



AN EVALUATION OF THE DISCUSSION AT THE WORKSHOP T Ki Kelly Speck








or delegated rights. Still others questioned the efficacy of the process concerns than negotiation imperatives, requiring extensive time, energy and resources to nursue elusive agreements on abstract levels. Perhans condemned as "conservative" perspectives) might provide a more useful framework through which the past five, or indeed, the 20 years might be viewed. A more critical assessment of the changes in policy and attitudes بالأران بالمالية فالملت عملهمما الممسمممم الوامسمور












## THE ABORIGINAL SELF-GOVERNMENT AMENDMENT: ANALYSIS OF SOME LEGAL OBSTACLES


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**.** 

The last of the constitutional conferences, comprising the Prime Minister, the premiers of the Provinces and the political leaders of the four major aboriginal groups in Canada, that is mandated under Section 37.1(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, will be held in March, 1987. The long period of negotiations relating to constitutional matters directly affecting the aboriginal peoples of Canada that has taken place between 1982 and the present day has served to focus the issues in debate. In particular, the demand for constitutional reform that has approved to



expressing liberationist claims - the story in Exodus of the escape of the Israelites from slavery in Egypt has not been drawn upon in making the control of the dominant society, and confine it to the terms that our legal system and political system are familiar with. In fact, the dominantly legal perspective on the self-government claim is the perspective of non-liberation. Having said that, however, it must be, and can be



It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with each of these problems in detail. Instead, I will look in some detail at the first legal problem identified - the problem of whether the aboriginal self-government amendment as proposed will amount to an amendment of the amending formula.

section 38) it is necessary to determine the "matter" of an amendment. It is at this point that the distinction between statecraft and adapting the constitution to new legal claims comes into play. If we view the clause under which self-government agreements will be automatically entrenched as part of the implementing device for giving new


whether this derogation of normal governmental power fits the conditions for certain forms of constitutional amendment. But if we view the clause as expressing the autonomous status of aboriginal peoples, analysis based on the impact on existing powers will become beside the point.

It is worth noting that when section 35(3) was added to Part II of the

Spatientian in 1004 it was not done !

But let us take the weakest case. Let us take section 35 (the basic recognition section within Part II) at its most minimal scope. This would potail consider that the word "avietine" in access 75 ..... the at

when the question of aboriginal rights was contemplated as a matter for future amendment, it was not contemplated in terms of a rule of unanimity. In addition, the presence of Part IV is strong evidence that there was not legislative silence about aboriginal rights development. It is clear evidence that the framers of the Constitution Act, 1982 adverted to the possibility of aboriginal rights amendments in the future, and self-consciously created a special regime which partly conditions such amendments. In light of this clear record of advertence it is significant that they did not include in section 41 - in the list of matters which must be agreed to unanimously - the question of charicinal



The legal obstacles to a self-government amendment are in some senses quite real, but in other ways they are the product of a failure of imagination on the part of lawyers and politicians. The diversity of groups involved in these negotiations, and the dazzling array of issues which lie behind the negotiations present

point at issue here is whether some matters are best left out of court, to be dealt with by political rather than judicial authorities.


Of course, aboriginal peoples know only too well the dangers inherent in that solution - political failures in the past have spurred aboriginal leaders to demand legally enforceable promises. To the extent that

opportunity, it seems to me that a political compromise may be

If aboriginal rights (including the right of self-government) are to be meaningful as collective rights, they must at a minimum guarantee that the survival of the collectivity, and its essential functioning. 

## Session V


## Financing Issues




The James Rev and Northern Overhan Samonment and did fan d

adoption of self-government legislation which was to replace the *Indian Act* for the Crees of Quebec. This has in fact been done and the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act now provides us with full regulatory power at the community level, control over our local governments, and the ability to assert that we have obtained self-determination and self-government. This legislation was adopted pursuant to an avowed federal recognition of its special responsibility toward the Crees (and toward other Indians) and the legislation itself recognizes this.

all efforts to have that formula approved by Treasury Board, have misinformed Treasury Board of the nature of the agreement with the Crees and have caused a major financial crisis for our communities \_






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is not to say that there must be a similar relationship, or non-relationship, between financing and self-government. The two issues are distinct. The first relates to the issue of whether sections 91 and 92 are pubarration or not and which a sale accommend to

local and regional groups can expect to address in the way of fiscal powers and financial transfers; and some clarity about the role of the provinces, where they are involved, in financing the negotiation and outcome of agreements.

Despite the fact that most provinces see the federal government as

exclusive federal power under section 91(24) over everything coming out of self-government negotiations. Most provinces believe that some aboriginal self-governments would be exercising at least some of the legal




transferring the "who pays" battle down to the level where aboriginal groups are least able to influence the outcome. 16

A general equalization provision concerning levels of services and autonomous resourcing of aboriginal governments; 1. 3. A process provision.

incentives to aboriginal governments that are not provided to other groups who choose not to negotiate self-government. Since MNSI communities now get little or no service support from the federal government, does this mean they can expect none lest this indicate an "unwarranted incentive"? This is surely a peculiar way to reflect a supposed commitment of the federal government to aboriginal self-government.

So far the response of provinces to the proposed equalization approach has been less than coherent. Manitoba has given strong support for a full commitment to both comparability and autonomy. Other provinces, including the Maritimes and even Quebec, have stated support for a simple principle that the federal government has primary financial



## Cost-Sharing Options 1. By Group: a) on-reserve vs. off-reserve

the merit of not importing legislative definitions. However, there are no other definitions available. One consequence of going this route would be to force the abandonment of the *Indian Act* regime. It could not survive in the face of any constitutional regime that had to untangle the current reality of Non-Status Treaty Indians, Status Métis, and so forth.


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Avoidance of the issue at the First Ministers' level will only mean a worsening of the climate for negotiations at the local and regional levels. Without an arrangement for essential resourcing, the entrenchment of the right self-government may prove hollow.


My remarks will be very brief. The panelists have covered a good deal of ground and I suspect there are many who are eager to get into the discussion. I confess that after listening to Billy Diamond and Ian Cowie





solely dependent upon federal and provincial governments. And there is agreement with respect to public accountability for government expenditures, although some difference in terms of whether aboriginal governments should be accountable to their own members, or to Parliament and/or legislatures.

In terms of addressing the key financing issues, it might be most productive to begin by building agreement in areas where there are shared concerns.



### ISSUES OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN ABORIGINAL AND NON-ABORIGINAL GOVERNMENTS

Ian B. Cowie

What I was asked to do today is to summarize some of the main points from my background paper for this project, on jurisdictional issues between aboriginal and non-aboriginal governments. Before I do this however,I will make some general observations on the current

Diamond's point of view that it's difficult to be optimistic about the

table. There are continuing attempts to make a "best effort", but the enthusiasm, the real political will to make the fundamental changes required is not there.

For any self-government amendment to be contemplated without some precision of understanding regarding future fiscal relations between federal, provincial and aboriginal governments means that the

101 45. Look, this is just another meeting. It's an important meeting but if failure is the result, things will continue on. Things are

My paper does not look at the legal aspects of the current constitutional discussions. It starts with the premise that irrespective of the outcome of the constitutional discussions, there are a variety of opportunities and processes now open to aboriginal peoples for moving forward with the negotiation of self-government. We have concentrated much of our energies on the constitution; now we must translate some of the concepts discussed. A lot of aboriginal communities are now focussing on questions which are constants in a number of negotiation self-government negotiations under amendment, negotiating comprehensive claims, or the so-called Indian community self-negotiation policy announced in 1986. The paper tries to identify some of the questions and issues that now confront governments and aboriginal participants in defining the strategies - the policies, the financing requirements authorities and the self-government for the future. It says that while we are focussing all of this energy constitutionally, we must become aware that at the


community level, people are grappling with more fundamental questions. It outlines what some of those fundamental questions are, and gives an indication of how people prepare for the substantive negotiations and arrangements required.

anyone's definition. The most comprehensive antion is applicable to Î.

conservative options are processes currently underway within the Department of Indian Affairs under the headings of alternative financial

arrangements, devolution programs, and the negotiation sector-specific agreements under current arrangements, whether it be education, child-care, or policing.

related to the social interaction of the people is included here. Third, the to economics, life-support or wealth creation. This incorporates resource



**CONCLUSION - EXPLAINING THE FAILURE** AND LEARNING FROM IT particinants honeful regarding the outcome of the uncoming\_First

Ministers' Conference. In terms of their outlook for the March FMC, most participants were of the view that the parties to the negotiations


search for accommodation. However, even the most promising forms of 117

It is also the case that many of the government leaders had changed during the constitutional reform process. Compare, for example, the First Ministers' table of 1981 (the time of the patriation debate) with that of 1987 - Trudeau vs. Mulroney, Blakeney vs. Devine, Lougheed vs. Getty, and Levesque vs. Bourassa (who did not attend the March 1987 FMC). We have today a very different cast of characters and some, we

of 1987 - Trudeau vs. Mulroney, Blakeney vs. Devine, Lougheed vs. Getty, and Levesque vs. Bourassa (who did not attend the March 1987 FMC). We have today a very different cast of characters and some, we would argue, do not share or feel bound by their predecessors' commitments to aboriginal peoples and constitutional reform.

Nor were the aboriginal peoples' organizations at the table without


blame. They adopted a negative approach from the outset of the Conference (e.g., their response to the Ontario draft constitutional



of	self-government by aboriginal peoples, together with broad public	
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	If we have learned a lesson from this exercise, it is that we need a new	
	mework or lens through which to view aboriginal - non-aboriginal	
	ations. We must look to fundamental values rather than arcane	
lega	alism. We must seek to remove a tie that does not belong, and that	
<b></b> po	ould not hind. We have in the ideas and values that underlie our	
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	eral system, a framework with the capacity to encourage many nmunities with different values to flourish.	

back from the constitutional negotiations and examine, in a comprehensive fashion, the section 37 process and the "failure" of the March 1987 FMC. We need to explore the negotiation process, how it was structured and the issues that emerged, with a view to uncovering

# Appendix A Workshop Agenda



### **AGENDA**

Workshop on "Issues in Entrenching Aboriginal Self-Government"

Monday, February 16	
7:00 p.m 10:00 p.m.	Registration and Opening Reception Sir John A. MacDonald Room

Tuesday, February 17

1. David Hawkes, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations: "The Search for Accommodation"

2. Keith Penner, M.P.: "The Politics of Aboriginal Self-Government"

Lunch - open

12:00 noon - 1:30 p.m.

DISCUSSANTS: Ian Stewart, Queen's Rick Ponting, University of Calgary David Hawkes, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations This session will explore issues such as the

## Appendix B

List of Participants

### **PARTICIPANTS**

### PANELISTS & DISCUSSANTS

Ian Cowie
Ian B. Cowie and Associates
Management Consultants

Billy Diamond

Chief Negotiator
Federal Cree Negotiations on Implementation of
James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement

Vina Starr Barrister and Solicitor University of British Columbia Ian Stewart Department of Political Studies Queen's University John Whyte Faculty of Law Queen's University **PARTICIPANTS** Nigel Bankes Associate Professor of Law University of Calgary

Brian Bennett A/Director Self-Government Indian Affairs

Grand Chief Joseph Morton

Mohawk Council of Kahnawake

Norm Prelypchin Ministry of Attorney-General

Harvey Schachter Editorial Department The Whig Standard

Robert E. Simon Tribal Director Shuswap Nation Tribal Council

Kelly Speck
Queen's University

Sam Stevens

University of British Columbia

Inuit Committee on National Issues

Michael McGoldrick Consultant

Gary Mitchell

#### Ontario

Deborah Doxtator Ministry of Natural Resources

Linda Stevenson

Race Relations Division Ontario Human Rights Commission


Staff

David C. Hawkes Project Director

Pauline Hawkes Conference Coordinator

Peter Leslie The address at 1700 has been

Evelyn J. Peters Research Associate



12. C.E.S. Franks, Public Administration Questions Relating to