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Even before the end of the Cold War, the promotion of democratic development in other countries was increasingly embraced as a goal of foreign policy by Western states. Governments in Ottawa, Liberal and Conservative, were as keen as other Western states to devote energy and resources to the cause: both the governments of Brian Mulroney and Jean Chrétien were enthusiastic promoters of democratic development. When it came to power in February 2006, the Conservative government of Stephen Harper likewise seemed attracted to democracy promotion as part of a “principled” foreign policy. But in its seven years in office, the Harper government has progressively abandoned democracy promotion as an important foreign policy objective.

In this Occasional Paper, Gerald Schmitz, one of Canada’s foremost experts on human rights and democracy promotion, explores the emergence—and then the disappearance—of democracy promotion under the Harper Conservative government. He notes the enthusiasm of parliamentarians in 2006 and 2007 for a reinvigoration of democracy promotion was soon replaced after 2009 by an increasing tendency of the government to back away from embracing such initiatives, exemplified by the termination of Rights & Democracy, a government-supported organization for global democracy promotion. Schmitz suggests that while some of the broader challenges to democracy globally might account for part of Ottawa’s reluctance, he argues that we need to look to other explanations, particularly the desire of the Conservatives to recast the very bases of Canadian foreign policy.

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Occasional Papers published by the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen’s University are intended to provide both the policy community and the broader public with short analyses of contemporary issues in international and defence policy.

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It's curious that the Harper government should have shelved its many promises to make democracy promotion a larger part of its

subject to growing skepticism. Notwithstanding the unexpected “Arab Spring” uprisings of 2011, The Economist Intelligence Unit’s fourth annual edition ‘HPRFUDF\ , QGH [, published in December 2011, reached the sobering conclusion that: “The dominant pattern globally over the past five years has been backsliding on previously attained progress in democratisation. The global financial crisis that started in 2008 accentuated some existing negative trends in political development.”² Democratic prospects in Tunisia and Egypt are seen as “highly uncertain”; their unfinished revolutions as not easily reproduced elsewhere. Overall, the 2011 trends observed by the Index are largely negative, with the average of countries’ “democracy scores” declining for all regions—including North America and Europe—apart from the Middle East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. Freedom House’s annual global survey published in 2013 records some, albeit ambiguous, gains as a result of the Arab popular movements. “However, a number of regions experienced setbacks due to a hardened and increasingly shrewd authoritarian response to these movements.”³

It seems clear that democratic development challenges are not diminishing globally; quite the contrary. At the same time, the case for addressing these challenges through international action is made more difficult when the democratic functioning of the traditional aid-donor countries in European and North America is becoming less exemplary. Moreover, democracy promotion has suffered from a backlash against the perceived aggressive and ideological policies of its largest funder, the United States—specifically President George W. Bush’s ill-fated “freedom agenda” associated with ill-advised military interventions and m

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this is as true of the 2007 parliamentary report that prompted the Harper

1986 final report, , Q G H S H Q G H Q F H D Q G , recommended W L R C
instead the creation of a small agency for human rights and democracy
assistance that would be at arm's length from government, albeit subject to
periodic parliamentary review. This proposal was subsequently seconded
in) R U : K R V H % H Q H À W ", the landmark May 1987 report of the Sta
Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (since 2006, the

a key missing piece in achieving development effectiveness. Soon the development agencies of Western liberal democracies adopted the language of “good governance” objectives, which raised questions about the quality of decision-making processes, the relationship of the state to its citizens, and the public accountability of decision-makers. Unlike the IFIs, restricted by supposedly “non-political” technocratic mandates, these bilateral donors soon started associating improvements in governance with advances in democratic rights and freedoms as well as the smooth functioning and “sound public administration” of state institutions.

Seeking guidance, CIDA commissioned a study which resulted in a 1992 bilingual book on democratic development.⁶ ICRDD, given its relative freedom from government, was already positioned to undertake more politically risky activities including support for democratic oppositions in authoritarian regimes (such as Burma). The general aid program sought ways to encourage respect for human rights and democratic development through more formal institution-building in recipient countries. Strengthening civil society would also be an indirect way of creating conditions favourable to democratic development.

In 1996 the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien released a “Government of Canada Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization

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After the first Harper minority government was elected in 2006, Conservative MPs on the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (SCFAID) gained the support of the other parties for an examination of Canada's role in democracy assistance. The result was a lengthy and ambitious July 2007 report, *Strengthening Democracy in Canada: A Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development*. Noting the rather limited and low-profile nature of existing Canadian efforts, the report recommended several new arms-length agencies—in particular a Canadian foundation for democracy support—including an emphasis on getting involved in assisting multiparty democracy.

Taking into account familiar concerns about association with dis

the weakness in evaluating effectiveness, the third recommendation called for a full independent evaluation of all publicly-funded democracy assistance to be undertaken within one year, tabled in Parliament and referred to the committee.¹⁰

Given this concern, it is striking that at no time was the committee made aware of the CIDA-commissioned evaluations then underway of the performance of the agency's work in the "governance" sector since the 1996 policy was put into effect. Several months before the committee's report was tabled, CIDA had received four external evaluations of the main sectors of governance programming, including one of its "democratization portfolio" of projects. The results were summarized in a "Synthesis Report" that was eventually posted to CIDA's website.¹¹ CIDA figures indicate that as much as \$3.8 billion was spent on governance programming over the 1996-2006 period—and as much as \$1.3 billion on 835 "democratization projects"—though the amounts cannot be stated with any confidence given very high number of coding errors (57 per cent) in the democratization portfolio.

These evaluations, had they been known to the committee, would certainly have reinforced its doubts about CIDA's role as the primary instrument for delivering democracy assistance. The analysis reveals numerous deficiencies and failings in governance programming which were not allayed by the creation of a short-lived internal Office of Democratic Governance (ODG). A main conclusion of the Synthesis Report is blunt:

The Agency's performance in management and delivery of governance programs is ineffective. The 1996 HRDDG policy was highly regarded inside and outside the Agency, but there has been an enormous gap between policy and implementation. Once a leader in the sector, CIDA is no longer viewed as an innovator. The problems underlying this state of affairs are, in large measure, structural and institutional in character. Yet, beyond this there has been little effort at the Agency level to come to terms with what might be required to support governance as a priority sector.¹²

Although CIDA management acknowledged the Synthesis Report's recommendations for taking corrective action, one of the evaluators involved describes the response as "pro forma."¹³ In effect the findings were buried and had little impact on operations. Since the demise of the ODG, governance has been presented as "cross-cutting" CIDA priority.

But given the fate of these evaluations, there is little reason to believe CIDA has progressed as an effective provider of democracy support.

Not all of the House committee's 2007 recommendations commanded non-partisan support. MPs parted ways—with the Bloc Québécois and NDP members ultimately dissenting from the Conservative-Liberal majority—over the report's argument that a new institutional framework was required in order to make Canada a major player in the democratic development field. The report observed that there were many Canadians already working in the field for US-based and international organizations who could be attracted by a Canadian organization. Calling for significantly more funding devoted to democracy assistance, the Committee report cited Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy as examples of the scale and arm's-length nature of what could be done. Nevertheless, the Bloc and NDP members remained unconvinced that a new government-established institution would not overshadow and perhaps attempt to control, if not take over, the work of existing organizations such as Rights & Democracy and the Parliamentary Centre, both of which had made submissions to the committee proposing a larger role for themselves in delivering democracy assistance. Moreover, although the report recommended that the new institutions be governed by an independent arm's-length relationship to government and supported by multi-party cooperation, the dissenting MPs remained suspicious of potential ideological motivations behind the Conservatives' strong endorsement for creating such institutions. Similar suspicions would come to the fore in 2010 when a battle over the direction of Rights & Democracy, and allegations of undue government interference, exploded into public view. The effect was to paralyze and ultimately fatally undermine an agency which had been created by a previous Conservative government, with implications that I will turn to shortly.

To this point there was still an expectation that a new government initiative on democracy promotion would be forthcoming,¹⁴ even if progress on the file had been slow and had followed a rather ambiguous path. The Harper government's November 2007 formal response to the committee's report had been positive overall, promising a three-member expert panel to study the idea of creating a substantial new foundation and the release of a whole-of-government strategy within six months. Matters then languished over the next year with ministerial shuffles, a fractious

minority parliament, a controversial prorogation, and an election which returned the Conservatives to power with another minority. There had been no panel or strategy announced. So it was somewhat of a surprise when the Conservatives' election platform promised action. The Harper government's November 2008 Speech from the Throne included a commitment to establish a new multiparty democracy promotion agency "to support the peaceful transition to democracy in repressive countries and help emerging democracies build strong institutions."¹⁵

Curiously, though, the responsibility for this file was then transferred from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the new Minister of State for Democratic Reform, Steven Fletcher, appointed to this position on 30 October 2008. More months of uncertainty followed another prorogation and a

In addition, Burron alleges that the Harper government has shown a tendency to want to assert control over the Canadian “democracy assistance community of practice”—which he identifies with the rights-based approach to democratic development as enshrined in Rights & Democracy’s founding legislation, adopted by CIDA and followed by the NGOs who met periodically to dialogue with their government counterparts in the “Democracy Council” forum that emerged from the Martin government’s 2005 , QWHUQDWLRQDO ²³ROLF\ 6WDWHPHQW.

Beauregard, appointed to the post by the Harper government in 2008, Rights & Democracy was vulnerable to other criticisms. It was never much loved by Foreign Affairs or CIDA, and it came to be seen by some as a thorn in the side for its criticisms of Canadian foreign policy and associations with left-leaning NGOs.

During 2008-2009, the Harper government appointed several members of a more conservative bent to the board of Rights & Democracy. One of these, Aurel Braun, a political science professor at the University of Toronto, became board chair in March 2009. Braun and several other board members questioned certain activities which had been approved by the president and his staff, and objected to small grants that had been made to Middle East NGOs critical of Israel. Braun, Jacques Gauthier and Elliot Tepper were also involved in a negative performance review of Beauregard which became the object of much] t

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MPs who held a majority on SCFAID were nevertheless not ready to give up on Rights & Democracy. The committee's majority report expressed a strong belief that "there remains a vital role for Rights and Democracy in the promotion and protection of international human rights and the strengthening of democratic systems around the world. ... Considering the events that have been witnessed in recent years where Rights and Democracy has been active—whether it is Zimbabwe, Burma, Haiti, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, or the Sudan—the rationale for having such an organization has never been stronger." The report's first recommendation was to affirm that: "The Government of Canada should publicly recommit to the independence and continuing role of Rights and Democracy in providing critical support for human rights and democratic development around the world."²⁵ The other recommendations proposed corrective actions to support this renewal.

While Conservative MPs on the committee disagreed with criticisms made of the SuR

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government's agenda. It was not mentioned in the March 2010 Speech from the Throne or in the first Throne Speech of the majority Harper government elected in May 2011. The new minister of foreign affairs, John Baird, confirmed that the proposal was dead when questioned by NDP foreign affairs critic H el ene Laverdi ere, a former diplomat, during his first appearance before SCFAID on 1 December 2011. He added that: "I'd like to review the mandate and operations of Rights and Democracy, which I think can play a greater role than it has played in the past."²⁸

Whatever internal review may have taken place, in the absence of any public consultation, it certainly did not reach such a salutary conclusion. On the heels of the government's March 2012 budget, which included substantial expenditure cuts to both DFAIT and CIDA, Baird abruptly announced on 3 April that Rights & Democracy would be closed down through forthcoming legislation (which would no doubt easily pass given the government's comfortable majority). The minister's brief statement cited the organization's "many challenges" and the need to move beyond them with a "clean slate." But it also framed the decision as "part of our efforts to find efficiencies and savings," adding that Rights & Democracy's "functions will be brought within Foreign Affairs and International Trade

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clashes at R & D are better known than the work it did. Whether or not

to SCFAID's recommendations was generally positive. It seemed the ground was being prepared for a new agency in the context of a broad policy thrust in which the government promised to:

Develop a : K R O H R I * R Y H U Q P H Q W for the specific area of Democracy Support (within six months of the tabling of this Government Response).

Establish a Canadian research program on democracy support and a Democracy Partners Research and Study Program to generate knowledge on the challenges to democracy in specific country contexts.⁴⁰

Neither of these promises was kept. However the 2008 election platform included the following commitment: "A re-elected Conservative Government led by Stephen Harper will make the promotion of Canada's democratic values on the world stage a major focus of our foreign policy. We will establish a new, non-partisan democracy promotion agency that will help emerging democracies build democratic institutions and support peaceful democratic change in repressive countries."⁴¹ That carried over into the subsequent Speech from the Throne and was the backdrop to the work of the 2009 Axworthy advisory panel. (The four-person panel included Leslie Campbell, a senior executive with the U.S. National Democratic Institute who had been chief of staff to former NDP leader Audrey MacLaughlin, and who had previously worked with Axworthy to promote the idea of a Democracy Canada Institute.)

At the same time, however, this momentum encountered difficulties that became more apparent during 2010. One was fiscal: by the time the Axworthy panel reported in late 2009, there was a ballooning deficit and thus little appetite for substantial new funding programs. The other was ideological and bears closer scrutiny. The second Harper minority government was marked by an increasingly fractious parliament and partisan divisions which spilled over into the area of international affairs. The 2010 battle over Rights & Democracy was a flashpoint in a larger estrangement between the Harper government and the constituencies which supported a traditionally liberal internationalist approach to foreign gm nin fb Ä Ä Axwo Move Ä

of the poorest African countries. In addition, further controversy was sparked that fall when it was revealed that Bev Oda, CIDA's minister, had inserted a hand-written "not" on a memorandum from senior CIDA officials recommending funding to the interchurch development coalition KAIROS, making it appear that those senior officials had recommended terminating KAIROS funding.

The Harper government, with its emphasis on the military's combat role in Afghanistan over UN peacekeeping, its diminished posture at the UN, its free trade and commercial priorities, was seen as moving Canada away from the established liberal internationalism of its predecessors. That perception was correct and the distancing deliberate, a E

see in the Middle East, means that if Canada wants to play a role in the debate about the direction that these transitions take in the Middle East right now it's doing so from a huge disadvantage."⁴⁵ For his part, Tom Axworthy argued that the Conservative government should not sit on the sidelines: "As a new democratic wave crashes into the autocracies of the Middle East, Prime Minister Harper should return to his original good idea and make democracy central to our foreign policy."⁴⁶

However, the Canadian Press story suggested the democracy agency proposal was not completely dead, but had been sent back by cabinet. Citing a Conservative source, it was noted that "some felt that the climate was not right for establishing the centre in the context of the political battle being waged over the state of arm's-length body Rights & Democracy, and with the substantial costs that would be incurred by such an initiative."⁴⁷ While not enamoured of plunging ahead with an expensive new agency, George Perlin, who had succeeded Axworthy as head of Queen's University's Centre for the Study of Democracy and Diversity, argued that Canada should be doing more to help the democracy assistance community: "International research and education on democracy promotion policy are still substantially under-developed. Despite its current limited engagement, Canada is well-positioned to take a leading role in this field. It has a strong corps of experienced practitioner organizations and individuals who can work with the academic community in creating Canadian capacity for knowledge development and professional education. An investment in these activities can not only help improve the effectiveness of Canada's own policies; it can help Canada contribute in an important way to the collective international enterprise."⁴⁸

Unfortunately such an argument, however well-founded and seemingly endorsed in the government's own 2007 response n e report, was not likely n hav -much traction in a highly partisan elec year. As well, Mo - tives were not keen on supporting independent policy-based research m / o which uncomfortably wim m / calculations and decisions. Mwere especially not on overm]patternM Mdecisions, arrived at inM mannern nded n considerations o partisan is not surprising, m] Mm r t dissident views could fnd a platform.

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In international affairs the result has been a concentration on a nar-

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is not accidental: “Ideology appears to be a driving factor, as the government seems to take a very combative and hyper-partisan approach to any government-funded initiative.” Moreover, the Axworthy panel’s proposals for a new agency to be established by Parliament involved undertaking support for political party development. As Kippen put it to me, “I don’t think that the current environment in Canada is conducive to work in this area internationally. There is too much acrimony between the government and opposition to make things work in an efficient and effective manner, and petty political differences would end up poisoning the process—R &D [Rights & Democracy] being a case in point.”⁵⁵

Likewise, the Harper government has an apparent lack of interest in, if not aversion to, public consultations that might give voice to a diversity of views including critical ones. Cameron has argued that “Canadian foreign policy itself should be democratized. A well-designed, broadly consultative foreign policy review is overdue. There are all sorts of innovations in civil society participation that could serve as models for democratic consultation. ... A bold democracy assistance agenda would not be just about making ‘them’ more democratic like ‘us.’ It would be about making the world a more democratic place, Canada included.”⁵⁶

In the area of foreign policy the Harper Conservatives believe they have a mandate to pursue their policies on their terms without any need to invite further parliamentary or public input. The government’s emphasis on economic growth, trade and private-sector development are readily apparent. Beyond that, any policy reviews remain internal. I have heard of work being done within CIDA to update the human rights, democratization and good governance policy. But nothing has been made public to that effect, and as observed earlier, there is little evidence of the lessons of critical evaluations being taken seriously.

Foreign Affairs and CIDA officials were extremely reluctant to say anything about present policy. On the Foreign Affairs website, “democracy” continues to be one of the declared “core values” of Canadian foreign policy. Baird has pointed to the “democratic transitions” envelope of the Glyn Berry Program in Peace and Security (formerly the Human Security Program under the Liberals) which funnels \$3 million annually into small projects that fit the government’s priorities.

This is, however, a fraction of the \$5 million annual budget of the new Office of Religious Fre

conspicuously, at the Toronto-area mosque of a Muslim minority sect, doubtless to allay concerns that it would focus on threats to the rights of Christians and Jews. However, critics are unlikely to be reassured by Harper's simultaneous choice as the office's first ambassador of Andrew Bennett, a dean at Augustine College, an institution that strongly appeals to conservative Christian tradition.⁵⁷ It has been never been made clear why among the full range of international human rights only this particular one deserves a specific office and ambassador. (Previously the Harper government had eliminated ambassadorial positions for circumpolar affairs and sustainable development.) The vague mandate of the office speaks of promoting "tolerance" but without addressing the potential for rights claimed on religious grounds to come into conflict with other fundamental rights, for example the equality rights of women and of sexual minorities.

The broader agenda of human rights and democratic freedoms has not been forgotten by opposition spokespersons in Parliament. For example, Paul Dewar, Official Opposition critic for foreign affairs, observed that: "Action on this is valuable—but must not come at the expense of, or to the exclusion of, developing other important democratic rights." Dewar claimed that the Office "represents both a broken Conservative promise and a missed opportunity. Conservatives had repeatedly promised a democratic development agency, but they broke that promise and now they're moving forward on a much more limited and narrow approach." He claimed that the real motives are less than pure, and called on the Conservatives "to stop playing domestic politics on the international stage."⁵⁸

The Harper government continues to assert that support for democracy is part of its "principled" foreign policy. For example, interviewed as part of a 3 R O L F \ 2 S W L R Q V April 2012 issue devoted to Canadian fo policy, Baird responded to a question about disturbing developments in Russia by asserting that "promoting democratic development is a key priority, promoting freedom is a big priority around the world, in Russia and everywhere."⁵⁹ At the same time, it is hard to square these occasional rhetorical flourishes with bureaucratic moves like putting DFAIT's former democracy unit, which administers the Glyn Berry democratic transitions envelope, into the Francophonie and Commonwealth Division, even if the latter has added "democracy" to its title. Still to be determined is the impact that very substantial cuts to DFAIT and CIDA announced in the March 2012 federal budget may have on what remains of democracy support programs.⁶⁰

DFAIT as a result of the March 2013 federal budget will have any positive effect on available resources.

So one is left with a paradox. With the closing of Rights & Democracy, it seems very likely that Canada will be spending O H V V on government support for democratic development in the next several years than was the case in 2006 when SCFAID started its examination of how Canada could do more.

There is a vacuum that could be seen as an opportunity to at least improve the effectiveness of the remaining support programs and build a better knowledge basis for work in this field without getting into more controversial areas like political party development. In December 2012 the McLeod Group of international affairs consultants released a study suggesting the creation of a new body that they argued could provide a “learning and policy development function in the fields of human rights and democratic development.” In their view such an organization could develop “an implementation capacity that would allow it to act in a U

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understandably reacted negatively to these developments. Burrton sees the pressure on this community to realign towards compliance with Conservative government objectives, as well as a subordination of diplomacy to commercial interests, as trends moving in the opposite direction to a progressive rights-based approach to democracy promotion.

As Andrew Cohen has argued, there is a wider agenda at work in the 2012 budget cuts: “There are many words commentators have used to describe the new federal budget: conservative, cautious, humdrum, prudent, bold, visionary, revolutionary, transformative. It’s hard to find OH PRW MXVWH but here’s another: small. Small government. Small n Small ideas. Parochial, petty, cheap.”⁶⁶

I think the operative phrase here is VPDOO JRYHUQPHQW, me long-term restriction in the role of the federal government and reductions in direct federal funding in favour of encouraging private-sector initiatives.⁶⁷ Bob Miller, former head of the Parliamentary Centre and an astute long-time participant-observer in the field of Canadian democracy assistance, points to the influences on Prime Minister Harper of the neoconservative, small-government philosophy of University of Calgary mentors associated with some have called the “Calgary School”—former

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Canada not only no longer punches above its weight, but has gone missing in action on democratic development, falling further behind American and European initiatives. (Indeed the U.S., after being chastened by the backlash over the Bush agenda, may be renewing its efforts if President Obama's second inaugural address is any indication, affirming that: "We will support democracy from Asia to Africa; from the Americas to the Middle East, because our interests and our conscience compel us to act on behalf of those who long for freedom."⁶⁹) What accounts for the Harper government's bold intentions of a few years ago to boost Canada's role in democracy promotion coming to naught?

The most plausible answer has little to do with actual fiscal constraints, and more to do with the Harper government's incremental reconsideration and reorientation of established foreign policy in directions that most strategically serve its interests while appealing to its electoral base. We are seeing the elaboration of a Conservative foreign policy that consciously deviates from that of previous Liberal governments, and indeed from the internationalism of the Mulroney government that, with cross-party support, created an institution like Rights & Democracy. In taking a narrower approach to international issues more attuned to domestic partisan and ideological considerations, the Harper government has shown it is not inclined to reach out to opposition parties or to engage in wide-ranging public consultations, especially now that it has a stable majority. To be blunt, I think it believes it has nothing to gain from that kind of (potentially troublesome) democratization.

One might well ask "who cares?" when international issues—including our Afghanistan involvement that has cost so many soldiers' lives—were barely mentioned during the last election campaign, and if most Canadians do not seem to be much roused by the above controversies. Nossal concludes that "the new directions in Canadian foreign policy have not inspired the kind of negative reactions among the broader public that might otherwise prompt the Conservative government to change its mind about the current directions in foreign policy." He suggests that this is likely to be self-reproducing: "the more that the public accepts (or, as importantly, does not reject) new ideas about Canada's proper role in world affairs articulated by the Conservatives, the less relevant that reminders of a

Liberal internationalist—if not liberal internationalist—past in Canadian foreign policy will become.”⁷⁰

So, although there is scope for Canada to do much more in the field of international democratic development—as extensively reviewed by the 2007 SCFAID report during the first Harper minority government and affirmed by the 2009 Axworthy panel report—the Canadian political climate has deteriorated significantly for a publicly-funded internationalist initiative based on broad parliamentary and public support.

It might be said that the Harper Conservatives are more interested in curtailing expectations of public funding, and controlling such funding in ways that advance their interests and confer electoral advantage, than in democratizing policy processes. It is an orientation that applies as much to international as to domestic spending. Unless and until this situation changes, there is little prospect of any substantial new Canadian undertaking in international democracy assistance consistent with the multi-party and liberal-internationalist premises that have traditionally guided Canadian foreign policy in this area.

That does not mean that those who do care about reviving that legacy and building Canada’s position in the world should throw in the towel. There is a compelling case to be made for a larger and carefully considered Canadian role in supporting international democratic development. It awaits another government to make it.

Notes

1. Jeffrey Simpson, “The road to democracy promotion’s paved with broken vows,” *7 K H * O R E H D Q Q F e b D a r y* 2011.
2. ' H P R F U D F \ , Q G H [' H P R F U D F \ 8 Q G H U 6 W U H V V , A R e p o r t I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t , 3 , https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2011.
3. Freedom House,) U H H G R P L Q W K H : R U O G ' H P R F U D W L F % D O D (N e w Y o r k : F r e e d o m H o u s e , 2 0 1 3) , <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2013>.
4. See the analysis in Lincoln Mitchell, “The New World of Democracy Promotion,” & X U U H Q W + L V W R U \ 110 (November 2011), 311–16.
5. House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, \$ G Y D Q F L Q J & D Q D G D < V 5 R O H L Q , Q W H U Q D W L R ' H Y H O R S O t t a w a , J u l y 2 0 0 7 . F u l l d i s c l o s u r e : I w a s t h e d r a f t e r o f t h e r e p o r t .

6. The study was a collaboration between ICHRDD and the North-South Institute. Gerald Schmitz and David Gillies, 7 K H & K D O O H Q J H R I ' H P R F U D W L F ' H Y H O ' H P R F U D W L J D W L R Q L Q ' H O T T A W A T S E N O R T H - S O U T H I N S T I T U T E , 1 9 9 2).
7. For a critical analysis see, Geoffrey Cameron, "Between Policy and Practice: Navigating CIDA's Democracy Agenda," University of Regina, The Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy, Public Policy Paper 47, December 2006.
8. I have surveyed these developments in much greater detail in Schmitz, "The Role of International Democracy Promotion in Canada's Foreign Policy," 3 R O L F \ 0 D W W H 5:10 (November 2004), <http://www.irpp.org/pm/archive/pmvol5no10.pdf>.
9. SCFAID, \$ G Y D Q F L Q J & D Q D G D \ V 5 R O H L Q 6 X S S R U W I R U , Q W P H Q W, 2007, p. 30.
10. Ibid., pp. 52-54.
11. See CIDA, 5 H Y L H Z R I * R Y H U Q D Q F H 3 U R J U D P P L Q J L Q & , ' \$ 2 6 mance and Knowledge Management Branch, April 2008, <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/NAT-78143933-PVS>; Phillip Rawkins and Madeleine Guay, "Review of CIDA Programming in Democratization: A Portfolio Assessment," May 2007. Note that the four evaluations were not made public. I am indebted to John Saxby, one of the consultants on the public-sector reform evaluation, for this information.
12. 5 H Y L H Z R I * R Y H U Q D Q F H 3 U R J U D P P L Q J L Q & , ' \$
13. Information from John Saxby, 14 February 2013.
14. Lee Berthiaume, "Democracy promotion centre inching forward," (P E D \ 3 February 2010.
15. Prime Minister of Canada, Speech from the Throne, "Protecting Canada's Future," 19 November 2008, <http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1364>.
16. Cannon's exact words were: "Hopefully it is done in much the same way as at IDRC, which is I think not only world renowned but certainly something of whose work Canada can be extremely proud." See House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, (Y L G H O F 2 1 10 February 2009, 10, <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Committee/402/FAAE/Evidence/EV3663799/FAAEV02-E.PDF>.
17. Lee Berthiaume, "Full steam ahead on spreading democracy," (P E D \ 18 February 2009, 1, 4.
18. Privy Council Office, \$ G Y L V R U \ 3 D Q H O 5 H S R U W R Q W K H & U H D W L R 3 U R P R W L R Q \$ J H Q F \ , N o v e m b e r / 2 0 0 9 . p s . <http://www2009.pso-bcp.gc.ca/docs/information/publications/promotion/docs/promotion-eng.pdf>.
19. Ibid., 10.

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53. Conservative Party of Canada, "Here for Canada: Platform 2011," 40, http://www.conservative.ca/media/ConservativePlatform2011_ENs.pdf.
54. Jim Creskey, "Religious freedom as a wedge issue," (P E D V V \ , 18 April 2012, 8.
55. Grant Kippen, e-mail communication, 3 May 2012.
56. Cameron, "Democracy promotion."
57. The formal announcement and rationale for the office can be found on the Prime Minister's Office website: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=1&featureId=6&id=5306>. The office includes a "Religious Freedom Fund" budgeted at \$4.25 million annually.
58. For the full statement see: http://www.ndp.ca/news/statement-new-democrat-foreign-affairs-critic-paul-dewar-office-religious-freedoms?utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=twitterfeed.
59. "A conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs," 3 R O L F \ 2 S W L R Q V , April 2012, <http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/apr12/baird.pdf>.
60. The cuts amount to \$170 million from DFATD's budget by 2014-2015 and \$320 million for the development assistance over the same period. Other federal departments and agencies that engaged in aspects of democracy support such as Elections Canada have also had their budgets cut.
61. The McLeod Group, ([S R U W L Q J ' H P R F U D F \ A W C L W o r d G r o u p R o c e i g H D " Policy Perspective, Ottawa, December 2012, 8–9, <http://66.147.244.205/~mcleodgr/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Final-Nov-23.pdf>, emphasis in original.
62. Cited in Nossal, "The Liberal Past," 22.
63. See Irwin Cotler, "CNOCC-Nexen: The deal that human rights forgot," 1 D W L R Q , D O 3 R V 5 March 2013.
64. Nossal, 22 and 29.
65. Ibid., 22.
66. Andrew Cohen, "A diminished Canada at home and abroad," 2 W W D Z D , & A p m L] H Q 2012, A12.
67. SCFAID, which has never revisited its 2007 democratic development recommendations, is currently studying the role of the private sector in international development.
68. Interview with Bob Miller, Ottawa, 18 January 2012.
69. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/inaugural-address-president-barack-obama>
70. Nossal, "The Liberal Past in the Conservative Present," 30.

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One of Canada's foremost experts on Canadian foreign policy, Gerald Schmitz was employed by the Parliamentary Information and Research Service (PIRS) for thirty years, a parliamentary career that also made him one of this country's most distinguished public servants.. Specializing in the fields of international relations, political economy, human rights and parliamentary affairs, Schmitz held several senior roles with PIRS prior to his retirement in 2011. He was also the longest-serving research director for the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade/Development (1994-2008). During this time he was the lead drafter of many major reports, including: Canada and circum-polar cooperation; the future of the World Trade Organization; relations between Canada and the United States and Mexico; Canada's relations with the Muslim world; Canada's international democracy assistance; and Canada's role in Afghanistan. Schmitz's reputation for excellence in research and government policy knowledge also led to him twice being seconded-first as a program director for the North-South Institute and, later, as an advisor for Minister of Foreign Affairs. Schmitz was awarded a Hans-Seidel Memorial Fellowship in 2007 and is a prolific author, having penned an array of scholarly papers, books and critical parliamentary reports. Among a wide range of interests, Schmitz is an accomplished photographer, winning the World Wildlife Fund's international grand prize in 2005. An ambassador of the Canadian Film Institute, he is also the longtime film critic for the Saskatchewan-based weekly journal The Prairie Messenger. In March 2013 he was recognized as an alumni of influence by the University of Saskatchewan's College of Arts and Sciences.

