Canada's Feminist Foreign Policy
And Women, Peace and Security Norms

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joining international security eúorts, and women participate in both NATO statesô militaries and oώcer corps at low rates (Hutchinson et al. 2018). This is to the detriment of global peace processes: when women are included in peacebuilding, there is a 35% increase in an agreement lasting at least 15 years (Lindborg 2017). NATO country militaries must

second country in the world to adopt an oώcially òfeministó foreign policy. Canada scores in the top half of almost all NATO indicators of

areas. Integrating women in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), as well

important for equality, but also to improve policy eúectiveness (von Hlatky 2014). Recently, Canada has attempted to bring military gender

to eliminate sexual violence in the CAF, though many have disputed the operationôs eúectiveness (English 2016). More action is necessary

Since Canada is a key member of NATO and other international orga nizations, if Canada has gaps in its implementation of UNSCR 1325

problems, making Canada an interesting test case for NATO states on

the gaps in its own implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the related

This paper investigates the question, ò

?ó Speciþcally,

larger NATO membershipôs implementation of gender mainstreaming, since NATO transmits gender policy norms in the international arena.

Resolution 1325 and many further studies on gender in Canadian secu rity, Canada in a 1325 context, or Canada and NATO, the study of 1325 via gap analysis of the ideal implementation of 1325 in Canada and the on the ground reality is an unutilized approach (see, for example, de Jonge Oudraat et al. 2015a; Hutchinson et al. 2018; Greco and von Hlat ky 2018). Understanding the gap is the þrst step for scholars and prac

cy does not align with international gender norms like UNSCR 1325

problems, and insuώcient numbers of women in critical roles. The last two of these reasons is itself an issue that UNSCR 1325 calls nations to

this paper aώrms these þndings.

This paper contains þve chapters. In this introductory chapter, I provide information on Canadaõs feminist foreign policy, international gender norms, and how this paper will evaluate the argument described above.

goals and their implementation in Canada. Fourth, I analyze the þve main sources of the gap established in section three, and note that the reduction of this gap must occur through the resolution of one or more of these intersecting issues. Finally, I present my conclusions and areas for future research.

ond, I provide information about UNSCR 1325 and the related reso lutions, as well as NATOõs role in addressing the resolutions. Third, I explain Canadaõs role in implementing UNSCR 1325. Fourth, I outline

for increased research that this policy report strives to þll. Fifth, I note

Asquith 2018).

eign policy. As St®fanie von Hlatky notes, this requires òintegrating the mentality of gender equality in [not only] the programming and policy

highlighting diversity (Ho 2018).

doctrine of the feminist foreign policy, the 2017ð2022 National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (C-NAP), the Feminist Internation al Assistance Plan (FIAP), and the defence strategyôs discussion of gen der. The C-NAP on WPS details implementation plans and priorities. Areas of focus include increasing the meaningful participation of wom en in conÿict prevention, resolution, and statebuilding, gender equal

violence in conÿict, meeting the speciþc needs of women and girls in

Canada 2017). With the goal of supporting global eúorts to eradicate poverty by promoting the rights of women and girls, Canadaõs 2017 FIAP commits almost all foreign aid Canada distributes to be in some

organizations (Global Aúairs Canada 2017). Under the policy, 15% of

gender equality and quality of life for women and girls by 2021ð2022. Additionally, Global Aúairs Canada commits to investing no less than 80% of bilateral international development assistance in initiatives

increase gender integration and empowerment (Global Aúairs Cana da 2017). This is a signiþcant departure from as recently as 2015ð2016, when only 2.4% of Canadian aid was explicitly directed toward gender equality (Global Aúairs Canada 2017). Canada also emphasizes that the decision to intervene abroad militarily will be guided by 1325õs im pulse to consider the needs of women and girls in conÿict situations.

The 2016 Chief of Defence Staúõs Directive for Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions into CAF Planning and Operations empha sizes a military perspective for preventing sexual abuse, exploitation,

ing, alongside increasingly involving women in conÿict reconciliation

plementation of UNSCR 1325 and the subsequent WPS resolutions. To

are integral to NATOõs three core tasks. Gender mainstreaming and in creased representation of women in NATO civilian and military struc tures and in Allied and partner forces improve our eúectiveness and contribute to a more modern, agile, ready, and responsive Alliance.ó (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2018)

The history of women in NATO dates back more than 50 years. The þrst oώcial Alliance conference on the role of women in NATO forces took place in 1961, organized by women within the Alliance who want ed to seek opportunities for women in the armed forces. A formal Com mittee on Women in the NATO Forces (formerly CWINF, since 2009 called the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives, the NCGP) was recognized in 1976 (Hutchinson et al. 2018; Gottemoeller 2017). Sepa rately, in 1998 the Oώce of Women in the NATO Forces was created, which is now the called the Oώce of the Gender Advisor, a key player in NATO gender mainstreaming (Gottemoeller 2017). Corresponding ly, since 2000, NATO has increased its gender mainstreaming eúorts. The 2002 NATO Prague Summit directed the International Staú (IS) to

al Military Staú (IMS). These eúorts contributed to the 2007 adoption of the þrst NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) òPolicy on Implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security.ó (Hutchinson et al. 2018) This policy was the þrst overall framework within the Alliance for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions, engaging with each of the

for policies, and centralizing the role and value ascribed to women in the Alliance (Hurley 2017). In 2008 the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the primary NATO decision-making body, requested a strategy for im plementing 1325 from NATO Strategic Command, leading to the 2009 policy document Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 (Bi-SCD 40-1) on integrating UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives into NATO com mand and operational structure. This marked the oώcial integration of the Resolution into NATO doctrine, rendering upholding 1325 and its related resolutions obligatory for the Alliance (Hutchinson et al.

2018; Hurley 2017). 2010 brought the þrst result-oriented action plan re garding NATOõs implementation of 1325 and the related WPS Security

2016).

Three major changes occurred in 2012. First, the Nordic Centre for

ness- promoting an increased representation of women across NATO and in national forces to enhance operational eúectiveness and success; and

frameworks. NATO, Allies and partner nations seek to contribute and

al. 2018a)

NATO partner countries like Australia, Japan, the UAE, and others, in dicates the onward march of NATOôs gender mainstreaming practices, continually evolving to meet emerging challenges (North Atlantic Trea ty Organization 2018b). A detailed implementation plan for the new policy is expected in 2019.

implementation indicators. Past implementation plans for 1325 from NATO have included measures like, òNumber of events, declarations etc. addressing Women, Peace and Security priorities,ó and, òNumber and role of local coordinating mechanisms between NATO and interna tional organizations.ó (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2014a) These

gender mainstreaming and may artiþcially drive states to produce nu

NATO is relevant to a discussion of the Canadian implementation of

ing national policy. According to the UNôs 15-year anniversary report on Resolution 1325, regional policies like those advanced by NATO òprovide opportunities to share limited resources and build on neigh

(Coomaraswamy et al. 2015). Through repeated policy cycles, the orga nization adopts a minimum baseline policy, which member states will

a whole (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2012).

Furthermore, NATO articulated in its 2018 Action Plan that òThe primary responsibility for the implementation of the [WPS] agenda

feasible from amnesty provisions; (United Nations 2000)

(d) Provisions that refer to òall partiesó of UNSCR 1325

Some of the òall partiesó obligations that apply to member states

particularly during situations of armed conÿict, prosecuting those re

reintegration (United Nations 2000).

the other WPS resolutions are similar, with more speciþc language re

the Freedom House 201n ⋆ m = tith k r ' prsciq' pn a| mqatu

ple, Momani 2019). These individuals are distinct from those in camp

neglects histories of colonialism, legitimizes violence, and perpetuates western views of womanhood (Howell 2005). They are distinct from

ample, in a perspective shared by others, Raþa Zakaria (2019) argues

ments to freedom from oppression; an òadd women and stiró approach does not work without corresponding political eúorts. Individuals af þliated with the Women, Peace, and Security Network-Canada such as Margaret Capelazo and Diana Sarosi argue that Canadaôs national

policy, lacks operational and budget speciþcity, creating signiþcant policy gaps (see, for example, Women, Peace and Security Network ð Canada 2018). Other Canadians aώliated with NGOs, universities, and

> The perception of UNSCR 1325 as an issue which is additional, rather than integral to NATOôs core identity as a defensive institution, has been
>
> sible for delivering on UNSCR 1325, particularly given that a number of
>
> (NATO Oώcial, 2014). The implication of women being perceived by ex tension of their gender as a natural þt for a role working on gender results
>
> reproduction of gender (Zalewski, 2010: 24) serves to reinforce, rather
>
> formative change within organisations) (Cockburn, 2010: 143). In part, this is a reÿection of a weakness within UNSCR 1325 itself, which has framed gender as synonymous with women (Shepherd, 2008: 171). That NATOôs adoption of UNSCR 1325 has not sought to challenge the logic
>
> (Wright 2016)

ship on 1325, often unconnected to NATO, which argues that a problem with the Resolution is that it equates the word ògenderó with the word òwoman,ó which is reductive and contributes to men not buying into

Hurley 2017; Kennedy 2016; George and Shepherd 2016; Hermoso and Sugawara 2016). Hurley (2017) interviewed senior NATO personnel and found that there was consistent òmisunderstanding or conÿa

opportunities,ôó and that the word òwomenó itself was a signiþer of so many other things, within NATO particularly problem solving on

men and women. Framing 1325 as a womenôs issue within NATO plac

support from men, which reproduces and essentializes negative gen der stereotypes, a key problem with NATOôs gendered implementation (Wright 2016). Some women at NATO feel like they need a man on their

only òfemale stuú,ó and would instead listen to a man talking about

Again, it indicates the possibility that UNSCR 1325 can be co-opted to

tive change.ó Some oώcers interviewed for Matthew Hurleyôs (2017) research may ascribe to women in the military òôsoftô female compe

sentialize women, rather than solely point to positive attributes. This restricts womenôs agency and promotes, according to Hurley òunreal

NATOôs interpretation of Resolution 1325. Matthew Hurley (2018a) de scribes how the narratives and stories told by NATO about gender are

sult in ògender,ó òwomen,ó and òsecurity,ó rendered into òpolitical and problematicó signiþer words that are essentialized and reductive rather than developing an organizational agenda to support women in the military (436ð437). In an earlier article, Hurley also argues that NATOôs implementation of the 1325 mission has been feminized, negatively im

of Resolution goals. He writes, òperceived gender transgressions are policed and controlled via trivialization and feminization; and é con ceptualizations of masculinist protection and credibility can reinforce

Pratt analyze the imperialist implications of 1325. She writes,

> the lives of women (and men) in conÿict zones... this reconceptualiza tion of gender occurs through a reinscription of racialðsexual boundaries, evocative of the political economy of imperialism é Understanding the signiþcance of race and sexuality in the conceptualization of gender has
>
> er that give rise to war, conÿict, insecurity, and injustice. (Pratt 2013, 772)

Pratt thus highlights the perspective that UNSCR 1325 was primar

rity for brown women in the global south. She argues that this reiþes culturally dominant systems of oppression and visions of òthe otheró across gender, class, race, and sexual lines (Pratt 2013). Nicole George and Laura Shepherd (2016) further this argument, noting that the 1325

ment was prominent in their thoughts about 1325 at a November 2018

While the authors presented in this section oúer criticism of NATO and UNSCR 1325, particularly in terms of the interpretation of ògen deró itself, reading the non-NATO perspectives on this issue help to

to 1325. Best practices on the Resolution can evolve from renewed at

Second, an additional source of scholarly critique of NATOõs treat ment of UNSCR 1325 stems from its implementation of doctrine, or rather the lack thereof. These authors more closely reÿect some of the internal NATO criticisms of 1325 doctrine, which generally argue that existing NATO doctrine is þne, but that it is not acted upon. Authors George and Shepherd (2016) comment on the transmission of 1325 and related Resolution aims into NAPs. While the authors praise the rise of NAPs overseen by regional bodies like NATO, they comment that only 11 of the 54 countries with NAPs in 2014 had budgets to support the policies they advanced (George and Shepherd 2016, 298). George and

Shepherd (2016, 299) point to additional di ώculties with NAP trans

consider local histories, contexts, and traditions, stating, òClearly, local

but at the same time òWe might also consider if ð and how far ð local ised eúorts to formulate ôusefulõ WPS policy stretch, creatively reinter

This is a particular concern given that some NAPs have turned away from the anti-militarist sentiment that inspired the 1325 movement, los ing progressive potential and òmould[ing] to harmonise with the goals of the liberal statebuilding orthodoxy that has informed recent conÿict stabilisation interventions.ó (George and Shepherd 2016, 300)

NATO couples UNSCR 1325 with its role as a security and stability pro vider, it becomes a part of NATOõs òcorporate identity,ó which does not allow for full mainstreaming, noting, òIn this (re)framing, UNSCR 1325 is moved from a disruptive policy ð one that exposes deÞciencies ð to a natural extension of NATOõs values, identity and purpose, and a tool to enhance alliance success. In this sense, UNSCR 1325 becomes a supplement ð not a disruption ð to NATOõs pre-existing, organisational

in which increased womenõs involvement ð and female agency ð is con -

analyzed 15 elements of the plans and their impact on implementation.

> The location of the NAP within the domestic political structure seems to be signiþcant, for example. According to another study, minority world NAPs tend to be located in departments or ministries associated with foreign aúairs, while majority world NAPs tend to be driven by minis tries responsible for gender equality. The ownership of the NAP within
>
> and its level of inÿuence (national womenõs machineries are typically lacking the resources and political status in many conÿict-aúected coun
>
> 2016, 325)

ment turn toward use of 1325 to increase a diúerent kind of militariza tion, Miller et al. and Shepherdõs arguments þnd that funding and at

goal of UNSCR 1325 is not to òmake war safe for women.ó

than the þrst group to apply to a reframing of policy implementation on UNSCR 1325 for both NATO and member state national action plans. On the one hand, NATO and member states could recommit to the

NATO as a òcorporateó and male-created entity is an intractable issue.

A gap in the literature that this paper seeks to address is the policy

WPS goals. As demonstrated by the presentation of two distinct bod

feminist foreign policy, and still others emphasize norming documents like UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions, but there is not currently

To analyze the implementation of Canadaôs feminist foreign policy and why it might diúer from international WPS goals, I use ògap analysis

plished. A non-Canadian foreign policy example helps explain how

alyze the actual cupcake made from the bakeryôs recipe and the bak

Applied to Canadaôs feminist foreign policy, I collect data from Ca

UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions, and international organiza tion recommendations, later analyzing these documents to understand

organization is established to best analyze the gap. The chapters follow

alyze why this gap between international aims and domestic output is

aforementioned hypotheses, each policy area will be scored on a 1ð5

partment of National Defence in its 2017ð2018 progress report on the C-NAP for WPS implementation (Canada Department of National De fence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018b). I deþne norms in this in stance as an obligation for member states or òall partiesó under UNSCR

1325 and the related resolutions (1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122, and 2242), since they are the internationally agreed upon standards for gen der policy. I utilize the line or lines from UNSCR 1325 and the related

icy. Full implementation is deþned as a state taking proactive, strong,

a member state obligation listed in UNSCR 1325 of òIncrease[ing] their voluntary þnancial é support for gender-sensitive training eýorts.ó A

ing the òfullnessó test, but a state that appropriated additional funding,

armament and countering extremism, adjusting sanctions, NAP cre ation and monitoring / evaluation, local development and post-conÿict

5. Virtually all signiþcant particulars are implemented to the best

4. Between 95% and 75% signiþcant particulars are implemented

3. Between 74% and 50% signiþcant particulars are implemented

2. Between 49% and 25% signiþcant particulars are implemented

1. Less than 25% signiþcant particulars are implemented to the

A qualitative version of those same scores is as follows:

formation on gender diύerences and social relations in order to identify

as òmethods used to understand the relationship between men and women in the context of the society.ó (de Jong et al. 2015b, 24) Examples of gender analysis include taking into account the diύerent security

(Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 2015).

Gender balance: NATO deþnes the term as within a 60:40 ratio to ward one gender or the other (Hurley 2017).

Gender equality: òThe equal rights, responsibilities and opportuni ties for women and men, and girls and boys. Equality does not mean

whether they are born female or male.ó (de Jonge Oudraat et al. 2015b, 24)

Gender mainstreaming: NATO directives state that gender main streaming is òa strategy to achieve gender equality by assessing the im

tion, policies and program in all areas and at all levels.ó (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2017) The 1325 Scorecard Project, supported by NATO and several civil society organizations, goes further, and adds to the end of the oώcial NATO deþnition òin order to assure that the

to that women and men beneþt equally and inequality is not perpetuat ed.ó (de Jonge Oudraat et al. 2015b, 24)

Integration of gender perspective: òA way of assessing gender-based diύerences of women and men reÿected in their social roles and in

ACO and ACT activities it is used synonymously with implementing the requests of UNSCR 1325, related resolutions, as well as directives emanating from NATO é More fundamentally, implementing a gender

(de Jonge Oudraat et al. 2015, 24)

Sex: òThe permanent and immutable biological characteristics com

mon to individuals in all societies and cultures.ó (Kennedy 2016, 1061)

Sexual or gender-based exploitation: òIncludes, at a minimum, tak

nerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or beneþts to obtain

2. The Canadian Government's Implementation of International Gender Norms

As the chair of the global group of Friends of 1325, the second

a member of international organizations committed to gender

A component of Canadaõs G7 leadership was advocating for in

on 1325 and the related resolutions, in part because, òAdvanc ing gender equality is the most eúective approach to eradicat

prosperous world.ó Global Aúairs Canada 2018

of women in international security spaces. The Elsie Initiative

the Elsie Initiative globally could be something Canada would

mented. First, Canadaõs position in the global context of 1325 diýerent broad areas of UNSCR 1325 implementation by the Ca

2013)

es, and it is not close to its goal of 25% representation of wom

Armed Forces 2018a). Despite not being a top þve scorer in fe male representation, according to the data shown in Figure 2.2, Canada is among the NATO countries with the highest percent age of female applicants for armed forces positions, at 28.4%. Partner states are in a lighter color, while NATO members are the darker color (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016).

Ultimately, 20.3% of women are successfully recruited to the Canadian forces, the 7 highest success rate among NATO mem

three were Greece, the Czech Republic, and Australia (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016). With 14.7% women in the reserve forces, Canada is above the NATO and partner country average of 10% female reservists, but signiþcantly lower than the highest country, Albania (35.3%), and again, far from its gener

Figure 2.2

Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2016. “Summary of the National Reports of NATO Member and Partner Nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives.” 13.

al benchmark aim of 25% (North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Figure 2.4

Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2016. “Summary of the National Reports of NATO Member and Partner Nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives.” 15.

the CAF on policy to ensure that womenôs voices on their em ployment status and rights are heard in the organization (Can ada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018a). The 2016 SNR included the important practice that the NATO عي
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aation t016

There are þve primary documents or individual policies that ad

policy: the national action plan (C-NAP), the Chief of the De fence Staú Directive on the implementation of 1325 and WPS, the CAF Diversity Strategy, the DND program òDefence Cham

OUR order (von Hlatky and Lacoursi¯re 2019; Government of Canada 2018a; Government of Canada 2017b; Government of Canada 2017c; Chief of the Defence Staú 2016a; von Hlatky and Lacoursi¯re 2019).

Oώcially launching in 2017, Canadaôs òfeministó foreign policy is the second in the world, behind Sweden. As articulated by Ma

and La Francophonie (Lib): Compton ñ Stanstead in Hansard (

After laying out the broad feminist foreign policy in Parlia

of the policy in the C-NAP on Women, Peace, and Security for 2017ð2022 (C-NAP) and the Feminist International Assistance Policy. The C-NAP summarizes:

> Canadaûs National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (Action Plan) is integral to Canadaûs Feminist Foreign Policy that includes its Feminist International Assistance Policy and Defence
>
> most eúective approach for Canada to reduce poverty, and build a more inclusive, peaceful and prosperous world. Global Aúairs
>
> work. (Government of Canada 2017b)

The C-NAP lists three priorities for GAC that are key parts of

Canada will support local womenûs organizations in countries

be participants in peace negotiations in conÿict-aúected areas, for zero tolerance for sexual exploitation by peacekeepers of local in

governance bodies like the UN and NATO. Third, Canada will

sonnel about WPS in conÿict, increasing collaboration with civil society stakeholders, and utilizing GBA+ when making opera tional and policy decisions (Government of Canada 2017b). Thus, the C-NAP contains measures which will help improve gender

garding diplomacy and development (Reeves 2013).

Anticipate. Adapt. Act,ó and Annex C, òGender-Based Analysis

National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018b).
ter 1 examines Canadaõs eúorts to have òa military that looks

2.2.2 and 2.2.4. In chapter 1, the CAF describes eúorts taken and

tionally eúective by reÿecting Canadian diversity, including gen
der diversity, and that òThe Canadian Armed Forces is commit

partment of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces
2018b, 21) The chapter also discusses preventing gender-based

en Canada to apply a GBA+ lens to the policy text. The Annex

speciþcally noting that the sections on òRecruitment, Training, and Retention,ó òLeveraging Canadaõs Diversity,ó the reduction

Furthermore, the Annex highlights how Canadian evaluation of

(health, education, etc.), fostering ògrowth that works for every

(Global Aúairs Canada 2017).

tance in its feminist foreign policy, noting in its òHandbook: Swe denõs Feminist Foreign Policyó that, òGender equality is a the

Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance on ϰ o ᵠ ɣ Ƙ
A tii, tolicyc#

states, among other tasks (Government of Canada 2018b).

Second, Canada used its 2018 G7 presidency to advance the

conÿict. One way that Canada carried out this policy prioritiza tion was by hosting the þrst ever global summit of female foreign ministers on September 20ð21, 2018 in Montreal. As of March 2019, there are around thirty women who hold the òtop diplo mató job in their countries (Thompson and Asquith 2018). Top

emphasized the importance of their work at the summit, partic

ÿict negotiations, stating: òI think we all know that prosperity

life.ó (Lowrie 2018) The meeting also featured some male attend ees such as Japanõs Foreign Minister, demonstrating the wide

relations in line with UNSCR 1325.

1? Elements of many of the WPS reM] ƭᵛ ή Q в ậʾ ng: reM] j

2. Between 49% and 25% signiþcant particulars are imple

1. Less than 25% signiþcant particulars are implemented to the

earlier resolutionôs iteration of the sentiment. This list (Table 2.1),

As can be seen from the chart, the doctrinal texts of Canadaôs

the WPS resolutions. Additionally, even in the areas that are not

hence why they all receive a score of a 2 rather than a 1. While the

To implement UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions through

foreign aúairs space " e ! sUt ċ ű

Table 2.1

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch 2
1325	"Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the preven-	5, these are the clear aims across the stated doctrines
1888	"Recognizing that the romotion and empowerment of women and that support for women's organizations and networks are essential in the consolidation of peace to promote the equal and full participation of women and encouraging Member States, donors, and civil society, including non-governmental organizations, to provide support in this respect."	4, the doctrines strive to engage local groups
1888	"Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training to carry out their responsibilities."	4, Strong Secure Engaged strives to engage with this
2122	"Recognizes the continuing need to increase women's participation and the consideration of gender-related issues in all discussions pertinent to the prevention and resolution of and in this regard, the Council: Encourages concerned Member States to develop dedicated funding mechanisms to support the work and enhance capacities of organizations that support women's leadership development and full participation in all levels of decision-making, regarding the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), inter alia through increasing contributions to local civil society."	5, these are the clear aims across the stated doctrines, particularly the FIAP

Table 2.1, continued

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch 2
2242, sim in 2122	"Welcomes the efforts of Member States to implement resolution 1325, including the development of national action plans, further welcomes the increase in national action plans in recent years, and calls upon Member States to further integrate the women, peace and security agenda into their strategic plans such as national actions plans and other planning MYHTLYYRZDZMÄPLUYLZYJLZUJSKPUNPTWSLTLUHPVUVMYLSLHUVISPNHPVUZ under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, through broad consultation, including with civil society, in particular women's organizations, calls upon countries with national action plans to provide an update on the progress made in their implementation and review during the annual Security Council Open Debates on Women, Peace and Security, further welcomes the efforts of regional organizations to implement resolution 1325, including through the adoption of regional frameworks, and encourages them to pursue further implementation."	5, these are the clear aims across the stated doctrines
1325, sim in 1889	[HSSZVVUHSSWHYPLZHYTLKJVUÅVYLZVLJDLJPSPHUHUKOTHUPHYPHUJOHYHJLY of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000."	3, not substantially discussed though present
1325	"Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia (a) The special needs of women and girls KYPUNYLWHPVUHUKYLZSLTLUHUKMVYYLOHIPSPHPVUYHPVUHNVKWVZVUÅ[reconstruction; (b) Measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous WYVJLZZMVYJVUÅYLZSPVUHUKDHPUVSLYTLUPUHSSVMDLPTWSLTLUHPVU mechanisms of the peace agreements; (c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary"	4, political systems are not a main aim in the FIAP and C-NAP but receive attention

Table 2.1, continued

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch 2
1888	¥XNLZHSSWHYPLZHJVUÅJVLUZLQHHSSYLWVYZMZHSPVSLUJLJVTTPLKI` civilians or by military personnel are thoroughly investigated and the alleged perpetrators brought to justice, and that civilian superiors and military commanders, in accordance with international humanitarian law, use their authority and powers to prevent sexual violence, including by combating impunity."	3, Strong Secure Engaged and some of the FIAP move in this direction
2122, sim in 2242, 1960, 2106	"Calls upon Member States to comply with their relevant obligations to end to impunity and to thoroughly investigate and prosecute persons responsible for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity or other serious violations of international humanitarian law; and MYQLYUVLZQHQLÄOHNHPUZTWUPMVYQLTVZYPVZYPTLZMPULYUHPVUHS concern against women and girls has been strengthened through the work of the International Criminal Court, ad hoc and mixed tribunals, as well as specialized chambers in national tribunals."	3, not mentioned at length in these doctrinal texts, though Canada is a strong supporter
1888	"Encourages States, relevant United Nations entities and civil society, as appropriate, to provide assistance in close cooperation with national authorities to build national capacity in the judicial and law enforcement systems in situations of particular concern with respect [VZHSPVSLUJLPUHYTLKJVUÅJ[	4, this is a primary FIAP doctrinal aim
1325, sim in 1820, 1888, 1889, 2242	HSSZVVUHSSWHYPLZHYTLKJVUÅJVYLZVLJMSSPULYUHPVUHSSHHWWSPJHISLVQL rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court."	3, not mentioned at length in these doctrinal texts, though Canada is a strong supporter

Table 2.1, continued

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch 2
2106	"Encourages Member States and donors to support national and international programs that assist victims of sexual violence such as the Trust Fund for Victims established by the Rome Statute and its implementing partners; and requests the relevant United Nations entities to increase allocation of resources for the coordination of gender-based violence response and service provision."	3, limited conversation, though discussed

Source: Author's compilation.

ada, the organization tasked with its implementation, deþnes GBA+ as:

> An analytical process used to assess how diverse groups of wom
>
> grams and initiatives. The òplusó in GBA+ acknowledges that GBA goes beyond biological (sex) and socio-cultural (gender) diıerences. We all have multiple identity factors that intersect to make us who we are; GBA+ also considers many other identity
>
> disability. (Status of Women Canada 2018)

The government of Canada believes that GBA+ is everyoneõs responsibility, and has made GBA+ training toy

eral policy (Government of Canada 2017c, 23).

GBA+, feminist foreign policy, and international gender norms when referring to how the GBA+ deals with evaluation of DND

> The Defence team also recognizes that conÿict, natural disasters,

and abroad, such as the feminist foreign policy. The 2017ð2022 C-NAP on Gender-Based Analysis provides the current status of GBA+ implementation in Canada:

> In 2015, the Government renewed its commitment to GBA, in
>
> ulations are sensitive to the diúerent impacts that decisions can have on men and women. The Fall 2015 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, òImplementing Gender-based Analysis,ó re leased in February 2016, pointed to the need to do more to ful ly implement GBA as a rigorous practice across government. [C M

Additionally, GBA+ can be crucial to mission success. During Operation REASSURANCE, an exercise with NATO allies to provide vital training to partners in Poland and Latvia, GBA+

geon for the enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group realized

person qualiþed to administer the corresponding tests. Employ ing GBA+ methodology, he realized that this could make some

and Straatsma 2018).

Furthermore, GBA+ helps to understand why having women

can be so crucial. For example, in Afghanistan, for Canada to en

ture, Afghans may only talk to strangers of the same gender. St®

> While Afghan men take up arms and þght on the battleþeld,
>
> community-level security concerns. NATO allies deployed female
>
> paid oú and showcased what women can bring to the þght...For
>
> diverse pool of applicants. The CAF have an interest in making military careers more attractive to women. (von Hlatky 2014)

This consideration of the security risks faced by Afghan wom

signiþcantly more comfortable engaging with a CAF member

who is female-presenting indicates the importance of GBA+ and

diversity strategy, a part of feminist foreign policy. Announced in 2017 by General Jonathan Vance, Chief of the Defence Staú, the strategyõs goal is to have the military increasingly reÿect Cana

Alan Okros, a professor at the Canadian Forces College, noted in June 2017, òThis idea that people with diúerent views, diúerent experiences, diúerent skill sets are going to make the military

about a year and a half é This isnôt a luxury, this isnôt social engi

This is now an operational requirement.ó (Berthiaume 2017) In

they are exclusive to particular communities (Berthiaume 2017).

charging forward with the plan. The head of the Navy, Vice Ad miral Ron Lloyd noted, òIn order to be successful in the future,

aume 2017) The strategy is still at the planning phase and not yet

(Berthiaume 2017). However, the CAF is working on solutions.

The strategy is the latest in a series of CAF policies on diversity

egy is also being used to help increase the size of the military to

of 3,500 regular force members and 1,500 reservists (Canada De partment of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018c, 4). However, as the CAF makes this policy shift, it is ac tively attempting to comply with GBA+ and international gen

der policy norms. A statement from the CAF and DND explains:

> Through our comprehensive Diversity Strategy and Action Plan,
>
> our eϋorts to develop a deeper understanding of our increasing ly complex world and to respond eϋectively to the challenges it presents. We will ensure the integration of GBA+ in all defence ac
>
> place free of harassment and discrimination, and characterized by
>
> the Canadian Armed Forces 2018c, 4)

The DND and CAFõs language mirrors the WPS resolution

To evaluate the broad policy doctrine of GBA+ and the Diver

chapter 1 and the same chart as in section 2.2.1, using parts of the resolutions most relevant to the particular doctrine. Since GBA+

SCR 1325 and the related resolutions. Consequently, this chart (Table 2.2) pulls a cross section of resolutional obligations and assesses how the doctrine of GBA+ scores on the established 1ð5

The chart demonstrates that GBA+ is acting across a wide

Pursuant to the call in UNSCR 1325 that member states, òIn crease their voluntary þnancial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training eúorts, including those undertaken

and by the Oώce of the United Nations High Commissioner for

to increase its gender training in recent years (Rodrigues 2017; United Nations 2000).

In 2016, the Chief of the Defence Staú announced a policy that required all CAF personnel to take online GBA+ introductory training. These changes were made in the CAF in consultation

ety organizations (Rodrigues 2017; The Maple Leaf 2017). The

… text continued on page 73

Table 2.2

Res.	Text of obligation	Ch 2. Score
1960	"Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training on sexual and gender-based violence, inter alia, to carry out their responsibilities."	4, GBA+ provides the platform to encourage undertaking such measures
1325	"Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making	

Table 2.2, continued

Res.	Text of obligation	Ch 2. Score
22422242		Ch 2. Scor92242-CID 3168 BDC 0 0 0 rg /GS2 gs

Table 2.2, continued

Table 2.2, continued

Res.	Text of obligation	Ch 2. Score
2106	“Recognizes the need for more systematic monitoring of and attention to sexual violence PUHYTLKJVUÅJ[HUKWVZVUÅZ[HPVUZHUKV[DLY`VTLUHUKWLHJLHUKZJYP[commitments in its own work and, in this regard, expresses its intent to employ, as appropriate, all means at its disposal to ensure women’s participation in all aspects of mediation, WVZVUÅJ[YLJV]LYHUKWLIPSKPUNHUK[VHKKYLZZHS[PVSLUJLPUJVUÅPJ[ing, inter alia, in the establishment and review of peacekeeping and political mandates, W\SPJ[LTLUZVU[`PZZHÄKPUNTPZZVUZU[YUHPVUHSJVTTPZZVUZMPUKY` consultations with regional bodies and in the work of relevant Security Council sanctions committees.”	3, GBA+ provides the spirit of this obligation, but some monitoring and evaluation gaps

Source: Author’s compilation.

word òtrainingó is mentioned 101 times in the implementation plan for the 2017ð2022 C-NAP on WPS, indicating its importance to Canada (Government of Canada 2017b). Below, the Canadian government summarizes the basic gender and diversity training

> oώcers and non-commissioned members and more advanced training is provided on advanced leadership qualiþcation cours
>
> al harassment. All CF members learn that sexual misconduct and
>
> ployment to an operational theatre, CF personal [sic] receive spe

Table 2.3

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2
1960	"Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training on sexual and gender-based violence, inter alia, to carry out their responsibilities."	4, based on strong training doctrine and intent
1325	¥NLZLTILY:H[ZPUJYLHZDLPY]VSU[HYÜHUJPHS[JOUPJHSHUKSVNPZJHSZV-port for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children's -UKHUKIDL6MÄVMDLUP[K5HPVUZPNOVTTPZZVULYMVY9LMNLLZUKVDLY relevant bodies."	4, based on strong training doctrine and intent
1820	"Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group and relevant States, as appropriate, to develop and implement appropriate training programs for all peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel deployed by the United Nations in the context of missions as mandated by the Council to help them better prevent, recognize and respond to sexual violence and other forms of violence against civilians."	3, Peace-support Training Center has some of this programming
1820	"Urges troop and police contributing countries to take appropriate preventative action, including pre-deployment and in-theater awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel."	3, good pre-deployment offerings, though limited quality training once in theater

Table 2.3, continued

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2
2122	"Encourages troop- and police-contributing countries to increase the percentage of women military and police in deployments to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and further encourages troop- and police-contributing countries to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training to carry out their responsibilities, and relevant United Nations entities to make available appropriate guidance or training modules, including in particular	

Figure 2.6

Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2016. "Summary of

Figure 2.8

Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2016. “Summary of the National Reports of NATO Member and Partner Nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives.” 67.

2016 were òvoluntary,ó òmedical,ó and òservice completion,ó in that order, with òvoluntaryó by far the highest. For women in the

lows the òDeschamps Reportó in March 2015, which reviewed

development of a uniþed, coherent policy using plain language.

promulgation of new training material. (Chief of the Defence Staú 2016)

Op HONOUR is supposed to involve the whole of the CAF, but speciþcally uses the òStrategic Response Team ð Sexual Miscon

of sexual harassment, and the CAF has completed a whole mili tary òTraining Needs Analysisó of all programs related to HISB, resulting in the development of the òOperation HONOUR Lead

Armed Forces 2016a, 9; Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2016b)
stitutions like training and legal reporting structures, the CAF

trained in handling sexual assault. There were signiþcant reports

and women in 2016 that were directed to the Sexual ! ă ĸ

honour, and dignity,ó the CAF has a long way to go (Govern ment of Canada 2016). Still, Canadaõs eúort in this area is notable,

serve to reduce the instance of sexual assault in the CAF in line

Again, this section utilizes the evaluation metric of the 1ð5

lutions regarding gender in the military (Table 2.4). These WPS resolution obligations are notable because while they are speciþc to women in the military, they are not all at þrst glance about

a concerted eúort to improve the status of women in the military

tions. While there are still signiþcant problems with Canadaõs

With international gender norms emphasizing the participation

are being made, it is necessary to analyze the status of Cana daõs governmental gender parity. Canada has made signiþcant

ogy of gender equality. In November 2015, Prime Minister Jus tin Trudeau appointed the countryõs þrst ever gender-balanced Cabinet, with female Members of Parliament taking on signiþ

… text continued on page 89

Table 2.4

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2
1960	"Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training on sexual and gender-based violence, inter alia, to carry out their responsibilities."	4, based on stated goals and attempts
2122	"Encourages troop- and police-contributing countries to increase the percentage of women military and police in deployments to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and further encourages troop- and police-contributing countries to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training to carry out their responsibilities, and relevant United Nations entities to make available appropriate guidance or training modules, including in particular the United Nations predeployment scenario-based training on prevention of sexual and gender-based violence."	4, based on stated goals and attempts
1325	"Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, THUHNLTLU[HUKYLZZS[PVUVMJVUÅ[	4, based on stated goals and attempts in the CAF
1888	"Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training to carry out their responsibilities."	4, based on stated goals and attempts in the CAF

Table 2.4, continued

Table 2.4, continued

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2
1888	"Urges States to undertake comprehensive legal and judicial reforms, as appropriate, in conformity with international law, without delay and with a view to bringing perpetrators of ZHSPVSLUJLPUJVUÅJZQZJLHUK[VLUZPUN[DHZP]VYØHL[HJJLZZQZJL are treated with dignity throughout the justice process and are protected and receive redress for their suffering."	3, Op Honour is trying to enforce human rights protections w/in the CAF
1960,		

Table 2.4, continued

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2
2106	“Recognizes the need for more systematic monitoring of and attention to sexual violence	

of Environment and Climate Change. Few other countries have women with such signiþcant executive power, who guide their portfolios, in part, with a gender perspective (Krook 2012; An nesley and Franceschet 2015). Furthermore, the Senate is near ly 50% women. Though the Senate is far less powerful than the

still an important achievement (Cataly !

> en all espouse the same beliefs? Absolutely not. But when 75 per
>
> the remaining 25 percent to always do justice to the diversity and depth of womenôs views and experiences. (Peckford 2013)

from wanting to seek oώce, such as old boysô networks and lack

oώce because of these systemic issues. Yet with each passing year, the rate of women running for oώce, winning, and serving in Parliament is increasing. Civil society organizations like Equal

alleviate these challenges (CBC, n.d.; Equal Voice, n.d.).

nèpresentationpiov2019,Ahe percentage of women in provin] l ғ s ä u

Table 2.5

Table 2.6

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2
1325	"Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, HUKYLZSPVUVMJVUÅJ[	4, due to ever-increasing political representation and some key female decision-makers
1888	"Urges the Secretary General, Member States and the heads of regional organizations to take measures to increase the representation of women in mediation processes and decision-making WYVJLZZ[DYLNHYK[VJVUÅJ[YLZSPVUHUK peacebuilding."	4, due to the key placement of female decision-makers and PUL[U[VMS[this obligation
2242	"Urges Member States, in light of the High-level Review, to assess strategies and resourcing in the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda, reiterates its call for Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the WYL[U[PVUHUKYLZSPVUVMJVUÅJ[UJVYYHNLZ those supporting peace processes to facilitate women's meaningful inclusion in negotiating parties' delegations to peace talks, calls upon donor coun[YPLZWYV]PKLÄUHUJPHSHUK[JOUPJHSHZZPZ[HUJL to women involved in peace processes, including training in mediation, advocacy, and technical areas of negotiation, as well as providing support and training to mediators and technical teams on the impact of women's participation and strategies for women's effective inclusion, further encourages the meaningful participation of civil society organizations at international and regional peace and security meetings, as appropriate, including donor conferences to help ensure gender considerations are integrated in the development, prioritization, coordination, and implementation of policies and programmes, and encourages the hosts of such meetings to give due consideration to facilitating a cross representation of civil society participants."	4, regarding the domestic / international body inclusion section of this WPS obligation

Source: Author's compilation.

Gender Advisors, or GENADs, are a key part of gender main

emphasized as a part of NATOîs gender mainstreaming process. As follows, Canada has adopted GENADs into their feminist for

ready added GENAD appointments into their own armed forces

mand Directive (Bi-SCD) 40-1 describes the role of a GENAD as

ley 2017; North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2017). In addition to GENADs, NATO deþnes a Gender Focal Point or GFP as a òpo

and procedures with a gender perspective.ó (Hurley 2017) The role is described in detail in the NATO Allied Command Opera tions (ACO) Gender Functional Planning Guide, and is below the GENAD in hierarchy. The guide elaborates, òGFPs are to facilitate gender §

SCR 1325 and the related resolutions in Canada is expanding to more spaces in the CAF and DND, ensuring womenõs voices are heard and considered in conÿict.

Again, text from the WPS resolutions regarding Gender Ad

highly speciþc to the presence of gender advisors, indicating the importance of GENADs in the eyes of the international commu

1ð5 scale, with 5 as full implementation (Table 2.7).

Notably, Canada performs poorly in this speciþc area of WPS international norm implementation. Canada is open to GENADs

GENADs actively engaged in decision-making or on deployed

… text continued on page 97

Table 2.7, continued

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2
1888	¸+LJPKLĘZPUJSKLŻVLJPÄWYVĮPŻVUŻIŻWWYV-priate, for the protection of women and children from rape and other sexual violence in the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations, PUJSKPUNVUHJHŻIJHŻIHŻĘOLPKLUĮPÄ cation of women's protection advisers (WPAs) among gender advisers and human rights protection units, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the need for, and the number and roles of WPAs are systematically assessed during the preparation of each United Nations peacekeeping operation."	2, based on current stated doctrine and usage, they have an important role but not often used

Source: Author's compilation

The 1325 Scorecard, a joint project of the NATO Science for Peace

overall performance on implementing UNSCR 1325 within their armed forces (de Jonge Oudraat et al. 2015b). The report found disturbing trends for NATO members as a whole, noting:

> tation of UNSCR 1325 within the armed forces of NATO al Į Ą

and 4s, indicating qualitatively ò
the best of the stateõs abilityó or òmajority implemented though

er s ^ t v ᵠˢ ptɛ lE

While all three hypotheses are aώrmed by Canadaῶs doctrinal

be aώrmed when examined in a diύerent light in chapter 3, or be aώrmed for other reasons. Further investigation in the next chap

1325 and the related resolutions, largely emphasizing what it

decision-making have historically excluded women. Speciþcal

tional WPS norms in six areas: feminist foreign policy, GBA+, gender training, CAF recruitment, women in government, and GENAD/GFP development. In contrast, the next chapter elabo rates on the weak points described above by the 1325 Scorecard,

SCR 1325 and the related resolutions. Successful development of bold policy ideas like the 2017 feminist foreign policy have not

3. The Gap Between Resolution Goals and Implementation in Canada

and Security in the Oώce of the Secretary General made three

gender policy following her years of service in NATO. She not
ed þrst that as many female staú and GENADs of all genders
should be deployed as possible (Schuurman 2015, 2). Second, she
emphasized the importance of òthe further integration of a gen

develop for policy improvement (Schuurman 2015, 2). Indeed,

policy (2015, 2). Third, she highlighted local women as crucially

ingly consulm f Mb č ò } f ě b women ±anl D M

how we safeguard a Europe [NATO] at peace, whole and free.

tion gaps in all three areas Schuurman emphasizes. This section

gories as chapter 2: the policy documents most closely entwined with the feminist foreign policy, GBA+, gender training, CAF re cruitment, women in government, and GENAD/GPF develop ment. Unlike chapter 2, this paper is much more explicit about

is later explored in chapter 4. Indeed, the section ends by oúering

metrics in chapters 2 and 3, concluding thoughts, and next steps

There are four kinds of gaps with UNSCR 1325 and the related

foreign policy planning documents, the National Action Plan on WPS (C-NAP), the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP), and the defence policy òStrong Secure Engaged.ó First,

programs that target women and gender while channeling 80% toward foreign policy programs that òintegrateó gender by 2021.

> funding for womenõs organizations in conÿict settings. Grassroots womenõs organizations play a unique and widespread role in conÿict prevention and response. It is critical that this important work is supported, politically and þnancially é It is therefore dis

Canadaõs feminist foreign policy plans. Furthermore, speciþc policy directives like those in targets 1.5 and 1.6 are important

notes regarding the C-NAP, Canadaõs humanitarian and military

> cy, trade and defence. Canadian arms exports to Saudi Arabia have increased by 47% in 2016. The Saudi led coalition against the Houthi in Yemen is causing a humanitarian disaster. Millions of women and children are at the brink of starvation. A key pillar of the WPS agenda is the prevention of conÿict, which includes de-militarization, tackling root causes and strengthening non-vio lent conÿict resolution. The focus of the new C-NAP on achieving
>
> lead to conÿict and strengthening societyõs ability to resolve con ÿict peacefully, needs to be prioritized. (Women, Peace and Secu rity Network ð Canada 2018, 17)

The conÿict in Yemen is an example of how the WPS resolu

articulated in the C-NAP that is echoed in international norming

beneþts of equality on the domestic side of the mission, many

partment of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2019b). Furthermore, as of January 2018 there were 14,434 total female-identifying members of the CAF of 93,578 total, for 15.3%, slightly higher than the SNRõs number of 15.1% gathered two

Canadian Armed Forces 2019b). It is challenging to get a precise number of CAF members currently deployed, but estimates are around 3,600, with the approximately 500 deployed women at 13.8% of the force abroad (Canada Department of Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2019c; Canada Department of Na tional Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2014). The DND

-

women in the CAF,ó òEnsure appropriate representation on the Interdepartmental Committee on GBA+,ó and òSupport the par

curity eúorts.ó (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018b) These are abstract action items

recting to speciþc implementation channels. Indeed, the means

the DND section of the C-NAP and the follow up DND progress report are about the ònumber of Xó who have done a particu

indicators like, òTrack recommendations made by CAF UNSCR 1325 Implementation Working Group.ó Itôs hard to measure and

assess cultural organizational change that has become more wel

fence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018b).

Table 3.1 uses the same 1ð5 scale from chapter 1 as implement ed in chapter 2, assessing how Canada has to date met member state obligations as deþned by international gender norms. A þve

25 percent implementation. However, while chapter 2 assessed

niþcant diúerences in the scores presented in chapters 2 and 3.

itary and team composition all present implementation ÿaws in

for chapter 3, drawing contrast with chapter 2. While Canada

… text continued on page 120

Table 3.1

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
1325	"Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and YLZSPVUVMJVUÅ[	5, these are the clear aims across the stated doctrines	3, women are present in most rooms where decisions are being made, but that doesn't mean they are being heard or are many of those present
1888	"Recognizing that the promotion and empowerment of women and that support for women's organizations and networks are essential in the consolidation of peace to promote the equal and full participation of women and encouraging Member States, donors, and civil society, including non-governmental organizations, to provide support in this respect."	4, the doctrines strive to engage local groups	3, recognition is present, actual-ization is the next step
1888	"Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training to carry out their responsibilities."	4, Strong Secure Engaged strives to engage with this	2, women are very few of those deployed