and air)

The 2005 budget builds upon to the Government's 2004 commitment to acquire new maritime helicopters, a mobile gun system, and a search and rescue aircraft. On balance, it appears that real capabilities will be added to the CF if all the budget promises are kept by the current and any future Canadian government.

Along with these new capabilities will come a renewed CF that emphasizes joint operations and establishes “Canada as an operational theatre” in order to better conduct operations to support the needs of all Canadians and “to prevent threats from being manifested in Canada.”¹²⁹ This reinvigorated CF will be able “to have the maximum profile and footprint for Canada’s benefit anywhere [it] does business”¹³⁰ and it will be particularly well-suited for brigade-level expeditionary, stability operations — a stated goal of the CDS as well as the Prime Minister. Such an expeditionary CF would be capable of “making a difference in the world” and guaranteeing Canada a “seat at the table” in dealing with international partners.¹³¹

Some of the new equipment — for example, maritime patrol aircraft — outlined in Canada’s budget will be “dual use” in that it will provide utility in both the CDSA and the expeditionary missions. Other items such as strategic lift, more land force troops, and medium lift helicopters appear more suited to an expeditionary role. Absent from the budget is any mention of a next generation fighter aircraft, a replacement for the Navy’s four ageing destroyers or upgrades for her 12 capable frigates. Canada’s navy, conditioned over the decades to support overseas task force operations, may be less inclined to commit or seek assets best suited for continental defence. It is in this area where a CF CDSA capabilities gap should be examined.

Canada’s navy currently possesses 12 maritime coastal defence vessels which, because they are lightly armed and slow, are usually assigned to training naval reservists rather than offshore security patrolling. Therefore, the navy “is presently compelled to task two frigates on the east coast alone for domestic security related roles.”¹³² Replacing current coastal defence ships with an offshore patrol

“We should not,” he offered, “be exchanging business cards at the site of the next ground zero” following a future attack on our nation. Thus, NORTHCOM creates demands on the DoD for unique forces and formations tailored to meet its mission to deter, prevent, defeat and mitigate threats within its AOR while working in harmony with other combatant commanders and interagency players.

General Eberhart’s “home game/away game” analogy may be helpful in analyzing the comments of the new CDS, General Hillier, regarding Canada’s budget and its intended transformational influences on the CF. This, in turn, may shed light on Canada’s current and potential contributions to a CDSA. At a recent conference in Canada, General Hillier noted that budget presented by the government represented the dollars required for people, capital and infrastructure requested by DND. Essentially, DND got what it asked for.¹³⁵

What DND appears to have asked for, and what General Hillier seems to be talking about with his renewed emphasis on joint expeditionary operations while treating Canada as an operational theatre,¹³⁶ may be related to concepts outlined by two Canadian scholars in their recent book entitled *Campaigns for International Security*. Douglas Bland and Sean Maloney propose that Canada’s national security will be best served by “harmonizing deterrence and defence at home with the protection of North America and such overseas interventions as threats and interests warrant. The guiding principle must be to prepare the armed forces for a single strategic imperative encompassing the defence of Canada, North American and international operations defined by the circumstances of what the authors refer to as the world order era.”¹³⁷ Such a strategic harmony would be enabled and assisted by a unified command and logistics system directed by the CDS and assisted by a unified central staff. DND would provide a capability set based on the level of resourcing afforded by the government. The CF would then apply its capabilities across three broad mission areas:¹³⁸

- *The Harmonized Mission in Canada* — aimed at the defence of Canada, Canadians and their property by detecting, deterring, and defeating hostile and illegal intrusions, internal security and traditional aid to civil authorities for a range of domestic activities.
- *The Harmonized Campaign in Cooperation with the U.S.* — not just the defence of North America, but cooperative national defence with the US on a worldwide basis in pursuit of Canada’s interests. Convincing the U.S. that no serious threats to the U.S. will originate from Canadian territory and undertaking in unison expeditionary operations on matters that may threaten mutual CANUS security and defence. *Forward defence* of North America would occur in areas far from the homeland such as Afghanistan and Haiti. Additionally, the CF would be prepared to act with or without direct support from the U.S. wherever and whenever the U.S. cannot do so.
- *The Harmonized Campaign in International Security Affairs* — continue to make militarily significant commitments and contributions to international

security institutions and alliances under guidelines of relevance, selectiveness and practicability. In other words, “make a difference in the world”

The Defence portion of the 2005 IPR names establishes a new organization, Canadian Command (CANCOM), as the transformed CF command structure that will undertake a fully integrated and unified approach to operations. It will be a single operational command headquarters that will enable the CF to more effectively meet its fundamental goals to protect Canadians at home and deliver timely,

of bureaucratic advisors and handed the review over to Oxford University professor Jennifer Welsh in order to put the finishing touches on the project. “Welsh’s academic work and recent book on Canadian Foreign Policy have addressed the same basic question Martin hopes will be answered by his review: How can Canada make a difference in the world?”¹⁴⁴

Dr. Welsh advocates a “mature relationship with the U.S.” based on the premise that “we are friends, but not best friends.”¹⁴⁵ She encourages Canada to pursue its role as a “model power” for the world based on its credentials and worldwide “brand” as “relatively successful liberal democracy — civil, pluralist, internationalist” in outlook.¹⁴⁶ As to the role of the military, Welsh argues that Canada should share the risks and burdens of continental defence with the U.S. and build a deployable “peace enforcement brigade” capable of operating alongside the U.S. or alone in order to “help others help themselves.” In such a role, Canada would be understood to play the role of “regime builder versus regime changer” and act as a member of the collective international community that both “pulls its weight and exercises restraint.”¹⁴⁷

have been made and honoured in areas beyond defence as well. In Canada, the government established a new cabinet-level portfolio for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, a more or less parallel organization to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. NORAD has re-engineered itself to look inward as well as outward and respond rapidly to emergency situations. Maritime cooperation between CANUS navies and coast guards continues to blossom through exercises and the continuation of previous operational relationships. Canada's Maritime Security Operations Centres will be operational and further enhancing the North American common operations picture by summer 2005. Yet, the role of Canada's Coast Guard in the security realm must continue to evolve and the Canadian Navy's coastal patrol capabilities augmented or assumed by other Navy assets. In the near term, the most progress on continental defence cooperation can be expected in the lower cost areas associated with enhanced situational awareness. It is in the areas requiring a concrete Canadian commitment to providing platforms that the future of a CDSA force remains in doubt even in the event of a Canadian decision to participate. In the near term, should Canada "opt in" on CDSA — regardless of the organizational construct selected — new capabilities will be a long time in materializing. Current capability gaps will remain, even with agreement and resolve to overcome them.

It is because the external environment does not automatically determine all of Canadian defence policy that the governmental and domestic environments are also important in understanding the process and content of defence decision making.¹⁵¹ In this spirit, the Canadian defence decision making model examined inputs, communications channels, conversion structures, outputs, lenses and feedback within an international and domestic environment. In choosing to consider possible CDSA outcomes in light of the model, it is hoped that the reader has been given an appreciation for the complexity of the decision that will ultimately rest in the hands of the Government of Canada.

While each actor in the defence policy process will influence the CDSA policy outcome, the need and ability to make defence policy choices will remain. "For to

all domain NORAD [a CDSA] is clearly in the interests of both countries. We need the improved capabilities it promises.” Mason continues, “The bi-national principle institutionalized in NORAD has proven successful. Expansion is particularly in Canada’s interest because it is the most effective and practical way for Canada to control key elements of its own defence at a reasonable cost. It is also

5. Ibid.

33. Privy Council Office, vii.
34. D.W. Middlemiss, J.J. Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants* (Canada: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1989) 10.
35. Ibid, 9.
36. Ibid, 14.
37. Ibid.
38. David G. Haglund, "North American Cooperation in an Era of Homeland Security," *Orbis*, 47 (4), Fall 2003, 684.
39. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 15.
40. Ibid, 16-17.
41. Ibid, 18-19.
42. Ibid, 21.
43. Ibid, 23.
44. Ibid, 23-24.
45. Ibid, 10.
46. Douglas L Bland, ed., *Canada Without Armed Forces*, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004) 126.
47. Canada, Department of National Defence, *1994 White Paper on National Defence*, (Ottawa, 1994), http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/doc/5112_e.htm, 3/12/2005, np.
48. Ibid.
49. Bland, *Canada Without Armed Forces*, 6.
50. See for example: "For an Extra \$130 Bucks ... Update on Canada's Military Financial Crisis," *Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, (Ottawa: 37th Parliament-2nd Session) 10.
51. David B. Dewitt, Jeffrey P. Plante, "National defence vs. foreign affairs," *International Journal*, Toronto: Summer 2004. Vol. 59, 3; 581-582.
52. Richard Gimblett, *Operation Apollo: The Golden Age of the Canadian Navy in the War Against Terrorism*.(Canada: Magic Light Publishing, 2004), 8-15.
53. Canada, Backgrounder: The Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces response to September 11, 2001, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_9/27/2004, np.
54. Bland, *Canada Without Armed Forces*, xiv.
55. Author's interview with members of the Privy Council Office staff, Ottawa, August, 2004.
56. *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, 8.
57. The new so-called "white paper" is actually the defence component of the International Policy Statement. Both were released simultaneously in April 2005. See: Canada, Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Defence*, (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005).
58. Hays, et al., 11.
59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Denis Stairs, "The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (December 1982), 684-685, cited in David G. Haglund, "Here Comes M. Jourdain: A Canadian Grand Strategy out of Moliere," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Toronto: Spring 1998. Vol. 27, 3., np, Via proquest.umi.com, accessed 2/21/2005.

84. Bi-National Planning Group, Canada and the United States Enhanced Military Co-operation, Interim Report, 13 October 2004, Appendix VI, 2-3.
85. Foreign Affairs Canada, "Model Neighbours," *Canada World View*, Winter 2005, issue 24, 5.
86. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Overview*, Ottawa (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005), forward.
87. General R.R. Henault, *Annual Report of the Chief of Defence Staff 2002-2003*, DND, Ottawa, 26.
88. Ibid.
89. BPG Report, Appendix VI, 2-3.
90. See for example: Miro Cernetig, "Cellucci offers wish list for our military," *Toronto Star*, 18 February 2005, A8. & Robert Fife and Anne Dawson, "Spend More on spies, soldiers, Cellucci urges — And don't forget the planes to carry them around,"

104. Peter Andreas, "Redrawing the Line," *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 2, (Fall 2003), 93.
105. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 121.
106. MacLean's Annual Poll, 30 December 2002, Macleans.ca, Rogers Media Inc., np.
107. The Dominion Institute of Canada and The Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, *Visions of Canadian Foreign Policy*, survey by Innovative Research Group, 4 November 2004, 6.
108. Ibid, 20.
109. Ibid, 11.
110. Ibid, 15.
111. Ibid, 4.
112. Ibid, 4 & 15.
113. Pollara Poll for Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA) cited in "Canada's National Security and Defence Policy in the 21st Century," Conference of Defence Associations Institute, Ottawa, May 2004, 10.
114. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 130.
115. Interview with Dr. Douglas Bland, Queens University, March 2005.
116. Bob Sudeyko, "Canada's Military role in Fortress North America," CBC News Online, interview with Dan Middlemiss, 5 May 2003, np.
117. Ibid.
118. Alexander Panetta, "Canadian Give PM big thumbs up on eve of summit," Canadian Press Online, 22 March 2005, np. <http://www.canada.com>.
119. Hays, et al, 13.
120. Alexander Panetta, "Bush administration levels flip-flopping accusation at Martin over missile snub," Canadian Press Online, 6 March 2005, np. <http://news.yahoo.com>.
121. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 99.
122. Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, *Canada's Coastline: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*, Vol. 1, Thirty-Seventh Parliament, Second Session, October 2003, 11.
123. Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, *For an extra \$130 Buck: Update On Canada's Military Financial Crisis A View From the Bottom Up*, Thirty-Seventh Parliament, Second Session, November 2002, 31.
124. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 223.
125. Ibid.
126. Conference of Defence Associations (CDA), "Budget 2005:CDA Analysis," 28 February 2005, 1.
127. CDA, Budget, 2.
128. Ibid.
129. Gloria Kelly, "Assuming the Top Post," *The Maple Leaf*, 16 February 2005, Vol. 8, No. 7, 3.
130. Ibid.

131. General Rick Hillier, Chief of Defence Staff, remarks to Conference of Defence Associations, Ottawa, 3 March 2005.

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