



## **Creating an International Network Of Democracy Builders: The Overview**

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## **Intervention and Conflict: Moving Towards a More Realistic Understanding of Democracy**

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# Introduction and Overview

## *Democracy as a Universal Commitment*

When asked by a leading Japanese newspaper what he thought was the most important thing that had happened in the twentieth century, the 1998 Nobel Laureate in Economics Amartya Sen had no difficulty in choosing the emergence of democracy as the preeminently acceptable form of governance.<sup>1</sup> This idea of democracy as a universal commitment that is unconstrained by geography or culture is quite new. Unlike the nineteenth-century discourse on whether a country was “fit for democracy,” the prevailing view in the twentieth century is that a country has to become “fit through democracy.” In his book *Democracy as a Universal Commitment*, Sen developed his insight that the value of democracy includes its *capacity* of political and social participation in human life, its *ability* in generating political incentives to formulate and respond to economic needs, and its *role* in the formation of democratic values.

This is a broader view of democracy – going well beyond the freedom of elections and ballots – that gives a central place to guaranteeing free public discussion and deliberative interactions in political thought and practice. What is required in “the exercise of public reason,” as John Rawls observed, is the safeguarding of “diversity of doctrines – the fact of pluralism” which must be secured in a democracy by “basic rights and liberties.”<sup>2</sup> The championing of social

## ***Building Local Knowledge***

Building local knowledge of democracy as participatory governance in countries undergoing democratic transitions begins distinctly at home. The three country case studies presented in this volume are national histories of democratic development in very different contexts. The process of democracy building is examined in Costa Rica, long counted amongst Central and Latin America's most stable and pacific democracies, that has enabled it to move towards a modern welfare state. Considered a poorer cousin to its neighbours, it has nevertheless created a society with an effective liberal-constitutional framework, a universal education system, extensive social security and public health provisions, while at the same time nationalizing the banking system and disbanding its army in 1949. The political history of

history of Liberia, particularly since the end of the Second World War, acknowledges many of the potential stumbling blocks on the path to political freedom, while highlighting essential elements for any successful transition to democracy.”<sup>4</sup>

The third and final case study chronicles the political events that produced the Palestinian territories and gave rise to Hamas and its electoral victory in 2006. It asks the central question whether “extreme and anti-democratic parties should be permitted to benefit from



# The Approach: National Narratives and Democratic Development

## *History, Conflict, Diversity and Democracy*

Few would disagree with the observation that documenting and understanding the context of a country's democratic development requires delving into its history. Indeed, the phenomenon of democratic transition is essentially historical and the human experience of democracy over time is deserving of serious historical analysis. Lived history is embedded in the documented narratives of the past that, in the national context, is limited to the narrative of shared experiences bounded by space and time.

Good national narratives of shared social connection are explicitly referential and empirically grounded, and "whose claims to knowledge consist in locating events, ideas, things, and persons in explanatory contexts."<sup>8</sup> In short, historical accounts do more than set context; they also provide explanations for the democratic experience. Individual case studies can distil the essence of that particular experience through the historical method, the careful use of evidence and coherence of arguments. The best-known example of this is de Tocqueville (1835), the French political thinker and historian who wrote of his travels in early nineteenth century America and explored the effects of the rising equality of social conditions on the individual and the state in

In his seminal work \_\_\_\_\_ the British historian of international relations E.H. Carr argued that history is always constructed; it is a discourse about the past and not a reflection

when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context.”<sup>9</sup> The risk of subjectivity and relativism is tempered by how historical meaning is constituted, by how the historian arranges the facts as derived from the evidence, and influenced by his knowledge of the context.

Simon Schama, in his well-known book

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employ a framework or typology of key background factors developed by George Perlin. This framework is the analytical spine of the study. A typology does not establish the relationship between cause and effect, but it does organize data into categories that can be understood.

In assessing the different outcomes – Costa Rica emerging from fragility to become a consolidated democracy; Liberia, since the 1980s, being almost the classic definition of a “failed state”; and Palestine, born in such hope in 1993, falling into a downward trajectory of violence – the structural comparisons explain a lot. Costa Rica, while enduring a high level of conflict in the 1940s, had a long history of self-government and a traditional emphasis on the value of education. These engrained habits prove stronger than the temporary passions of civil war. Liberia, in contrast, had a narrowly focused elite, intent on economic advantage, which eventually spawned a revolution that quickly degenerated into terror (as did the French Revolution). Palestine had an external revolutionary elite that returned after the Oslo Accord

messages and behaviours spread, just like viruses do.”<sup>15</sup> In an event as tumultuous as the French Revolution, one can point to many tipping points, but certainly one was the convening in 1789 of the Estates General in the first place. Louis XVI had many other choices than in convening this ancient body, but once the decision was taken that only by this dramatic initiative could support be won from the aristocracy for the imposition of new taxes, then the die was cast and events were in the saddle. This project concentrates on applying Perlin’s framework to the three cases, but key events in the three histories are highlighted. One such event – the decision of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf to leave North America to return home to contest the Liberian election of 2005, forms the basis of a teaching case by Valerie Ashford in the Liberian Case Study (Volume 2).

In the democracy case studies of Costa Rica, Liberia and the Palestinian Territories, we have in each a record of experience with drama, a lively dialogue between past and present, and a sense of contingency that are the essential elements in a compelling historical narrative. Thematically, these also explore the very complex and difficult “relationship between conflict, democracy and diversity, if only to adopt a more realistic and nuanced approach to democracy assistance.”<sup>16</sup> At the same time, these development pathways critically test the prevailing conceptual model of third-wave democratic transition that assumes a set sequence of stages consisting of democratic

## ***Comparison and Theory: Perlin's Model***

At this point of discussion, two observations can be made about the historical and comparative approach that governs these IDRC case studies. The first is that while national histories are distinctive and variegated, “the nation cannot be its own historical context” isolated from the rest of the world; “no less than the neutron or the cell, it must be studied in a framework larger than itself.”<sup>19</sup> While the nation-state is the natural container of history or the shared memory of its people, it also shares a common global history. If, as Sen has argued, people everywhere have participated in a single global history of democratic governance since the twentieth-century, then it is worthwhile to develop enriched national narratives that are situated more fully within the larger, transnational and intercultural global context of democratization.

This then begs the second question - how to integrate and make sense of the country case histories with other, larger stories of democratic development? The Queen's University approach is to examine the country case studies through a wider lens, one based on normative democratic attainment fashioned by Professor George Perlin as a comparative theoretical framework.

This approach was developed as part of a major evaluation of international democracy assistance recently completed by the Centre for the Study of Democracy for Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT).<sup>20</sup> It is worthwhile to highlight the essential features of the Perlin model as described in the DFAIT report:

A key feature of the research and analysis is testing George Perlin's theory-of-change towards the creation of democratic values. Democracy at its core, Perlin argues, is a normative concept. Democracy is a system of governance that is organized to give effect to the values embedded in the tradition of liberal political thought that gave rise to the democratic transformations which began at the end of the Eighteenth century.

evolved in that tradition. Thus, democratic development may be defined as the

of civil society. The “facilitating” conditions are more contentious. While not all of the propositions advanced here are accorded general agreement, they are those most widely supported in empirical theories of democracy. They are: an open, non-polarized system of social stratification; a functioning market economy regulated to prevent disproportionate aggregations of power and ensure fairness in economic relations; and a political community that is internally cohesive.

It needs to be emphasized that the elements of the model, because they are an ideal standard, do not represent a form of democratic development that is ever actually likely to be realized. This approach acknowledges that liberal democracy is constantly evolving. The practices of democratic governance as they exist in the established democracies today are the result of a constant process of adjustment, reflecting continuing debate about how best to realize the purposes of liberal democracy. Further, this approach recognizes that democratic governance can be understood to embrace many different sorts of institutional arrangements. There is no universally applicable best way to organize the practice of democracy. Each approach has advantages and disadvantages. What is appropriate in one set of circumstances may not be appropriate in another.<sup>21</sup>

Against this methodology backdrop that emphasizes the national narratives of democratic development as part of a larger examination of democracy building, the next section presents executive summaries of the three case histories, followed by an assessment of democratic attainment to date in Costa Rica, Liberia and Palestine using the Perlin model. The national narratives were developed prior to the formulation of the Perlin model but additional efforts

# **Case Study Summaries and Contents**

*The Process of Democracy Building in the Republic of Costa Rica*



rapid increase of financial rates over Third World external debts, situations that have impacted much of Central America. The Costa Rican paradigm has undergone major reformations, which have been felt in social development and governmental policies in the new millennium.

the country's single albeit very hopeful election and a dramatic reduction in open violence, but can we assume that the country is ripe for democracy? If so, upon what criteria?

The Perlin model provides a comprehensive framework enabling the assessment of complex post-war environments to determine the presence or lack of liberal-democratic conditions.<sup>22</sup>

The model is a tool by which the field worker, political analyst or aid donor is assisted in the determination of where to best focus resources. In applying the Perlin framework to an analysis of post-2003 Liberia, this paper demonstrates the model's utility; the framework is of particular value in cases of competing prognoses, which can muddy prospects for international consensus on the merits of various aid alternatives. An assessment of essential conditions in Liberia, including levels of political engagement, democratic political culture and civil society, as well as such facilitating conditions as social stratification, market economy functionality, and political community cohesion, indicates that Liberia has not met all or most of the conditions to achieve and sustain a liberal democracy. Liberia held a free and fair election in 2005 that was met with great enthusiasm by the electorate,<sup>23</sup> and this event signifies a level of political engagement amongst Liberians, which is promising for democracy in Liberia, but several requirements (an engaged and informed citizenry, state elites mindful of the limits of their authority, an active civil society) are finally burgeoning but may not be sustainable without (currently significant) international troop presence and financial aid. Ultimately, such facilitating conditions as a large middle classge intetocial 413 (IJE,ET78 ( ) -60a

economy, religion and politics of the region. Nevertheless, tentative conclusions might be reached.

The chief of these is that there are aspects of Islam that would appear to be incompatible with democracy as it is conceived of in the West. These may be attributed to the adherents of the religion who are frequently described as 'fundamentalists', who wish to impose Shari'ah law on their societies. Such an imposition would be incompatible with democracy because it does not accord full rights or status to minority groups and to women. It also features such non-

From the experience of Turkey in recent years, it would appear that an Islamic society may well seek an Islamic identity. As a cultural manifestation, this need not represent a threat to individual freedoms or social contracts. Nor need the election of an 'Islamic' party represent a threat to democracy, provided that constitutional safeguards are in place to prevent the abolition of rights and liberties, although the role of the Army as guardians of the secular constitution represents a restraint on the abuse of constitutional power that would be better safeguarded in other ways. The failure of Arafat regime to develop such safeguards undoubtedly was a factor of the success of Hamas and the subsequent civil war.

### ***The Tipping Points***

Mathew Johnson, in his literature review on democracy and conflict in Appendix I, highlights the advice of Thomas Carothers that any potential intervention in democratic institution-building must have a deep knowledge of local conditions. Carothers' list of the five factors that improve the likelihood of democratic transition is similar to the Perlin framework – level of economic development, concentration of national wealth, identity-based divisions, historical experience with pluralism and whether the region or neighbourhood is democratic. Carothers and Perlin both argue that any democratic intervention has its own particular needs and requirements. The literature review confirms the utility of using frameworks that focus attention on local conditions and underlying structural conditions.

Johnson also summarizes the classification scheme by Derick Brinkerhoff, which categorizes countries as failed, failing, fragile and recovering states. The three case studies of this project correspond to Brinkerhoff's categories. Liberia was a failed state, now attempting to recover through the leadership of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. Tensions between the Fatah Party of President Arafat and the extremist Hamas movement and the never-ending pressure by

certainly a fragile state in the 1940s, but rather than going down the spiral which we have seen in Liberia and Palestine, it instead enacted a new democratic constitution in 1949 that

described by Ordonez in the Costa Rica case tensions had been building in the Central American Republic since the 1940s. In 1948, in a disputed election, the conservatives newspaper publisher Otilio Ulate claimed victory by 10,000 votes



The impact of Diasporas, or the expatriate community, is potentially controversial. The survey<sup>26</sup> carried out by the Sua Foundation and the University of Liberia found that a significant minority of 32% believe that returning expatriates should not be appointed to government positions because there are qualified Liberians who have never left the country even though Liberians returning from the Diaspora were the two top presidential contenders. Their candidacies, compared to the locals who ran, were aided by the prevailing view that time abroad was useful in learning about freedom and democracy. Two-thirds of the respondents in the CSD-sponsored survey believe that freedom and democracy were the main reasons Liberians had gone to Europe or North America during the civil war. The same percentage (62%) believe that freedom and democracy, rather than money, were the reasons that the expatriates had left, and that, therefore, living outside Liberia had been a positive learning experience.

The survey shows that there is suspicion among many about the role of expatriates, but at the same time, two-thirds of the respondents believe that the experience of living in free societies abroad improves commitment to freedom at home. The Liberia survey and the electoral



supporters in 2006 put fighting corruption as their top priority, compared to only 19% of Fatah supporters. Shikaki concludes that Hamas understood the desire for governmental integrity very well, while Fatah did not, or chose to ignore it, hoping to meet public needs in other areas, such as the peace process. He writes: “Fatah lost the election because voters believed Hamas could offer better governance in the critical area of fighting corruption.”

Voter dismay about the reality of Fatah corruption was the main reason that Hamas won, not because Palestinians increased their support for extremism or because there has been a decline in support for democracy. One of the tipping points in the Palestinian story, therefore, is President Arafat’s refusal to change his governing style from the era when Fatah was in exile. As Fogg describes, Arafat was the symbolic, and, for a time, real, hero for his people. To survive the murderous world of Palestinian exile politics, Arafat became a master of divide-and-rule by using money to reward and punish. When he became the legitimate elected President of Palestine, he continued to practice the personal style that had served him well in exile, but which created aversion when he was head of a system that now was accountable to voters.

There are many tipping points in the Palestinian case study – most to do with Israel – but Israel did not force President Arafat to run the Palestine National Authority as he did. Unlike leaders like Nelson Mandela, who understood that his revolutionary style in the era of the outlawed African National Congress, was no longer appropriate for the elected President of South Africa, Arafat could not, or would not, change. The Palestinian case study demonstrates that corruption is often a negative tipping point in stunting democracy building. Corruption led to election of Hamas. Unlike Costa Rica in 1948, Hamas and Fatah could not agree to a viable power-sharing pact — the result has been civil war.

Costa Rica, Liberia and Palestine are good examples of Gladwell’s thesis on tipping points. “Don Pepe” Figueres negotiated a power-sharing pact with his rival that gave legitimacy to his radical decision to abolish the army, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf took the chance to return home to run for President and President Arafat decided not to change the habits of a lifetime. These cases illustrate the conclusion by Gladwell that:

Tipping points are a reaffirmation of the potential for change and the power of intelligent action. Look at the world around you. It may seem like an immovable, implacable place. It is not. With the slightest push – in just the right place – it can be tipped.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Gladwell: p. 259.

## Assessment and Next Steps

### *Attainment of Democratic Norms*

Several observations can be made from mapping the case study results against the Perlin model. In the first instance, such a checklist conveys results only in a binary form – in this case, either yes or no to a particular democratic norm. This raises the question of how to gauge progress towards achieving an ideal democratic standard. No degrees of difference in democratic attainment can be deduced from such a portrait, nor any explanation found in such a matrix. There is no substitute here for the serious historical narratives that are presented here as country case studies. Such is the case with the Palestinian Territories where the emergence of democracy “has laboured under a heavy external burden”, specifically the continued supervision of Palestinians by the Israeli authorities, and the Hamas challenge of the compatibility of violence with democracy.<sup>28</sup> Under these circumstances, the Perlin model raises important questions about the transition to democracy in Palestine, including the conditions necessary to achieve and sustain liberal democracy. Given the external factor, how does one assess the political engagement of citizens, the democratic political culture and civil society? How does Hamas’ electoral success fit with notions of popular sovereignty in terms of governing institutions responsive and accountable to citizens, free and fair elections, party politics and representative government? More broadly, can the Perlin model incorporate democratic tendencies within Islam? For all these reasons, the authors of the Palestinian case study have not declared the achievement of specific conditions for democracy as outlined in the Perlin model.

Where applicable, however, it should be understood that the Perlin model is diagnostic tool that enables policy makers and analysts to identify key areas of democratic development and non-development, of strengths and weaknesses, which form the basis of any assessment for further policy or research action. For example, this set of results may be used to probe specific areas in country-level state of democracy audits such as conducted by International

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<sup>28</sup> Fogg and Salam, : p 8.

IDEA. To focus research resources, such results may indicate priorities for evaluation. In any event, it is certainly possible to use the matrix form to structure discussion and explanation, as amply illustrated in Appendix II “Costa Rica Through the Perlin Model Lens” in the Costa Rica case study.

A final observation is that such a checklist is an assessment of current conditions for democracy that are dynamic and fluid. This is notable in the case of Liberia where gains made in certain essential and facilitating conditions for democracy in the 2005 election are tenuous for a post-war state. These are inextricably linked to the ability of the Johnson-Sirleaf administration to undertake effective state reforms and the continued presence of international peacekeepers and donor organizations to assist in conflict-prevention and economic reconstruction.

***Summary Matrix Based on Case Studies***




# **Appendix I: Intervention and Conflict: Moving Towards a More Realistic Understanding of Democracy**

By Mathew Johnson

## ***Introduction***

The optimism that greeted the surge of democracy after the fall of communism has waned. In its place has emerged a much more pessimistic attitude, fed, in part, by incidents such as the







building and rule-of-law reforms.”<sup>32</sup> Sequentialism is fundamentally pessimistic about democracy, seeing it as a process unleashing wars, revolutions and ethnic bloodshed. Gradualism is much more optimistic. This debate is likely to continue into the future.

### ***The Relationship Between Democracy, Violence and Conflict***

An exploration of the relationship between democracy and conflict underlies the recent discussion surrounding Sequencing and Gradualism and has been ongoing for a number of years. For many authors, this question is tied to broader questions surrounding the Democratic Peace theory developed in the International Relations theory.<sup>33</sup> One suggestion that has gained increasing support is not that democracies do not fight, but rather that democracies do not. Nascent democracies, before developing strong institutions, are at risk of national, ethnic or religious calls to mobilization, and are more prone to both fighting external wars and descending into internal conflict. Even more prone to conflict are “incomplete” or “hybrid” democracies, which have partly democratized, but retain significant aspects of autocracy.

There is little agreement, however, over the factors that make such conflict more likely. Aslaksen and Torvik, for example, argue that resource wealth increases the likelihood of conflict, while high productivity decreases it. Overall, they argue that conflict is increasingly likely where resource wealth is high, labour productivity is low, political competition is high and politicians are shortsighted.<sup>34</sup> Collier and Rohner, on the other hand, argue that the sole

Fish and Kroenig challenge the assumption that diversity leads to conflict. Their model suggests that the presence of oil and Islam decrease the likelihood of democracy, while the presence of a large population and rough terrain (which provides cover for guerrillas) increase the likelihood of conflict. Diversity, whether linguistic, ethnic or religious, was neither a barrier to democracy, nor an indicator of conflict. The authors suggest, in fact, that diversity can have a positive effect on democracy.<sup>36</sup> Merkel emphasizes the role of neighbourhood in the likelihood, with autocratic regions more likely to generate conflict within democracies. War is also likely to create democracies, especially when autocracies lose (as opposed to democracy, which generally just leads to a change in government), but democracies generated as the result of war are more likely to turn into incomplete hybrid democracies.<sup>37</sup>

The significant questions within this debate surround the roles of diversity and resources in predictions as to the likelihood of conflict in a given state.

### ***Lessons Learned from External Democratic Interventions***

There has been an attempt within the literature to better understand the nature and consequences of attempts by the international community to intervene in conflict-ridden, failed, and post-Conflict states. Many authors remark that the success rate of international interventions has been low, and have sought to determine why some interventions have been more successful than others. Grimm and Merkel have divided interventions into four categories: enforced democratization after occupation, restoring elected governments, humanitarian interventions, and democratic interventions. These four categories also roughly correspond to distinct time periods: enforced democratization was pursued in Japan, Germany and Austria in the wake of WWII, restoring elected governments occurred in the 1980s and 1990s in Panama, Grenada, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, Humanitarian interventions were pursued in the 1990s, from Cambodia to Sierra Leone to East Timor and others, while Democratic interventions have occurred in the last decade in Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Fish and Kroenig, 2006.

<sup>37</sup> Merkel, 2008.

<sup>38</sup> Grimm and Merkel, 2008 and Grimm, 2008.



social and psychological aspects of reconstruction.<sup>40</sup> The authors note the following lessons: 1) ensuring security and the peaceful settlement of conflict is vital in order to make progress on any other aspect of reconstruction; 2) nation building is more likely to achieve its goals if those goals are openly and officially acknowledged; 3) without strong coordinating

## ***Individual Case Studies***

Many authors continue to look to individual cases to draw lessons both of internal violence, and the lessons to be learned from international interventions. Blunt and Turner, for example, look at Cambodia and the consequences there of decentralization, especially where there is little experience with local democracy. The Cambodian case illustrates how central governments can co-opt donor intentions to reinforce their own influence.<sup>42</sup> Borromeo, on the other hand, explores the unique characteristics of colonial wars, and how its unique features may be more conducive to democracy than other forms of internal conflict, by exploring the democratic revolution in Portugal.<sup>43</sup> Similar examinations of the differences between the democratizations of Croatia and Serbia,<sup>44</sup> the intervention in Sierra Leone,<sup>45</sup> and the result of Hamas' victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections.<sup>46</sup>

## ***Conclusion***

Despite setbacks in Iraq and disappointments in states such as Russia and Venezuela, the democratic debate continues to rage around the world. While the consensus is no longer nearly so optimistic as it was a decade ago, this may represent a maturing of the discussion. With scholars attempting to discern the best approaches to developing democracy, including whether there are necessary pre-conditions or preferable conditions, as well as attempting to better understand and classify the nature of the conflicts that we have and will intervene in. All these will improve future interventions. Democracy is no longer seen as a panacea, and

## Annotated Bibliography

***Aslaksen, Silje and Ragnar Torvik. (2006). "A Theory of Civil Conflict and Democracy in Rentier States." Scandinavian Journal of Economics. Vol. 108, No. 4, 571-585.***

There has been considerable academic debate over the relationship between primary resources and conflict. The existing literature suggests that the presence of "lootable" resources such as oil, gemstones and minerals are associated with conflict, while non-lootable resources such as agriculture have no effect on democracy and conflict. The authors model a political economic game to simulate the choices made by various political actors when faced with elections and the possibility of resorting to conflict.

The model is premised upon the question of whether "resource rents make the payoff from conflict to democracy higher." Where the payoff from conflict exceeds that of playing by democratic rules, political actors are much more likely to follow this course of action.

After developing a fairly extensive model, the authors conclude that that resource wealth makes conflict more likely, while high income due to high productivity increases the likelihood of democracy. Specifically, the possibility of achieving a self-sustaining democracy decreases as the size of resource rents increase. Conflict is increasingly likely where resource wealth is high, labour productivity low, political competition is high and politicians short-sighted.

***Bermeo, Nancy. (2007). "War and Democratization: Lessons from the Portuguese Experience." Democratization. Vol. 14, No. 3, 388-406.***

Attempts to understand the effect of the Portuguese colonial wars on its democratic transition. Suggests that while wars and conflict, both internal and external, generally have a negative influence on democracy (only 10% of 385 conflicts between '46 and '91 produced a democracy, and of these, 30% failed within first five years), that in the Portuguese case, a number of factors meant that the consequences of the war were positive for democracy. Normally, conflict is a negative factor: it changes the territory and composition of states, which weakens the demos and national unity that contribute to democracy; it undermines the trust necessary to found a democracy, as well as provide narratives that anti-democratic forces can use to challenge the system; it leaves an increased capacity and tendency towards violence, both in terms of available weapons, but in terms of the psychological acceptability of violence; finally, wars also leave the military humiliated and radicalized, which can be used by anti-democratic coalitions to mobilize support for coups and authoritarianism.

saw a future in European integration. The military was being overstretched and tired of the conflict. Emigration and overseas postings exposed individuals to outside information and undermined the informational monopoly of the elite. Finally, the necessity of maintaining support for the war forced Caetano to offer liberalizing reforms which created a democratic constituency. Lastly, the war required that large segments of the population to join the military, which meant that the officer corps reflected Portuguese society. Heterogeneous ideologically, its internal divisions meant that there was no single institutional push from within the military. Lastly, the fact that it was a foreign, colonial war meant that its local effect was limited, while its loss increased Portuguese prestige by its reacceptance into the international community rather than national humiliation.

It was also significant that the Portuguese state retained significant capacity following the revolution that allowed it to consolidate democracy. Portuguese authoritarianism was never kleptocratic, but rather effective, despite its coercive nature. It was also highly judicial, using legislation to justify its actions both domestically and in the colonies. A significant legal capacity and network were vital to the new democratic government. The revolutionary government retained 92% of its employees, despite purges, while the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs were left virtually untouched. Justice was integral in re-establishing the rule of law, while the MFA used its contacts to secure financing and resources necessary for the new government.

Also vital was the timing of elections. The revolutionary leaders had promised elections within a year, which were developed. This provided credibility to democracy, while strengthening the hands of the moderate groups who enjoyed widespread support. That these elections were demonstrably free and fair signaled to far-right and –left elements what the cost would be if they attempted to wrest power.

The author posits three final hypotheses: first, that colonial wars leave legacies that are very different from traditional international or domestic wars which are more likely to inhibit democratic development; second, that when wars leave state bureaucracies intact, they are much more likely to be followed by stable democracies; and third, that ideological heterogeneity is “absolutely crucial” amongst military elites by ensuring that the intra-military discussion was similarly democratic to the broader society and by ensuring that no single group was powerful enough to impose its will.

***Blunt, Peter, and Mark Turner. (2005). “Decentralization, Democracy and Development in a Post-Conflict Society: Commune Councils in Cambodia.” Public Administration and Development. Vol. 25, 75-87.***

Discusses the recent push towards decentralization and devolution within Cambodia. Nearly 30 years after the civil war and the defeat of the Khmer Rouge, Cambodia still remains a weak state with limited capacity and democracy. Donors pushed for decentralization. The paper looks at how governments will accommodate donor interests through public statements and legislation without following through with the necessary implementation. Cambodian government interest is to reinforce





Instead, he reiterates his support for gradualism. At its core, this argument suggests that democracies are more capable than autocracies in engaging in the second phase of state building, which focuses on institution building and rule-of-law development. Carothers suggests that sequentialism, where democracy is delayed until certain conditions are in place, prolongs autocracy for what could be significant lengths of time. The evidence suggests that countries that move early towards elections do

Overall, “incomplete” democratizations are especially prone to war, while quick and complete democratizations are much less risky. “Limited transitions in countries with weak central government institutions are likely to result in undesirable foreign policy consequences, including war.” This has encouraged a more cautious view of democratization, though authors such as Carothers and Paris have criticized this.

While the IR literature focuses on the external consequences of democratization, the comparative literature focuses on domestic conflict, and in particular, the risk of civil war. Similar to the IR literature, comparativists suggest that incomplete transitions are “disproportionately affected by civil wars.” Despite this, consideration of the link between conflict and democracy in comparative literature is relatively uncharted territory.

Looking at the literature as a whole, three key dynamics can be identified that increase the risk of both external and internal conflict. First, opening the political arena gives previously marginalized groups an opportunity to mobilize. In extreme cases, this can force the center to loosen its grip on the periphery, creating a political power vacuum at the centre. Second, democratization creates incentives for political actors to compete over constituencies and resources. This can lead to polarization, and risks having groups on the losing side resort to non-democratic means of protecting their interests (as occurred in Palestine). Third, mis-timed elections are particularly problematic. Elections held too early are likely to further intensify conflict, while national elections held after local or regional elections can destabilize the whole country (as occurred in Yugoslavia).

The authors conclude that the evidence of whether democratization triggers conflict is “somewhat mixed”, but that increasingly sophisticated means of analysis appear to be capable of discerning an effect.

***Collier, Paul and Dominic Rohner. (2008). “Democracy, Development, and Conflict.” Journal of the European Economic Association. Vol. 6, No. 2-3, 531-540.***

The study seeks to explore the relationship between democracy, political violence and income. While democracy decreases the likelihood that its citizens will resort to violent opposition, the reduction in capacity for repression means that democratic governments and societies will face increased violence because they are prevented through democratic accountability from taking non-democratic steps to end the violence. As such, the authors suggest that democracy has an ambiguous effect on political violence. As such, the authors look to see whether income might play a part in determining whether violence will increase or decrease.

Empirically, the data suggests that this is the case, and that there is a level of income where above will decrease the overall level of political violence, while below will have the reverse effect. As such, democracies become safer as average incomes increase. Alternatively, autocracies become more prone to violence as incomes increase, as non-elite groups seek their share. The authors suggest that this

raises significant questions for the promotion of democracy in low-income countries, as its encouragement may lead to more, rather than less, violence. This, however, should not discourage the

process. However, local ownership is not a new idea, and past uses have “degenerated” into corruption, self-dealing and rent-seeking where local input was merely an excuse for demanding more resources.

Despite this, state-builders should maximize local ownership for three reasons: 1) the difficulty of sustaining the effort necessary to run a country outright; 2) outsiders frequently do not know how to govern; and 3) early local ownership increases the likelihood of creating sustainable local institutions that are capable of surviving the exit of the occupying power. This often means that it is necessary to retain the old state apparatus, as occurred in post-WWII Germany and Japan. This is arguably the most significant mistake of the Iraqi occupation.

State building often conflicts with democracy promotion, and failing to balance this properly can lead to violence and internal conflict. State building is concerned with building the institutions necessary that enjoys a monopoly of legitimate power and can enforce the rule of the government throughout the territory of the State. Democracy promotion involves putting constraints on the use of that power so that it is dispersed to localities, limited by the rule of law and subject to public accountability and consent. Without a balance of both democracy and state building, whether due to a lack of democracy,

traditions of stable state structures, even if they had been recently destroyed. Recent interventions have not had this benefit. The same differentiation also applies in terms of the existence of a nation. It is also relevant that the end of the conflict after WWII was much clearer than in nearly any other intervention. The unconditional surrender of the axis gave the allies more room to rebuild than in recent conflicts, which have not generally had “clear-cut endings.”

Grimm identifies five areas that external actors need to focus on. These are interlocking and mutually reinforcing, with failure in one often disrupting progress in others. These areas of transformation take place over three transitional stages: stabilization, institutionalization, and consolidation. The five areas are: Welfare, which includes humanitarian aid, economic development, property rights and a tax system, and the development of infrastructure and production facilities; Stateness, which requires security, demobilization, disarming, and the development of new security forces; Rule of Law, which requires the development of an independent judiciary and the infrastructure and skills necessary to support it; Political Regime, which requires a generally acce-1

In all cases, external actors must be willing to stay long enough to establish democratic roots and include all local actors. Failing to do so will undermine even the best strategies. Finally, it is easiest to democratize when it is not necessary to engage in nation- and state building at the same time. Where the demos, territory or monopoly over the use of force is not challenged, democratizing a regime will



The article discusses how existing structures (bureaucracy and the chiefdoms) have resisted



defeat for Fatah, which had refused to reform itself, and that it was more of a pronouncement than a statement of support for Hamas.

Malki argues that the election has demonstrated to Palestinians that there is room for a third, and even fourth, legitimate political opinion in Palestinian politics. With the 2006 elections showing that political dualism is possible, a further step towards multipartism is possible. Given the weak showing of various leftist parties, it is a moderate option between Fatah and Hamas that is most likely to emerge, one whose floor of support may be upwards to 25%. The window of opportunity for such a party is limited, as both Hamas and Fatah may move to limit the ability for any competitors to emerge, which means that pro-democratic liberals within Palestinian society must move quickly to establish

unintended consequences of improving the chances of democracy, despite the wishes of the government.

Ultimately, “realistic knowledge about the sequencing of transitions may help to promote a few successes and avert a few Burundi- and Iraq-style disasters.

***Merkel, Wolfgang. (2008). “Democracy Through War.” Democratization. Vol. 15, No. 3, 487-508.***

Merkel examines the nature of the Kantian “democratic peace” thesis, and then analyzes it through the lens of both international law and political ethics. Looking at “democratic peace”, Merkel first notes that democracies do not fight less frequently than autocracies. Instead, the Kantian formula is recast so that mature democracies do not fight each other, while unconsolidated democracies are much more prone to conflict, given their undeveloped political institutions and increasing social mobility, which is often captured by ethnic or national rhetoric. Ultimately, mature democracies are more likely to win the conflicts they enter, choose their wars more carefully, are less likely to initiate crises, create collective and defensive alliances, and rarely initiate preventative wars. Unconsolidated democracies, on the other hand, do not have the same restraining power developed by more mature institutions. They are 60% more likely to be involved in a war than states that are not undergoing a democratic transition.

War is positive for democracy because not only do democracies win more often than autocracies,

Summarizes many of the difficulties with rebuilding post-conflict societies, yet argues that with experience and greater knowledge that we can begin to apply best practices and minimize our mistakes. This is important, given the number and cost of such rebuilding. The authors argue that there is a need for consistent and coherent nation-building policies that tie together the efforts of the various actors involved in the process, focusing not only on the economic and physical, but also on the social and psychological aspect of reconstruction. The authors then identify 8 key lessons from recent experience: 1) ensuring security and the peaceful settlement of conflict is vital in order to make progress on any other aspect of reconstruction; 2) nation building is more likely to achieve its goals if those goals are openly and officially acknowledged; 3) without strong coordinating mechanisms for carrying out aid, donor assistance will produce conflicting results; 4) the requirement of creating a strong state includes the need to protect human rights, generate economic opportunities, provide basic services, control corruption, combat poverty and inequality and respond effectively to emergencies; 5) democratic objectives, such as elections or developing parties can be counterproductive if implemented too early or as a substitute for stable, responsible government or the rule of law – donors must be aware of adverse consequences if stability has not been established; 6) the quicker that decisions can be transferred to the host government and people, the more effective will be the results, as well as ensuring that all segments of society are involved in making decisions about such results; 7) a competitive economy is a pre-requisite for progress, including establishing a framework for currency, customs and taxation systems and a banking system; and 8) focusing on the long-term goal of developing human capital, reducing poverty, promoting social equity and alleviating social problems are necessary for the ultimate success of rebuilding. Such projects must be started early. One particularly important development is developing gender-based programmes to empower women.

Learning from experience, and focusing on lessons learned, can help to ensure that our efforts are as effective as possible.

**Turner, Mandy. (2006). "Building Democracy in Palestine: Liberal Peace Theory and the Election of Hamas." *Democratization*. Vol. 13, No. 5, 739-755.**

Turner examines the 2006 election of Hamas in the context of the Liberal Peace Theory, as well as its implications both on Palestinian politics, the international response, and Israel. Turner argues that Palestine is a unique case for broader international relations theories. It is a heavily dependent quasi-state, incapable of enacting many of the policies that would allow it to be sufficiently strong to contain its anti-democratic tendencies. Unfortunately, transitional democracies with institutions that are weak and ineffective are unlikely to build democratic norms and may lead to increased conflict.

Islamic movements are on the rise in the Middle East in part due to recent liberalizations. Economic liberalization forced states to reduce their welfare provision, and Islamic movements filled the gap.

Political liberalization has then allowed them to consolidate the support they received due to their charity work politically. The same occurred in Palestine.

After reviewing the deficiencies of the PA in its internal organization and relationship with Israel, Turner evaluates the international response. She suggests that cutting off money and aid, as well as a refusal to recognize the Hamas government brought the reformist and radical wings within the Hamas movement together, where the reformers were previously willing to consider negotiations and compromise. The policy has also indicated to other Islamic movements that the US will only recognize the movements it supports, which decreases their likelihood of reforming and submitting to the democratic process in their own states.

By creating an incomplete democracy, Palestine has been created as a Hybrid democracy, which the literature suggests are more likely to revert to violence and civil war.

**Wyrod, Christopher. (2008). "Sierra Leone: A Vote for Better Governance." *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 70-83.**

**Zakosek, Nenad. (2008). "Democratization, State-Building and War: The Cases of Serbia and Croatia." *Democratization*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 588-610.**

Zakosek contrasts the development of Serbia and Croatia to determine why each state has achieved such different results. He notes that many researchers accept the pre-requisite of "stateness" for democratization, that state-building and democratization are not always compatible, and that war is inherently opposed to democracy, and that it will produce authoritarian tendencies. He notes that these basic theses do not adequately explain the wide array of democratizations that have been seen around the world, and shows that they are insufficiently nuanced by contrasting the two Balkan states.

Zakosek engages in a comprehensive overview of both the history and politics of both states, as well as of the various international responses to the Balkan conflicts. He notes that of the responses, it was the new forms of intervention – NATO peace enforcement and the ICTY – that were more effective than the traditional modes – embargoes and peacekeeping. Further, he notes that Croatia's cooperative and responsive attitude to Serbian intransigence that proved to be a significant difference between the two states.

Ultimately, the two states differed in key ways: first, Croatia had a clear state-building goal, while the Serbs' was undefined and fluid. The Serbs' formula: 'all Serbs in one State' provided no guidance as to the nature of that state. Instead, a general desire for "Greater Serbia" prevailed. Comparatively, Croatia pursued an independent state within their pre-existing Republican borders (though there were attempts to assimilate Croatian territory within Bosnia). This realistic goal enabled the Croats to effectively state-build, while the Serbian process was longer and drawn out. Second, Croatia democratized much faster than Serbia. Serbia under Milosevic was populist-authoritarian with

democratic trappings before turning into an “incomplete sultanate” later in his rule. Democracy only emerged in 2000. In Croatia, the Yugoslav communists reformed the system, and while the resulting system was not perfect, it was far more democratic than Serbia’s. The opposition victory in 2000