Crisis to Catalyst: The Strategic Effects of the Somalia Affair on the Canadian Armed Forces

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Additionally, I am particularly grateful for the support of my wife, Zoe Ann Cooper. Without her editorial acumen, grammatical precision and continued support to my academic efforts, this work would not have been accomplished.

Errors are mine alone.

Acronyms

ADM	Assistant Deputy Minister
CA	Canadian Army
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CAR	Canadian Airborne Regiment
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CJFS	Canadian Joint Force Somalia
CPAC	Canadian Public Affairs Channel
CO	Commanding Officer
DGPA	Director General Public Affairs
DND	Department of National Defence
JAG	Judge Advocate General
MND	Minister of National Defence
MP	Military Police
MMC	Minister's Monitoring Committee
MRL	Media Response Line
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PM	Prime Minister
ROE	Rules-of-Engagement
SILT	Somalia Inquiry Liaison Team
UNITAF	United Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
VCDS	Vice Chief of Defence Staff

Figure

Map

In 1992, the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) (roughly analogous to a US
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1. The Canadian Airborne Regiment was the sole airborne unit in the Canadian Army (CA), and was actually only of battalion size. Unique in the CA, the Regiment was actually a composite formed of members from each of Canada’s three Regular Force infantry regiments; each with their own sub-unit sized “Commando.” The regular force infantry regiments which contributed infantry to the Regiment were The Royal Canadian Regiment (3 Commando), The Royal 22nd Regiment (or “Van Doos” who formed 1 Commando) and Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (2 Commando). Most regiments train their own personnel once they have completed Basic Training; the Canadian Airborne Regiment was different in that all members took their basic infantry training at another regiment’s Battle School and served time with their parent regiment before joining the Canadian Airborne Regiment. For a comprehensive treatment of the Regiment’s organization and history see Bernd Horn and Michel Wyczynski,
(St Catherines, Ontario: Vanwell, 2001), 101–214.

2. Examples of previous crisis in the Canadian civil-military relationship include the two conscription crises during the First and Second World Wars, and the actions of the Royal Canadian Navy during the Cuban Missile Crisis when they deployed in contravention of the orders of the Diefenbaker Government.

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3. Douglas L. Bland, “The Government of Canada and the Armed Forces: A Troubled Relationship,” in
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10. As shown by his suggestion that his telephone calls were being recorded and monitored from the time he had been appointed to the Commission. Desbarats, *V]LY <W0 76 ¶76 2

11. David Bercuson, :PNUP˜JHU[0UJPKLU[! *HUHKH»Z (YT‘ [OL (PYIVYU , ;VYVU[V! 4J*SLSSHUK :[L^HY[0 5 :-2 will be explaine in this work.

12. Professor Donna Winslow has studied and written extensively on the Canadian Airborne Regiment and the Somalia mission. A full list of sources consulted is in the bibliography, however interested parties can refer to her “Between Dream and Reality: the Canadian Mission to Somalia,” in 7LHJL 6WLYH[PVUZ)L[^LLU 7LHJL HUK >H 0 LKP[LK I‘ ,Y^PUK (2:JOTPK[55 ,:LW[LTILY 5 -! 7 ¶9 0 ,9P[L Group Bonding in the Canadian Airborne,” (YTLK -VYJLZ :VJPL[‘, Volume 25, Number 70 :WYPUN 5 ,5 -! 86 ¶89 0 VY ,*HUHKPHU :VJPL[‘ HUK 0[Z (YT‘ 1V\YUHS, Winter 2003-2004 (2004): 11–24.

13. Three examples of this nature of scholarship are Grant Dawson, , /LYL PZ /LSS!„ *HUH KH»Z ,UNHNLTLU[PU :VTHSPH ,=HUJV\]LY! <)* 7YLZZ0 644 -0)LY -VYJLK [V *OHUNL! *YPZPZ HUK 9LMVYT PU [OL *HUHKPHU (YTL Press, 2015), and Sherene H. Razack, +HYR ;OYLH[Z HU >OP[LY 2UPNO[Z! ;OL :V 7LHJLRLLWPUN HUK [OL 5L^ 0TWLYPHSPZT (Toronto: University of Toronto Pre

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
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The de Faye Inquiry and Courts-Martial

Major-General Tom de Faye and his team began their work before the redeployment of the Regiment to Canada. Their mandate was to investigate "the leadership, discipline, operations, actions and procedures" of the Regiment. Additionally, latitude was given to investigate "the Battle Group's antecedents in Canada and higher headquarters in Somalia prior to and during its employment in Somalia."[1] Almost immediately a jurisdictional issue arose – how to deal with potential criminal acts and those already under Military Police investigations. This caused the then-CDS, Admiral John Anderson, to order that the board-of-inquiry (BOI) be split into two phases. Phase 1 was to deal with

portray the incidents as “isolated,” but the gathered media did not accept the ¿QGLQJV SXW EHIRUH WKHP

As then-Colonel Rick Hillier later described, “The credibility of the [de Faye] Board of Inquiry took a beating, and, along with it, so did the entire &DQDGLDQ)RUFHV · ,Q WKH DIWHUPDWK RI WKH D a public inquiry were heard.[5] DND’s response to the challenges that Somalia issues posed was to establish “the Somalia Working Group,” in September 1993 under the Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) for Policy and Communications, Major-General Jean Boyle. The group was charged with coordinating DND’s response to Somalia related issues, and in particular “advising the MND, CDS and DM [Deputy Minister] on future actions to be taken.”[6] Politically, the dynamics of the Affair changed in October when Kim Campbell and the Conservatives were defeated in a landslide victory for the Liberal party under Jean Chrétien, who subsequently appointed David Collenette as MND.[7] That December, Admiral Anderson retired – to be replaced as CDS by General John de Chastelain.[8]

Concurrent with preparation and release of the de Faye report, disciplinary investigations and subsequent courts-martial took place, keeping the incidents in Somalia in full view of the Canadian public between 1993 and 1996.[9] The potential inconsistencies between the courts-martial and the content of the de)D\H UHSRUW SRVHG D VLJQL¿FDQW ULVN WR WKH al Jean Boyle, in his capacity as head of the Somalia Working Group, initially raised this fact in October 1993 after reviewing the de Faye Report.[10] While public interest continued through the spring of 1994, owing to the ongoing courts-martial, Boyle wrote an “after-action report” with the intent of highlighting unresolved problems to the CDS, where the risks were clearly artic- XODWHG $V WKH 6RPDOLD &RPPLVVLRQ ZURWH L warned that:

> PXFK RI WKH FRQ¿GHQWLDO LQIRUPDWLRQ WKDW K [de Faye] report before it was released to the public would eventually become publicly available through the testimony at the courts martial of

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9 A National Force, 4 5 The Somalia Affair, 5
6 The Somalia Affair, [illegible]
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> soldiers involved in incidents in Somalia… there were weaknesses and… VLJQL¿FDQW GLVFUHSDQFLHV LQ WKH GH)D\H ERD dations… some of the de Faye board's conclusions… did not appear to be borne out by the testimony actually heard… leadership problems reached up the chain of command to Command CFJS. He referred to documents that indicated "direct attempts to cover up facts behind the 4 March incident, which will no doubt be brought to light during court proceedings. Also the 16 March incident reveals a blatant attempt at the RI¿FHU OHYHO WR µFRYHU XS¶ WKLV LQFLGHQW 7K NQRZOHGJH« DQG ZLOO VHULRXVO\ DWWDFN WKH F corps.'"[11]

In retrospect, it seems obvious that the courts-martial would inform the Canadian public, and its soldiers, as to what had occurred in Somalia. While it seems incredible that Boyle's warning was required, it bears remembering that the evolving media environment was a new phenomenon and no other Canadian deployment had ever experienced similar scrutiny. Of equal importance to the information that would become public knowledge however, were the conduct and outcomes of the trials themselves. With Master Corporal Matchee found incapable of standing trial as a result of his attempted suicide and as- VRFLDWHG SHUPDQHQW EUDLQ GDPDJH WKH ¿UV Kyle Brown.[12]

While the particulars of the trials are beyond the scope of this paper, three VDOLHQW SRLQWV ZDUUDQW PHQWLRQ 7KH ¿UVW ment, and negative aspects of their actions in Somalia, in the public conscious- QHVV WKURXJKRXW 1HZV UHSRUWV ¿UVW JH as the incidents of March 1993 emerged, the media reported on developments as they occurred.[13] Second, the trials themselves contributed to a distrust of the military justice system primarily because only Private Brown was found guilty

determined, the lighter the sentence. This is readily evident in the fact that Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu was repeatedly found not guilty on the charge of negligent performance of a military duty, and Major Seward – who gave the order to abuse intruders – initially received a “severe reprimand” as sentence

Video Release and Disbandment

Scott Taylor, a journalist and former Canadian soldier, had observed the fallout and periodically commented in editorials of Esprit de Corps magazine in 1994. At some point, Taylor acquired a copy of a videotape made by the soldiers of 2 Commando while in Somalia: a video in which Private Brown could be seen behaving in a normal, and markedly quiet manner when compared against the displays of bravado and commentary of his fellow paratroopers. Underestimating how the video could be interpreted and distressed by the injustice to which he viewed Brown as being subjected, he arranged to share the video with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC).[21] Sections from the tape were aired on the nightly news on 15 January 1995.[22]

A media frenzy erupted followed the airing. Images of a black-faced Canadian soldier, racial slurs, and overt racism were what the Canadian public saw and took away from the three-minute clip on the nightly news. As Martha Armstrong described the situation, "The next day, the story was everywhere, and not as Taylor had envisioned. The soldiers' racist and violent comments were the focus…[rather than] absolving Brown and exposing the military's leadership failings."[23] Worse was to come.

Within days, existence of a second video became known. Filmed during an initiation ceremony that took place before the Regiment had deployed to Somalia, it depicted "a group of drunken soldiers from 1 Commando vomiting, eating something indistinguishable and vomiting again, doing push-ups, and urinating on other soldiers."[24] Contents from the video were broadcast nationally on 18 January 1995. Repercussions were swift. The Canadian public was ERWK GLVJXVWHG DQG DQJU\ '1' ZDV ‡PRUWL¿H an investigation.[25] Politically, the reaction was without precedent in Canadian military history.

On 24 January 1995, Minister Collenette announced, against the advice of the CDS, that the Regiment would be disbanded.[26] The rationale was predominantly political, but included ethical and cultural factors as well – the leadership failures were anathema to Canadian values. As historian Dan Loomis

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[illegible] Scapegoat, [illegible]
[OL L]LU[Z SLHKPUN \W [V [OL]PKLV»Z YLSLHZL ZSPNO[S' KPM
[illegible]
[illegible] Sunday Report, [illegible]
1HU\HY' HJJLZZLK 5V]LTILY
[illegible]
[V ^OLU [OL ˜YZ[ ]PKLV ^HZ ZOV^U ^P[O ZJOVSHYZ +H]PK)LYJ
[illegible]
^OPJO Z[H[L \ULX\P]VJHSS' [OH[P[HPYLK VU 1HU\HY'
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] The Somalia Affair, [illegible]
[illegible] SCR, [illegible]

noted, “Any credibility the [Regiment] may have been left with was lost in the eyes of the public along with its political leadership. This spelled the end of the [Regiment].”[27]

VLJQL¿FDQW DQG EURDG ZLWK WKHLU WHUPV RI

> inquire into and report on the chain of command system, leadership within the chain of command, discipline, operations, actions and decisions of the Canadian Forces and the actions and decisions of the Department of National Defence in respect to the Canadian Forces deployment to Somalia and…matters related to the pre-deployment, in-theatre and post-deployment phases of the Somalia deployment.[34]

The Commission began by organizing into three broad components, each ZLWK LWV RZQ WDVNV WKDW DLPHG WR PHHW WK ence – investigation, research and hearings.[35] The investigative component's goal was to sort through over 150,000 documents and interview "hundreds of potential witnesses" in an effort to ascertain a factual basis on which to judge events and decisions.[36] The research component, working largely behind the scenes, undertook "an exhaustive comparative assessment of rules and policies affecting military operations and decision making."[37] The third, most visible component, was the conduct of public hearings, where witnesses were inter-

CDS General Boyle.[43]

While much has been written on the perceived bias and hostility with which the Commission treated some witnesses, acting more like a criminal court than an inquiry, it is several activities internal to the CAF and DND that merit comment here.[44] Given the volume of documents required for the Commission to complete its task, an imperative existed for an agency within DND empowered to respond to, and to coordinate with, the Commission.[45] In response the Department created the Somalia Inquiry Liaison Team (SILT), which worked for the Associate ADM (Policy & Communications) – Major-General Boyle.[46] From the outset, the working relationship between the SILT and the Commission was poor; perceptions by the Commission of the SILT's intransigence and/or incompetence made it worse.

Response Lines" (MRLs). When the media used access to information protocols requesting RTQs on a given subject they were then informed that none existed.[51] Additionally, there is documented evidence of attempted destruction RI GRFXPHQWV UHODWHG WR WKH 6RPDOLD ,QFL UHYHDO WKDW WKH 574V KDG EHHQ PRGLI¿HG EHI[52] The relationship, and trust, between the public, the media, and the Commission on one hand, and the CAF on the other, continued to erode owing to a demonstrated inability to exercise leadership in an ethical fashion.

In December 1995, General de Chastelain retired from the CAF, being replaced by newly-promoted General Boyle.[53] Handling the Somalia Affair ZRXOG GH¿QH KLV WLPH DV &DQDGD¶V VHQLRU he shut down all training and operations across the CAF, ordering a detailed search for missing documents.[54] ,Q PLG $XJXVW KH WHVWL¿HG L mission and admitted that he, and his staf 0 W À&í .Ð|¶ D ¶À p W € Ó € 0Q ë®þÐê !:ëì

mendations as to how to improve Canada's military justice system.[60] Separately, Young examined broader military reform.

Using the services of four noted Canadian academics, Albert Legault, Jack Granatstein, Desmond Morton, and David Bercuson, he began creating his own report with the goal of shaping the evolution of the CAF before the Soma- OLD &RPPLVVLRQ ZRXOG ¿QLVK WKHLU ZRUN 7KH ership development and enhancing intellectual capacity within the CAF. These HIIRUWV UHÀHFWHG KLV EHOLHI WKDW WKH FUX[R I¿FHU FRUSV LQ SDUWLFXODU VWHPPHG IURP the ability of the CAF to be attuned to the larger society it served.[61] By the end of March 1997, Young had completed his work and submitted it to the Prime 0LQLVWHU &RQWDLQLQJ VL[W\ ¿YH UHFRPPHQGD energize and guide the evolution of the CAF over the coming years.[62] Three months later, the Somalia Commission submitted its report to the Canadian government. Its 1,500 pages included 157 recommendations, many of which would be implemented to a greater or lesser degree.[63] However, the primary driver for change was ultimately The Young Report.

With the delivery of the two reports the Somalia Affair concluded. Vice-Admiral Murray acted as CDS for less time than General Boyle.[64] His own mark- HGO\ GH¿DQW WHVWLPRQ\ WR WKH &RPPLVVLRQ subsequently removed from the position in the summer of 1997.[65] Doug Young, who had expected to be able to push his reforms through the CAF after the Affair had ended, lost his seat in the federal election that spring. He was replaced by Art Eggelton as MND, who then oversaw the implementation of the reforms proposed by The Young Report.[66]

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On Effects

Possessing an understanding of elements of the Somalia Affair, it is worth
UHYLVLWLQJ WKH F@ WKHYY $A@D CKH @ ° 0FKKH
WXULQJ RI WKH FLYLO PLOLWDU\ UHODWLRQVKL
WKH IRUFHG HYROXWLRQ RI WKH &DQDGLDQ RI¿
3ULRU WR GLVFXVVLQJ HDFK HIIHFW LW LV QH
LV WR UHLWHUDWH WKDW WKH &DQDGLDQ FLYLO
WLHWK FHQWXU\ DQG LQ SDUWLFXODU LQ WKH $
LQ ZDV WHQVLRQ ¿OOHG 7KLV KDV EHHQ D
ZKR ZURWH ‡7KH KLVWRU\ RI WKH &DQDGLDQ $U
RI WKH WZHQWLHWK FHQWXU\ LV« PDLQO\ D VWF

[1]

6HFRQG WKDW WKH RSHUDWLQJ FRQWH[W RI W
WKH HIIHFWV JHQHUDWHG E\ WKH $IIDLU 7KXV
ZKLFK DUH GHVFULEHG EHORZ ZHUH FDXVHG E\
FHSWHG WKDW WKH FRQWH[W LQ ZKLFK WKH HYH
HUDWLRQ RI WKH HIIHFWV :KLOH D FRPSOHWH H
the scope of this monograph, note must be made that elements of the CA were
FRQVLVWHQWO\ GHSOR\HG RQ SHDFH HQIRUFHPH
GXUDWLRQ ZKHUH RWKHU VFDQGDOV RFFDVLRQ
dals did not result in either public inquiries or formal, mandated changes to
WKH &DQDGLDQ PLOLWDU\ LW ZDV VROHO\ WKH
investigation and governmental intervention.
7KLUG WKHUH ZHUH RWKHU HIIHFWV EH\RQG
WDFWLFDO OHYHO PDQ\ FKDQJHV ZHUH PDQGD

1 A National Force, 2 3 .

SUH GHSOR\PHQW WUDLQLQJ XQGHUJRQH E\ WKH
GHSOR\HG LQ 6RPDOLD ([DPSOHV LQFOXGH WKH
SURFHGXUHV DQG WUDLQLQJ IRUPDOL]HG WUDL
WKH LQFOXVLRQ RI 03V LQ WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQD
:KLOH WKHVH HIIHFWV DUH DOO H[WUHPHO\ LPSR
RI SUH GHSOR\PHQW WUDLQLQJ DQG RYHUVHDV
RI WKLV VWXG\

/DVWO\ WKHUH LV WKH IUHTXHQWO\ DVNHG TXH
PHQW DFKLHYHG WKH HIIHFW RULJLQDOO\ GHVLU
GHSOR\LQJ WKH 5HJLPHQW WR 6RPDOLD ZLWK 81
2OLYLHUR KDYH GHDOW ZLWK WKH TXHVWLRQ D
TXHVWLRQ LV PRRW 7KH HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI WKH
WKH 5HJLPHQW EURXJKW VWDELOLW\ WR D SRUW
VKDGRZHG E\ WKH $IIDLU DQG WKH DFWLRQV RI O
E\ ‡VLJQL¿FDQW LQFLGHQWV· DW WKH WDFWLFD
FDXVHG E\ WKH 5HJLPHQW¶V RSHUDWLRQDO HIIH
KRZ WKH FKDLQ RI FRPPDQG ERWK LQ 6RPDOLD D

H[SRVHG ZKLOH WKH VRFLHWDO LPSHUDWLYH UH
WR UHÀHFW WKH ‡VRFLDO IRUFHV LGHROJLHV
VRFLHW\· – LQ SODLQ WHUPV WKH QHHG IRU D F
of the nation it serves.[4] An appropriate balance between the two, enables both
HIIHFWLYH PLOLWDU\ IXQFWLRQ DQ[5]G WKH PDLQW
2I HTXDO LPSRUWDQFH LV WKH PHDQV WR H[HUF
DV H[SUHVVHG LQ +XQWLQJWRQ¶V WZLQ LGHDV F
trol.[6] 6XEMHFWLYH FRQWUROO LV WKH XVH RI JRYHU
RU FRQVWLWXWLRQDO IRUP WR HIIHFW FRQWUROO
O Àp À @W° 0FLYLOLDQ GXW„RULWLHVQ
WKH P

’RFWULQDOO\ WKH &$) YLHZV WKUHH SDUWLHV
WKH PLOLWDU\ WKH VRFLHW\ EHLQJ VHUYHG WK
ZKLFK DVVLVW LQ PDQDJLQJ WKH PLOLWDU\ RQ
basis.[14] ,W LV LQWHUHVWLQJ WR QRWH WKDW WKLV
YLRXV DUWLFXODWLRQV RQ WKH WRSLF RI FLYLO
GRHV QRW PDNH PH QWLRQ RI WKH PHGLD[15]

$OO WKH DIRUHPHQWLRQHG LGHDV ZHUH GLUHF
HLWKHU ZKLOH LW ZDV RQJRLQJ RU LQ WKH VXEV
DV WKH 6RPDOLD &RPPLVVLRQ FRQGXFWHG LWV
WKH 5HJLPHQW LW ZDV UHDGLO\ HYLGHQW WKDW

W |E

FRQWURO LV VHHQ LQ WKH DFWLRQV ZKLFK IROO
6RPDOLD ,QTXLU\ DQG WKH SURGXFWLRQ RI

The Young Report

,QVWHDG Duty with Honour PDNHV WKH SRLQW WKDW WKHUH
DXWKRULW\ RYHU WHFKQLFDO PLOLWDU\ PDWWHU
WKH SURIHVVLRQDO GHYHORSPHQW RI LWV PHPE
SROLF\ DQG WKH LQWHUQDO RUJDQL]DWLRQ RI
IRUFH[23])XUWKHU LW GHWDLOV WKH LGHD WKDW

> /HJLWLPDF\ LQ WKH H\HV RI WKH JRYHUQPHQW DQG
> O\ FRQWLQJHQW RQ WKH DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH PLO
> JLYHV WKH RWKHU DWWULEXWHV RI WKH PLOLWDU\
> profession considerable scope for self-regulation to ensure professional effectiveness.[24]

0RVW VWUL Duty with Honour LV KRZ LW WDFNOHV WKH LGHD RI SU
WDU\ DXWRQRP\ DW WKH VWUDWHJLF OHYHO $IW
‡KLJK GHJUHH RI DXWRQRP\ DW WKH WDFWLFDO D
argues that owing to the nature of the strategic level, with its requirements for
‡IXUWKHU FROODERUDWLRQ DQG LQWHJUDWLRQ
H[LVWHQFH RI D ‡G\QDPLF UHODWLRQVKLS · WKD
FLYLO DQG PLOLWDU\ FRP[25] 7KH [illegible]
DXWRQRP\ RU VWULFWO\ PLOLWDU\ FRQWURO RY
RSHUDWLRQV LV QRW HQYLVLRQHG LQ WKH &DQD
5H H[DPLQLQJ WKH HYHQWV RI WKH 6RPDOLD $
SURIHVVLRQDO DXWRQRP\ RU WKH DELOLW\ WR
LQLWLDWLRQ RI WKH 6RPDOLD ,QTXLU\ LQ WKH ID
%2, LV D FOHDU H[DPSOH RI ZKHUH WKH PLOLWD
SROLFH LWVHOI DQG GHWHUPLQH ZKDW ZHQW ZU
PHQW RYHU WKH REMHFWLRQV RI WKH &'6 LV H
SURIHVVLRQ GLG QRW SRVVHVV WKH UHTXLVLWH
VHOI UHJXODWLRQ 7KLV ODFN RI FUHGLELOLW\
PDF\ FDQ EH WUDFHG WR WKH PDQQHU E\ ZKLFK
to the incidents in Somalia were carried out, and their reporting within the
&DQDGLDQ PHGLD)XUWKHU WKH GLVFLSOLQDU
WKHLU DFWLRQV LQ 6RPDOLD DQG WKHLU RXWFR
SXQLVKPHQWV GLUHFWO\ FRQWULEXWHG WR D P
DELOLW\ ZLWKLQ WKH PLOLWDU\

$QRWKHU VHFRQG RUGHU HIIHFW ZDV WKH FUH

[illegible]

H\[VUVT' HUK ZLSM YLN\SH[PVU„ ^OPSL [OL JP]PS ZPKL THPU[
SH[PVUZOPW [V *HUHKPHU :VJPL[' HUK 7VSPJ' *VU[YVS „ ;OPZ

[illegible]

FHUV DQG VROGLHUV RI WKH &$) $ SHUFHSWLRQ
WKH DFFXVHG ZDV WKH PRUH OLNHO\ WKH LQGLY
more severe the sentence that would be pronounced. When these events were
UHSRUWHG LQ WKH PHGLD LW UHLQIRUFHG WKH
cerned about themselves, and were more than willing to pass the blame to their
VXERUGLQDWHV $V ’RXJODV %ODQG ZURWH

> :KHQ« WKH FRXUWV PDUWLDO KDQGHG KDUVKHU SX
> WR WKHLU RI¿FHUV DQG ZKHQ VHQLRU RI¿FHUV H[P
> GRGJHG UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU WKH VWDWH RI WKH
> RSHQHG EHWZHHQ RI¿FHUV DQG VROGLHUV 7KH FU
> WR PHDQ D IDLOXUH LQ OHDGHUVKLS FDXVHG E\ DQ
> values.[26]

7KH SHUFHSWLRQ RI WKH VSOLW ZDV UHLQIRUF
OLD ,QTXLU\ DIWHU WKH WULDOV KDG EHHQ FRP
%R\OH WHVWL¿HG DW WKH ,QTXLU\ DQG DEURJD
PHPEHUV RI KLV VWDII +LV GHPRQVWUDWHG ODF
disheartening and did nothing to bridge the gap between the soldiers and their
RI¿FHUV
5HFRJQL]LQJ WKHVH LVVXHV ’RXJ <RXQJ WKH
$IIDLU WRRN DFWLRQ WKDW LQ LWVHOI LV ERWK
control over the evolution of its profession, and one of the positive legacies of
the Somalia Affair. With the publication of The Young Report, the civilian side
RI ’1’ ERWK DVVHUWHG FRQWURO RYHU WKH SURI
RI¿FHU FRUSV ZRXOG HYROYH

;OL ,]VS\[PVU VM *HUHKH»Z 6M˜JLY *VYWZ

5HDGLQJ WKH The Young Report W ZH QW\ \HDUV DIWHU LW
VWUXFN E\ WKH LQVLJKW DQG YLVLRQ IRU WKH I
WKH 6RPDOLD $IIDLU XQIROG IRU IRXU \HDUV L
WR VHH D PRUH SXQLWLYH WRQH LQ WKH &DQDG
0LQLVWHU <RXQJ RIIHUHG D YLVLRQ IRU WKH IXW
RI¿FHUV HYROYH WR PHHW WKH FKDOOHQJHV SR\
XOWLPDWHO\ KHOS EXLOG WKH IRXQGDWLRQ IRU
WKH WZHQW\ ¿UVW FHQWXU\
’RXJ <RXQJ ZDV H[WUHPHO\ FOHDU LQ DUWLFXO
‡:H DUH QRW JRLQJ WR ZDLW IRU WKH &RPPLVVL
PLVVLRQ@ WR WDEOH LWV UHSRUW WR VHW LQ W
QHFHVVDU\ LQVLGH WKH &DQDGLDQ)RUFHV ·

While the creation of the report was

National Defence Headquarters Centre for Decision: a Study Prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia

Forced to Change, 53.

DOUHDG\ EHHQ GHWDLOHG LW LV ZRUWK UHLQI
VDZ D FRPPRQ WKHPH LQ WKH UROH RI HGXFDWLI
future to cope with the ever-more sophisticated demands of its profession.[28] All
IRXU ZHUH DEVROXWHO\ XQL¿HG LQ WKHLU YLHZ
XFDWHG DQG RXW RI WRXFK ZLWK &DQDGLDQ VRF
The Young Report contained a hundred recommendations on all manner of
WRSLFV DIIHFWLQJ WKH &$) ZLWK D SURQRXQFH
tem, education, ethics and values, and leadership. ,Q WKH ODVW WKUHH
<RXQJ GLUHFWO\ VKDSHG WKH HYROXWLRQ RI WK
)RU WKH ¿UVW WLPH D XQLYHUVLW\ GHJUHH ZD
for all those who wished to be commissioned within the Canadian Forces.[31]
$GGLWLRQDOO\ WKH ZKROH VFRSH RI SURIHVVLI
SODFLQJ SURQRXQFHG HPSKDVLV RQ [32] YDOXHV H
ZDV WR FRPPHQFH ZLWK XQGHUJUDGXDWH SURJU
DQG FRQWLQXH WKURXJKRXW DQ RI¿FHU¶V FDUH

QHFWHG ZLWK &DQDGLDQ VRFLHW\ DQG WKH GD\
<RXQJ¶V DUWLFXODWLRQ HFKRHV WKH ODQJXDJH

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Trusted to Serve. [illegible] Canada s Army [illegible] Duty With Honour [illegible] -

[illegible] -

[illegible]

[illegible] Trusted to Serve, [illegible] Fighting Spirit, [illegible]

7RG 6WULFNODQG LV DQ LQIDQWU\ RI¿FHU E\ SU
$UPHG)RUFHV IRU RYHU WKLUW\ ¿YH \HDUV ZL
DQG $IJKDQLVWDQ 3RVVHVVLQJ PXOWLSOH JUD
LQ PLOLWDU\ KLVWRU\ DQG FXOWXUDO WUDQVI
GDQW RI WKH &DQDGLDQ)RUFHV &ROOHJH LQ 7R

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