Approaches to National Security
A Canadian-Australian Comparison

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Occasional Paper Series

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Michael Rostek's paper compares Canada's and Australia's approaches to the contested concept of national security, showing how each country's perceptions, doctrine, policy and institutions evolved in response to the post-2001 global and regional security environment. Given their obvious similarities — prosperous middle powers with a British colonial legacy, immigrant populations, resource-based economies, strong military traditions, and close security and defence ties to the United States — it is surprising how infrequently their policies have been subjected to rigorous comparison. From the Vietnam era to the end of the 20th century, their foreign and defence policies in fact differed in many ways, as did their respective postures toward their chief ally and protector. Neither, however, had given much thought to the foundations of a national security policy. Drawing on each country's key foreign and defence policy statements from the 1990s, the first part of Rostek's paper shows how far this pattern had developed by September, 2001.

The second part analyzes the impact of the attacks on New York and Washington, and of the ensuing war on terrorism, on the two countries' definition and pursuit of national security. While it lacked an overarching national security policy, Australia's awareness of its dangerous neighbourhood had at least provided a certain clarity of military purpose and a robust approach to the use of force. Canada had farther to come, from a fixation with human security in the 1990s to the rethinking embodied in its National Security Policy of 2004 and the International Policy Statement of 2005. The result, Rostek concludes, is a convergence of Australian and Canadian understandings of national security both as a concept and as a policy, manifested most clearly in the relations of each with an America seemingly more aware of the need for, and needs of, close friends and allies.

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Approaches to National Security: A Canadian-Australian Comparison

Security is a difficult concept that defies universal definition. As noted by W.B Gallie, security is an "essentially contested concept" generating unsolvable debates about meaning and application.[1] This definitional dilemma is in turn transferred to the concept of national security which does not lend itself to neat and precise formulation.[2]

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. Prior to 9/11, there was a "national security policy gap"[8] in Canada; that is, a national security policy was not articulated by government nor were there policy-coordinating mechanisms in place ensuring a unified government response to matters of national security. As noted by David Bashow, [i]n reality, security policy in Canada, when it has existed at all, has been more *ad hoc* than codified in a structured manner.[9] As a result, in order to get a sense of how national security was viewed within Canada prior to 9/11, an investigation of foreign and defence policy, key components of national security, is required.

. . The protection of Canada's security within a stable global framework was a central component of the 1995 foreign policy white paper entitled *Canada in the World*.[10] It defined, at least in part, Canada's national security outlook:

> Our own security, including economic security, is increasingly depend-
> ant on the security of others. More than ever, the forces of globalization,
> technological development, and the scale of human activity, reinforce
> our fundamental interdependence with the rest of the world. We need
> to address security issues in an integrated fashion and to draw on all
> available foreign policy instruments.[11]

The international focus of Canada's concept of national security was further evidenced by Canada's participation within international institutions such as the United Nations (UN), regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF), and the Organization of American States (OAS). In the Western Hemisphere, while noting the growing importance of Latin American and the Arctic, the paper asserts that Canada's "…relationship with the US is key for security of Canadians."[12]

Further, the white paper went on to indicate that within this international context, national security must be defined in a broader context, one that moved beyond military security focusing at the individual and societal level:

> Serious long term challenges are posed by environmental, demographic,
> health and development issues around the globe. Some of these chal-
> lenges-such as global warming-could affect us directly. Others may
> provoke crisis producing humanitarian tragedies, epidemics, mass mi-
> grations, and other problems from which, even if half way around the
> world, Canada will not be immune. Still others may result in the adop-
> tion abroad of policies that ultimately degrade our economic security
> by undercutting labour, health, environment or other international stand-
> ards. All of this demands a broadening of the focus of security policy

from its narrow orientation of managing states-to-state relationships, to one that recognizes the importance of the individual and society for our shared security.[13]

The focus on individual security came to be defined as "human security" and dominated Canada's national security thinking in the 1990s. Human security was first defined in the 1994 United Nations Development Report:

Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life — whether in homes, in jobs or in communities.[14]

In 2000, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's (DFAIT) published its first edition of *Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security* which recognized human security as central to Canadian foreign policy.[15]

Although it is not my intention to unpackage the debate that surrounded

defence policy, one that provides the means to apply military force when Canadians consider it necessary to uphold Canadian values and security interests, at home and abroad."[17]

Chapter Six, "Contributing to International Security", states that "[a]s a reflection of the global nature of Canada's values and interests, the Canadian Forces (CF) must contribute to international security."[18] Further, it stated that "[m]ultilateral security cooperation is not merely a Canadian tradition; it is an expression of Canadians' values in the international sphere."[19] In this respect, the white paper stressed Canada's tradition with multilateral operations was unsurpassed[20] and the CF would continue to engage and expand multilateral experience with Central and Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Asia, Latin America and Africa alongside its traditional multilateral

and Canada's national security and policy decisions were conditioned by Canada's alliance commitments to NATO, North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) and the United Nations.[27] Complementing this internationalist position was DFAIT's focus on human security, conceived and employed in isolation. National security was coordinated from the Privy Council Office and remained the sole purview of the Prime Minister:

> The Prime Minister of Canada is ultimately accountable to Parliament and to the people of Canada for the integrity and security of the nation. The Prime Minister therefore provides broad guidance to the security and intelligence community.[28]

The inaction of the Canadian government in structural and procedural matters demonstrated a general lack of interest in a more formal national security process even as its own documentation clearly articulated a broader and deeper concept of security. Although Y2K and weather related disasters from 1997-1998 prompted the establishment of OCIPEP, whose mission was to enhance the safety and security of Canadians in their physical and cyber environment with a vision of "a safer more secure Canada,"[29] there was no impetus to establish a national security process linking foreign and defence policy. As Jane Boulden notes:

> For all the government's speeches and publications about foreign and defence policy, there is no overall linking strategy which is articulated in one document as a national security strategy, and which acts as a policy anchor for defence and foreign policy."[30]

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.In 1996, largely due to its strategic circumstances and historical sense of insecurity, Australia established a national security framework consisting of a National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC) and a Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCNS). At the political level, the Prime Minister chairs the NSCC, which is the focal point of decision-making on national security. The committee includes key government portfolios such as the Minister for Defence, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and others. Supporting the NSCC is SCNS comprising the heads of agencies engaged in national security issues, and chaired by the Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Australia also had a National Anti-Terrorist Plan in Place which was controlled by SAC-PAV (Standing Advisory Committee for Commonwealth/State Cooperation for Protection Against Violence) created in 1978 after a terrorist bombing incident in Sydney. Despite this structure, a national security policy was not

articulated and calls for a unified, high-level policy development and coordina-tion staff ensued as the NSSC and SCNS were not seen to be fulfilling their role:

> The creation of the National Security Committee of Cabinet and the Secretaries Committee on National Security,…, does not fulfill this re-quirement. These are essentially interdepartmental rather than supra-departmental in nature, and the wrangling between the depart-ments continues.[31]

Although the creation of national security structures signals a greater aware-ness of national security issues, the lack of an articulated national security policy directs one's attention to foreign and defence polices in order to get a better sense of national security thinking in Australia.

.   . In 1997, Australia released a new foreign policy white pa-per entitled *In the National Interest*. While recognizing that Australia was not likely to face a direct threat by armed force the white paper described the re-

However, while recognizing the broader security agenda, Australia found

to Australia's security because they have the power — actual or potential — to influence events throughout the Asia Pacific region. Their relationships will set the tone for the whole region.[43]

D2000 also gives evidence of a broadening security agenda in outlining "new military tasks" or "peacetime national tasks" such as humanitarian relief, evacuations, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement, coastal surveillance, illegal immigration, and counter-terrorist response. Security concerns from non-military threats such as cyber attack, organized crime and terrorism were also identified as part of Australia's strategic environment.[44] However, despite recognition of the broadening security agenda, D2000 clearly articulates that traditional security thinking remains valid, stating that the "…approach is to draw on the expertise of the Defence Force where it is most appropriate to do so, but not allow these roles — important as they are — to detract from the ADF's core function of defending Australia from armed attack."[45]

In recognition of a lack of power or reach to protect many of its own interests, Australia relies on multilateral and bilateral security arrangements:

We work through the growing range of multilateral security forums and arrangements in our region, as well as a network of bilateral defence and security relationships, including Australia's most important single strategic relationship — our alliance with the United States.[46]

The United Nations' broadened range of security activities and responsibilities represents Australia's multilateralism at the international level. Regional security relations include bilateral security arrangements with many Asia Pacific states and multilateral arrangements such as the ARF and the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). However, Australia views its security relationship with the US, underwritten by the ANZUS Treaty, as a "great national asset"[47] and the US's continued engagement in the Asia Pacific region is seen to "…play a critical role in maintaining strategic stability in the region as a whole."[48]

. As mentioned above, Australians established a national security structure but have not articulated a national security policy. How they thought about national security was derived from their foreign and defence white papers. Investigation revealed that although there was evidence of the deepening and broadening conceptualization of security in both the foreign and defence policies, the foreign policy paper "adopted a policy of cooperative security designed to promote greater regional dialogue and cohesiveness."[49] Graeme Cheeseman noted that D2000 "…represents old rather than new thinking on defence and security."[50] Further, Paul Dibb commented that D2000 is "…centered on the defence of Australia and adjusted for the strategic circumstances in our immediate region"[51] This confusion between foreign and defence policies is further exacerbated by the idea that the alliance with the US is a "national asset." While it is not my intention to unpack the defence and foreign policy

dilemma in Australia, it must be recognized that a well-articulated national security policy could potentially overcome this dilemma in balancing these competing national security issues.

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Neither Canada nor Australia articulated a national security policy prior to 9/11. Although neither state felt threatened, Australia was more conscious of the

the Canada Firearms Centre, the Canada Border Services Agency and three review bodies. Anne McLellan, Deputy Prime Minister, became the first Minister of PSEPC signaling, as with John Manley, the importance of this portfolio to the Prime Minister.

In April 2004, the Martin government released its first ever comprehensive national security policy *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*. While it is not the intention of this paper to critically analyze that statement in detail, there are points that warrant mention which are pertinent to our discussion. First, in creating what it calls an "integrated security system," the Minister will be supported by a National Security Advisor responsible for development and implementation of the security system; a National Security Advisory Council will be responsible for evaluation, improving the security system as well as harnessing outside security expert advice; an integrated threat assessment centre; and a cross-cultural roundtable on security composed of members of Canada's ethno-cultural and religious communities will advise the Minister.

Second, the drafters of the policy recognized that national security was about more than just terrorism:

> Beyond the fight against terrorism, there are new procedures aimed at improving the country's emergency preparedness. Ottawa will strive to work more closely with the provincial and territorial governments in preparing to combat natural disasters and health crises, such as SARS.[56]

In addition, the document takes account of the deepening security agenda in stating that national security "…is closely linked to both personal and international security". [57]

Third, the core national security interests identified are: protecting Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad; ensuring that Canada is not a base for threats to our allies; and contributing to international security. Six key strategic areas are identified in support of the above interests: Intelligence, Emergency Planning and Management, Public Health, Transport Security, Border Security, and International Security. The national security policy arguably has a domestic focus as evidenced by the interests and strategic areas listed above. While the rational for this is position is open to debate, it is reasonable to presume that the importance of Canada's economic relations with the US underpins much of the content of the national security policy. (   ). Prime Minister Paul Martin renewed interest in relations with the US and foreign policy:

> My first foreign trip as Prime Minister was to meet with the countries of the Americas at the Monterrey Summit. This was an important opportunity to develop our hemispheric relations and, significantly for Canada, to take a first step toward a new relationship with the United States.

The Government is therefore developing a contemporary approach to: our foreign policy objectives, our trade and investment needs, our defence requirements, and, our development assistance programs.[58]

resonate, to varying degrees, in the NSP. The release format and structure of the ISP demonstrates a greater congruence, not only within the ISP itself, but also in its linkages to the NSP.

. As mentioned above, national security was a key issue with Prime Minister Martin and there was greater recognition of the role defence plays in pursuing national security. To that end, "[i]n Budget 2005, the Government made

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   . As mentioned above, from 1996 onward Australia had a national se-
curity structure in place with the NSCC, SCNS and SAC PAV. These
arrangements allowed Australia to respond quickly to the events of September
11 — a response arguably heightened by Prime Minister John Howard being in
Washington at the time of the attacks. Prime Minister Howard invoked articles
IV and V of the ANZUS Treaty for the first time in the history of the treaty. In
addition, Australia had a "comprehensive and well-tested" National Anti-Terrorist
Plan (NATP) in place prior to 9/11.[68] Even with this structure and plan in place,
the government commented that they had committed over $2 billion to counter-
terrorism, and implemented over 100 measures since September 11, 2001.[69]

   Much of the increase in finances and policy measures stemmed not only
from 9/11 but also from the terrorist bombing of the Sari nightclub in Bali on 12
October 2002 where 80 Australians died. In its aftermath, Prime Minister Howard
immediately commissioned a Review of Commonwealth Counter-Terrorism
Arrangements. In addition, Howard and the State and Territory Premiers and
Chief Ministers signed an Inter-Governmental Agreement on Australia's Na-
tional Counter-Terrorism Arrangements and The Department of Prime Minister
took on the lead role in counter-terrorism policy.[70] Other immediate measures
included a reward of $2.5M for any person providing information leading to the
conviction of a person for an indictable offence contained in Australia's counter-
terrorism legislation and increased funding for the Australian Security and
Intelligence Organization (ASIO), Department of Immigration and Multicultural

to ensure a response to any national terrorist situations from the strongest possible position. Most significantly, SAC-PAV was reconstituted as the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC), with a broader mandate to cover prevention and consequence management issues and with Ministerial oversight arrangements.[72]

2002-2003. On 14 May 2002 the Australian government delivered a budget in response to 9/11. The budget speech opened by reinforcing D2000 and increasing the funding for Defence by $1B with a further $524M for the ADF and the War Against Terrorism. Under the second heading of "Upgrading Domestic Security", $1.3B over five years was allocated for improvements to

. The Australian government released a defence update in February 2003 entitled *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update*. This update outlined adjustments in defence policy as a result of 9/11 and the Bali bombings. The defence statement was "…intended to present the implications

would be valid policy for Australian forces to conduct a pre-emptive strike on the territory of a regional neighbour in order to thwart a terrorist attack.[86]

These points concerning the Australian-US relationship and decreasing significance of the UN are themes also evident within the 2003 foreign policy white paper.

In criticizing capability development for the ADF as approved wish-lists without guidance from a strategic policy, Aldo Borgu states, "[a] link also needs to be established in placing our Defence White Paper within the parameters of a broader National Security Strategy."[87] Dr. Alan Dupont, addressing the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, stated that "[w]hat was missing, in his view, was a broader "overarching document where the foreign affairs white paper and the defence white paper can be seen to fit."[88]

The defence update following the foreign policy white paper demonstrates a semblance of a policy formulation process; however, as noted above, there is no overarching national security policy driving these two policies. Dr. Alan Dupont notes that "[w]e still lack in this country an overarching whole-of-government approach to foreign policy, trade and national security."[89]

. Australia has yet to articulate an overarching national security policy bringing together both foreign and defence policies. Australia's approach to national security remains legislative.[90] This means that national security is comprised of a broad suite of acts called "National Security legislation." In 2002, this legislation was further consolidated under the 'Counter Terrorism Legislative Package.'

Structurally, NSCC and the SCNS oversee Australia's domestic and international security. In July 2003, Prime Minister Howard established the National Security Division (NSD) within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet with the mandate to foster greater coordination of, and a stronger "whole-of-government" policy focus on national security. The division is made up of two branches: the Defence and Intelligence Branch and the Domestic Security and Border Protection Branch.

> The division provides the Prime Minister with advice and support on matters relating to defence policies; national security; intelligence community and law enforcement. The Secretariat for the National Counter-terrorism Committee and the Taskforce on Offshore Maritime Security are both located within National Security Division.[91]

Of particular interest is the fact that the Australian government chose a decentralized model, as contrasted with a homeland security-type model. The rationale for this decision lies with differing degrees of coordination as well as a hesitation to expand government bureaucracy:

It will always be a matter for debate, how we go about organising struc-tures to coordinate the national effort. In Australia, we have a relatively small number of agencies involved, and of course a much smaller number of states and territories than in the US. For example, we have 9 police forces, not 18,000 as the US has. The government believes that in general current arrangements are serving Australia well and that we have high-performing agencies with well-defined roles. As al-ready outlined, the government's approach is to make sure the structures we have are well funded and administered, with legislation appropriate to the threat we face, and which are well coordinated.[92]

However, in characterizing the Howard government's current national se-curity approach as "…complex web of agencies and departments presided over by a patchwork of part-time ministers" the "shadow" government (official oppo-sition) proposed a simplified Homeland Security portfolio:

The portfolio will encompass border protection, crime prevention, intel-

respond to 9/11; it had a structure and plans in place, which were subsequently reviewed in response to the Bali bombing in October 2002. It created the NSD and articulated a "whole-of-government" approach without drafting a national security policy. In response to 9/11 and Bali it undertook a new foreign policy and defence update and articulated a more traditional security approach focused on terrorism.

Canada took a new approach to national security most notably in the creation of a centralized structure with PSEPC and the drafting of its first-ever NSP. The NSP was followed up by an IPS linking the NSP with foreign and defence polices. Although 9/11 and terrorism were important aspects of the policy documentation, Canada continued to account for the broadening and deepening security agenda through human security and international security alliances. In the post 9/11 period, it is clear that both states took similar strides towards a more robust national security position. However, Canada appears to have taken greater steps forward in clearly establishing its national security framework.

It is not the position of this paper to pass judgment on whose national security approach will provide the greatest degree of security; the aim is rather to compare the two approaches to further our understanding of national security. Canada and Australia are very similar states — history, culture, institutions — and the evolution of their respective approaches to national security highlights the complexity and challenges of national security within a dynamic global security environment. From evidence presented in this paper, it can be argued that 9/11 has levelled the playing field and that Canadian and Australian national security frameworks are more similar now than they were five years ago. One conclusion that stands out in considering matters of national security is that "geography matters". This was strikingly apparent in the post 9/11 period — Canada's ad hoc, minimalist approach to national security compared to Australia's regionally focused structural framework. It is seemingly ironic that the one catalyst which arguably brings these two rather disparate national security policies closer together knows "no geography"; namely, terrorism. Terrorist acts such as those of 9/11 and Bali, alongside other threats to peace and stability, are stark reminders of the constantly changing and often volatile global security environment within which we live. Such reminders reinforce the need for governments to give due regard to the most important social service they provide to their citizens, national security.

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2.   Ibid. 16.

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4.   W.D. Macnamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald, "A National Security Framework for Canada", *Policy*

21. Ibid, 12.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid, 15.

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26. Ibid, 3.

27. Boulden, 2-3.

28. Government of Canada (Privy Council Office), *The Canadian Security and Intelligence Community: Helping Keep Canada and Canadians Safe and Secure* (Ottawa: National Library of Canada, 2001) 4.

29. Donovan Arnaud, "Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness", Presentation to West Coast Security Forum 17 Nov 2003, viewed 1 Apr 05 <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inict-tic.nsf/en/it07619e.html#4>.

30. Boulden, 34.

31. Ian Wing, *Refocusing Concepts of Security: The Convergence of Military and Non-military Tasks*, Working Paper No.111 (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2000) 98.

32. Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *In the National Interest* (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Statistical Services), 1997) 1.

33. Ibid, 2.

34. Ibid, 38.

35. Ibid, 3.

36. Ibid, 27.

37. Ibid, 29.

38. Ibid, 40.

39. Ibid, 39.

40. Commonwealth of Australia (Department of Defence), *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2003) 21.

41. Ibid, 30.

42. Ibid, 21.

43. Ibid, 22.

44. Ibid, 19.

45. Ibid, 20.

46. Ibid, 32.

47. Ibid, 34.

48. Ibid.

49. Craig A. Snyder, "Australia's regional security environment", Chapter 6, *Australia's Security in the 21st Century*, ed. J. Mohan Malik (NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1999) 2.

50. Graeme Cheeseman, "The Politics of the Defence White Paper: Illuding the Public-Again", *Australian Defence Fore Journal*, No. 147, March/April 2001: 23-25.

51. Paul Dibb, "Australia's Best Defence White Paper?" *Australian Defence Fore Journal*, No. 147, March/April 2001: 26-28.

52. Kim Richard Nossal, "Canadian Foreign Policy After 9/11: Realignment, Reorientation or

64. Ibid, 9.

65. Ibid.

66. Minister of National Defence Bill Graham, "Defence" *Canada's International Policy State-ment*, viewed 19 April 2005 < http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-en.asp> 1.

67. Ibid, 5.

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Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek joined the Canadian Forces in 1979 by way of Le Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean. In 1984, he graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada with a Bachelor of Arts (Commerce) and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps. Upon completion of armoured training in 1985 he became a member of The Royal Canadian Dragoons stationed in Lahr, West Germany. He has held a variety of Regimental command and staff appointments as well as various school and training positions. He was promoted to his current rank in 1999 and has served as Directing Staff at both the Canadian Forces College in Toronto and the Australian Command and Staff College in Canberra, Australia. While in Toronto, he completed a Master's of Arts (Defence Management and Policy). He is currently pursuing his doctorate in War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada and held the position of CF Visiting Defence Fellow at the Centre for International Relations at Queen's University in 2005-2006.